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This thesis analyses the empirical puzzle of purported revisionist state endorsement of 
international norms. It demonstrates that despite expectations of norm rejection, 
‘revisionist’ states in fact endorse the norms that comprise the very international order they 
ostensibly oppose. Employing Cuba as a case study of a paradigmatic revisionist state, it 
assesses the reasons behind Cuban endorsement of three international norms - the 
elimination of chemical weapons, prohibition of torture and conservation of biological 
diversity - within an analytical framework comprising fifteen attributes frequently credited 
with international norm diffusion in extant scholarship. In doing so, this thesis proffers a 
revised framework for international norm diffusion in a least likely scenario, identifying the 
key attributes that most consistently impacted norm endorsement by a ‘revisionist’ state. It 
also dispels the myth of socialisation as either an explanatory factor behind, or result of, 
international norm endorsement. Rather, the findings demonstrate that international norms 
were harnessed and ultimately endorsed by a purported revisionist state in an attempt to 
constrain, shame or otherwise hold the prevailing hegemon to account, rendering 
international norm endorsement a form of empowerment of resistance. This study 
additionally raises questions regarding the very meaning of revisionism in world politics. It 
reveals conceptions of revisionism and deviance as subjective - indeed performative - 
constructs, rendered operational as devices of hegemonic consolidation only in the hands of 
the most powerful, thereby simultaneously refracting and propagating the stratified power 
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Figure 1: Cuban press depicts denunciations of revisionism at the  
United Nations Security Council, 19921 
 
When representatives of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Sudan expressed grave 
concerns and sought to “review the viability of the concept” of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) during the associated 2009 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) debate,2 they 
were largely dismissed as “the most doctrinaire,”3 “openly rejectionist,”4 “spoilers,”5 
expressing “dissenters’ resistance.. (an) alternative kind of sabotage,”6 and simply unwilling 
“to entertain constructive debate on R2P.”7 These states were “expected to reject R2P on 
 
1 Anon, “Cuba denuncia y Estados Unidos ofende a la justicia,” Granma (28:103, Fri 22 May 1992), 1. 
2 Cuba, A1631677: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/cuba-2009-r2p-debate.pdf, 3, Venezuela, Nicaragua, 
Sudan, “Statements on R2P 2009 to Present”: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-
archive/government?view=fjrelated&id=2409. 
3 Alex Bellamy, A Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014), 4. 
4 Melinda Negrón-Gonzales, Michael Contarino, “Local norms matter,” Global Governance (20:2, 2014), 264. 
Also: Jacinta O’Hagan, “The Responsibility to Protect” in Ramesh Thakur, William Maley (eds), Theorising the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2015), 298. 
5 Cristina Badescu, Thomas Weiss, “Misrepresenting R2P and advancing norms,” International Studies 
Perspectives (11:4, 2010), 361. 
6 Anette Stimmer, Lea Wisken, “The dynamics of dissent,” International Affairs (95:3, 2019), 515. 
7 Lauren Fitzsimons, “The Status of the Responsibility to Protect Norm in International Relations,” e-
International Relations, June 2015. 
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both normative and interest grounds,”8 given, for example, “it suits the anti-imperialist 
rhetoric of Venezuela and Cuba.”9 Yet to presume norm opposition based solely upon a 
perception of revisionism is ill-considered. According to the United Nations Treaty 
Depository, Cuba, for example, has ratified over 60 multilateral treaties since 1920,10 each 
of which comprise and represent various international norms.  
 
 
Figure 2: Date of deposit of international conventions signed, ratified and acceded to by 
Cuba at the United Nations Treaty Depository, 1920-2017.  
 
Other perceived revisionist states hold similar records of international treaty 
endorsement.11 This does not mean, of course, that the presumption of rejection should be 
reversed and these states should be expected to endorse international norms. It does, 
however, beg the question regarding why such states, which are broadly considered 
revisionist and often publicly oppose core elements of a prevailing international order, 
endorse the norms that they do. 
 
Answers to this question in International Relations (IR) and International Law (IL) 
scholarship remain slightly obtuse - revisionist states are frequently either omitted from 
analysis of international norm evolution processes and treaty adoption, presumed to be 
 
8 Negrón-Gonzales, Contarino, “Local,” 264. 
9 Bellamy, R2P, 12. 
10 United Nations Treaty Collection Depository pertaining to Cuba: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?clang=_en.  
11 United Nations Treaty Collection: https://treaties.un.org/pages/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?clang=_en. In 
comparison, however, Sweden, Brazil, Canada ratified over 90 treaties. 
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rejectionist, or perceived to be targets of socialisation, following which they will no longer 
be revisionist. Wunderlich notes, for example, that “Among scholars—particularly those 
coming from a Western liberal context—there seems to be agreement that so-called “rogue 
states” are defined by their norm deviance and that they are to be treated as objects of 
normative intervention rather than agents shaping the normative order of which they are 
an integral part. However, deviance from international norms is very often merely 
presumed and lacks clear proof.”12 Indeed, Figure 2 demonstrates it is not always the case, 
with a purported revisionist state endorsing international norms represented within 
international treaties relatively regularly, despite both perceived and self-ascribed 
revisionist status. By showing that important outcomes do not conform with current 
explanations, a compelling puzzle has been established. Borrowing from Finnemore, “Similar 
action (of norm endorsement) by dissimilar actors (revisionist states) in the absence of 
constraint is anomalous under these theories… It is precisely the similarity in behaviour 
where none should exist that makes these cases theoretically anomalous and worthy of 
investigation.”13  
 
This thesis therefore explores three related research questions, in narrowing specificity. 
First, why do purported revisionist states endorse international norms, thereby submitting 
to a global governance regime they seemingly oppose? Second, how do international norms 
diffuse in these scenarios? Relatedly, and third, which attributes of international norm 
diffusion influence norm endorsement in these cases and how? By asking why revisionist 
states endorse international norms and identifying the key micro-processes behind 
international norm diffusion in this instance, this thesis addresses both causal and 
constitutive questions to understand and explain the very constitution of global governance 
- why and how ideas possess power at the international level. It does so via qualitative 
analysis of the reasons behind norm endorsement by one purported revisionist state in 
three norm studies. First, four decades of IR and IL scholarship pertaining to international 
norm evolution is collated and interrogated,14 and an analytical framework comprising the 
 
12 Carmen Wunderlich, Rogue States As Norm Entrepreneurs (Cham: Springer, 2019), 67. 
13 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 6,25. 
Similarly: Richard Price, “Book Review,” World Politics (55:4, 2003), 600. 
14 Refer: Erin Graham, et al, “Review Article: The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science,” 
British Journal of Political Science (43:3, 2012), 673-701 for a summary of prior policy diffusion scholarship. 
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fifteen attributes most frequently credited with international norm diffusion is 
conceptualised. These attributes are then systematically and consistently assessed for 
impact across three norm case studies, employing Cuba as the paradigmatic revisionist 
state. First, Cuban endorsement of the international security norm to eliminate chemical 
weapons as represented in the 1997 UN Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is 
considered. Second, attributes that held most impact over Cuban endorsement of the 
international human rights (HR) norm to prohibit torture as represented in the 1987 UN 
Convention against Torture (CAT) are identified. Finally, influence over Cuban endorsement 
of the environmental norm to conserve biodiversity in the 1992 UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) is determined. The respective impact, manner of operation and 
most common configuration of attributes thus far credited in norm scholarship for 
international norm diffusion in these least likely scenarios is thence tested. Cross-case 
comparison of outcomes reveals some surprising conclusions, which offer four unique 
contributions to IR scholarship and practice. 
 
First, this thesis presents a revised international norm diffusion framework for purported 
revisionist state norm endorsement, recognising the particular import of six of the fifteen 
attributes currently credited for diffusion, albeit at greater levels of complexity, plurality, 
multilinearity and with capacity for adverse effect. Second, it dispels the dominant myth of 
socialisation in constructivist norm literature. By analysing the process rather than the 
outcome of norm diffusion, from the perspective of the periphery rather than the core, it 
reveals that socialisation had no effect on norm endorsement processes or outcomes in this 
case. Third, in a surprising twist, the purported revisionist state in fact endorsed norms on 
these occasions as a form of hegemonic resistance. Norm endorsement provided Cuba with 
opportunities to promote its mutually perceived and self-ascribed revisionism as model 
international citizenship and simultaneously denounce what it perceived to be United States 
(US) recalcitrance. In fact, norms were endorsed by Cuba as a form of revisionist 
empowerment, in attempts to constrain, shame or otherwise hold the prevailing hegemon 
to account. At one stage or another, Cuba attempted to harness each norm for the intended 
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purpose of hegemonic norm entrapment.15 Fourth, and finally, this thesis proffers a healthy 
critique of constructions of revisionism in IR. It ultimately reveals revisionism as a subjective 
construct, successfully employed by those most powerful to consolidate their dominant 
status. 
 
The thesis progresses as follows. Conceptions surrounding revisionism in IR are explored 
in the following chapter, including how expectations regarding revisionist state norm 
rejection, or endorsement via socialisation, prove inadequate and raise a compelling puzzle. 
The chapter then turns to the analytical framework around which the empirical data is 
analysed and assessed. It offers a definition of norms, revised conception of the 
international norm evolution cycle, and then zooms in to identify core norm diffusion 
attributes. These attributes comprise the analytical framework around which reasons 
behind revisionist state norm endorsement are subsequently determined. Chapter three 
outlines the methodological approach, detailing scope conditions, use of norm diffusion 
attributes as variables, and process tracing methodology. The chapter then documents and 
justifies case study selections and data sources. Chapters four to six comprise the empirical 
analysis. One chapter is dedicated to each norm study, recording which attributes held most 
influence over norm diffusion and endorsement as anticipated in associated scholarship, 
which held important - however not quite as expected - impact, and which proved 
negligible. Results across all three case studies are collated and assessed in the penultimate 
chapter, which presents conclusions regarding which attributes proved most significant and 
how, why a purported revisionist state endorsed international norms, and what this means 
for understandings of international norm diffusion processes, socialisation, and revisionism 
in IR. The final chapter distils these conclusions, outlines the contribution of this thesis, and 
canvasses important avenues for future research. 
 
15 John Ikenberry, “America’s unipolar order,” LSE Miliband Lecture on American Power in the 21st Century, 
2003, Ernst Haas, “Words can hurt you” in Stephen Krasner (ed), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 213, G. John Ikenberry, et al, “Unipolarity, State Behaviour, and Systemic 





This chapter establishes the framework around which the empirical data is analysed and 
conclusions drawn. It sets out the conceptual foundation of the research puzzle, through a 
review of scholarship pertaining to understandings of revisionism in world politics and 
expectations of revisionist state norm rejection. International norm evolution research 
across IR and IL is then interrogated to disaggregate the current myriad of occasionally 
conflicting explanations of international norm diffusion.1 First, norms and the norm 
evolution process are defined. Second, three categories of international norm diffusion 
attributes - at the systemic, state and norm level - are identified, alongside their reported 
relation to processes of socialisation. The resulting analytical framework presents the novel 
means to assess international norm diffusion processes and test the respective manner and 
weight of influence of each norm diffusion attribute over revisionist state endorsement, in 
the empirical analysis that follows.  
 
2.1 REVISIONIST STATE NORM REJECTION 
 
Revisionist states have been labelled many things in both academic and political 
discourse: rejectionist, recalcitrant, deviant, counter/stigmatised, unsatiated, delinquent, 
rogue, pariah, evil, a have-not, unequal sovereign, outlaw, revolutionary, illiberal, outsider, 
dissatisfied, discontented.2 The term ‘revisionist’ is employed for the purpose of this thesis, 
whilst engaging with this range of scholarship and terminology, to maintain consistency.3 
Despite nomenclatural proliferation, what constitutes a revisionist state remains contested. 
 
1 This analysis does not aim to essentialise what constitutes a depth and breadth of theoretically complex, 
interrelated paradigms, however a level of generalisation is necessary given space constraints. 
2 Toni Erskine, “How Should We Respond to ‘Delinquent’ Institutions?” Journal of International Political Theory 
(4:1, 2008), 1-8, Wei Liang, “China: Globalization and the Emergence of a New Status-Quo Power?” Asian 
Perspective (31:4, 2007), 146-7, Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” International Security (19:1, 
1994), 85, footnote 59, Alexandra Homolar, “Rebels without a conscience,” European Journal of International 
Relations (17:4, 2010), 710, special issue of International Politics (51:4, 2014) especially Anna Geis, Carmen 
Wunderlich, “The good, the bad, and the ugly,” International Politics (51:4, 2014), 458-65, Gerry Simpson, 
Great Powers and Outlaw States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 55-6,281-2, Rebecca Adler-
Nissen, Ayse Zarakol, “Struggles for Recognition,” International Organization (Forthcoming, 2021), 4. 
3 Alternative terms will, however, be used when quoting directly from this literature. 
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Much scholarship focuses on the determination of what gives rise to or causes the 
phenomenon of revisionist states (hereafter termed ‘revisionism’), in the absence of 
defining what it actually is or how it is embodied.4 According to Chan, “the logic and 
evidence used to identify status-quo and revisionist states respectively are often 
problematic. States are usually assigned to one or the other category of this dichotomy 
according to an individual analyst’s assertions rather than systematic reasoning and 
comparative data.”5 Indeed, Ward observed that “revisionism is a poorly understood 
concept. It often serves as little more than an ad hoc explanation for otherwise inexplicably 
aggressive behavior.”6 Nevertheless, scholars across a range of theoretical paradigms 
primarily agree that purported revisionist states will likely reject prevailing international 
norms. 
 
2.1.a: Realist Perspectives 
 
Traditionally, in IR scholarship, revisionism was considered within the realist paradigm as 
describing a challenging, primarily bellicose, rising power,7 such as within power-transition 
theory8 or the status inconsistency model.9 A growing body of research, however, now 
observes that because prevailing systems benefit rising powers, status-quo hegemons are 
actually more likely to demonstrate revisionist tendencies against rising power challenges in 
order to maintain their dominant status.10 This literature matured, culminating in the 
analytical typology recently presented by Cooley, Nexon and Ward, which contends that 
revisionism incorporates dissatisfaction with either or both the prevailing distribution of 
 
4 Sten Rynning, Jens Ringsmose, “Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist?” International Politics (45, 2008), 19-
39, Steve Chan, “Can’t get no satisfaction?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (4, 2004), Alex Cooley, et 
al, “Revising order or challenging the balance of military power?” Review of International Studies (15, 2019), 4. 
5 Steve Chan, “On States’ Status-Quo and Revisionist Dispositions,” Issues & Studies (51:3, 2015), 3. 
6 Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1. 
7 Jason Davidson, “The Roots of Revisionism,” Security Studies (11:4, 2002), 128. 
8 A.F.K. Organski, J. Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 19. 
9 K.J. Holsti, “National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy,” International Studies Quarterly (14, 
1970), 233–309, J. Galtung, “A structural theory of aggression,” Journal of Peace Research (1, 1964), 95–119. 
10 Ian Hurd, “Breaking and making norms,” International Politics (44:2-3, 2007), 201, Ward, Status, 2-5, Chan, 
“Satisfaction,” 210,234, “States,” 5-8,13-4, Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, “Recognition,” 7-8, Katherine Combes, 
“Between Revisionism and Status-quo,” POLIS Journal (6, 2011/2012), 1-37, Ikenberry, et al, “Unipolarity,” 12-
3, Rosemary Foot, Andrew Walter, “Global norms and major state behaviour,” European Journal of 
International Relations (19:2, 2011), 344-7. 
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power and elements of the international order.11 Four ideal actor types are identified: 
status-quo actors satisfied with both aspects; positionalist actors dissatisfied with the 
specific distribution of power rather than the broader international system; reformist actors 
concerned with the opposite; and, finally, revolutionary actors, who seek to alter both the 
balance of power and elements of the international system.12 Other scholars concur, with 
Chan, for example, anticipating positionalist actors when he observed, “the hegemon and 
the international system are not synonymous. One can try to displace the current hegemon 
without replacing the system.”13 
 
While debates remain regarding the relative relevance of capabilities, intentions, actions, 
risk-taking propensity, resolve, and status ambitions,14 revisionism within this stream may 
be broadly defined as dissatisfaction with and pursuit of the goal to reshape the status-quo, 
whether through a reordering of territory, status or prestige positionality, material 
capabilities, ordering principles, ideological regimes or dominant political systems.15 
Importantly, given Cooley, Nexon and Ward’s definition of the international order as 
comprising an “ecology of military, economic, status, and other goods… (and) the ‘rules’ and 
‘norms’ associated with them,”16 at least reformist and revolutionary revisionists appear to 
axiomatically oppose international norms in accordance with this typology. Furthermore, 
given classic realist contentions that norms require hegemonic buttressing for existence,17 
 
11 Cooley, et al, “Revising,” 17. 
12 Cooley, et al, “Revising,” 1-20.  
13 Chan, “States,” 11, Alastair Johnston, “Is China a status-quo power?” International Security, (27:4, 2003), 10-
11, Steven Ward, “Race, status, and Japanese revisionism in the early 1930s,” Security Studies, 22:4 (2013),  
Carmen Wunderlich, et al, “Non-aligned Reformers and Revolutionaries” in Harald Müller, Carmen Wunderlich 
(eds), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control (London: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 246, Svenja 
Gertheiss, Stefanie Herr, “Approaching International Dissidence” in Svenja Gertheiss, et al, (eds), Resistance 
and Change in World Politics (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 13-5, Christopher Daase, Nicole Deitelhoff, 
“Reconstructing global rule by analyzing resistance,” Internationale Dissidenz Working Paper 1/2014, 2014, 10-
3, Alastair Johnston, Social States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), xxii. 
14 Jihwan Hwang, “Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity,” World Affairs (168:1, 
2005), 39-48, Erskine, “Institutions,” 6 note 2, Chan, “Satisfaction,” 216, Davidson, “Revisionism,” 125-33, 
Schweller, “Bandwagoning,” 99-105, Benjamin Miller, “Between the Revisionist and the Frontier State,” 
Review of International Studies (35, 2009), 85-119. 
15 David Zionts, “Revisionism and Its Variants,” Security Studies (15:4, 2006), 632-4, Davidson, “Revisionism,” 
25, Schweller, “Bandwagoning,” 87-100, Chan, “Satisfaction,” 207-16, Ikenberry, “Unipolarity,” 12, Cooley, et 
al, “Revising,” 4, Miller, “Revisionist,” 89, Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, “Recognition” 4,7-8: although far from realist, 
recognise “The discontented are frustrated with their perceived positions in the recognition hierarchy.” 
16 Cooley, et al, “Revising,” 17 (original emphasis). 
17 Refer: 2.3 Analytical Framework, below. 
 23 
positionalists, or indeed any actor rejecting the hegemon or challenging the status-quo 
order, are also expected to reject norms.18 Chan, for example, concludes that “participation 
in and ratification of international conventions (especially treaties on arms control) could 
provide another sign of acceptance of and commitment to the international status-quo,” 
with rejection indicating the opposite.19 The only exception to realist expectations of 
revisionist state norm rejection is when material benefits or incentives dictate otherwise. 
 
2.1.b: Liberal Perspectives 
 
While realists thereby constitute revisionism at the systemic-level, liberal theories turn 
inward and consider certain domestic structures and internal state behaviours as deviant 
characteristics.20 Revisionism is frequently conflated with authoritarian, left-wing, or any 
regime that challenges liberal democratic forms of governance in what Simpson terms 
‘liberal anti-pluralism’.21 According to Nincic, “a non-democratic system of government is 
the key criterion in getting a state labelled ‘rogue’.”22 Studies show that nations moving 
towards democracy and open economies, for example, were more likely to endorse “US-led 
liberal norms” in the UNGA and thus less likely to be considered revisionist.23 This is 
 
18 Ikenberry, Kupchan, “Socialization,” 283-315, Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” Haas, “Words,” Arthur Stein, 
“Coordination,” Donald Puchala, Raymond Hopkins, “International Regimes” in Krasner, Regimes, Stephen 
Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 6,220,228, Stephen 
Krasner, “Sovereignty and Intervention” in Gene Lyons, Michael Mastanduno (eds), Beyond Westphalia? 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), Andrew Hurrell, Terry Macdonald, “Ethics and Norms in 
International Relations” in Walter Carlsnaes, et al (eds), Handbook of International Relations (Sage: London, 
2013), 71, Peter Gourevitch, “The Governance Problem in International Relations” in David Lake, Robert Powell 
(eds), Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 138,164. 
19 Chan, “Satisfaction,” 216-9,233. Also: Michael Bailey, et al, “Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from 
United Nations Voting Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (61:2, 2017), 430-56, Combes, “Revisionism,” 3-5. 
20 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” International Organization (51:4, 1997), 513-53, 
Homolar, “Rebels,” 721, Harald Müller, “Evilization in liberal discourse,” International Politics (51:4, 2014), 479. 
21 Simpson, Powers, 76-8,278-315. Per: Jeffrey Checkel, “Why Comply?” International Organization (55:3, 
2001), 553-8, Bailey, et al, “Preferences,” 430-56, James Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights,” 
International Organization (62:1, 2008), 65-101. Critique: H. Richard Friman, “Introduction” in H. Richard 
Friman (ed), The Politics of Leverage in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 17, 
Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 466-7, Müller, “Evilization,” 475-91. 
22 In Carmen Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation à la Carte” in Gertheiss, et al, Resistance, 84. See also: K. P. 
O’Reilly, “Perceiving Rogue States,” Foreign Policy Analysis (3:4, 2007), 297. 
23 Bailey, et al, “Preferences,” 445-9. Also: Kathryn Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and 
Sovereignty in Latin America,” International Organization (47:3, 1993), 434, Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do 
not Float Freely,” International Organization (48:2, 1994), 203-4, Thomas Risse, et al (eds), The Power of 
Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 241-7,275-6, Judith Kelley, “Assessing the 
Complex Evolution of Norms,” International Organization (62:2, 2008), 229, G. John Ikenberry, Charles 
Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization (44:3, 1990), 284,292. 
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reflected both theoretically in the Democratic Peace Theory,24 and within real world 
discourse by successive US Presidents and allies who perceive “that countries that are not 
democratic are potential if not actual threats to the international system,” a notion Jervis 
argues holds “deep resonance in American history, traditions and ideology.”25  
 
Good international citizenship associated with norm endorsement thus primarily 
attaches to states with “strong liberal or social-democratic tradition.”26 Liberal theorists 
contend that the internal governance structures of ‘closed’, authoritarian, socialist, or 
“ideologically deviant” states hinder adoption of new ideas by limiting vulnerability to both 
internal civil society and external influences.27 Although highly complex and still contested, 
IL scholarship similarly considers dictatorships less likely to enter into and comply with 
human rights and economic treaties.28 Simpson records expectations that outlaw states “are 
incapable of forming the correct attitude towards the international legal order… Some are 
serial violators of the dominant mores of the international legal order (bad). Others are a 
threat to the international legal order because of some internal malfunction or propensity 
to disorder (dangerous).”29 This is reflected in liberal discourse in practice, with the 2002 US 
National Security Strategy, for example, asserting that ‘rogue states’ “display no regard for 
 
24 Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes,” International Organization (54:2, 2000), 220, 
Bruce Russett, et al, “The Democratic Peace,” International Security (19:4, 1995), 164-84. 
25 Robert Jervis, “Socialization, revolutionary states and domestic politics,” International Politics (52:5, 2015), 
613. See also: David Campbell, Writing Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 30-2,134-5.  
26 Una Becker-Jakob, et al, “Good International Citizens” in Müller, Wunderlich, Norm Dynamics, 208. Also: 
Beth Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior,” American Political Science Review (94:4, 2000), 819. 
27 Perry Mars, “Foreign Influence, Political Conflicts and Conflict Resolution,” Journal of Peace Research (32:4, 
1995), 438-44, Zachary Elkins, et al, “Getting to Rights,” Harvard International Law Journal (54:1, 2013), 88, Jay 
Goodliffe, Darren Hawkins, “Explaining Commitment,” Journal of Politics (68:2, 2006), 362, Jeffrey Checkel, 
Ideas and International Political Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), xi, Laurence Helfer, Anne-
Marie Slaughter, “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,” Yale Law Journal (107, 1997), 278, 
Moravcsik, “Origins,” 223-9, Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion,” West European 
Politics (35:1, 2012), 12, Sanjeev Khagram, et al (eds), Restructuring World Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 17-8, Frank Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialisation” in 
Jeffrey Checkel (ed), International Institutions and Socialization in Europe (New York: CUP, 2007), 40-1,214. 
28 Eric Neumayer, “Qualified Ratification,” Journal of Legal Studies (36:2, 2007), 402, Richard Nielson, Beth 
Simmons, “Rewards for Ratification,” International Studies Quarterly (59, 2015), 197-208, Thomas Miles, Eric 
Posner, “Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why?” John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Article No. 420, 
University of Chicago, 2008, 14-8, Oona Hathaway, “Cost of Commitment,” Stanford Law Review (55, 2003), 
1849-54, Oona Hathaway, “Do HR Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal (111, 2001), 1935-42, Edward 
Mansfield, et al, “Why Democracies Cooperate More,” International Organization (56:3, 2002), 477-513, 
Andrew Moravcsik, “Explaining International HR Regimes,” European Journal of International Relations (1:2, 
1995), 157-89, Michael Barnett, “Evolution Without Progress?” International Organization (63:4, 2009), 621-2. 
29 Simpson, Powers, xi,281-3,295. 
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international law, threaten their neighbours, and callously violate international treaties.”30 
According to Homolar, “Such ‘norm deviants’ were considered highly dangerous precisely 
because it was believed that they could not be influenced or contained by appealing to 
existing international standards of behaviour.”31 When it comes to ‘rogue states’, therefore, 
“Breaking norms is regarded as their foremost attribute.”32 
 
2.1.c: Critical Perspectives 
 
For postcolonial theorists, revisionism and norm rejection is a concomitant and 
encouraged “project of ideological resistance to ‘the imperialism of the Same’.”33 
Postcolonial scholars often promote defiance, highlighting the complicity of international 
norm universalisation in propagating, if not perversely legitimising, vastly unequal 
hierarchies, epistemicide and the silencing of alternative, subaltern norms.34 According to 
Inayatullah and Blaney, “the dichotomy between relativism and universal objectivism turns 
on the prior and complete destruction of alternatives. The ethical heroism of norms 
constructivism has cultural genocide as precondition.”35 Normative resistance, on the other 
hand, provides agency and empowerment to ‘norm antagonists’,36 recalcitrant actors that 
deliberately reject international norms and assert autonomous identity to challenge the 
 
30 In Müller, “Evilization,” 480. See also: Paul Hoyt, “The ‘rogue state’ image in American foreign policy,” Global 
Society (14:2, 2000), 297-308, O’Reilly, “Rogue,” 297-8, Wunderlich, et al, “Reformers,” 248. 
31 Homolar, “Rebels,” 710. Similarly: Hoyt, “Rogue,” 303. 
32 Wunderlich, et al, “Reformers,” 248. Also: O’Reilly, “Rogue,” 311, Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 83. 
33 Upendra Baxi, “What may the ‘Third World’ expect from International Law?” in Falk, et al, International Law 
and the Third World (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 10. Also: Antony Anghie, “Evolution of International Law” in 
same, 47, Charlotte Epstein, “The postcolonial perspective,” International Theory (6:2, 2014), 295. 
34 Naeem Inayatullah, David Blaney, “The Dark Heart of Kindness,” International Studies Perspectives (13:2, 
2012), 168-75, Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “The Social Self in International Relations,” European Review of 
International Studies (3:3, 2016), 36, Maria de Almagro, “Boomerangs, the rebound effect and transnational 
advocacy networks,” Review of International Studies (2018), 4, Stephan Engelkamp, Katharina Glaab, “Writing 
Norms,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political (40:3-4, 2015), 201-18, Charmaine Chua, “Against localisation,” 
Arjun Chowdhury, “International norms in postcolonial time,” Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Ulrik Pram Gad, “In the 
post-colonial waiting room,” Charlotte Epstein, “Postcolonial Perspective” in Charlotte Epstein (ed), Against 
International Relations Norms (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 92-3,100-2,106-7,178,308. 
35 Naeem Inayatullah, David Blaney, “Constructivism and the normative” in Epstein, Against IR, 28-9. Also: 
Vivienne Jabri, “Colonial rationalities, postcolonial subjectivities, and the international” in same, 38-52. 
36 Chua, “Against,” 87-92,94-100. See also: Charlotte Epstein, “Stop telling us how to behave: Socialization or 
Infantilization?” International Studies Perspectives (13:2, 2012), 83, Ayse Zarakol, “What Made the Modern 
World Hang Together,” International Theory (6:2, 2014), 328, O’Hagan, “R2P,” 286, Amitav Acharya, “The 
Responsibility to Protect and a theory of norm circulation” in Thakur, Maley, R2P, 60,192-5, Ann Towns, 
Women and States (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 50-2, Wunderlich, Rogue, 74-6, Alan Bloomfield, Shirley Scott 
(eds), Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change (Routledge, 2018). 
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legitimacy of prevailing world orders and presumed norm-setter/follower relationships.37 
Noting Fanon’s demand that “We today can do everything, as long as we do not imitate 
Europe,”38 norm resistance presents as almost obligatory from this perspective.39  
 
Critical Marxist and Gramscian perspectives primarily concur. International norms, which 
comprise part of the hegemonic ‘cultural, moral and ideological leadership’ over 
subordinates, quell resistance via cooptation and complicit hegemonic reproduction: they 
must be rejected to achieve revolution.40 Construing Gramsci's ‘ideologies’ as norms:41  
ideologies for the governed are mere illusions, a deception to which they are subject, 
while for the governing they constitute a willed and a knowing deception… (they) must 
be combatted and their nature as instruments of domination revealed, not for reasons of 
morality, etc., but for reasons of political struggle: in order to make the governed 
intellectually independent of the governing, in order to destroy one hegemony and 
create another.42 
 
As Stavrianakis noted, “Strategies against hegemony require transgression to be effective. 
That is, they must signal an ‘assault on the way social norms, beliefs, inequalities and 
oppressions are reproduced’… Effective strategies therefore make demands that ‘cannot be 
met within existing structures’.”43 Revisionist actors are thus expected to oppose prevailing 
international norms, unless, or until, they are co-opted into the very system they ostensibly 
reject, and become no longer revisionist. 
 
 
37 Antje Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 10, 
Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect (New York: Routledge, 2011), 181,192, Jinghan Zeng, Shaun 
Breslin, “China’s ‘new type of Great Power relations’,” International Affairs (92:4, 2016), 775, Falk, et al, 
“Introduction,” 3-5, Anghie, “IL,” 37-8, Chowdhury, “Norms,” 106-10, Adler-Nissen, Gad, “Post-colonial,” 138, 
Sarah Phillips, “The norm of state-monopolised violence from a Yemeni perspective” in Epstein, Against IR, 
178,187, Tarak Barkawi, Mark Laffey, “Retrieving the Imperial,” Millennium (31:1, 2002), 115-26. 
38 In Jabri, “Colonial,” 48-52. Also: Vivienne Jabri, “Disarming norms,” International Theory (6:2, 2014), 385. 
39 Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Conclusion” in Abdullahi An-Na’im (ed), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 428-9, Miles Evers, “On transgression,’ International 
Studies Quarterly (61:4, 2017), 787-8, Baxi, “Third World,” 10. 
40 David Forgacs (ed), The Antonio Gramsci Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 422-4. Also: 
James Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 39-40,316,341. 
41 Both are “instrument(s) of government of dominant groups in order to gain the consent of and exercise 
hegemony over subaltern classes:” Forgacs, Gramsci, 197. 
42 Forgacs, Gramsci, 192. Also: Scott, Weapons, 304. 
43 Anna Stavrianakis, “Missing the Target,” Journal of International Relations and Development (15:2, 2012), 
233, quoting Tim Jordan, Activism! (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), 32,36. 
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2.1.d: Constructivist Perspectives 
 
Scholars associated with constructivist theorising, meanwhile, define revisionist actors as 
those that challenge “existing norms and rules.”44 Although rarely addressing revisionist 
states directly, ‘mainstream’ or ‘liberal’ constructivist scholarship45 explains international 
norm endorsement via socialisation, “the process by which states internalize norms arising 
elsewhere in the international system.”46 Checkel describes it as “a process of inducting 
actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance 
based on the internalisation of these new norms.”47 In this manner, employing Wendt’s 
conception of the state as an unitary actor with anthropomorphic qualities of contingent 
and socially constructed identities and interests,48 states not only come to believe in the 
appropriateness of a norm, but the norm eventually comprises part of their very interests 
and identity, altering internal rule models and self-perceptions in the process.49 In an 
indirect nod to revisionist state norm endorsement, Reus-Smit explains how this process 
holds true for all but the most deviant: 
a consensus exists among the majority of states about the nature and validity of the 
prevailing systemic norm… The existence of ‘outlier’ states, which do not subscribe to 
this ideological consensus, does not compromise the argument… they will be drawn into 
the production and reproduction of basic institutional practices… Functional imperatives 
 
44 Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 10. See also: Friman, 
“Introduction,” 16-7, Ellen Lutz, Kathryn Sikkink, “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin 
America,” International Organization (54:3, 2008), 659: “ostracized ‘out-groups’ of norm breakers.” 
45 Zarakol, “World,” 312, Epstein, “Postcolonial,” “Stop telling us how to behave: Socialization or 
Infantilization” in Epstein, Against IR, 7,9-10,77. 
46 Kai Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization,” Review of International Studies (27:3, 2001), 416-7. See 
also: Frank Schimmelfenning, “International Socialization in the New Europe,” European Journal of 
International Relations (6:1, 2000), 109-39, Susan Park, “Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within International 
Organizations,” International Politics (43:3, 2006), 353-4, Shogo Suzuki, “Japan’s socialization into Janus-faced 
European International Society,” European Journal of International Relations (11:1, 2005), 137-64. 
47 Checkel, Institutions, 5,241. Also: Schimmelfenning, “Socialization,” 109-39, Park, “Theorizing,” 353-4, 
Thakur, R2P, 4, Johnston, “Institutions,” 494-5, Alderson, “Socialization,” 416-7. 
48 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 43.  
49 Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization (52:4, 1998), 902, Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1995), 27-8,165-8, Tonny Knudsen, “Primary Institutions and International Organizations,” IR502 Research 
Workshop Working Paper, London School of Economics, 2017, 20-2, Johnston, States, 29-32, Schimmelfennig, 
“Calculation,” 36-41,58, Helene Sjursen, “Principles in EU Foreign Policy,” International Institutions, Law and 
Ethics Workshop Paper, London School of Economics, 2016, 2,7-8, Checkel, Institutions, 6-9, Johnston, 
“Conclusions,” 216-21, Alderson, “Socialization,” 418-24, Margaret Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond 
Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 18,214, Stewart Patrick, “Evolution of International Norms” in 
William Thompson, Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2001), 138-9,158-9, 
Michael Zürn, Jeffrey Checkel, “Getting Socialised to Build Bridges” in Checkel, Institutions, 246. 
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thus drive all but the most autarkic and recalcitrant states to participate in established 
fundamental institutions, and in doing so they reproduce those very institutions.50  
 
Indeed, some scholars argue that perceived revisionist states work hard to ‘become normal’ 
via norm endorsement, signing “onto a new norm in order to increase their own prestige or 
to boost state legitimacy.”51 According to Ayoub, “states that have historically failed to gain 
international recognition are often the first to reach higher levels of norm adoption in order 
to improve their reputations in international hierarchies.”52 Even if a state does so initially 
as a form of lip service, socialisation is claimed to be the ultimate outcome given discursive 
and rhetorical entrapment leads to cognitive dissonance resolution.53 “It may be true,” 
conclude Hurrell and Macdonald, “that the international system tames and socializes 
revolutionary regimes.”54  
 
However, at least two limitations may be identified in relation to arguments that 
socialisation may explain revisionist state norm endorsement. First, the theory suffers from 
a ‘catch 22’. Socialisation into international norm endorsement axiomatically renders the 
purportedly socialised revisionist state no longer revisionist upon endorsement. Second, the 
presumption of a one-size-fits-all socialisation process is misleading. For it relies upon a 
presumption of community, or habitus, within which states are vulnerable to normative 
conformity pressures through either inducements or desires for international legitimacy, a 
 
50 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 35-6. 
Similarly: Harald Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That,” European Journal of International Relations (10:3, 
2004), Klotz, Norms, 165-8, Francisco Ramirez, “Institutional Analysis” in George Thomas, et al, Institutional 
Structure (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987), 319-26, Vreeland, “Institutions,” 78-9, Alderson, 
“Socialization,” 417, Andrew Hurrell, “Power, institutions and the production of inequality” in Michael Barnett, 
Raymond Duvall (eds), Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 40-1,51-2. 
51 Bailey, “Arrested,” 292,305-6,314. Contra: Haas, “Words,” 242-3. 
52 Phillip Ayoub, “Contested norms in new-adopter states,” European Journal of International Relations (21:2, 
2015), 300. Also: Ann Towns, “Norms and Social Hierarchies” International Organization (66:2, 2012), 189, 
Towns, Women, 194, Ramirez, “Analysis,” 319-20.  
53 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap,” International Organization (55:1, 2001), 65-6,77, Thomas 
Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’,” International Organization (54:1, 2000), 32, Hurrell, Macdonald, “Ethics,” 72, Sikkink, 
“HR,” 415, Joshua Busby, Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
34, Risse, Ropp, “HR,” 276, Zürn, Checkel, “Socialised,” 249, Cora True-Frost, “The Security Council and Norm 
Consumption,” Journal of International Law and Politics (40, 2007), 186, Jochen Prantl, Ryoko Nakano, “Global 
Norm Diffusion in East Asia,” International Relations (25:2, 2011), 210, Emilie Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, 
“Human Rights in a Globalizing World,” American Journal of Sociology (110:5, 2005), 1378, Ikenberry, Kupchan, 
“Socialization,” 291, Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights,” International Organization (52:3, 1998), 636. 
54 Hurrell, Macdonald, “Ethics,” 73. 
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respected reputation, or consideration as a good or equal citizen on the world stage.55 
Johnstone explains, “From a constructivist perspective, concerns about reputation and 
status relate to a sense of being part of a community and becoming socialised to its 
norms.”56 Vulnerability to community pressures or a desire to belong is thus crucial, arising 
“both from the availability of leverage and the target’s sensitivity to leverage… Countries 
that are most susceptible… are those that aspire to belong to a normative community of 
nations.”57 Whether a state cares about belonging and how it is perceived therefore 
matters.58 Accordingly, as Jervis observes, socialisation into international norms “might be 
true for states that want to join the prevailing order, but most revolutionary states do 
not.”59 Flockhart concurs, “It is not possible to socialize agents who manifestly do not wish 
to belong to the social group of the socializer.”60 Given the seminal definition of norms 
proffered by Katzenstein as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a 
given identity,”61 the very identity of a state as revisionist may immanently preclude norm 
endorsement.  
 
Adler-Nissen thus identified the ‘counter-stigmatiser’, an actor that not only accepts 
stigmatisation surrounding its revisionist status but transforms “it into an emblem of pride… 
 
55 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo,” International Organization (53: 3, 1999), 462-3, Zarakol, “World,” 
318-9, Jennifer Bailey, “Arrested Development,” European Journal of International Relations (14:2, 2008), 292-
314, Bernhard Zangle, “Judicialization Matters!,” International Studies Quarterly (52, 2008), 829-46, Price, 
“Review,” 586-93, Thomas Weiss, Ramesh Thakur, “Framing Global Governance” in Thomas Weiss, Thinking 
about Global Governance (New York: Routledge, 2011), 150, Olga Avdeyeva, “Does Reputation Matter for 
States’ Compliance with International Treaties?,” The International Journal of Human Rights (16:2, 2012), 299-
300, Thomas Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics” in Carlsnaes, et al, Handbook, 436-7. 
56 Ian Johnstone, “The Power of Interpretive Communities” in Barnett, Duvall, Power, 187-9. See also: Trine 
Flockhart, “’Complex Socialisation,” European Journal of International Relations (12:1, 2006), 96-7, Adler-
Nissen, “Self,” 36, Dana Zartner, Jennifer Ramos, “Human Rights as Reputation Builder,” Human Rights Review 
(12:1, 2011), 73, Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 418-9,428. 
57 Keck, Sikkink, Activists, 23-9. Also: James Franklin, “HR Naming and Shaming” in Friman, Leverage, 55, 
Alderson, “Socialization,” 416, Darren Hawkins, “Domestic Responses to International Pressure,” EJIR (3:4, 
1997), 409, Ellen Lutz, Kathryn Sikkink, “Justice Cascade,” Chicago Journal of International Law (2:1, 2001), 5. 
58 Evers, “Transgression,” 786, Johnston, States, 205-8, Zarakol, “World,” 319, Amy Gurowitz, “The Diffusion of 
International Norms,” International Politics (43:3, 2006), 310-1,330-6, Matthew Hoffman, Ozone Depletion and 
Climate Change (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 40, Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National 
Interests,” European Journal of International Relations (2:3, 1996), 277-84. 
59 Jervis, “Socialization,” 610-2. Similarly: Wunderlich, Rogue, 71. 
60 Flockhart, “Socialisation,” 97. Also: Müller, “Evilization,” 477. 
61 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed), The Culture of National Security (New York: CUP, 
1996), 5 (emphasis mine). Also: Annika Björkdahl, “Norms in International Relations,” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs (15:1, 2002), 15, Jon Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 99-100,105, 
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stigma is turned into a virtue and the deviant value their exclusionary status.”62 Revisionist 
states are empowered by their ostracism and “more likely to reject the norms and seek 
solidarity among the deviant,”63 in what Smetana labels “justificatory rejection.”64 Recent 
research takes such agency a step farther, arguing that rather than merely rejecting 
dominant norms, “‘oppositional’ norms (may be) promoted by not so liberal, radical norm 
entrepreneurs,” as Wunderlich explains: 
revolutionary norm entrepreneurs are expected to champion the promotion of a 
fundamentally alternative normative order. Their norm entrepreneurship exceeds mere 
resistance against the prevalent order… (it is) marked by strong opposition to the 
prevalent normative order, aiming at overthrow of the existing system and the 
establishment of a new order.65 
 
Such “Opposition against and dissent over the existing normative order is often decried as 
‘norm hostility’. This opprobrium hits especially ‘pariah’ states.”66 This scholarship thereby 
reinforces expectations of strong and active revisionist state norm resistance, either via 
rejection or alternative, revolutionary, norm entrepreneurship.67 According to 
constructivists, therefore, states are either socialised and thereby no longer deviant, or 
remain revolutionary and rejectionist in nature.68 
 
No matter the paradigm, IR scholarship therefore predicts that, absent material 
incentives, a purportedly revisionist state such as Cuba will likely hold a weak record of 
international treaty ratification, reject or remain indifferent towards prevailing international 
norms, or ultimately become socialised into norm acceptance and thus no longer revisionist. 
 
62 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Stigma Management in International Relations,” International Organization (68:1, 
2014), 153. Similarly: social/rebellious deviant in Erving Goffman, Stigma (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 170-
2; ‘isolate’ in Zachary Elkins, Beth Simmons, “On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (598:1, 2005), 40-1; William Schulz, “Caught at the Keyhole” in Friman, 
Leverage, 37: “Iran, Cuba, or Venezuela, may wear American condemnation as a badge of honor.” 
63 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 154. Also: Evers, “Transgression,” 786-94, Zarakol, “World,” 313, Brent Steele, 
“Broadening the contestation of norms in international relations,” Polity (49:1, 2017), 134. 
64 Michal Smetana, Nuclear Deviance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 42,54-5,79-83. Similarly: Ann Towns, Bahar 
Rumelili, “Taking the pressure,” EJIR (23:4, 2017), 768, Towns, Women, 50-1, Patrick, “Evolution,” 136-7,156. 
65 Carmen Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics” in Müller, Wunderlich, Norm Dynamics, 
34-5. Also: Harald Müller, Carmen Wunderlich, “Not lost in contestation,” Contemporary Security Policy (39:3, 
2018), 352,357-60, Annika Björkdahl, Ivan Gusic, “’Global norms and ‘local’ agency,” Journal of International 
Relations and Development (18, 2015), 274, Wunderlich, et al, “Reformers,” 21,246-7, Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, 
“Recognition,” 16-7, Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 12: labelling it “radical resistance.” 
66 Wunderlich, et al, “Reformers,” 248. Wunderlich, Rogue, 57. 
67 Wunderlich, Rogue, 76-7,269-74. 
68 Adler-Nissen, “Self,” 35-6, Chua, “Against,” 93,101, Alan Bloomfield, “Norm antipreneurs and theorising 
resistance to normative change,’ Review of International Studies (42:2, 2016), 314. 
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As Geis and Wunderlich observe: “’Rogue states’ are commonly depicted as ‘outlaws’ and 
outsiders to the group of ‘decent states’, not willing to abide by the central rules of the 
prevalent normative world order and intending to destabilize or destroy the current 
(normative) system… ‘rogues’ are conceptualized as deviant actors who stand out by norm-
breaking features and behaviour.”69 Although indirect, socialisation provides the rare 
theorisation, or “critical mid-level mechanism,”70 to explain revisionist state norm 
endorsement absent material benefits. However data suggests that Cuba, for one, endorsed 
a range of norms while maintaining purportedly staunch revisionism. This thesis sets out to 
resolve this puzzle of revisionist state norm endorsement by identifying the key attributes 
underlying international norm diffusion and determining which most effectively facilitated 
norm endorsement in this revisionist state instance. 
 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
 
This section defines norms and the international norm evolution process, laying the 
groundwork for the final section in which core norm diffusion attributes are distilled and 
operationalised into an overarching analytical framework. 
 
2.2.a: Definition of Norms 
 
Norms are commonly defined as shared or intersubjective understandings around which 
behaviour is judged and expected to conform.71 Whilst initial IR scholarship referred to 
norms as regimes, institutions and cultural accounts,72 Khagram, Riker and Sikkink built 
 
69 Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 466,470. Similarly: Evers, “Transgression,’ 786, Wunderlich, Rogue, 3,65-6,71. 
70 Alderson, “Socialization,” 429. 
71 Finnemore, Interests, 22, Hurrell, Macdonald, “Ethics,” 69-70, Weiss, GG, 3-4, William Maley, “Humanitarian 
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International Organization (41:3, 1987), 491-517, Reus-Smit, Purpose, Alexander Wendt, Raymond Duvall, 
“Institutions and International Order” in Ernst-Otto Czempiel, James Rosenau (eds), Global Changes and 
Theoretical Challenges (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), 53, Freidrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie, 
“International Organization,” International Organization (40:4, 1986), 753-75, Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Force 
of Prescriptions,” International Organization (38:4, 1984), 685-708. 
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upon Katzenstein’s seminal definition of norms,73 to denote international norms as “the 
shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior accepted by states and 
intergovernmental organizations that can be applied to states, intergovernmental 
organizations, and/or nonstate actors of various kinds.”74 Norms are not solely ideas, which 
are private thoughts within the minds of individuals as opposed to collective understandings 
of behaviour.75 They are neither values, habits, customs, traditions, nor commands, for 
which mutual expectations of collective conduct may not exist.76 Norms are also not 
inherently ‘good’.77 Morality is neither immanent nor inexorably attached to norms. Rather, 
norms are “assigned value,” evolving both temporally and spatially according to the 
diverging perspectives of different actors.78 International norms do not therefore equate 
inherently to ethical norms, and a theory of norms is not a normative theory per se.79 
International norms are also not necessarily legal norms, although of course they may be.80 
They are considered norms due to collective, intersubjective, and frequently self-evident, 
expectations of behaviour rather than definitive legal obligations or codified 
requirements.81 As Florini explains, “norms are obeyed not because they are enforced, but 
because they are seen as legitimate.”82 
 
There are different types of international norms. While Goldstein and Keohane originally 
categorised norms into 1) world views, or large ideational forces that structure identities, 2) 
principled beliefs, comprising normative ideas of right and wrong, and 3) causal beliefs, 
 
73 This chapter, footnote 62. 
74 Sanjeev Khagram, et al, “From Santiago to Seattle” in Khagram, et al, Restructuring, 14. 
75 Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 171, Risse, et al, Power, 
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77 Kenneth Himma, “Incorporationism and the Objectivity of Moral Norms,” Legal Theory (5:4, 1999), 415-34. 
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78 Towns, “Norms,”187. Also: Acharya, Ideas, 171-2, Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), 15:40. 
79 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 8-9, 
Klotz, Norms, 14, Hurrell, Macdonald, “Ethics,” 60, Emily Paddon Rhoads, Taking Sides in Peacekeeping 
(Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016), 17. 
80 Geoffrey Garrett, Barry Weingast, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions” in Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane, 
Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 203-4, Young, “Regime,” 93, Kenneth Abbott, 
Duncan Snidal, “Hard & Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization (54:3,2000), 421-56. 
81 Elster, Cement, 101. 
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which embody guides or strategies to achieve objectives,83 norms have since been 
construed as substantive, constitutive norms that affect and comprise identities, interests 
and ideologies on the one hand, and regulative, constraining or procedural norms that guide 
specific actions in accordance with substantive norms on the other.84 Reflecting Puchala and 
Hopkins’ theory of embedded regimes, in which single-issue norms are nested within 
broader, diffuse, multi-issue norms,85 Welsh coined the term ‘complex norms’ to describe 
norms comprising multiple layers of prescription.86 Paddon Rhoads similarly employed the 
terminology ‘composite norm’, as an heuristic tool designed to denote the diversity and 
dynamism within norms, demonstrating that even ostensibly singular norms can in fact 
encompass a confluence of elements, each of which may evolve tangentially or be 
contested.87 While Paddon Rhoads conceptualised peacekeeping impartiality as one such 
complex norm, others include humanitarian intervention, R2P or multilateralism. 
 
2.2.b: International Norm Evolution 
 
The process through which a norm emerges and crystallises at the global level is the 
international norm evolution process. Although early models were often linear, static, top-
down and enclosed,88 recent conceptions envisage the process more accurately as ongoing, 
cyclical and contested.89 As Sandholz argues, norm evolution actually “occurs in cycles that 
are linked, forward and backward, in a longer historical dynamic.”90 The norm evolution 
 
83 Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy” in Goldstein, Keohane, Ideas, 8-10.  
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process thus incorporates the duration of the life and death of a norm:91 interrelated 
periods encompassing a norm’s initial emergence on the international stage to solve a 
transnational problem, spread across regimes and platforms as it is adopted, continued 
evolution during contestation, reinterpretation and re-employment in different contexts, 
multiple manifestations across the course of time and space, and multiple trajectories 
including ‘failure to launch’, ‘ideational decomposition’, decay, regress, erosion, 
toothlessness, collapse, death, rebound, or even resurrection.92 Although an extreme 
simplification, the following diagram captures this process: 
   
Figure 3: The international norm evolution process 
 
The analysis in this thesis is limited to the period after a norm emerges on the 
international stage, evidenced via discussion and debate at a transnational level, until its 
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broad endorsement via ratification in an international treaty. This is the period represented 
by the box labelled diffusion/translation in Figure 3, which reflects the “process through 
which ideas, normative standards… policies and institutions spread across time and 
space.”93 Although the term ‘translation’ is used in lieu of ‘diffusion’ in some scholarship,94 
diffusion is employed for the purpose of this thesis to maintain consistency.95 Given the 
specific focus on diffusion, how an idea is formed and appears on the global stage as well as 
how it evolves or is/not complied with after broad endorsement, remain beyond the scope 
of analysis.96  
 
2.2.c: International Norm Diffusion 
 
To determine the reasons behind revisionist state norm endorsement, this thesis 
identifies which attributes of international norm diffusion held most influence over 
revisionist state decision-making. A wealth of scholarship has tackled questions regarding 
the international norm diffusion process, both directly and indirectly, and highlighted 
influential attributes. Initially, with a focus on material gains, realists primarily exogenised 
norm evolution processes by claiming that states alone possessed capacity to create and 
maintain otherwise epiphenomenal norms - norms were either in specific state interests or 
buttressed by an hegemonic power.97 Rationalists contended norm endorsement depended 
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on strategic cost/benefit calculations based upon instrumental logic of consequences 
reasoning and coercion or material or social incentives.98 Neoliberal institutionalists and 
some IL scholars, for example, credited norm endorsement to coordination gains expected 
from, or demand for efficiency in issue areas that required, international cooperation: 
norms decreased transaction costs, increased information transparency, and provided road 
maps for new principled or causal ideas in times of uncertainty; they comprised focal points 
to coordinate behaviour in the absence of unique equilibrium; and they embodied 
frameworks for issue linkage.99  
 
However, taken individually, these arguments proved inadequate if not wrong. Countless 
international norms - such as those pertaining to criminal justice or the prohibition of land 
mines - are neither in state interests nor supported by a dominant hegemon. They did not 
decrease transaction costs to enhance international cooperation in issue areas for which 
states deliberately sought coordination or demanded efficiency. And they did not always 
provide material benefits in a cost/benefit analysis.100 Constructivist scholarship addressed 
the resulting gap by sprinkling ideational factors and non-state actors into the norm 
diffusion mix. While contending that neither material, rational nor ideational factors alone 
are necessary or sufficient to explain diffusion, these scholars argued a combination is 
relevant.101 As Finnemore explained, “Actors conform to (norms) in part for ‘rational’ 
reasons (for instance, because of the costs involved in ‘bucking the system’ and the 
resources that become available through conformity) but also because they become 
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socialized to accept these values, rules, and roles.”102 Constructivism built upon prior 
paradigms by first documenting the power of international norms and the manner in which 
they not only constrain but enable behaviour, shape and constitute preferences, identities 
and interests, and even explain system change.103 Subsequent scholarship then turned to 
explicating how this occurs, by identifying the attributes that contribute to international 
norm diffusion. This scholarship has been categorised into three ‘waves’,104 and it is 
primarily from these that norm diffusion attributes may be elicited and an analytical 
framework compiled to determine which hold most influence over norm endorsement by a 
revisionist state.  
 
 Three initial caveats are in order. First, although divergently categorised for analytical 
clarity, there is inevitable and obvious blurring between these waves. Ayoub, for example, 
recognises the mutual relevance and interplay of each given “Taken individually, existing 
explanations are simplistic because they ignore the multiple dimensions of diffusion in a 
complex, multi-level interactive environment.”105 This thesis itself seeks to consolidate 
results across the waves in order to consider and assess them holistically. Second, recent 
scholarship that challenges and deconstructs positivist notions of norms as stable ‘things’ - 
focusing instead on norms as dynamic, contested, hierarchical, structuring and constructed, 
partial and intangible, unfinished products, historical constructs, or even mere symbols 
around which identities are shaped - may be considered a fourth, critical wave.106 Although 
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norm diffusion attributes feature and have been elicited from this scholarship, given its 
primary focus on post-diffusion implementation and compliance after broad international 
endorsement,107 it will not be additionally explicitly referenced as such within the analytical 
framework that follows. Third, this framework does not definitively encompass all possible 
attributes that may affect norm diffusion, but rather seeks to better understand and refine 
existing conceptions without discounting the potential that other, unidentified attributes 
may yield effects.   
 
2.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Norm diffusion attributes have been identified and elicited from each wave of the norm 
literature, however they are categorised alternatively for the purpose of this thesis. As 
Flockhart notes, “the norms transfer process is so complex and multifaceted that practicality 
often prevents consideration of all the different factors that play a role.”108 To facilitate such 
consideration, and evaluate the influence of each norm diffusion attribute in accordance 
with the overarching aim of this thesis, the attributes have been classified according to the 
level at which they pertain: whether they relate to the norm itself, to characteristics 
associated with the endorsing state, or to broader, systemic diffusion forces. Akin to the 
four waves of norm evolution literature, there is inevitable blurring between these 
categories.109 Nevertheless, such categorisation helps clarify the attributes and structure the 
resulting examination and argument, while findings proffer important insights regarding the 
levels at which the attributes operate and arguments pertaining to socialisation. 
Disaggregation of norm diffusion attributes into systemic, state and norm-related levels 
thus comprises the analytical framework around which reasons for norm endorsement by 
revisionist states are best determined and assessed. 
 
 
151, Bloomfield, “Antipreneurs,” 315-316, Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 294-311, “Infantilization,” 75-79, Stimmer, 
Wisken, “Dynamics,” 517, Wunderlich, “Theoretical,” 26, Towns, Women, 46,51,185-91, Engelkamp, Glaab, 
“Norms,” 203, Zarakol, “World,” 311-32, Almagro, “Boomerangs,” 5-7, Zimmermann, “Same,” 104, Björkdahl, 
Gusic, “Global norms,” 271-2, Steele, “Broadening,” 132-8, Antje Wiener, Contestation and Constitution of 
Norms in Global International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 8-9. 
107 Welsh, “Contestation,” 379-80, Stimmer, Wisken, “Dynamics,” 519-521, Wiener, Constitution, 10-2,39-50, 
Subotic, “Truth,” 364-5, Birdsall, “But we don’t call it ‘torture’!,” International Politics (53:2, 2016), 176-97. 
108 Flockhart, “Socialisation,” 90. 
109 Further: 2.3.d: Consolidation, below. 
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2.3.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
Cross-border, transnational elements operating at the global level, referred to as 
systemic attributes for the purpose of this thesis, comprise what may be termed the 
international opportunity structures for international norm diffusion.110 These were 
primarily credited by the first wave of norm evolution literature, which attributed agency 
for diffusion beyond the state in a ‘top-down’ manner - systemic attributes drove global 
institutionalisation and state internalisation of norms.111 Rapid worldwide change across 
dissimilar state units suggested such transnational rather than state-level causes.112 These 
elements primarily included Transnational Activist Networks (TANs)/International Non-
Governmental Organisations (INGOs), International Norm Entrepreneurs (INEs), Global Civil 
Society (GCS), epistemic communities, and International Organisations (IOs), alongside 
regional, other state and Multinational Corporation (MNC) suasion. While some scholars 
credited one of these factors, others noted a confluence, either simultaneously or at 
different stages of norm evolution.113 Evidenced by the contended outcome of norm 
internalisation by states, this research triggered the second wave of norm evolution 
scholarship focused upon state socialisation. The state returned to analysis, however only as 
a target of socialisation and principally passive recipient of international norms via the 
systemic attributes.114 In this manner, systemic norm diffusion attributes may be considered 
the drivers or means of the socialisation of states into norm endorsement, as follows. 
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Khagram, “Santiago,” 18, Franklin Rothman, Pamela Oliver, “From Local to Global,” Tammy Lewis, 
“Conservation TSMOs,” Kim Reimann, “Building Networks from the Outside In” in Jackie Smith, Hank Johnston 
(eds), Globalization and Resistance (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 2002), 117,175-6.  
111 Finnemore, Sikkink, “Dynamics,” Khagram, Restructuring, Risse, “Transnational,” Schmitz, Sikkink, “HR,” Lisa 
Martin, Beth Simmons, “International Organizations and Institutions” in Carlsnaes, et al, Handbook. 
112 Kristian Skrede, Michael Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,” International 
Organization (60:4, 2006), 911-33, Garrett, “Conclusion,” 344, Risse, Ropp, “HR,” 273, Finnemore, Interests, 
22, Price, “Reversing,” 616, Ramirez, “Analysis” 320-1, Iver Neumann, Ole Sending, Governing the Global Polity 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), 6. 
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(59:3, 2005), Albert Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,” International Organization (50:1, 1996), 87, 
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114 Brian Greenhill, “The Company You Keep,” International Studies Quarterly (54:1, 2010), Patrick, “Evolution,” 
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2.3.a.i: International Norm Entrepreneurs 
A wealth of scholarship allocates primary responsibility for international norm diffusion 
and state socialisation to TANs and INGOs, broadly defined as “actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, 
and dense exchanges of information and services.”115 Such networks reportedly affect the 
emergence, development, institutionalisation and implementation of international norms 
by harnessing cross-boundary social mobilisation in the pursuit of principled beliefs, 
professionalising ‘informational power’ and practices, empowering domestic groups, 
accessing political elites, and employing material and ideational resources to lobby states, 
organisations, corporations and societies in support of international norms.116 In doing so, 
these groups effect socialisation by altering identities, interests and normative structures at 
the global level. As Wapner explains, environmental TANs “aim to change the way vast 
numbers of people see the world - by dislodging traditional understandings of 
environmental degradation and substituting new interpretive frames” to not only alter 
government policies and codify new norms, but “shift the standards of good conduct and 
persuade people to act differently.”117  
 
According to Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang pattern’, domestic advocates seek support 
from like-minded TANs, which place norm-violating states on the international agenda, 
empower local activists and pressure states from both above and below to implement 
international norms, via effective framing and information, symbolic, leverage and 
accountability politics.118 Although this pattern, along with related spiral models, do not 
 
115 Keck, Sikkink, Activists, 2. See also: Price, “Review,” 580, Sikkink, “HR,” 415, Price, “Reversing,” 615, 
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Sikkink, “Restructuring World Politics” in Khagram, et al, Restructuring, 307-16, Jacqui True, Michael Mintrom, 
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George Thomas, “World Culture in the World Polity,” American Sociological Review (62:2, 1997), 171-90, Beth 
Caniglia, “Elite Alliances and Transnational Environmental Movement Organizations,” Sidney Tarrow, “From 
Lumping to Splitting” in Smith, Johnston, Globalization, 153-5,160-8,238-45, Finnemore, Interests, 71-87, Jutta 
Joachim, “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities,” International Studies Quarterly (47:2, 2003). 
117 Paul Wapner, “Politics Beyond the State,” World Politics (47:3, 1995), 321-2. 
118 Keck, Sikkink, Activists, 12-24,37. Also: Volha Charnysh, et al, “Frames and consensus formation in 
international relations,” European Journal of International Relations (21:2, 2015), 323-51, Finnemore, Sikkink, 
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explicitly pertain to diffusion given post-norm endorsement application to violating 
states,119 TANs are credited with agency for diffusion via similar methods.120 Price thus 
concludes that TANs are important for normative agenda setting, coalition building, solution 
development and implementation, given authority derived from their expertise, moral 
influence and claim to political legitimacy.121 Rodio and Schmitz demonstrate how self-
perpetuating HR INGOs have actually narrowed understandings of international norms to 
those reproduced by their activism.122 Khagram, Riker and Sikkink conclude “One of the 
primary goals of transnational advocacy is to create, strengthen, implement, and monitor 
international norms… international nongovernmental organizations and transnational social 
movements are emerging as a powerful new force in international politics and are 
transforming global norms and practices.”123  
 
Relatedly, scholars credit GCS for a role in not only shaping and implementing global 
norms, but in constituting TANs themselves.124 According to Kaldor, GCS encompasses but is 
not limited to civic networks, charities, NGOs, think tanks, commissions, activists, 
intellectuals, professionals, experts, nationalist or fundamentalist groups, workers, students, 
peasants, business corporations or any organisation “through which individuals can 
influence and put pressure on the centres of political and economic authority… (to) 
 
Price, “Reversing” 617,627-31, Bailey, “Arrested,” 292, Busby, MM, 49-56,63-5,271, Price, “Review,” 596, 
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“Prohibition,” 484-5,524, Lewis, “Conservation,” 82-3, Price, “Review,” 581-3, Weiss, Thakur, GG, 150,302, 
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Clair, Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2009), 4,15. 
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negotiate new social contracts or bargains at a global level.”125 Through a voice rather than 
a vote, GCS campaigns, lobbies, influences, educates, pressures, confronts, monitors and 
fights for rights and norms, driving norm diffusion and state socialisation.126 Weiss refers to 
such actors as the ‘Third United Nations’, crediting them with helping “to shifts ideas, 
policies, priorities, and practices that are initially resisted by governments and international 
secretariats.”127 Haas and Johnstone highlight the importance of a sub-set of GCS, epistemic 
and interpretive communities respectively, which they contend employ expertise to change 
public policy via credible truth claims and access to dominant political coalitions through 
states or IOs.128 Indeed, Bailey, for example, claims the lack of agreement amongst one such 
community played an important role in the failure of the international anti-commercial 
whaling norm.129  
 
Although much less prominent, scholars have also recognised the potential for indirect 
impact on norm diffusion by MNCs, in the event reputation or profits are affected, in 
anticipation of increased regulation, or simply via sustained interaction with government 
agencies, such as Stavrianakis’ state/industry ‘revolving door’.130 Each of these entities - 
TANs, INGOs, GCS, epistemic communities and MNCs - along with the individuals that 
comprise them, may be classified within the INEs described by Finnemore and Sikkink as 
agents that “call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, 
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interprets, and dramatizes them.”131 As Wunderlich explains, “Norm entrepreneurs figure as 
key driving forces for norm development by identifying new ideas as problem-solving 
devices.”132 IL scholarship also acknowledges non-state entities as “increasingly key actors in 
the development of international legalization” securing international norms via hard and 
soft international law.133 According to Risse, “One can probably go as far as to argue that 
there has rarely been a new normative issue on the international agenda which has not 
been promoted by transnational advocacy coalitions, INGOs, or epistemic communities.”134 
 
2.3.a.ii: International Organisations 
Other authors focus specifically on the role in which IOs, including UN agencies, 
international commissions, UN conferences, and representatives such as the UN Secretary 
General (UNSG), diffuse norms and drive socialisation as autonomous entities.135 Whether 
through advocacy, coercion, persuasion, channeling, exposure, shaming, sanctions, 
information definition, categorisation and dissemination, simple bureaucratic structure or 
enmeshment, interest convergence via institutional socialisation, acting as transnational 
regulatory networks, or merely providing the forum and shaping sustained interactions for 
‘consensus mobilisation’ among states and with others, IOs are credited for international 
norm development, reification, state endorsement and state socialisation.136 IOs are said to 
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build, shape, articulate, promote, establish, transmit and teach norms to states,137 as 
“conveyor belts for the transmission of norms… They are the missionaries of our time.”138 
McNeill and St. Clair conclude that IOs are the primary ‘response-able’ moral authorities in 
the international sphere with a duty to promote norms.139  
 
2.3.a.iii: State Suasion 
Other research focuses specifically on state capacity to influence norm adoption and 
socialisation, via deliberate or implicit suasion,140 the dominance of one state over another 
in an hierarchical and unequal international system,141 coalitions of like-minded or middle 
power states acting as ‘norm brokers’,142 provision/withdrawal of state support/resources 
to or pressure on behalf of INEs and IOs,143 conditional bilateral, economic, military or other 
assistance between states,144 public or private diplomatic suasion or sanctions, including 
within international bodies,145 embodiment of successful role models from which others 
may learn,146 or simple state behaviour, given norms are both products of, and influences 
upon, state actions.147 In this respect scholars note the importance of ‘critical states’: states 
particularly affected by, or capable of affecting, the norm in question, for whom 
endorsement is essential or who possess exemplary moral or political standing.148 According 
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to Patrick, “most successful norms have enjoyed the political sponsorship of at least one 
state.”149  
 
2.3.a.iv: Regional Suasion 
Additional scholarship notes the power of regional influences, including pre-existing 
regional normative structures,150 designated normative or thematic regional bodies,151 
subtler intended or incidental forms of regional institutional persuasion and diffusion,152 
conditionality clauses for membership of or relations with regional bodies or the provision 
of regional aid or assistance,153 simple geographic proximity and sensitivity “to the nuances 
of regional culture and practice,”154 or even geographic contagion through which states 
learn from or are positively influenced by their neighbours.155 Gilardi, for example, 
documents an anecdote of regional norm diffusion in South America when “Venezuela 
literally copied and pasted Mexico’s legislation: the Venezuelan legislation made reference 
to the wishes of the Mexican legislature and the need to be consistent with the Mexican 
constitution. Worse still, the original Mexican list had included Venezuela, and thus by 
copying the Mexican list, Venezuela succeeded in blacklisting itself.”156 Although rarely quite 
so patent, regional influence is thus said to impact international norm diffusion and state 
socialisation. 
 
2.3.a.v: World Context 
Finally, at the systemic level, analysts credit cataclysmic world events, dramatic 
transboundary threats, exogenous shocks, triggers, or simple permissive windows of 
opportunity as ‘critical junctures’ in which ‘ideational vacuums’ facilitate norm diffusion at 
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the global level.157 While scholars initially observed global normative change following 
periods of intense international upheaval, such as war,158 recent research recognises other 
crises - oil spills, nuclear accidents, genocide - as clarifying requirements for new solutions 
and prompting renewed focus on issue-specific norms.159 At a broader level, experts note 
the permissive or restrictive effects of systemic events, such as the end of the Cold War, the 
commencement of the US War on Terror, global technological innovations or certain UN 
reforms - the temporal context - as altering the normative structure within which norms rise 
or fall.160 Exogenous events, referred to as ‘world context’ or ‘world time’, are thus 
considered drivers of international norm diffusion and state socialisation.161 According to 
Weiss, the “birth and survival of ideas within the UN - or their death and suppression - 
invariably reflect events and are contingent upon world politics and the global economy… 
timing is everything.”162  
 
2.3.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
Challenging what presents as Western-centric notions of ‘good’ international norms 
‘taught’ to, if not coerced upon, “targets of socialisation” or ‘bad’ states via the above-listed 
attributes,163 responses to systemic-oriented scholarship focused on the capacities of states 
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to not only create but reshape international norms in accordance with national 
attributes.164 This was primarily contended by the third wave of norm evolution scholarship, 
which returned agency to the state not simply as a norm taker/follower but norm 
giver/setter in a ‘bottom-up’ “project of domestic social and political actors.”165 This wave 
argued the difference in timing, manner and extent of international norm adoption and 
state socialisation could only be explained through unit-level analysis, given that the 
international system remained constant while state responses to norms differed.166 
Johnston explains, “Clearly the pace, process, and outcome of socialisation inside one 
(international) environment will be affected by socialisation in a previous (domestic) 
environment. Actors are usually not blank slates when they enter new social 
environments.”167 Similarly, Zürn and Checkel conclude that “the effects of socialisation are 
often weak and secondary to dynamics at the national level… (We) have much to gain by 
‘bringing the domestic back in’.”168  
 
In this manner, state-level norm diffusion attributes comprise a type of filter for the 
socialisation of states into norm endorsement. They represent permissive or prohibitive 
conditions at the domestic level that operate as windows or shutters of opportunity for the 
drivers of socialisation at the systemic-level. As such domestic opportunity structures for 
norm diffusion and socialisation, national contextual settings warrant targeted analysis. 
According to Tholens and Groß, “Instead of remaining at the level of assessing the extent to 
which such domestic factors serve as ‘obstacles’ or ‘scope conditions’ for norm diffusion, 
however, the contributors have gained even more from studying these trajectories in their 
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 48 
own right.”169 This section thus considers state-level norm diffusion attributes in their own 
right - state agency via the ‘feedback loop’, national identity, domestic structural conditions 
(DSCs), domestic norm entrepreneurs (DNEs) and local salience - in order to determine 
precisely how much “the domestic constellation plays a crucial role”170 in revisionist state 
norm endorsement and purported socialisation. 
 
2.3.b.i: Feedback Loop 
In focusing international norm diffusion analysis at unit-level, scholars first observed the 
bottom-up origin of norms, wherein established domestic norms diffuse ‘up’ into 
international society. Acharya defined this as a process of norm subsidiarity, empowering 
and affording agency to non-Western, ‘Third World’, or otherwise ‘weak’ nations.171 
Subsequent theories proposed the opposite with ongoing processes of contestation leading 
to state reformulation of international norms domestically for internal implementation. 
Norms are adapted - not simply reframed or grafted but reconstituted - in accordance with 
local cognitive priors to enhance domestic ‘fit’. Prantl and Nakano, for example, “offer a 
dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that identifies how regional actors deconstruct and 
reconstruct global norms in order to make them fit domestic beliefs and identities.”172 
Acharya and others labelled this a process of constitutive norm localisation,173 while Wiener 
referenced alternative ‘meanings-in-use’ following international institutionalisation and 
interplay with divergent social and cultural practices.174 Norms are thus validated not 
through socialisation but deliberation, negotiation and resistance to socialisation by states, 
where local agency as a type of filter is paramount. Zwingel explains:  
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the notion of the local as sufficiently powerful to contest the homogenizing influence of 
globalization helps us see the complexity and variety of the many possible processes of 
‘norm implementation’… It represents a vision of contextualized self-determination that 
no idea or norm negotiated ‘‘somewhere’’ should be closed to further negotiation when 
applied ‘elsewhere’.175 
  
These theories explain divergent domestic implementation of norms, counter traditional 
norm-maker/taker dichotomies and contest the unadulterated operation of norm diffusion 
attributes as socialisation drivers in systemic-oriented scholarship.176 They also reflect IL 
scholarship regarding state use of reservations and declarations in international agreements 
to ascribe alternative normative meanings through qualified contingent treaty 
endorsement.177 
 
This research culminated in the contention that local norm alterations reflect back upon 
the international realm to revise global norm meanings.178 As Adler-Nissen noted, “the 
‘norm-taker’ may influence the normative order in ways that go beyond recent 
constructivist arguments about local norm reinterpretation and resistance.”179 The agency 
of the state in international norm diffusion is thereby further enhanced. While Finnemore 
acknowledged it earlier,180 Acharya coined the label ‘norm circulation’. Interweaving 
theories of subsidiarity with localisation, he outlined a two-way process of contestation 
between transnational moral agents and regional, domestic or local agents, in which norms 
are created either at the systemic level and constitutively localised, or formed locally and 
repatriated internationally during a period of contestation, reformulation and 
consolidation.181 Negrón-Gonzales and Contarino considered this process a normative 
‘feedback loop’ in which states not only accept international norms, but harness the power 
to reject or reshape them through hard or soft feedback in accordance with domestic norm 
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hierarchies.182 Prantl and Nakano conclude that during such feedback loops, “the norm has 
been reconstructed and deconstructed at the regional and national levels and fed back into 
the global discourse” to modify the very content of the norm.183  
 
Although often associated with purported emerging powers,184 this feedback loop 
reflects the overarching mutual constitution of agents and structures in the international 
system. It occurs explicitly, as Hurd explains, when states are “both socialized to norms and 
strategic calculators that manipulate them… (reflecting) the mutual constitution of state 
practice and international norms.”185 And it occurs implicitly through an adaptive and 
evaluative process of mutual feedback when “Agents’ internal rule models coevolve with 
their social context (including international norms) – a context that their actions and 
interactions have created.”186 There is thus a symbiotic relationship between state 
socialisation and norm reconstruction via a process of mutual interaction.187 This process in 
which state agency in fact socialises and remoulds norms, thereby filtering and refining the 
work of systemic socialisation drivers, is characterised in this thesis as the ‘feedback loop’. 
 
2.3.b.ii: National Identity 
Deemed “a prior causal factor” and “filter” of norm diffusion and state socialisation,188 
national identity reflects how citizens and leaders envisage their state in terms of values, 
interests, ambitions and ethics. It is true that “states are never finished as entities,” “always 
in a process of becoming,” and “marked by an inherent tension between the various 
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domains that need to be aligned for an ‘imagined political community’ to come into 
being.”189 Nevertheless, identity may be defined as “the social meanings and practices 
through which an actor becomes distinctively recognizable or known as such, enabling the 
becoming of an acting ‘self’.”190 National identity thus comprises a complex confluence of 
dynamic material, socio-economic, historical, rhetorical and intersubjective factors, that 
may include but are not limited to linguistic, racial, ethnic, cultural, colonial/imperial, 
political, institutional, or military associations of belonging.191 Such conceptions shift in 
response to both internal and external stimuli,192 yet proponents claim they implicitly affect 
state receptiveness to the systemic drivers of socialisation and international norms. 
According to Hooghe, the “institutions of one’s country of birth also tend to be most 
influential…. (humans) acquire basic beliefs about democracy, freedom, community, race, 
and rudimentary political allegiance and partisanship during adolescence… So an 
international official’s nationality comes with distinctive cultural baggage.”193 According to 
Fey, et al, the “impact of power status on policies is mediated by self-images, political 
traditions, domestic politics, and interests as defined by the ruling elites.”194 These directly 
impact state decisions regarding international norms and thus the efficacy of systemic 
socialisation drivers. National “ideological predispositions and conceptions of identity” 
thereby impact international norm diffusion.195  
 
This understanding of national identity encompasses conceptions of state preferences, 
political, strategic or organisational culture or ideologies and political will, frequently 
identified in scholarship as prerequisites for international norm diffusion.196 Political will, 
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culture and preferences are guided by self-image and national identity perceptions. 
Donnelly, for example, attributed South American amenability toward human rights norms 
to the legacy of persistent national political struggles against violations.197 Tannenwald 
documented how US self-perception as a ‘civilised nation’ led to the nuclear taboo, while 
Risse and Ropp demonstrated that modification of human rights policies in Morocco 
followed questioning of the enlightened identity and self-image of the monarch.198 Bailey 
contended the failure to associate the anti-whaling norm with a ‘liberal state’ identity 
contributed to its arrested development, while Sikkink showed that European adoption of 
human rights norms was in response to a perceived juxtaposition between European and 
Soviet national identities at that time.199 Meanwhile, both Simmons and Elkins, and Solingen 
and Börzel, demonstrated increased norm diffusion among states with similar cultural and 
religious identities,200 while Towns argued it may be either unimaginable - or alternatively 
imperative - for a state to endorse a given norm depending on its self-identity.201 Indeed, 
the association between norm diffusion and national identity lies within the very definition 
of norms: norms establish appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.202 
According to Hurrell, it is therefore “impossible to produce a credible account (of norm 
diffusion) without understanding, first, the particular historical construction of the states 
involved; secondly, the processes by which both interests and identities are created and 
evolve; and thirdly, the ways in which interaction and enmeshment reinforce these 
changes.”203 
 
2.3.b.iii: Domestic Structural Conditions 
A broad array of research contends that domestic structural conditions also affect 
international norm diffusion.204 DSCs incorporate political institutions, opposition 
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coalitions/party constellations, governance structures, state/society relations, domestic 
constituencies, economic development and stability, and/or public administration 
procedures.205 These structures impact state responses to international norms and 
socialisation drivers by influencing national identity,206 filtering norms in accordance with 
preferences,207 empowering/delimiting actor agency,208 constraining/enabling systemic 
attributes and DNEs,209 facilitating/hindering norm adherence/implementation,210 or 
impacting cost/benefit analyses of decision-makers. For example, whether a regime is a 
democracy, in which represented leaders ostensibly consider opinions of the electorate 
when determining international norm endorsement, or an autocracy, in which decisions 
may instead reside with unelected elites, reportedly impacts norm diffusion.211 The level of 
openness - the social and political porosity of a country to new ideas and international 
suasion – operates similarly, with domestic political change towards democracy frequently 
heralded as increasing norm endorsement.212 In this manner, DSCs reportedly influence 
state norm responses and filter systemic drivers of socialisation, thus impacting 
international norm diffusion. 
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2.3.b.iv: Domestic Norm Entrepreneurs 
Relatedly, scholars highlight the influence of domestic lobby groups, civil society 
movements, NGOs and individual activists - collectively termed DNEs – on socialisation 
drivers and international norm diffusion.213 Particular importance is attached to DNEs with 
direct access to decision-makers/making,214 however this is not essential given the 
boomerang, spiral and norm life cycle frameworks, for example, point instead to DNE 
indispensability for the causal effect of TANs.215 Although occasionally conceding 
insufficiency as a solitary variable, scholars nevertheless document DNE relevance in 
relation to local political dis/empowerment of a norm via framing to enhance/dispel 
domestic resonance, localise or maintain norm salience, shape society, rework and diffuse 
norms internationally, shame violators, educate and distribute information, pressure 
adoption, and facilitate or service implementation.216 DNEs therein hold significance both 
for the efficacy of systemic socialisation drivers and norm diffusion generally. 
 
2.3.b.v: Salience 
Finally, despite some IL scholarship recognising the seriousness with which states 
approach international treaty obligations,217 others argue norms may be endorsed given 
simple state indifference: acquiescence due to habit-driven behaviour, path dependency, 
signaling for other benefits, or mere lip service through international treaty endorsement 
for which there is no intention to implement in practice.218 Such endorsement likely only 
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occurs when norms hold low salience with the state in question.219 Salience is defined, 
according to Foot and Walter, “as the extent to which, in a given issue area, global norms 
and associated behavioural rules and principles impinge directly on the organization of 
domestic social and political life.”220 Johnston therefore reports that when “the issue at 
stake is highly volatile, is contested, and touches on the identities of majority and minority 
populations,”221 more than mere ‘persuasion’ from the systemic socialisation drivers is 
required for norm endorsement. Conversely, in their study on R2P, Negrón-Gonzales and 
Contarino conclude “Low-salience states… by definition lack strategic interests regarding 
R2P. These nations, without exception, either have been silent on R2P in international 
forums, or have embraced the norm… when it doesn’t really matter, norms do matter.”222 In 
this manner, high local salience may operate to filter out socialisation drivers, while minimal 
salience is expected to ease norm endorsement and diffusion. 
 
2.3.c: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
Elements of the above are echoed in the final category of attributes that reportedly 
impact international norm diffusion and the socialisation of states: characteristics of the 
norm itself. These attributes are drawn from norm evolution scholarship across the waves 
and may be considered enablers or impeders, or positive/negative force-multipliers, of the 
socialisation of states into norm endorsement. These attributes increase or decrease the 
likelihood of norm endorsement and the success of the drivers of socialisation at the 
systemic-level. Despite inevitable crossover between the levels of categorisation, norm-
related attributes comprise norm substance, internal characteristics, norm origin, domestic 
resonance, and international concurrence. 
 
2.3.c.i: Norm Substance 
First in this norm-related category is the ‘issue area,’ ‘character,’ ‘intrinsic nature,’ ‘social 
appropriateness,’ ‘legitimacy,’ ‘normative compliance pull’, ‘theoretical persuasiveness,’ 
 
219 Busby, MM, 52: when “an issue becomes temporally compelling to decisionmakers.” 
220 Foot, Walter, “Global,” 329-52. 
221 Johnston, “Conclusions,” 212. 
222 Negrón-Gonzales, Contarino, “Local,” 269 (emphasis mine). 
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‘intrinsic appeal,’ ‘intrinsic value,’ or ‘inherent attractiveness’ of the norm itself.223 
According to Evans, “Ideas matter... (they) are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.”224 Decision-makers may therefore be 
influenced by an idea they deem personally valuable or appropriate.225 Busby, for example, 
emphasises “the importance of morality and other motivations that were not strictly 
instrumentally rational or self-interested and how those concerns could lead to costly acts 
of altruism when policy gatekeepers believed those values to be important.”226 This 
attribute does not attach to the decision-maker, however, as Patrick notes, “international 
selection operates mainly on norms themselves, rather than on norm carriers… Potential 
norms must win over relevant experts and moral authorities within government and civil 
society on the basis of their theoretical appeal, ethical resonance, or practical relevance.”227 
 
Yet there is little consensus regarding what type of norm content or substance holds 
greatest influence. Initially, “the most important inducement” for international norm 
emergence is an issue that transcends national borders and requires a multilateral 
solution.228 Following that, Keck and Sikkink contend that most successful norms are those 
“involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals… and issues involving legal equality of 
opportunity,”229 while Donnelly argues that human rights norms in particular “have moral 
and political authority that goes well beyond their backing by power (force),”230 in what he 
terms “the ideological hegemony of the proposed project. The seemingly inescapable 
normative appeal of human rights.”231 Gertheiss and Herr refer simply to the compellability 
 
223 Combes, “Revisionism,” 1-37, Bailey, “Arrested,” 300-4, Price, “Review,” 598, Ayoub, “Contested,” 298, 
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 376-8. Similarly: Weir, “Ideas,” 88: the “power of vested interests is 
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225 Busby, “Jubilee,” 251, MM, 67, Tannenwald, “Taboo,” 462. 
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229 Keck, Sikkink, Activists, 27,204. Similarly: Hawkins, “Institutions,” 785-6. 
230 Donnelly, HR, 57,171-2. Also “State Sovereignty,” 145: “International HR policies rest largely on the fact that 
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231 Donnelly, HR, 195. See also: Price, “Reversing,” 616-9,640, Nadelmann, “Prohibition,” 481-90,524-5: import 
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of “basic notions of human dignity common to most cultures.”232 Others, however, contend 
the opposite. Thakur, for example, argues that “At the international level, one of the most 
likely arenas for normative dissonance is that of human rights, precisely because of 
alternative moral frameworks.”233 Charnysh, et al, claim “the inherently state-empowering 
crime-fighting approach is much more likely to appeal to a broader coalition of states than 
are human rights obligations toward foreigners.”234 Mazower similarly documents the 
“prudential limits to a morality-based foreign policy.”235 However, international security 
norms are deemed classically difficult to attain given contrasting “incentives for establishing 
such regimes and the obstacles to so doing are especially great in the security arena 
because of the ‘security dilemma’.”236  
 
Norm type enables or impedes the efficacy of other diffusion attributes and socialisation 
drivers and filters, with researchers reporting that environmental TANs experience greater 
success in states with open DSCs, while HR TANs hold greater effect in states deemed 
closed.237 Normative breadth and scope is also considered relevant, albeit with contrasting 
explanations. Reflecting the characterisation of norm-related attributes as socialisation 
enablers, Hooghe contends “Socialisation is more likely for norms that concern large or 
diffuse values in life.”238 Similarly, but with a divergent outcome, Zürn and Checkel argue 
“that socialisation is easier with respect to superficial as opposed to deeper, norms.”239 
Irrespective, the clout of a particular issue area and compellability of the substance of the 
norm is considered impactful upon international norm diffusion and may ease or hinder 
systemic socialisation drivers and filters. 
 
2.3.c.ii: Internal Characteristics 
Second, a norm’s internal characteristics, including its strength (prominence, universality, 
permanence, resilience, stability, durability or long-standing legitimacy despite challenges or 
 
232 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 19. 
233 Thakur, R2P, 3. 
234 Charnysh, et al, “Frames,” 332 (original emphasis). 
235 Mark Mazower, Governing the World (Penguin Press: New York, 2012), 395. 
236 Jervis, “Security regimes.” 
237 Smith, Johnston, “Globalization,” 7, Smith, “Conservation,” 76, Bailey, “Arrested,” 300, Busby, MM, 7. 
238 Hooghe, “Roads,” 71. 
239 Zürn, Checkel, “Socialised,” 251. 
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breach), and clarity (specificity, precision, internal coherence, simplicity or determinacy of 
guidelines/obligations for behaviour) operate similarly.240 According to Thakur, “A 
preliminary distinction can be made between ‘robust’ and ‘soft’ norms. Annika Björkdahl 
and Sean McMahon define robustness in terms of specificity (clarity of meaning and 
comprehension), durability (longevity) and concordance (how widely shared they are in the 
family of nations),”241 with ‘soft’ norms lacking one or more of these features and thus less 
likely to enable endorsement and socialisation. Doyle implicitly noted the weakness of R2P’s 
internal characteristics, for example, when he reported that its multiple understandings led 
to confusion over application,242 Hadden and Seybert contended the “shifting content” and 
“absence of increased normative cohesion” hindered the norm of sustainable 
development,243 while Bailey argued the lack of clarity and ambiguous requirements of the 
anti-whaling norm facilitated its reframing by oppositional groups and impeded adoption.244 
According to Percy, “Precision is an often cited feature of law, and moreover many scholars 
see a relationship between precision and the evolution of a norm.”245 
 
A minority of voices, however, argue the opposite. Krook and True contend “that norms 
diffuse precisely because — rather than despite the fact that — they may encompass 
different meanings, fit in with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse 
actors,”246 while Neumayer considers that human rights norms attract adherents precisely 
because “human rights treaties often use vague language that is open to interpretation as 
to its precise meaning.”247 Critiques similarly exist within IL scholarship, which note that 
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within “a number of well-established areas of international law with strong records of 
influence and compliance, norms are relatively imprecise,”248 while Percy argues that the 
very precision of the anti-mercenary norm led to its flawed legal articulation and weakening 
status.249 Thus, while internal characteristics of clarity and durability may prove portent, so 
may the malleability and vulnerability of the norm to reformulation in line with moderately 
divergent state interests.250 When assessing the relevant import of this attribute to norm 
diffusion and revisionist state norm endorsement, clarification of operation and impact of 
these parameters will be ascertained as well. 
 
2.3.c.iii: Origin 
Third, experts argue that deference to or respect for the perceived source of a norm - 
whether individual, state, regional or institutional251 - may also increase its attraction,252 
while doubt pertaining to origin legitimacy or manner of diffusion may prove a hindrance.253 
As such, norm origin may enable or impede norm endorsement and diffusion, and the 
socialisation drivers and filters. According to Zarakol, “Some may adopt norms just because 
they are Western, and others reject them for just that reason.”254 Acharya contends 
“receptivity to a new international norm is likely to be higher if the responsibility for its 
creation and diffusion is seen to be more broadly shared than being credited to any 
particular group… the origins and vantage points of the creators mattered.”255 From an IL 
perspective, Franck concurred, arguing that “countries are more likely to regard treaties as 
legitimate and are therefore more likely to support and comply with treaties that have been 
negotiated in a process that even less powerful countries regard as fair.”256 Kessler goes so 
far as to argue that the creation of perceptions of impartiality are essential for norm 
success: “norms need to be made stable in order to be able to ‘guide’ action and produce 
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‘positions’. Stability is gained by making the origin disappear, by (making) evanescence rule. 
In the end, the imaginaries of the market, law, and the public need to be represented as 
being impartial.”257 Norm origin or source is therefore deemed an important attribute of 
international diffusion, that may enable or impede state socialisation. 
 
2.3.c.iv: Domestic Resonance 
Resonance between the norm and local norm hierarchies/cognitive priors is also claimed 
to impact state responses to international norms. According to Negrón-Gonzales and 
Contarino, “local norms significantly drive positions unless a crisis or other strategic interest 
dictates otherwise.”258 While this may be viewed as comprising a state-level attribute, given 
its relevance relates to the resonance of the content of the norm with domestic 
environments, it is considered a norm attribute for the purposes of this thesis. Risse 
explains, “A ‘resonance’ hypothesis has been developed by students of international norms 
trying to explain their differential diffusion in domestic practices. The more new ideas 
promoted by transnational coalitions resonate with preexisting collective identities and 
beliefs of actors, the more policy influence they will have.”259 Busby concurs, arguing the 
importance of “messages (that) resonate with local value structures,” considering “cultural 
resonance” one of three crucial factors for norm endorsement: “countries are most likely to 
embrace normative commitments that are framed to fit with local cultural traditions. 
Frames that lack such a cultural match should be less successful.”260  
 
This was recognised early by Finnemore, who observed that “compromises arrived at 
may be contingent on local circumstances and personalities and are likely to reflect the local 
norms and customs with which international norms have had to compromise.”261 Klotz, 
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similarly, provided evidence that anti-apartheid sanctions were adopted in the US only once 
the issue resonated within domestic race relations, while the matter was initially ignored in 
the UK due to lack of domestic discourse on racial equality.262 Katzenstein also compared 
the effect of divergent domestic resonance upon norm adoption in post-WWII Germany and 
Japan.263 The norm’s fit with historically constructed local normative priors is thus pertinent: 
“the more congruent are the norms and behavioural expectations generated by domestic 
and international actors” the more likely a state will be to endorse them.264 Resonance of 
content between a norm and domestic normative hierarchies is therefore deemed an 
important attribute of international norm diffusion and may operate to enable or impede 
state socialisation. 
 
2.3.c.v: International Concurrence 
A similar argument holds at the international level. Although “global 
normative frameworks can be complex, multilayered and evolving phenomena that exhibit 
internal inconsistencies,”265 it remains rare for incompatible or contradictory norms to 
coexist at equal levels of preponderance upon endorsement.266 For this reason, normative 
concordance or at least coherence with pre-existing international norms, fundamental 
institutions and surrounding ‘social structure’267 - in what may be termed the international 
normative framework268 - is considered significant to norm diffusion and endorsement. 
While this attribute could also be categorised as systemic, the focus on the environmental 
resonance of the content of the norm also renders it best understood as norm-related for 
the purpose of this framework. Hurrell and Macdonald explain: “an interconnected 
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normative system in which historical development and the evolution of specific legal 
doctrines or concepts over time play a crucial role. Thus, the content of a particular norm 
and the degree of obligation that attaches to it is related to its place within this broader 
normative order.”269 According to Maley:  
Norms rarely emerge in virginal form. They arise in the context of concerns that have 
often long preoccupied those who seek to promote norms as solutions to political 
problems, and often take shape alongside other norms and rules that may have 
something to offer. It may be quite important that new protective norms not undermine 
existing normative structures.270  
 
Indeed, recent scholarship documents the increased resilience of norms embedded 
within stable, established ‘norm clusters’ - defined as “collections of aligned, but distinct, 
norms or principles that relate to a common, overarching issue area” - which represent a 
third, intervening layer between norms and the international normative structure.271 Risse 
and Ropp, for example, credit “the increasing strength and robustness of both the 
international human rights regime and the transnational advocacy networks,” for the rise of 
certain HR norms, Cottrell observes the importance of the prior Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons in enabling the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty, and Bellamy defends R2P 
with the argument “that consensus on R2P was possible precisely because it did not 
change—or even seek to change—the basic international rules governing the use of 
force.”272 The impact of resonance with international normative frameworks also operates 
in reverse, with Weir researching instances in which the “interaction of ideas and politics 
over time created a pattern of ‘bounded innovation’ in which some ideas became 
increasingly unlikely to influence policy,”273 thereby inherently enabling or impeding 
socialisation via norm endorsement simultaneously. Either way, as Patrick observes, the 
“direction of normative change (and the consolidation of protonorms into new collective 
standards) will be mediated by the norm’s logical, affective, and moral continuity with 
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current institutions and identities.”274 Normative concurrence with prevailing international 




These fifteen attributes comprise the analytical framework around which reasons for 
revisionist state norm endorsement may be identified and assessed. The respective impact 
and operation of each attribute is tested in three norm observation studies and a cross-case 
comparison establishes which among them most consistently influenced norm diffusion and 
endorsement in the revisionist state case. Determining which attributes thus far credited 
with norm diffusion hold such significance, both as anticipated in the norm literature 
outlined above or not, permits refinement of international norm diffusion theories. In doing 
so, arguments pertaining to state socialisation are also tested, given the inter-relation 
between international norm endorsement and the socialisation of states.276 Specifically, 
norm literature has been drawn upon to propose consideration of systemic norm diffusion 
attributes as drivers of state socialisation, state-level attributes as filters, and norm-related 
attributes as enablers of or impediments to socialisation. As Flockhart explains, socialisation 
“emanates from a socializing agent located outside the norm receiving domestic society” 
(systemic attributes), while state-level attributes act “as ‘filters’ because they determine the 
speed with which socialization might take place.”277 Through influencing norm endorsement 
these attributes thus contribute simultaneously to international norm diffusion and state 
socialisation.  
 
For the sake of parsimony, the analytical framework may be summarised as follows: 
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Figure 4: International norm diffusion attributes278 
 
While some scholars credit one attribute, others acknowledge a confluence. As already 
highlighted, many are quite obviously and inherently interrelated. It is unlikely that an INE 
will promote a norm if it is deemed redundant, incoherent or weak, for example, and 
whether DNEs hold influence may depend upon DSCs. Similarly, there is a relationship 
between the socialisation efforts of a regional body and the national identity, for example, 
of a state. As already indicated, some attributes also clearly operate on multiple levels. 
Given this, and despite inherent simplification, the following diagram provides a more 
accurate representation of the attributes and their interplay: 
 
 
Figure 5: Three interrelated levels of international norm diffusion attributes 
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Without occluding the potential existence of others – now, in the past, or in the future - 
these are the attributes overwhelmingly credited in norm scholarship, albeit often 
independently and occasionally in diverging ways via different case studies, as effecting 
international norm diffusion and state socialisation. However, little attention has been paid 
to addressing their respective impact and precise manner of influence within one 
consolidated and holistic study, to determine whether any configuration of attributes might 
prove prevalent. This is especially the case in relation to revisionist state norm 
endorsement, as Vreeland notes: “further research on the development of norms among 
authoritarian countries is required... Future work should explore how international pressure 
interacts with the domestic institutions of dictatorship.”279 As detailed in the next chapter 
on research design, this is precisely what this thesis addresses. 
 





This thesis tests the respective impact and manner of operation of attributes thus far 
credited in norm scholarship for international norm diffusion. It determines which attributes 
proved most influential to revisionist state norm endorsement and how. In doing so it 
discloses insights regarding the presumed socialisation process and why a purported 
revisionist state endorses international norms. It ascertains whether systemic norm 
diffusion attributes acted as drivers of socialisation, whether state-level attributes operated 
as filters, and whether norm-related attributes enabled or impeded socialisation as 
anticipated in associated literature. This chapter documents the approach through which 
answers to these questions have been obtained, analysed and assessed. It commences with 
an outline of the methodological design, listing scope conditions and the use of the fifteen 
norm diffusion attributes as descriptive variables via a qualitative process tracing 
methodology. The case studies are then outlined and justified, including the use of Cuba as 
a single state case study in conjunction with three norm observation studies. The chapter 
concludes with details regarding the empirical data from which assessments are made and 
conclusions drawn, including the method of collection and structure of subsequent analysis. 
 
3.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
3.1.a: Scope Conditions 
 
3.1.a.i: Micro-Level Analysis 
Noting that “the usual understanding of agents and structures as constituting the major 
forces of world politics is incomplete without an understanding of the processes of world 
politics,”1 this thesis focuses on the processes underlying international norm diffusion. The 
micro-processes that reportedly lead to the endorsement of international norms and 
potential state socialisation - the fifteen norm diffusion attributes – thus comprise the focus 
 
1 Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2. 
Smetana, Deviance, 33 concurs. 
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of analysis. They are the factors that “operate at an analytical level below that of a more 
encompassing theory; they increase the theory’s credibility by rendering more fine-grained 




Figure 6: Adaptation of Coleman’s Boat demonstrating the micro-level analysis of 
international norm diffusion attributes, which affect the macro-level international norm 
evolution process4 
 
As Hedström and Ylikoski argue, it is only through identification of such micro-level causal 
mechanisms, which generate macro-level observations, that deeper explanatory 
understanding may be attained.5 Specifically, according to Johnston “the ontology of social 
constructivism should point researchers squarely in the direction of these microprocesses… 
it may indeed matter a lot, when explaining state behavior… the value-added of the 
sociological turn in the international relations subfield rests heavily on showing what 
socialisation microprocesses look like, how they are supposed to work, and whether they 
 
2 Checkel, “Institutions,” 9. 
3 Per Wendt, Social Theory, 42,Ch. 4. 
4 Peter Hedström, Petri Ylikoski, “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences,” Annual Review of Sociology (36, 
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5 Hedström, Ylikoski, “Mechanisms,” 59. 
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matter in a very common sense way.”6 Akin to Wiener, this thesis therefore asks what works 
on norms and norm diffusion, with particular regard to revisionist state norm endorsement, 
rather than the broader question regarding how norms work.7 It thus deviates “the focus of 
the study from how ‘the ought becomes the is’ to how ‘an ought is made an is’,”8 especially 
“when seen from the periphery.”9 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, these micro-level attributes are distinguished from their 
own underlying or associated techniques, mechanisms, resources, tools or strategies. These 
sub-elements are diverse yet interrelated and include discursive tools (argument, 
persuasion, framing, grafting, branding, praising, shaming), bargaining strategies (coercion, 
signaling, competition, diversion, deception, circumvention, symbolic action utility 
maximization), socialisation mechanisms (emulation, learning, role modeling, educating, 
information campaigning, advertising, interpreting), and material resources (sanctions, 
communication technology, economic capabilities, security threats, aid donations, foreign 
investment, trade flows). The disaggregation between the micro-level attributes and these 
sub-element techniques remains unclear in norm scholarship due to divergent lexicon. For 
while Towns refers to the latter as useful taxonomies,10 O’Faircheallaigh labels them 
ideational and material strategies or resources,11 Solingen and Börzel term them causal 
mechanisms,12 Moravcsik refers to policy instruments,13 Johnston socialisation 
microprocesses,14 Gilardi diffusion categories,15 Tholens and Groß instruments,16 Sunstein 
 
6 Johnston, States, xiv-xv,17-20,44. For lack of and need for such analysis: Alderson, “Socialization,” 416, 
Patrick, “Evolution,” 140, citing Ruggie: “corresponding micropractices that may have transformative effects 
must be identified and inventoried.” 
7 Wiener, Norms, 8. See also: Bernd Bucher, “Acting abstractions,” EJIR (20:3, 2014), 742-65. 
8 Almagro, “Boomerangs,” 8. 
9 Epstein, “Symposium,” 121. 
10 Towns, “Norms,” 184-5. 
11 O’Faircheallaigh, “IR,” 155-176. 
12 Solingen, Börzel, “Introduction,” 173-87. See also: Börzel, Risse, “Introduction,” 14. 
13 Moravcsik, “Explaining,” 160-78. 
14 Johnston, “Institutions,” 495-506. Similarly: Johnston, States, 22-32,197-8. Prantl, Nakano, “Diffusion,” 209-
18, Price, “Reversing,” 616-23, True-Frost, “Council,” 180-5, Finnemore, Sikkink, “Dynamics,” 895-905, Ryan 
Goodman,Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States,” Duke Law Journal (54:3, 2004): “non-coercive acculturation.” 
15 Gilardi, “Diffusion,” 460-9. Also: Dietmar Braun, Fabrizio Gilardi, “Taking ‘Galton’s Problem’ Seriously,” 
Journal of Theoretical Politics (18:3, 2006), 299, Florini, “Evolution,” 375-80, Miles Kahler, “Evolution, Choice, 
and International Change” in Lake, Powell, Choice, 165-82. 
16 Tholens, Groß, “Diffusion,” 251. 
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tools,17 Busby a coercion-conversion continuum,18 and Checkel mechanisms that “connect 
things; they are ‘recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a specific 
outcome’.”19 The attributes that comprise the focus of this study are none of these. Rather, 
to paraphrase Weber, the attributes under analysis here operate as the switchmen at 
railway junctions that determine the trajectory along which norms proceed, as opposed to 
the tracks - or underlying mechanisms - upon which they travel.20 
 
3.1.a.ii: Norm Endorsement 
The point of conclusion of analysis, given specific focus on the norm diffusion period, is 
Cuban ratification of the treaties embodying the norms in question. Although norms remain 
contested following official international recognition and may also crystallise in the absence 
of legal codification,21 the point at which a treaty embodying a norm enters into force 
symbolises what Price describes as the reversal of the burden of proof for a norm.22 The 
norm contained within that treaty is deemed to have attained broad international 
acceptance at that time.23 Ratification, or when an international norm is institutionalised 
within a national legal system - as opposed to simply signature, which represents an intent 
to codify - thus demonstrates official norm endorsement by a state for the purpose of this 
thesis.24 Treaty ratification, rather than signature, thus mitigates allegations that 
endorsement may be a figurative gesture entailing no intention to comply, rendering debate 
regarding the motivations behind norm endorsement futile.25 Instead, the critical juncture 
represented by treaty ratification aligns with the stage described by True-Frost as “a distinct 
moment in the process of diffusion when an actor formally acknowledges and declares a 
 
17 Sunstein, “Norms,” 948-52. 
18 Busby, “Jubilee,” 250-1. 
19 Checkel, “Institutions,” 6-14. Also: “Norms,” 477-9, “Comply,” 559-63. Busby, MM, 6,15-6,39, Martin, 
Simmons, “IOs,” 335, Hooghe, “Roads,” 66, Ayoub, “Contested,” 298, Tannenwald, “Taboo,” 462-5. 
20 In John Hall, “Ideas and the Social Sciences” in Goldstein, Keohane, Ideas, 48. 
21 Martha Finnemore, Stephen Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’,” International Organization (55:3, 2001), 
743-58, Khagram, “Santiago,” 15, Puchala,Hopkins, “Regimes,” 88-9, Abbott,Snidal, “Law,” 456, Betts, Orchard, 
“Introduction,” 9-10, Abbott, et al, “Legalization,” Sarah Percy, Mercenaries, 246. 
22 Price, “Reversing,” 617,631-3. Similarly: Patrick, “Evolution,” 162, Busby, MM, 8-9. 
23 Finnemore, Sikkink, “Dynamics,” 900-1, Puchala, Hopkins, “Regimes,” 64, Betts, Orchard, “Introduction,” 8, 
Katzenstein, “Terrorism,” 269, Khagram, et al, “Santiago,” 14-5, Wiener, “Meaning,” 191, Koremenos, IL, 8-9. 
24 Betts, Orchard, “Introduction,” 5, Hawkins, “Institutions,” 782. 
25 Hurrell, Macdonald, “Ethics,” 72, Alderson, “Socialization,” 418-20, Busby, MM, 37, Bernstein, “Ideas,” 467. 
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particular norm’s relevance to its work.”26 According to Percy, “The creation of international 




The dependent variable in this research is international norm endorsement signified by 
treaty ratification. Given this, there is no variation in behaviour outcome and this represents 
a study of similarity. Such research is beneficial given that “studies of similarity can allow 
investigators ‘to eliminate some hypothesised causes, which can be a useful first step in 
causal analysis.’”28 This thesis does so by employing and assessing the fifteen international 
norm diffusion attributes as descriptive independent variables. Empirical analysis of their 
respective impact across three norm studies in a ‘competitive test’ permits delineation of 
which most frequently influenced norm endorsement by a revisionist state, and whether 
any particular configuration of variables proves common.29 In doing so it addresses Patrick’s 
call that: 
It will be the task of future research to address the intriguing implications of multiple 
selection pressures operating simultaneously on the transmission of international 
norms… what determines which one has the greatest impact?… The several selective 
forces identified above are unlikely to possess equivalent importance for the global 
evolution of norms. To determine their relative weight, investigators will need to conduct 
qualitative research on historical instances of normative change.30 
 
This thesis responds directly to this call and determines which of the attributes frequently 
credited for international norm diffusion held impact over revisionist state norm 
endorsement, both as anticipated in associated theories and the analytical framework 
outlined in chapter two, or otherwise. 
 
 
26 True-Frost, “Council,” 117. 
27 Percy, “Mercenaries,” 387: “the utility of law is that it serves an expressive function, formally restating social 
values and norms.” 
28 Finnemore, Interests, 25-26, quoting Collier: “Theoretical anomalies should be investigated, and if those 
anomalies are anomalies of similarity, then we need methods to investigate similarity.” 
29 Tannenwald, “Taboo,” 439: competitive tests permit empirical evaluation of autonomous influence of 
variables, despite lack of complete autonomy amongst them. 
30 Patrick, “Evolution,” 163. 
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Given the focus on norms endorsed in UN treaties, the variable of IO suasion remains 
somewhat constant across the case studies. As Gourevitch conceded, “Research cannot 
proceed effectively by putting all variables into play… methodological bets are vital.”31 
However, as will be demonstrated, important insights regarding the application and 
influence of this attribute are nevertheless gained. By incorporating three levels of 
attributes, this thesis also adopts Reus-Smit’s notion of holistic, as opposed to systemic, 
constructivism. It accommodates “the full spectrum of conditioning factors, forego(es) the 
parsimonious elegance of systemic theorizing” and sets out to determine “how domestic 
and international social phenomena interact to condition the norms and rules that structure 
international orders.”32 Indeed, according to George and Bennett, “it is useful to develop 
models that incorporate both agent-centred and structure-centered mechanisms, so that 
theories can address how certain kinds of agents… operate in certain kinds of social 
structures.”33 
 
As Zionts notes, “Prior to engaging in the case study analysis, it is also necessary to 
operationalise the variables.”34 The following indicators, derived from associated literature, 
provide a guide for assessment of the variables in each case study: 
 
Level Attribute Indicators 
Systemic 
Attributes 
IO suasion Involvement of IO, or its representatives, in public support 
for/encouragement of norm; facilitation or establishment of 
negotiating bodies, committees, conferences, conventions, treaties 
to further norm; decision-maker reference to IO impact. 
Regional 
suasion 
Involvement of regional organisation, or its representatives, in 
public support for/encouragement of norm institutionalisation; 
prior regional codification, declarations, plans of action regarding 
norm; decision-maker reference to associated regional 
commitments or institutional support/suasion. 
 
31 Gourevitch, “Governance,” 164. Also: Yee, “Effects,” 84: to avoid infinite regress, instead of attempting to 
provide ideal explanatory text, analysts should rather explain parts of this ideal and key causal mechanisms, 
Finnemore, Interests, 5: “The cases do not and, indeed, cannot ‘prove’ that this approach is ‘right’. Proof of 
this kind is impossible in social inquiry. They can, however, demonstrate its utility.” 
32 Reus-Smit, Purpose, 166-7. Similarly: O’Faircheallaigh, “IR,” 156, referencing Price. 
33 Alexander George, Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 145. 
34 Zionts, “Revisionism,” 641. 
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State suasion Public/private, direct/indirect, encouragement from other states to 
develop/endorse norm; references to meetings/dialogue with other 
state representatives encouraging norm formalisation/ 





Public/private pressure from INEs to endorse norm; representative 
meetings with decision-makers; effective lobbying at/involvement in 
international forum; campaigns to shame/lobby state endorsement; 
decision-maker reference to INE activities/suasion. 
World context Decision-maker reference to influence/importance of global event, 





State representative reference to particular values, ideals, events, 
culture, history, ideologies, beliefs, policies said to embody national 
principles, identity, priorities, ambitions in relation to norm.35 
Feedback loop Whether state has interest/power to influence, contest, reformulate 
norm according to stated preferences; whether norm changed in 




Whether state political/institutional structure impacted norm 
endorsement - governance regime, functioning of legislature, 
executive, judiciary, electoral process, civil society, political culture, 
economic situation - per decision-maker reference in national 





Public/private pressure from DNEs to endorse norm; meetings with 
state representatives; effective lobbying at/involvement in relevant 
national/international forum; campaigns/protests aimed at suasion; 
decision-maker reference to DNE activities/suasion. 
Salience Whether norm pertains to important, controversial, prominent, 
consequential domestic issue, according to government statements, 





Long-standing public attitudes within prior legislation, policy, official 
declarations endorsing/rejecting norm; prior legislation, policy, 
support for contradictory norm; sympathetic reporting for norm in 
domestic press; national rhetoric in support of norm.37 
Origin Whether state respects purported/ostensible origin of norm per 
positive/negative statements regarding/relations with source. 
International 
concurrence 
Complementarity with international normative structure; 
concurrence/contradiction of key norm elements with pre-existing 
international norms, law, rules, UN resolutions, initiatives, 
conferences, prevailing discourses, international norm hierarchies, 
fundamental institutions. 
 
35 Gurowitz, “Diffusion,” 311. 
36 Cortell, Davis, “Understanding,” 70-2. 




Clarity, specificity, prominence, resilience, universalism or 
malleability of norm according to negotiation records, decision-
maker statements, expert observations.38 
Substance Import of overarching norm issue-area; decision-maker reference to 
immanent power/appeal/persuasiveness of norm content, import, 
paramountcy, urgency, non/derogability, non/universality. 
 





The goal of this thesis is to test the respective influence of the fifteen variables in relation 
to the specific case of a revisionist state. While ‘perspectivism’ is employed for this purpose 
- “foregrounding, and mining, the particular, without already collapsing it back (yet again) 
onto the universal”39 - research findings facilitate the making of provisional generalisations 
regarding norm diffusion models, processes of socialisation, and conceptions of 
revisionism.40 An interpretivist, qualitative epistemology and process tracing methodology 
forms the foundation for this testing of external criteria and norm diffusion theories in three 
norm observation studies.41 Process tracing provides the most appropriate avenue to 
identify the manner in which causal variables interact, or not. According to George and 
Bennett, “Process-tracing is particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for deviant 
cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by existing 
theories… Process tracing of deviant cases offers an opportunity to differentiate and enrich 
 
38 Panke, Petersohn, “Norms,” 725: “precision/imprecision of norms is operationalized through the extent to 
which norms have clearly defined procedures… vague norms entail complex undefined concepts, indistinct or 
conflicting procedures, and exceptional clauses that increase the interpretational leeway.” 
39 Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 10: theorising without universalising: “What is eschewed here, specifically, is a 
particular form of theorising that conflates the general with the universal. The latter is a specific form of 
generalising that works to erase its own standpoint… the ‘vision from nowhere’.” 
40 Gayatri Spivak, “Subaltern Studies” in Ranjit Guha, Gayatri Spivak (eds), Selected Subaltern Studies (New 
York: OUP, 1988), 17: “Theoretical descriptions cannot produce universals. They can only ever produce 
provisional generalisations, even as the theorist realises the crucial importance of their persistent product.” 
41 Christian List, Laura Valentini, “The Methodology of Political Theory” in Herman Cappelen, et al, The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophical Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14-9, Hurrell, Macdonald, 
“Ethics,” 60-4, Beth Simmons, Daniel Hopkins, “The Constraining Power of International Treaties,” American 
Political Science Review (99:4, 2005), 623, Roger Spegele, Political Realism in International Theory (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1996), 231-43, Busby, MM, 10-1, Andrew Moravcsik, “Trust, but Verify,” Security Studies (23:4, 2014), 
663-4, Andrew Bennett, Jeffrey Checkel (eds), Process Tracing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
4,18: “use of evidence from within a case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case.” 
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the general theory.”42 Process tracing also most effectively reconstructs decision-making 
processes, albeit inevitably incompletely,43 to ascertain what motivated Cuban decision-
makers to endorse the norms under analysis. As noted by Busby: 
If we want to understand both motivation and how the policy came together, ‘process 
tracing’ offers a way to understand the entire chain between cause and effect. Process 
tracing is a kind of qualitative case study method that political scientists use to look in 
detail at how decisions were made all along the way and, to the extent we can know, 
how they were justified internally and externally.44 
 
The fifteen norm diffusion attributes are therefore compared, contrasted and ultimately 
assessed for import and manner of influence across the three norm studies through a 
process tracing lens. Based on the broad range of IR and IL scholarship on international 
norm evolution, this methodology satisfies Bennett and Checkel’s ‘meta-theoretical’ 
standard, by reconstructing previously hypothesized causal processes within broader 
structural-discursive contexts alongside consideration of alternative pathways and 
equifinality.45 
 
Despite limitations surrounding “our inability to adequately penetrate the human 
consciousness” and determine precise reasons for behaviour,46 examining discourse 
provides key evidence of motivating factors, especially in relation to “ideational 
phenomena” and norm endorsement.47 According to Klotz:  
Focusing on consistencies in assumptions within decision-making processes - evident in 
discourse - reduces our dependence on divining individuals’ thoughts and motivations… 
and offers a tool for tracing changes in dominant global norms to the domestic decision-
making processes. Examining discourse is a key area for applying process-tracing 
methodologies.48 
 
Motivations and intentions are best understood not through actions or behaviour, but 
analysis of communicative processes and speech acts: decisions - and, crucially, 
 
42 George, Bennett, Case, 212-5. 
43 Spegele, Realism, 233-5. 
44 Busby, MM, 49. Keck, Sikkink, Activists, 34-5, Santa-Cruz, “Constitutional,” 670, Rhoads, Peacemaking, 11. 
45 Bennett, Checkel, “Tracing,” 21. George, Bennett, Case, 157,215, define equifinality, ‘multiple convergence’, 
‘plurality of causes’, and ‘multiple causality’ as multiple causal pathways to similar outcomes. 
46 Nadelmann, “Prohibition,” 480. Similarly: Steenbergen, et al, “Deliberation,” 26,43. 
47 Patrick, “Evolution,” 136, Vivien Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism,” Annual Review of Political Science 
(11:2, 2008), 305-13, Cortell, Davis, “Understanding,” 71-7, Hadden, Seybert, “Norm,” 254, Checkel, “Norms,” 
482-3, Wiener, Constitution, 74-5, Finnemore, Interests, 23-4, Gillies, “Reputational,” 104, Yee, “Effects,” 94-5. 
48 Klotz, Norms, 33. 
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justifications for them - emerge through communicative argumentation.49 Articulation 
immanent to such argumentation reveals stimuli for decisions and the “meanings on which 
action is then based.”50 This is particularly the case for norms embodied in international 
treaties given “Legalization entails a specific form of discourse, requiring justification and 
persuasion in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts.”51 Language matters. 
Justifications provide unique insights into factors that influence decisions. Even if actors 
misrepresent genuine motivations,52 they become entangled within rhetorical ‘self-
entrapment’, with behaviour changing according to ‘rhetorical momentum’ and ‘discursive 
validation’.53 The language or rhetoric employed may reflect, for example, the compelling 
content of the norm itself, the impact of particular external influences, ideological 
alignment, or structural constraints. Analysis of the communicative trail leading to 
international norm endorsement thus provides key insights into influencing factors. As 
Crawford concludes, “argument analysis is a way to understand and explain normative 
change in world politics.”54  
 
While cognisant of inescapable power plays within all communicative forays,55 what state 
representatives say and the language they use to justify decisions thus provide evidence of 
these motivations and help identify which attributes hold most power in the norm diffusion 
process. According to Doty, discursive evidence may be found in “the numerous 
memorandums, intelligence reports, and research papers that circulate within policy 
circles… Even speeches and press conference statements produced for specific purposes.”56 
The actors comprising the focus of study are thus the relevant decision-makers, diplomats, 
 
49 Roxanne Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” International Studies Quarterly (37:3, 1993), 302-5, 
Phillips, “Violence,” 150, Steenbergen, et al, “Deliberation,” 25-6, Hawkins, “Institutions,” 784, Risse, “Argue,” 
7-11, Kratochwil, Rules, 5-8,13,29-32,43, Charnysh, “Frames,” 328-3, Klotz, Norms, 29-30, Finnemore, Sikkink, 
“Dynamics,” 892, Krook, True, “Rethinking,” 105, Cortell, Davis, “Clash,” 9, Sandholtz, “Dynamics,” 106-9. 
50 Weldes, “Interests,” 285. 
51 Abbott, Snidal, “Law,” 429. 
52 Tannenwald, “Taboo,” 439, Busby, MM, 47-8, Kelley, “Evolution,” 37. 
53 Risse, “Argue,” 32-3, Risse, Ropp, “HR,” 276, Patrick, “Evolution,” 160, Yee, “Effects,” 94-5. 
54 Crawford, Argument, 2. 
55 Iver Newmann, “Discourse Analysis” in Audie Klotz, Deepa Prakash, Qualitative Methods in International 
Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), 70-3, Krook, True, “Rethinking,” 105. 
56 Doty, “FP,” 303. Also: David Howarth, Yannis Stavrakakis, “Introducing discourse theory and political 
analysis” in David Howarth, et al, Discourse Theory and Political Analysis (New York: Manchester University, 
2000), 4, Hadden, Seybert, “Norm,” 254, Bennett, Checkel, “Tracing,” 33-4, Busby, MM, 49.  
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civil servants, political elite and ‘policy gatekeepers’.57 As Ikenberry and Kupchan note, “For 
norms to have a consequential effect on state behavior, they must take root within the elite 
community.”58 Doty agrees: “the state, as an international subject, is constructed by the 
discursive practices of those who speak about, write about, and act on its behalf.”59 The 
medium comprising the primary focus of study is therefore the respective treaty 
deliberations.60 The statements, opinions and insights of state representatives attending the 
relevant international conferences, committees, deliberations and debates, alongside 
decision-makers within the Cuban government and foreign ministry, were examined to 
interrogate how each attribute affected responses. Through the prism of process tracing 
analysis, motivations behind Cuban endorsement of the three international norms is 
reconstructed and the most significant norm diffusion attributes identified.61  
 
3.2 CASE STUDIES 
 
3.2.a: Single State Case Study 
 
The fifteen attributes therefore represent Ostrom’s “complex array of variables as a 
framework rather than as a model” - a map of the broad terrain, or family of models, that 
generally account for all complexity or available options.62 The goal of this research is to 
narrow this general map of norm diffusion to identify the model that best addresses the 
particular puzzle of the paradigmatic, crucial, deviant case. The revisionist state is crucial 
given it is least likely to exhibit the given outcome of norm endorsement and thus presents 
 
57 Busby, MM, 55-63,255,266-70. 
58 Ikenberry, Kupchan, “Socialization,” 284,294,314. See also: Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, “Let Us Now 
Praise Great Men,” International Security (25:4, 2001), 133-6, Checkel, Ideas, 5-10, Morrison, “Austerity,” 175-
207, Caniglia, “Alliances,” 155-8, Putnam, “Diplomacy,” 456-8, Solingen, Börzel, “Introduction,” 174-84, Young, 
“Political,” 281-308, Krasner, Sovereignty, 7-9, Weldes, “Interests,” 281-3, Desmond King, “The establishment 
of work-welfare programs in the United States and Britain” in Steinmo, et al, Politics, 242. 
59 Doty, “FP,” 310. 
60 Charnysh, et al, “Frames,” 332-3, Elgström, “Negotiations,” 472: “norm spread is the result of both 
communicative action and strategic interaction, in this case labelled norm negotiations… focus on the 
elements of negotiation in norm diffusion processes is therefore necessary.” 
61 Akin to Checkel, “Comply,” 565-6.  
62 Ostrom, Governing, 214-5, given information is complex and dynamic, theorists are not omniscient 
observers and human error renders all theoretical models incomplete. 
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utility for hypothesis testing.63 The case is deviant in that current theories cannot predict, 
and are unable to explain why, such a revisionist state would in fact endorse international 
norms.64 According to George and Bennett, such a single state case study, in conjunction 
with multiple ‘no variance’ norm observations,65 is appropriate in this instance given the 
detailed, specific information that may be generated for theory testing and development 
purposes.66 Gerring agrees:  
The researcher hopes that causal processes identified within the deviant case will 
illustrate some causal factor that is applicable to other (more or less deviant) cases. This 
means that a deviant-case study usually culminates in a general proposition, one that 
may be applied to other cases in the population.67 
 
In this instance the deviant population pertains to revisionist states and the overall model 
for refinement is international norm diffusion. A single deviant state case study is 
particularly apt given the lack of prior dedicated analysis to revisionist state norm 
endorsement. To paraphrase Paddon Rhoads, this approach thus ‘provides a strong 
empirical base, which allows for additional case research and conceptual refinements. To 
include a second or third case would have required sacrificing depth for the sake of breadth. 
Given the paucity of conceptual analysis on revisionist states as well as the intrinsic 
importance of the Cuban case, objectives of (complete) generalizability are less applicable in 
this context.’68 Nevertheless, given this ‘hard-case design’, the attributes identified as 
holding most impact in this least likely case will arguably resonate in others.69 
 
 
63 John Gerring, “Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis” in Janet Box-Steffensmeier, et al (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Methodology, (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008), 659-64. 
64 Deviant/outlier cases are those in which “outcomes are not what traditional theories would anticipate”: 
George, Bennet, Case, 75, Gary Goertz, James Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 186-8. 
65 When case selection is based around the same dependent variable: here, international norm endorsement. 
66 George, Bennett, Case, 13,32-3,76,81,215, contra Gary King, et al, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). Also: Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research,” 
Qualitative Inquiry (12:2, 2006), 230, Rhoads, Peacekeeping, 13: the “rigorous single-case research approach 
chosen here allowed me to go narrow and deep, and is necessary to explicate in sufficient detail the process.” 
67 Gerring, “Selection,” 15.  
68 Paddon Rhoads, Peacekeeping, 13. Similarly: Busby, MM, 10-1: “to explore the outliers and difficult cases 
and to understand causal processes more clearly… to explore in some depth country cases for which many of 
the dominant accounts… have some difficulty explaining.” 
69 Zangle, “Judicialization,” 832. 
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Like the deviant case, this study is also paradigmatic in that it seeks to “develop a 
metaphor or establish a school for the domain that the case concerns,”70 in this instance, 
explanations for norm endorsement by purportedly revisionist states. This contributes to 
theory development by refining current understandings of international norm diffusion.71 It 
performs a building block role by addressing a gap in the scholarship regarding the specific 
phenomenon sub-type of norm endorsement by revisionist states via hypothesis testing, the 
charting of relevant causal pathways and variable conjunctions, and, ultimately, provision of 
a typological theory.72 According to George and Bennett: 
typological theorising attempts to outline the conditions under which a particular causal 
mechanism has a defined effect, and the differing effects it has in different contexts, by 
modeling recurrent combinations and interactions of mechanisms. In short, typological 
theorising offers the promise of cumulation without losing sensitivity to context.73  
 
A typological theory is particularly appropriate given it develops complex contingent 
generalisations based upon recurrent conjunctions of certain variables derived from 
multiple observations within a single case study.74 Haas’ caveat is also apt: “To avoid even 
the appearance of inflated claims, I maintain that the typological argument I offer falls short 
of constituting a theory… (these) are not full explanations of what happened… I am not 
testing my approach against rival explanations because other approaches are not rivals.”75 
This concurs with one of the goals of this thesis to refine rather than rival existing theories 
regarding norm diffusion in accordance with outcomes from this single paradigmatic deviant 
case. This is important, as George and Bennett note, given “identification and analysis of 
deviant cases and of cases characterized by equifinality are useful for developing contingent 
generalizations... The importance of developing conditional generalizations of limited scope, 
a form of middle-range theory, is emphasized.”76 Put simply, this research works “with a 
single case study to generate a working hypothesis for follow-up studies.”77 
 
70 Flyvbjerg, “Misunderstandings,” 230-3. 
71 George, Bennett, Case, 20. 
72 Cortell, Davis, “Understanding,” 86, George, Bennett, Case, 76-8,215: “Each block - a study of each subtype - 
fills a ‘space’ in the overall theory or in a typological theory… Its generalisations are more narrow and 
contingent than those of the general ‘covering laws’ variety that some hold up as they ideal, but they are also 
more precise and may involve relations with higher probabilities.” 
73 George, Bennett, Case, 12,32,149,207. 
74 Ibid, 146-9. 
75 Haas, Knowledge, 7-9. 
76 George, Bennett, Case, 216. 
77 Wiener, Constitution, 71. 
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Conceding the dynamism of revisionist perceptions, which fluctuate temporally, spatially, 
thematically and agentially,78 Cuba is employed for the time period and purpose of this 
study as a classic paradigmatic revisionist state. Cuba consistently condemned the 
international order under perceived US unipolarity within national discourse,79 and publicly 
and frequently upheld that “Our best contribution to the future of us all is resistance. And 
we will resist, for Cuba and for all humanity.”80 To quote Cuba’s Central Party Committee, 
“We will never comply with the ‘status quo’ that imperialism intends to impose on 
humanity, nor its draconian laws nor its peddlers of morality without scruple.”81 In practice, 
Article 12 of the Cuban Constitution “espouses the principles of proletarian internationalism 
and the combative solidarity of the people,” in which Cuba “considers that its help to those 
under attack and to the people that struggle for their liberation constitutes its 
internationalist right and duty; recognising the right of the people to repel imperialist and 
reactionary violence with revolutionary violence,” and basing its relations “on socialist 
internationalism, and the common objectives of the construction of the new society:”82 
ideals that directly contradicted dominant liberal capitalist orders. According to Wunderlich, 
“export of the revolution was a key ideological element of Castro’s vision for the country,”83 
which “reject(ed) the very idea of a world order shaped by Western - or rather US - 
hegemony and… advocate(d) alternative normative visions with strong anti-imperialist 
traits.”84 
 
78 McKeown, “Regress,” 10, Hurd, “Breaking,” 44, Goffman, Stigma, 163-4, Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 470, 
Combes, “Revisionism,” 24, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 154, Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 15,21. 
79 Nidia Diaz, “Cumbre de la Tierra: La esencia de sus debates,” Granma (28:94, Sat 9 May 1992), 6, Anon, 
“Comenzó con polémico tema última ronda negociadora de la Cumbre de Río,” Granma (28:96, Wed 13 May 
1992), 5, Orfilio Peláez, “A las puertas de ECO’92: Defender el derecho a la vida,” Granma (28:105, Tue 26 May 
1992), 3, Fidel Castro, “Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo: Suplemento 
Especial - Mensaje de Fidel,” Granma (28:120, Sun 14 June 1992), 1-8, Gustavo Robreño, “Cumbre de la Tierra: 
balance y perspectivas: Sin esfuerzo conjunto del Primer and Tercer Mundos no habrá soluciones,” Granma 
(28:123, Sat 20 June 1992), 5, Jesus Cutiño, “Concluyó realmente la guerra fría?” Granma (29: 262, Fri 31 Dec 
1993), 10, Felix Astudillo, “Solos o acompañados?” Granma (30:49, Thu 10 Mar 1994), 3, Adler-Nissen, 
“Stigma,” 166, Lana Wylie, “Special Case of Cuba,” International Journal (67:3, 2012), 670-1. 
80 Juan Bosque, “Discurso de Juan Almeida Bosque,” Granma (28: 183, Fri 4 Sep 1992), 5. 
81 Comité Central Del Partido, “Declaraciones del Comité Central Del Partido,” Granma (3:125, Thu 18 May 
1967), 8. Also: Anon, “Vietnam se ha convertido en la bandera,” Granma (4:258, Fri 25 Oct 1968), 7. 
82 E/CN.4/1989/46,10-11.  
83 Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 87. Also: Rogue, 263, Wylie, “Cuba,” 684, R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and 
International Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 1986), 61-2, Zionts, “Revisionism,” 648, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 168, 
Jervis, “Socialization,” 611: “the desire to remake the world is one central revolutionary impulse.” 
84 Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 90. 
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Voting preferences in the UNGA demonstrate that Cuba has most frequently and 
consistently voted against the “US-led liberal order” since the 1959 revolution.85 Politically, 
the regional Organization of American States (OAS) suspended Cuba in 1962 due to its 
communist government, and Cuba rejected its 2009 attempted reconciliation claiming 
ongoing subjugation and US subservience.86 Economically, Cuba withdrew from the 
International Monetary Fund in 1964 and co-founded the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas in 2004 to counter US economic influence and global neoliberal order.87 
Ideologically, by viewing the international as an arena of global class struggle rather than a 
society of states, Cuba also effectively disputed prevailing normative foundations and core 
understandings of legitimacy and justice in international relations, thereby aligning with 
conceptions that revisionists “do not just question the normative foundations of existing 
political institutions and regulations; they frequently seek to institute radically different 
concepts of political order.”88 According to Adler-Nissen, Cuba created its own 
“independent value system,” when it established a separate ‘system of honour’ to reject 
discriminatory labels proffered by the US against alleged rogue states.89 
 
Cuba’s persistent and public attachment to a political, economic and ideational identity 
in direct contradistinction to the prevailing US-led liberal world order - despite economic 
embargos, diplomatic rebuke, IO ostracism and material and social costs90 - reflects one of 
the realist perspectives of revisionism as comprising a clear articulation of revisionist goals 
(statements) coupled with willingness to pursue them at cost (behaviour).91 Such 
“fundamental resistance to key elements of an order”92 also aligns Cuba with the 
hypernationalist revisionist ideology identified by Miller as additionally integral to 
 
85 Bailey, et al, “Preferences,” 441-4. 
86 Wylie, “Cuba,” 669-70, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 169. 
87 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 168, Wylie, “Cuba,” 671. 
88 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 11. See also: Thakur, R2P, 144, akin to USSR: Müller, “Arguing,” 424. 
89 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 168,172. 
90 Rodolfo Casals, “Introduce EE.UU. clima de confrontación en debates: Comisión de Derechos Humanos,” 
Granma (25:51, 1 Mar 1989), 1,6, Editorial, “David, Goliat y los convidados de piedra,” Granma (28:105, Tue 26 
May 1992), 3. Davidson, “Revisionism,” 125-6.  
91 Davidson, “Revisionism,” 126,129, Zionts, “Revisionism,” 632-3,641 referencing Wolfers. 
92 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 13. 
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revisionism.93 In accordance with Gertheiss and Herr’s observation that “Dissidence 
manifests when actors claim to be opposed to rule or when representatives of a dominant 
order denounce others as lawless troublemakers,”94 Cuba not only self-identified and acted 
as a revolutionary entity but was also broadly perceived as such. Indeed, Cuba is 
consistently referenced as one of the key revisionist actors in IR.95 In real world discourse, 
successive US administrations have labelled Cuba a ‘backlash state’, ‘outpost of tyranny’, 
‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’, and amongst the ‘confederation of terrorist states,’ ‘Troika of 
Tyranny,’ ‘Triangle of Terror,’ ‘wolf pack of rogue states’ and “outlaw states run by the 
strangest collection of misfits, loony tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the 
Third Reich.”96 In scholarship, Adler-Nissen identifies Cuba as the prime example of a 
counter-stigmatiser: Cuba “openly challenged US military and political power” and re-
ordered dominant moral discourses to ultimately render the stigmatiser the transgressor.” 
Accordingly, “Through counter-stigmatisation, Cuba has become a symbol of resistance to 
US imperialism and a pluralist international society.”97 Cuba thus also aligns with the most 
extreme conception of revisionism proposed by Cooley, Nexon and Ward, the revolutionary 
state, which “rejects and challenges the international status quo at its most basic levels… 
the hegemonic leadership of the system and/or the constitutive norms, principles, and rules 
that undergird the system’s hierarchic and normative structure.”98 Cuba embodied the ideal 
paradigmatic deviant state case study required for this research. 
 
 
93 Miller, “Revisionist,” 94. 
94 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 12,15-6 (emphasis mine): “dissidence as an empirically observable 
phenomenon may be looked at in two ways - either as ‘self-ascribed’ or as ‘other-ascribed’… when actors are 
accused of violating the fundamental rules of the game… and when actors style themselves as political 
renegades rising up against oppression.” See also: Evers, “Transgression,” 789, Gurowitz, “Diffusion,” 310. 
95 O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” 305-6, Hawkins, “Responses,” 426, Chan, “Satisfaction,” 211, Elkins, Simmons, 
“Waves,” 41-2, Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 464-8, Müller, “Evilization,” 483, Smetana, Deviance, 46-9, 
Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 81-7, Homolar, “Rebels,” 711, Hoyt, “Rogue,” 302-9, Richard Falk, “Human 
Rights in Capitalist and Socialist Third World Countries,” Universal Human Rights (1:2, 1979), 29. 
96 Refer: Anon, “US expands ‘axis of evil’,” BBC News, 6 May 2002, John Bolton, “Remarks by National Security 
Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Administration’s Policies in Latin America,” The White House 
Statements, 2 November 2018, Tina Nguyen, “The White House’s ‘Troika of Tyranny’ is now a ‘Wolf Pack of 
Rogue States’,” Vanity Fair, 16 January 2019, Karen DeYoung, “Trump administration announces new 
measures against Cuba,” The Washington Post, 17 April 2019, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 165-7, Geis, Wunderlich, 
“Good,” 464, Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 82-3, Rogue, 58-60. 
97 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 169. Similarly: Schultz, “Caught,” 37. 
98 Cooley, et al, “Revising order,” 8. Additionally: Ward, Status, 2: radical revisionist. 
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3.2.b: Multiple Norm Observation Studies 
 
Selection of the three norm studies was based on Cuban treaty ratification in the 1990s, 
a period during which both Cuban rejection of the purported unipolar international order99 
and US containment of ‘rogue states’ was heightened: “According to the former National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake, the United States as the sole superpower ‘has a special 
responsibility… to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually 
transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international 
community’.”100 The timeframe also aligns with Cuba’s troublesome ‘Special Period’, when 
state leaders would likely have been preoccupied with urgent domestic considerations 
rather than international norm endorsement.101 Yet, according to Figure 2, it was 
nonetheless a period of increased international treaty accession by Cuba.102 This restricted 
time period of analysis also ensures comparison of cases across consistent systemic and 
national environments, so that both domestic and international political opportunity 
structures are as static as possible. For case selection purposes, data obtained from the 
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99 Miguel Rivas, “Otra prueba de la unipolaridad,” Granma (29:10, Thur 14 Jan 1993), 4. Also: Vasuki Nesiah, 
“Resistance in the Age of Empire” in Falk, et al, IL, 216, Ikenberry, et al, “Unipolarity,” 6-10, Combes, 
“Revisionism,” 32: “the current system and international order is clearly dominated by western, predominantly 
American, ideas and norms.” 
100 Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 467. Also: Jabri, “Colonial,” Rajagopal, “Counter-hegemonic,” 66, Astudillo, 
“Solos o acompañados,” 3, Cutiño, “Concluyó realmente la guerra fría,” 10: “Even though, according to some 
theories, the cold war officially concluded in December 1991, imperial policies with respect to Cuba have 
acquired more dramatic nuance since then.” 
101 Further: E/CN.4/1992/27,29, E/CN.4/1993/39,31-32, E/CN.4/1992/SR.34,19-20, 
E/CN.4/1992/SR.34/Add.1,4, E/CN.4/1995/52,6-7,20, Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report, 
1991 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1991), 73. 
102 United Nations Treaty Collection Depository pertaining to Cuba: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?clang=_en.  
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Environ. Convention on Biological Diversity Rio de Janeiro 
05/06/1992 
08/03/1994 
Economic International Sugar Agreement, 1992 Geneva 
20/03/1992 
14/10/1994 
HR Agreement establishing the Fund for the 
Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin 




HR Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 




Economic Grains Trade Convention, 1995 London 
07/12/1994 
16/10/1995 
Other Agreement to establish the South Centre Geneva 
01/09/1994 
17/11/1995 
Security United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 




Environ. United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification in those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, 




Security Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 




Environ. Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on 





Figure 8: List of international treaties ratified by Cuba during the 1990s103 
 
Given the logic of this inquiry, norms that Cuba was least likely to endorse were selected 
for analysis.104 As outlined in the opening section of each empirical chapter, these cases 
involved high anticipated material, legal or financial costs, alternative ideological pre-
dispositions, allegations of Cuban breach and/or opposing Cuban foreign policy statements. 
 
103 United Nations Treaty Collection, Participant Search for Cuba, filtered by Ratification and Date of Deposit: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?clang=_en.  
104 Busby, MM, 47-8: “By looking for cases where countries acted against their short-run, material interests or 
where their material interests were not clear-cut, we can get a better handle on what drove decision-making.” 
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In order to minimise the potentially biased effect of heterogenous issue area selection and 
enhance a level of contingent generalisability, norms were chosen according to three 
different issue areas; the environment, security and human rights. In accordance with these 
scope conditions and in light of Figure 8, the following norms, reflected in the below UN 




Norm Convention Cuban 
Ratification 
Environ. Conservation of 
Biological Diversity 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 08/03/1994 
HR Prohibition of 
Torture 
UN Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) 
17/05/1995 
Security Elimination of 
Chemical Weapons 
UN Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and 




Figure 9: Table of International Norm Case Studies 
 




Multiple sources of information have been collated, examined and assessed to address 
the question regarding why Cuba endorsed these norms. First, rarely accessed, let alone 
analysed, primary source archives from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) 
provided detailed correspondence between Cuban delegates, ministries and ministers 
regarding Cuban positions and priorities on respective treaty deliberations and norm 
development.105 Although inevitably incomplete, these documents offered an impressive 
and unique array of confidential and extremely valuable insights. Second, articles from the 
Party-run state newspaper, Granma, were combed for national public discourse regarding 
 
105 Accessed from Archivos del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, Avenida de los Presidentes, La 
Habana, Cuba, March-April, May-June 2019. The author assumes responsibility for all translations. 
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each norm throughout the respective periods of international negotiation.106 Third, the full 
range of relevant UN reports and convention negotiations were examined, including, for 
example, every verbatim plenary report of the UN Committee/Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) for the CWC between Cuban membership in 1979 and CWC adoption in 1993, each 
summary record of the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) that referenced the agenda 
item on torture until 1996, and minutes for every session of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Governing Council throughout CBD negotiations.107 
Fourth, associated INGO reports and daily bulletins were reviewed alongside, fifth, post-hoc 
reporting from diplomats directly involved in respective negotiations. As elaborated further 
below, interviews were not undertaken as originally intended with Cuban decision-makers. 
Finally, secondary sources provided further context, contentions and insights regarding the 
diffusion and Cuban endorsement of the three norms. 
 
3.3.a.i: CWC 
A wealth of UN records was analysed for the international norm to eliminate chemical 
weapons as reflected in the CWC, with particular attention to each CD plenary meeting 
record from the first in 1979 to the 648th following CWC adoption in 1993, Ad Hoc 
Committee on Chemical Weapons (AHC) Reports 1982-1992,108 all associated UNGA First 
Committee Verbatim Records between 1977-1993, as well as annual records from the UN 
Yearbook on Disarmament. Granma articles referencing CW were scoured between 1966-
1993, employing the Diario Granma Archives Index as an initial search tool,109 although with 
manual attention to key dates beyond that. Of crucial import, however, was primary source 
material from MINREX Archives, 1960-1995, which explicitly and critically recounted 
detailed norm negotiations and Cuban perspectives. These holdings provided 
comprehensive correspondence between Cuban ministries, departments, military experts 
and ministers with delegates, diplomats and others regarding CWC negotiations. Although 
 
106 Accessed from Biblioteca Nacional José Martí, Avenida 20 de Mayo, La Habana, Cuba, August-September 
2018, March-April 2019. The author assumes responsibility for all translations. 
107 To spare the reader footnotes of even greater length, all UN documents are cited by report number only. A 
fully itemised primary source bibliography may be obtained from the author upon request, or records are 
available to access from the UN Document Depository at https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp. 
108 AHC minutes/verbatim records remain unpublished and unavailable for analysis. 
109 Latin American Network Information Center, The University of Texas, Austin: 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/granma/.  
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available records were unquestionably incomplete, and omitted highly classified material, 
they nevertheless provided a great deal of otherwise unobtainable and unique insight into 
motivations behind Cuban CWC endorsement. Over 450 pages of notes were taken for 
these primary source materials in this case study alone. Post-hoc records from CWC 
negotiators, including Australian delegate Trevor Findlay, but also, more importantly, one of 
the Cuban delegates, Dr. Magda Solés, complemented additional secondary source material 




For the international norm to prohibit torture represented in the CAT, the myriad of UN 
reports, draft conventions, resolutions and summary records on the topic were analysed 
from 1948 to the conclusion of CAT negotiations in 1984, including from the UNGA Plenary, 
Third Committee, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, CHR plenary and issue-specific Working Group 
(WG).110 Given that Cuba did not ratify the treaty until 1995, CHR and CAT Conference of the 
Parties’ (COP) reports were also analysed between 1985-1996. MINREX archives pertaining 
to HR and CHR deliberations for the period 1978-1995 were requested. Although an 
unknown number of documents were not made available, particularly classified CAT-related 
documentation between 1980-1984, documents between 1978-1979 and 1985-1995 
contained revelatory private missives between Cuban CHR delegates and government 
departments and ministers, including lengthy and meticulous reports of CHR sessions, and 
external correspondence between Cuban representatives and the UN, Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), socialist allies and others. These similarly provided rare and very 
valuable insights into Cuba’s international HR strategy and decisions regarding the CAT. 
Granma articles between 1978-1995 were also analysed in relation to both the norm to 
prohibit torture and CAT negotiations, signature and ratification. Fourth, Amnesty 
 
110 WG minutes also remain unavailable: J. Herman Burgers, Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention 
against Torture: A Handbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), v: “The principal source materials 
which have been published are the seven reports submitted by the Working Group to the Commission on 
Human Rights during the period 1978-1984. No records were made of the deliberations in the Working Group. 
Most of the proposals tabled in the course of these deliberations had the form of conference room papers that 
have not been published. Several interesting details of the elaboration of the Convention are registered only in 
the memories of those who took part in the drafting work.” 
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International (AI) Annual Reports between 1977-1996 were reviewed, alongside post-hoc 
reporting from individuals directly involved in the negotiations, including Antonio Cassese, 
former Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities that recommended the CHR WG in 1977, Nigel Rodley, former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, 1993-2001, and head of AI’s Legal and Intergovernmental 
Organisations Office, 1973–1990, and Burgers and Danelius, CHR CAT WG Chairman-
Rapporteur, 1982-1984, and Swedish CD representative and CWC informal consultations 
chair respectively.111 Finally, secondary sources provided additional insights regarding  CAT 
evolution and endorsement. 
 
3.3.a.iii: CBD 
Primary source material was first obtained for the norm to protect biological diversity as 
embodied in the CBD from the Granma archives at the National Library of Cuba. Having 
previously employed the Diario Granma Archives Index as an online search mechanism to 
obtain references for articles pertaining to biological diversity, biotechnology, the CBD or 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), hard copies were examined 
alongside additional manual searches across key dates. Although occasionally incomplete, 
deteriorated or somewhat illegible, these articles nevertheless provided profound insights 
on key Cuban concerns, priorities, motivations and stances in relation to the norm as 
presented to the domestic public. UN reports regarding CBD negotiations between 1987-
1992 were also canvassed, including associated UNGA Resolutions, UNEP Governing Council 
sessions, WG, Intergovernmental Negotiating Committees (INCs) and UNCED PrepCom 
reports.112 A third source of valuable primary source material was obtained via the daily 
INGO Earth Negotiations Bulletins produced during UNCED PrepCom IV and UNCED, which 
attendees reported “was required reading for delegates and press… many of the official 
diplomatic telegrams which were sent back each night to capitals relied heavily on the 
Bulletin’s concise and well-informed reports. UNCED in reality was a many-ringed circus, but 
somehow the Bulletin’s reporters managed to be wherever they needed to be.”113 First-
 
111 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, v,31. 
112 CBD International Secretariat Documents Manager Officer confirmed WG/INC verbatim records/minutes 
remain published and publicly unavailable. 
113 Stanley Johnson, The Earth Summit (London: Graham and Trotman, 1993), 3. 
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hand material was also sourced from post-hoc recordings by those directly involved in 
negotiations, such as UK delegates Fiona McConnell and Stanley Johnson, Danish 
representative and regular WG Chairman, Veit Koester, Chilean representative and INC 
Chairman, Vincente Sanchez, head of the Swedish delegation, Ulf Svenssen, and UNCED 
Secretary-General, Maurice Strong. Finally, a range of secondary sources provided 
additional details and insights. 
 
3.3.b: Obstacles and Challenges 
 
As with the majority of the INGO reports, approximately half of the primary source UN 
documents were available online, and accessed through the UN Official Document 
system.114 Those not electronically accessible or yet to be digitised were nevertheless 
available in hard copy from the UN archives depository within the LSE Library Special 
Collections: months were spent at the LSE Library Women’s Reading Room pouring through 
over 600 CD Plenary reports and six years’ worth of UNEP GC reports, for example. The LSE 
and British Libraries also provided access to the large range of post-hoc but first-hand 
accounts of negotiations and relevant secondary sources. Both the Granma articles and 
MINREX documentation, however, required in-country fieldwork and ultimately rather 
challenging first-hand archival research. What follows illustrates the difficulties faced in the 
course of this research. The aim is neither to excuse nor explain any potential deficiencies in 
the findings, but to serve as a cautionary tale for those considering similar research. 
 
3.3.b.i: First Fieldwork, August-September 2018 
An initial scoping expedition was undertaken to Havana, Cuba, during August-September 
2018. The purpose of this trip was to secure an individual academic exchange with the 
Universidad de Habana, attempt to locate interviewees identified as Cuban diplomats in 
relevant treaty negotiations, and obtain access to the Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba José 
Martí and Archivo Nacional de la República de Cuba. Whilst I had previously sought contact 
with each of these entities from London via email and web-based queries, the rare 
responses received were not conducive to contact during this trip. Once in-country, I was 
 
114 https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp.  
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unable to locate intended interviewees and the University was closed for summer vacation. 
I was able to talk my way into the National Archives, despite its purported summer closure, 
however quickly ascertained that the majority of its records were pre-1950 and thus of little 
utility for this research. At the National Library I was able to register for access to special 
collections and obtain historical copies of Granma. However, the process was agonisingly 
slow: given the summer holidays, the library was only open publicly between 10am and 1pm 
during weekdays - when it was not suddenly and frequently closed for fumigation - with 
Granma requests restricted to one month per request and between a 15 minute but quite 
often one hour delay between request and receipt. Owing to the arbitrary closures, already 
restricted hours, limit on requests, and delay in receipt of documents - in addition to 
external personal impediments surrounding access to basic necessities and daily food 
provisions - only 20 to 30 Granma articles were able to be accessed, read, translated and 
noted on average per week. 
 
3.3.b.ii: Second Fieldwork, March-April 2019 
Three goals were attached to the second fieldwork trip to Cuba. The first was to 
complete all Granma research, which proved successful. The second was to make contact, 
secure and undertake interviews with Cuban diplomats identified as involved in negotiations 
for the three treaties under consideration. I had obtained necessary institutional ethics 
approval, compiled required consent forms and interview briefs, and confirmed the list of 
potential interviewees and their possible locations. The list, unfortunately, had contracted 
quite considerably due to the death of or inability to locate many of the former diplomats. 
As an example, of the 12 Cuban delegates and decision-makers identified as involved in CBD 
negotiations, three had passed away, three were aged in their 80s but unable to be located, 
no trace could be found of five since their involvement in said negotiations, and one was 
identified as fired from the government under mysterious circumstances, however working 
from a particular medical clinic in Havana as of February 2019. I managed to locate the 
clinic, wind my way through its labyrinthine halls to find the individual, introduce myself and 
my research, and request an interview. The individual refused to be interviewed, however, 
citing the length of time since CBD negotiations as the reason for refusal. Other attempted 




Semi-structured interviews were thence removed as a primary source for this research 
and replaced with the third goal of this trip: access to MINREX Archives. Following 
recommendation from a Cuban academic who had previously worked for MINREX, I 
contacted two institutes in Havana to request Archival access; the Instituto de Historia de 
Cuba (IHC) and Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales (ISRI). Once again, I had 
attempted prior contact via both email and online queries with no success. Once in Cuba 
however, I was able to locate the IHC, present my letter of introduction and wait a few days 
for a meeting with the Director. Whilst obliging and supportive, the Director kindly advised 
there was nothing the IHC could do as I required authorisation from ISRI. I repeated the 
process at ISRI, again waiting several days to secure an interview and introduction with the 
relevant Director, and again being told that I would actually first require a letter of 
authorisation and support from the IHC. The entire process commenced again, however on 
this occasion the IHC Director provided a letter of authorisation, which I was then able to 
submit to the ISRI Director, who undertook to process the authorisation over the next few 
weeks. Naturally, on the very day of my departure from Havana, I received notification that 
my authorisation request had been processed and I had been granted approval to access 
the MINREX Archives. 
 
3.3.b.iii: Third Fieldwork, May-June 2019 
During my fortnight return to London following the second trip, US sanctions against 
Cuba were raised, the Venezuelan crisis exacerbated diminished Cuban access to crucial 
imports, national rationing had been implemented and daily survival became an even 
greater struggle.115 Upon arrival my only bank card was cancelled due to purported 
suspicion of fraud and I spent the following three weeks without access to any funds, 
trekking across Havana to plead for assistance from every bank, potential money transfer 
outlet, and multiple embassies. In conjunction with a prior early morning visit by an 
unidentified officer in uniform requesting biographical and travel details, scant access to 
food or basic necessities and an inability to pay for even a bottle of water let alone 
 
115 Anon, “Cuba to increase rationing amid shortages,” BBC News, 11 May 2019, Pascal Fletcher, “Cuba’s 
government mocked by stampede of ostrich memes,” BBC News, 24 April 2019. 
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accommodation or travel to the airport, this period involved personal challenges. In terms 
of research, I returned to ISRI the day after my arrival, a Monday, only to be told that they 
could not find my authorisation and to return the following day. I returned the following day 
to be told they had found the authorisation, however the head librarian was away so I must 
return, again, the following day. I returned on the Wednesday, however was granted access 
only to the ISRI library rather than MINREX Archives: although this proved useful as I 
fortuitously obtained access to Solés’ thesis on the CWC, it was not the access I had been 
led to expect. ISRI again undertook to resolve the issue, however given MINREX Archives 
were only open on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays between 09:00-11:00 and 14:00-
16:00, ISRI asked me to return the following Friday. Upon return I was advised the Archives 
were closed given only one specialist was available during the morning and the building was 
shut for fumigation that afternoon. 
 
It was not until the following Monday, therefore, that I was first permitted access to the 
MINREX Archives and finally obtained an initial tranch of requested material. Within the 
hour, however, I was asked to pack up and leave given my authorisation letter was ‘not 
specific enough’: a new authorisation letter was required specifying the precise range of 
requested documentation. The process began again and I spent the remainder of the week 
between the IHC and ISRI attempting to secure renewed authorisation and approval. I finally 
obtained access the following week, however while granted general access, each document 
was reviewed and filtered before receipt, with varying degrees of permission depending 
upon the rigour (or boredom) of that session’s minder. The Archives were also repeatedly 
and randomly closed - whether due to purported flooding, an electrical outage, water 
shortage, staff training, Fathers’ Day, the anniversary of Che’s death, the anniversary of 
Che’s birthday, the anniversary of a battle Che commandeered, the anniversary of Che’s 
appointment as Director of the Bank of Cuba - and the opening hours were increasingly and 
inexplicably shortened, until sessions were called off half way through and eventually 
cancelled completely. Nevertheless, for the duration of this fieldwork only two other 
scholars obtained such access, and both reported refusal of access to other colleagues. 
Furthermore, the Archives provided a wealth of unique and valuable information that 
compensated a great deal for the absence of interview data. Ultimately, as the following 
case studies demonstrate, these trials and tribulations were ‘vale la pena’ (worth it). 
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3.3.c: Analytical Structure 
 
Results obtained from this data are presented in the following three empirical chapters: 
the first pertains to the CWC, the second the CAT, and the third the CBD. Each chapter 
follows the same structure to facilitate cross-case comparison. Each commences with a brief 
introduction of the norm and its respective international treaty, including definition and a 
general timeline of evolution. To establish the least likely aspect of each case, reasons for 
anticipated norm rejection by Cuba as a revisionist state are outlined. Given the goal of this 
thesis is to test the respective import and manner of operation of attributes credited for 
international norm diffusion, empirical analysis is then undertaken with regard to each, 
sectioned according to level and type of influence. Each analysis therefore begins with the 
attributes that held the greatest influence in accordance with expectations set out in the 
analytical framework. The next section then documents the attributes that held influence, 
however not as anticipated in associated literature, indicating need for revision of the 
overarching framework. The attributes that held negligible influence over the case in 
question are then considered, highlighting the need for greater amendment of, or at least 
prioritisation within, the analytical framework. Following individual case analyses, 
comparisons are drawn across cases in the penultimate chapter to identify correlations or 
consistencies regarding the attribute variables, and assess what results might mean for 
understandings of international norm diffusion, socialisation and revisionism in IR. The final 
chapter summarises these conclusions, outlines their contribution to both scholarship and 
practice, and identifies important avenues for further research. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY NORM 




Figure 10: ‘Impact of denunciation by Fidel Castro of suspicions that the US develops 




English language scholarship on the international security norm to ban chemical weapons 
(CW), as represented within the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction (CWC),2 allocates credit for norm codification primarily to the US and 
secondarily to the USSR3 and ‘Australia Group’ - a “group of advanced industrial states (that) 
 
1 Anon, “Repercusión ante denuncia de Fidel Castro sobre sospechas de que EE.UU. desarrolla guerra 
bacteriológica contra Cuba,” Granma (17:177, Tue 28 July 1981), 5. 
2 https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention.  
3 Trevor Findlay, Peace through Chemistry (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, 1993), 3-6, Floyd Bloom, 
“Editorial: Ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Science (276:5310, 1997), 179, George Quester, 
“Mismatched Deterrents,” International Studies Perspective (1:2, 2000), 175, Walter Krutzsch, et al, 
“Introduction and General Issues” in Walter Krutzsch, et al (eds), The Chemical Weapons Convention (Oxford: 
Oxford Public International Law, 2014), 8. 
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first met in 1984 to harmonise their (chemical) export control policies”4 - particularly in the 
context of the end of the Cold War and in response to Iraqi employment of CW in the 
1980s.5 Kelle, for example, contends that “the exercise of compulsory power by a limited 
number of states – the two superpowers plus, to a lesser degree, the fifteen participants of 
the Australia Group – served as a catalyst for institutional development to occur at the 
global level.”6 Similarly, Morel argues “Western democracies have been the major driving 
force behind the convention.”7 Yet this prevailing narrative neglects a large part of the story 
behind the norm’s international diffusion and, particularly, its endorsement by Cuba.  
 
This chapter presents a more holistic picture that offers two unique contributions to both 
international norm and CWC-related scholarship. First, while recognising the significance of 
certain norm diffusion attributes, analysis reveals the impact of some differed dramatically 
from that conceived in associated literature and outlined in the analytical framework. 
Indeed, the lack of influence as expected - particularly from systemic socialisation drivers - 
raises doubts regarding the purported socialisation of revisionist states via norm 
endorsement. Second, the most significant attributes facilitating norm endorsement in this 
case in fact related to the recalcitrance and threat posed by the US, and not traditional 
rogue states. Revealingly, this case thereby documents the endorsement and attempted 
appropriation of an international norm by a purported revisionist state seeking to constrain 
the hegemon, rather than endorsement via revisionist state socialisation as anticipated in 
norm scholarship. 
 
The chapter commences with an introductory section that defines the norm as embodied 
in the CWC, provides a general timeline for international diffusion, outlines reasons for why 
Cuban norm rejection was anticipated, and delineates the resulting puzzle of Cuban 
endorsement. Employing the table of indicators outlined in Figure 7 as the basis for 
 
4 Alexander Kelle, “Power in the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Regime and the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” International Politics (55:3-4, 2018), 404. See also: James Seevaratnam, 
“The Australia Group,” The Nonproliferation Review (13:2, 2006), 401-15, Müller, “Agency,” 339. 
5 Fey, et al, “Established,” 166-70, Müller, “Change,” 149-50, Findlay, Peace, 10-2, Quester, “Deterrents,” 175. 
6 Kelle, “Power,” 403-8,417. 
7 Benoit Morel, “Verifiability and Enforceability of the Chemical Weapons Convention” in Benoit Morel, Kyle 
Olson (eds), Shadows and Substance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 231. Also: Findlay, Peace, 5-9 credits 
“renewed Western resolve, Australian ingenuity.” 
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assessment, analysis is then undertaken of the impact of each norm diffusion attribute set 
out in the analytical framework. The attributes that held sway over Cuban endorsement as 
anticipated are detailed in the first section. The next considers those attributes that held 
influence, however not quite as expected, while the penultimate section identifies 
attributes with negligible effect. The chapter concludes with a review of preliminary 
conclusions drawn from this case.  
 
4.1.a: Definition of Norm 
 
Akin to all international treaties, the CWC comprises a range of norms, including CW 
demilitarisation and non-proliferation, international assistance and protection, and 
cooperation in the peaceful employment of chemistry.8 However, the “main purpose of the 
CWC is to abolish all chemical weapons… (an) ambitious task of eliminating an entire class of 
weapon from the world,”9 through the dual ‘fundamental goals’ of “complete, irreversible 
and verified destruction of existing CW stockpiles… (and) prevention of re-emergence.”10 
The CWC is thus not simply a ban on CW use, as embodied within the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) and customary international law,11 
but rather targets the elimination of their very existence, on earth, for all time.12 According 
to the US delegate, “This prohibition will be absolute.”13 The CWC thus represents a 
landmark in the field of international disarmament,14 constituting “a critical international 
 
8 Alexander Kelle, “The Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Beyond,” 
International Affairs (89:1, 2013), 143-53, Kelle, “Power,” 405-13. 
9 James Fry, “Sovereign Equality under the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law (15:1, 2010), 46. Similarly: J. P. Perry Robinson, “Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention” in Morel, 
Olson, Shadows, 38, Kelle, “Power,” 417. 
10 Kelle, “Conference,” 143-4. Also: Harald Müller, et al, “Regime Conflicts and Norm Dynamics” in Müller, 
Wunderlich, Norm Dynamics, 67. 
11 CD/PV.277,11, A/C.1/37/PV.57,17, Findlay, Peace, 2, Krutzsch, et al, “Introduction,” 3, Magda Solés, “La 
Convención sobre la Prohibición del Desarrollo, la Producción el Almacenamiento y el Empleo de las Armas 
Químicas sobre su Destrucción,” Tesis en Opción al Grado Científico de Doctor en Ciencia Política, Universidad 
de La Habana, Facultad de Filosofía, 2011, 24. 
12 Krutzsch, “Introduction,” 7. Also: Quester, “Deterrents,”167-8, Kelle, “Conference,”143-4, Fry, “Equality,” 46. 
13 CD/PV.635,3-4,8-9. See also: CD/PV.478,6: “For the first time on a multilateral level, States have agreed to a 
complete prohibition of an entire category of weapons together with appropriate enforcement machinery,” 
Brad Roberts, “The Chemical Weapons Convention and World Order” in Morel, Olson, Shadows, 13. 
14 Nikita Smidovich, “Russian and Other Perspectives” in Morel, Olson, Shadows, 56, Fry, “Sovereign,” 46. 
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norm against which the behaviour of every State in the international community will be 
judged.”15 
 
4.1.b: Timeline of Diffusion 
 
Concern regarding poisoned weaponry reportedly follows “an ancient and culturally 
diverse line, going back at least as far as the earliest recorded attempts at restraining 
warfare.”16 The first official international declarations on the subject were agreed at the 
1874 Brussels Conference, and then the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, which 
prohibited use of asphyxiant gas projectiles and venomous weapons.17 While the “traumatic 
experience with chemical weapons during the First World War made the international 
community aware of the barbarity of these weapons and led to the conclusion of the 
Geneva Protocol,”18 it was: 
no more than a no-first-use agreement, even one that positively legitimized possession 
or acquisition of the weapons of chemical and biological warfare in order to provide for 
the law-enforcing sanction of possible retaliation in kind…  If CBW was to be precluded, 
the ban would have to be on the weapons themselves, not just on their use.19 
  
Negotiations for such a ban were held but failed under the auspices of the League of 
Nations,20 although intermittent progress was subsequently achieved with the classification 
of CBW as weapons of mass destruction in 1948, and the first UNGA resolution on the 
matter in 1966.21 
 
CW prohibition was placed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD)22 in 
1968, reportedly following “Egypt's resort to poison gas warfare in the Yemen and, more 
 
15 US: CD/PV.635,6. Similarly: CD/PV.641,8, Krutzsch, et al, “Introduction,” 3, Findlay, Peace, 1. 
16 Robinson, “Origins,” 40. See also: Richard Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,” 
International Organization (49:1, 2018), 80-4. 
17 Price, “Genealogy,” 81-3, Solés,“Convención,” 23-4, Findlay, Peace, 2, Robinson, “Origins,” 40. 
18 Federal Republic of Germany: CD/PV.512,8. See also: “Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol and Other Interested States on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: Final Declaration,” 
International Legal Materials (28:4, 1989), 1020-1022, Robinson, “Origins,” 38-39, Müller, et al, “Regime,” 67. 
19 Robinson, “Origins,” 39. Similarly: Müller, et al, “Regime,” 67. 
20 CD/PV.249,13, Robinson, “Origins,” 39. 
21 UNGA Resolution 2162 B (XXI): Robinson, “Origins,” 37,48. 
22 Originally the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1959-62), Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 
(1962-68), and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78), Cuba joined when it became the 40 
member Committee of Disarmament (1979-83), renamed the Conference on Disarmament (from 1983). 
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conspicuously, the upsurge in the chemical warfare… which the United States, not yet a 
party to the Geneva Protocol, was conducting in Vietnam.”23 Despite 14 UNGA resolutions 
stressing the urgency of CW prohibition between 1968 and 1978, the separation of CW and 
biological weapons in 1971, the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (CBW) in 1975, and submission of draft 
conventions on CW, little substantive progress was made until bilateral superpower 
consultations commenced on the subject in 1977.24 The 1978 UNGA First Special Session on 
Disarmament then directed the CD to commence work on CW prohibition 
institutionalisation,25 which it did in 1979, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee/Working 
Group on CW (AHC) in 1980.26 However, “It had become a standing joke at the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva, which negotiated the treaty, that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention would forever be ready in just two more years. The political will seemed lacking, 
the technical problems appeared too severe and the lumbering negotiating apparatus 
looked incapable of ever producing any treaty, much less one as complicated as the CWC.”27 
The CWC was not adopted by the CD until 3 September 1992, over one decade later.28 
UNGA First Committee approval followed closely afterwards on 12 November 1992, with an 
unprecedented 145 sponsoring countries, including Cuba.29 The CWC was officially endorsed 
by the UNGA Plenary without vote in Resolution 47/39 on 30 November 1992,30 and opened 
for signature at the January 1993 Paris Conference, when Cuba, alongside 130 other states, 
became original signatory parties.31 Entry into force was triggered on 31 October 1996 upon 
the 65th ratification, fixing date of CWC entry at 29 April 1997.32 Cuba ratified the CWC that 
very day, four days after the US.33 
 
23 Robinson, “Origins,” 37,48. Also: Müller, et al, “Beyond the State” in Müller, Wunderlich, Dynamics, 320. 
24 A/C.1/36/PV.42,26, Findlay, Peace, 2, Robinson, “Origins,” 48-9, CD/PV.3,17,25, CD/PV.8,21-22, CD/PV.22,5, 
CD/PV.26,10-11, CD/PV.28,19,24, CD/PV.29,6,12,32,38, CD/PV.31,33,38, A/C.1/36/PV.42,26. 
25 Refer: 4.3.a.i: International Organisations. 
26 CD/PV.1, CD/PV.202,19. Findlay, Peace, 2-3. 
27 Findlay, Peace, 1. 
28 CD/PV.635,8,54,57,99, United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations Disarmament 
Yearbook, Volume 18, 1993 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1994), 28, Solés, “Convención,” 35, Daniel 
Feakes, “Introduction and General Issues: Adoption of the Convention” in Krutzsch, et al, CWC, 17. 
29 A/C.1/47/PV.4,47, A/C.1/47/PV.12,62, A/C.1/47/PV.28,28, A/C.1/47/PV.12,62, A/C.1/47/PV.14,28, 
Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 36,41, Findlay, Peace, 17-8. 
30 Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 36,39-41, Findlay, Peace, 18. 
31 CD/PV.636,8, Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 293, Feakes, “Introduction,” 17. 
32 Feakes, “Introduction,” 24. 




4.1.c: Why Cuban Rejection was Anticipated 
 
Yet analysts had presumed that Cuba, under the Castro regime, would remain revisionist 
in this field. According to Roberts, “Some likely holdout states are led by aging dictators 
whose successors may well seek concrete steps to signal their intent to re-join the 
international community. Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, and Syria stand out as possible 
examples.”34 A confluence of factors certainly hindered Cuban endorsement. As noted by 
Smidovich, “the national decisions to ‘join the club’ will also be heavily influenced by a 
whole range of ‘external’ factors, including the attitudes of neighbouring countries, the 
‘logistical’ ability to implement the convention, and financial costs of participation.”35 The 
following review demonstrates that each of these aspects and more contributed to 
expectations of Cuban rejection.  
 
4.1.c.i: Rejection of International Control 
Historically, Cuba had demonstrated reticence if not outright rejection of regional and 
international disarmament agreements involving international control, especially if the US 
was involved. A 1963 Cuban speech to the UNGA, for example, announced that “Cuba 
cannot subscribe to a treaty in which one of the signatory powers is the very protagonist, 
simultaneously, of a series of activities and exercises against our country in a policy… of 
undeclared war.”36 A 1967 Granma article provides valuable insight into Cuban perspectives 
on UN disarmament and verification agreements, and is worth reciting at length: 
The UN has absolutely not served to give people the least security, and, far from that, has 
generally also been an instrument for validating the crimes and misdemeanours of the 
yankee imperialist… It is because of this that we, Cuban revolutionaries, have not 
subscribed and will never subscribe to agreements regarding the cessation or prohibition 
of nuclear tests or against proliferation of this type of weapon, such as agreements under 
UN auspices, even though in the reality of our current technical development, that does 
not imply anything other than a position of principle. The imperialist yankees… develop 
 
34 Roberts, “CWC,” 3,6: noting “precedent for international cooperation against renegade states.” Also: 
Robinson, “Origins,” 41: “where political leaderships have little accountability for their actions… poison gas is 
nowadays to be seen as a weapon less of democracies than of dictatorships.” However, of the above-listed 
states, Cuba was the only original CWC signatory. 
35 Smidovich, “Russian,” 59. 
36 República de Cuba, “Discurso pronunciado por el Representante Permanente de Cuba ante la Asamblea 
General de las Naciones Unidas en Sesión Plenaria Celebrada el Día 7 de Octubre de 1963,” 11-2. 
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all the death machines and instruments of chemical and bacteriological war… the right of 
countries threatened by imperialism to develop defensive measures, whatever they may 
be, is irrevocable. It is because of this that we refuse to accept the US right to impose 
(restrictions on)… that type of weapon that our country, constantly threatened, must 
possess, and much less still accede to inspection of our territory, because it would be 
equivalent to validating the aggressors’ right to decide on the weapons that their future 
victims should or should not possess.37 
 
Concern over national sovereignty, non-interference and an inviolable right to self-defence 
was reflected in Cuban rhetoric throughout CD deliberations, both in the general field of 
disarmament,38 and with specific regard to the CWC and its ‘straightjacket’ verification 
provisions.39 According to a private memo from the Cuban Communist Party Central 
Committee in 1992, the “CWC contemplates a complete system of verification via 
inspections in situ that has no precedent… This would be the first time that Cuba accepts, in 
an international document, inspection on its territory.”40 Internal MINREX documentation 
from 1990-1991 listed various aspects of the proposed CWC supervisory mechanism and 
inspection procedures as “must change,”41 given “They are too much,”42 of “tremendous 
cost, (and) not necessarily appropriate for the objective.”43 Reluctance to submit to 
international control increased the likelihood of Cuban CWC rejection.  
 
4.1.c.ii: Financial Burden  
Experts acknowledge that the “verification system for the CWC is the most ambitious in 
the history of arms control and disarmament,”44 with “Estimates of direct costs of annual 
 
37 Comité Central Del Partido, “Declaraciones del Comité Central Del Partido: No Rehuiremos El Combate,” 
Granma (3:125, Thu 18 May 1967), 8: “What result can the renunciation of the development of peoples’ 
defensive measures have, other than to provide the imperialists with ideal conditions to subject the world to 
their terror and blackmail?” 
38 A/C.1/43/PV.17,48-50, A/C.1/44/PV.12,33, A/C.1/47/PV.14,31-2, A/C.1/44/PV.41,28, CD/PV.641,19. 
39 Fry, “Sovereign,” 46,55-6. Also: Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 40-1, Roberts, “CWC,” 1,4, CD/PV.617,19, 
CD/PV.635,29, A/C.1/47/PV.31,39-40, A/C.1/47/PV.11,8, CD/PV.635,3, A/C.1/46/PV.10,7: Cuba:“types of 
inspection… must constitute an essential minimum and must be as unintrusive as possible.” (sic) 
40 Partido Comunista de Cuba, Comité Central, “Re: 3/32- De: Carlos Aldana Escalante, A: Carlos Lage Dávila,” 
15 June 1992, 2. 
41 Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: 
Viceministro MINREX Raúl Roa Kourí,” 17 August 1990, 33-4,149. 
42 Ibid, 185. 
43 Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “R/S No. 563- De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, 
A: Ministro MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca,” 4 July 1991, 3-5. 
44 Findlay, Peace, 2. Similarly: Morel, Olson, “Introduction,” xviii,xix, Kathleen Bailey, “Problems with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention” in Morel, Olson, Shadows, 29-30. 
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on-site inspection… in the hundreds of millions of dollars.”45 Such costs concerned many CD 
delegations,46 yet Cuba particularly raised issues and submitted alternative financial system 
proposals repeatedly to the AHC,47 CD Plenary48 and UNGA First Committee.49 In a private 
letter to the AHC Chair the MINREX Minister pleaded that “this organ should adopt a 
mechanism of determination of its budget that takes account of the economic difficulties 
experienced by the majority of developing countries.”50 Within the 1990 draft CWC review, 
the Cuban expert lodged no fewer than four separate queries regarding how, and by whom, 
various Convention costs would be covered.51 The CWC imposed a large financial burden on 
State Parties, disincentivising Cuban endorsement. 
 
4.1.c.iii: Implementation Costs 
Compliance costs induced similar concerns, given the “CWC could create legal problems 
during implementation in many countries.”52 As subsequently noted by Cuban CD delegate 
Solés, the “multidisciplinary dimension of the Convention” instilled obligations upon 
“diverse sectors” of Cuba’s military, police, customs, industry and research facilities, which 
not only required new legislation and regulations, but also new institutions, mechanisms of 
coordination and supervision, and financial resources.53 A private memo from the Central 
Committee reveals particular anxieties over lack of resources to ensure CWC compliance: 
Cuban ministries had been unable to execute required national trial inspections, for 
example, and had resisted establishment of the mandatory National Authority given “an 
 
45 Lewis Dunn, “Making a Global Chemical Weapons Ban Work” in Morel, Olson, Shadows, 75. 
46 Examples: CD/PV.398,5-6, CD/PV.635,52, CD/PV.543,19, CD/PV.460,5, CD/PV.538,13, CD/PV.550,11, 
CD/PV.559,5, CD/PV.598,12, CD/PV.617,13, CD/PV.626,4, CD/PV.624,8, CD/PV.635,5, CD/PV.635,18-19, 
CD/PV.635,45-6, CD/PV.640,3, A/C.1/47/PV.11,8, Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 27. 
47 Working Paper entitled 'Aspects and principles of a system for funding the budget of the future Organization 
for the implementation of the CWC’: CD/1170,8. 
48 CD/PV.603,4: “necessary to strike an appropriate balance between what is required for a reliable and 
effective system and what can be viable without creating a financial burden which is unnecessary, costly and 
may even discourage universal adherence.” 
49 A/C.1/46/PV.10,7. 
50 MINREX, “RS/1319- De: Ministro Isidoro Malmierca, A: Sr. Hans Dietrich Genscher,” 10 March 1992, 2. 
51 Including Technical Support, “the problem of (OPCW) costs,” that “All (PrepCom) costs must be suffered by 
the Convention and must not be financed by quotas from State Parties,” that diplomats “must include in 
general discussion” inspection costs: Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “RS-259- De: 
Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: Ministro MINREX Isidoro Malmierca,” 21 March 1990, 1,3,21,31,131,147. 
52 Morel, Olson, “Introduction,” xviii. 
53 Solés, “Convención,” 81-3. 
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instruction exists not to create, in these moments, new organs or structures.”54 Decision-
makers held deep concerns that “If we accept the Convention, and up until now all 
indications are that this will be the recommendation raised for consideration by the 
government, we have to be sure, with sufficient time, that the country is prepared to 
assume the commitments derived in it, and by the preparatory work that has been done, 
this does not seem to be an easy task.”55 Indeed, members of the Party expressed 
confidential reluctance to sign the CWC given reputational concerns associated with 
potential breach due to inadequate resources to implement: 
in the political terrain, a breach, or even the suspicion of breach on the part of Cuba, 
could unleash a propaganda campaign that would prejudice us in all senses... despite 
having actively participated in the negotiating process for the Convention text, already 
officially declaring in Geneva that we do not possess CW and determining our positions 
with clarity, still many country delegations have doubts that Cuba will sign the 
convention. It is evident that incredulity is being stimulated by campaigns against Cuba.56 
 
Such concerns over implementation costs only exacerbated expectations of Cuban norm 
rejection. 
 
4.1.c.iv: Guantánamo Bay 
Cuba suffered an additional, unique, impediment to CWC ratification. According to 
Granma in 1992, “Cuba cannot assume commitments nor responsibilities in the remit of the 
Convention on Chemical Weapons faced with their possible presence on the insular territory 
of the Guantánamo naval base usurped by the US… Cuba is a nation that cannot accept the 
least commitment thanks to the possible presence of CW production installations in 
Guantánamo.”57 Private MINREX documents reveal such concerns echoed across every level 
of government, from the national Group of Disarmament studying the proposed 
convention,58 to the Cuban military expert analysing the 1990 draft treaty,59 the Working 
 
54 Comité Central, “Re: 3/32,” 1-3. For CWC National Authority requirements: Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 
32-3, Kelle, “Power,” 411, Bailey, “Problems,” 30. 
55 Comite Central, “Re: 3/32,” 3. Other country concerns: CD/PV.632,6. 
56 Comité Central, “Re: 3/32,” 2: “breach can (also) occasion us practical prejudice in the economic terrain.” 
57 Anon, “Fija Cuba su postura en relación con acuerdo sobre armas químicas,” Granma (28:158, Fri 31 July 
1992), 7. 
58 Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “RS-723- De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: 
Ministro MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca,” 17 July 1990, 1-2. 
59 Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador José,” 21,73-4,95-6 for additional examples. 
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Group assessing the 1992 penultimate draft convention,60 and the MINREX Minister himself, 
who noted “our Government will not be in a condition to report on the existence or 
otherwise of chemical weapons in the Naval Base of Guantánamo, nor assume any 
responsibility for the withdrawal or destruction of chemical weapons and the installations 
that could exist on said Base, responsibility that must fall entirely upon the US 
Government.”61 The CWC presented Cubans with the dilemma of simultaneously 
denouncing responsibility for the base (BNG), yet nevertheless insisting that the territory 
remained legally theirs.62 Cubans were nonetheless forced to announce publicly that 
“Because of this, the Government of Cuba cannot assume any commitment or any 
responsibility within the context of the aforementioned Convention that relate to the 
possible presence of chemical weapons or production facilities for such weapons on the 
territory of the said base.”63 Yet the CWC did not legally exempt such a scenario, and 
expectations of Cuban rejection consolidated. 
 
4.1.c.v: Allegations of Breach 
Finally, claims abounded that Cuba not only possessed CW, but had employed CW as 
recently as 1988-89 in Angola.64 These allegations echoed through the UN community, with 
evidence presented to the UN Sub-Commission on Minorities in 1989 and the matter 
included on the agenda of a Swedish workshop preparing CWC entry into force in 1992.65 
Although Cuban diplomats requested that MINREX provide “any information that could be 
useful to curb intentions to defame Cuba,” and MINREX responded with instructions “to 
 
60 MINREX, “RS-2865- De: Ministro Isidoro Malmierca, A: General De Brigada Guillermo Rodríguez del Pozo,” 10 
April 1992, 1. 
61 MINREX, “RS: 3667- De: Ministro Ricardo Alarcón, A: Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Vicepresident de los 
Consejos de Estados,” 24 June 1992, Annex 1,1-2. Similarly: Solés, “Convención,” 80. 
62 VicePresident Consejo de Ministros, “RS/3457- De: Carlos Rafael, A: Ministro a.i. de Relaciones Exteriores, 
Alcibíades Hidalgo,” 1 July 1992: concerned about: “the impression that Guantánamo Base is part of north 
american territory, but… it should remain clear that it constitutes an usurpation of Cuban territory by north 
american forces. It is clear that the troops accumulated and military resources utilised there, including atomic 
weapons, are the responsibility of the north american party that usurps this portion of Cuban territory and 
that the Cuban Government is not in a position to report on the existence or not of CW in this part of the 
national territory occupied illegitimately. Care must be taken in all formulations that are made of this.” 
63 CD/PV.628,17. Additionally: Cuban statement in 1992 AHC Report, CD/1170,18. 
64 The Sussex/Harvard Information Bank on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation listed Cuba as employing 
toxic warfare in 1957 internal fighting and 1988-89 Angola intervention: Robinson, “Origins,” 41-3. 
65 MINREX, “Ref: Nota RS/494 de Ginebra, De: Ana María González, A: Pedro Nüñez Mosquera, Director DAM,” 
17 November 1992, 1. 
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send arguments that permit counteracting this presumed enemy action,”66 expectations of 
Cuban CWC endorsement were likely low as a result.  
 
4.1.d: Endorsement Conundrum 
 
It was thus considered ‘remarkable’ when Cuba co-sponsored the CWC upon its UNGA 
First Committee adoption.67 Yet Cuba had supported it from the very beginning. Granma, 
for example, heralded Cuban co-sponsorship of the 1969 UN resolution on the subject,68 the 
Cuban “delegation was instructed to vote in favour of” three draft resolutions urging pursuit 
of CWC negotiations in 1971,69 and Cuba co-sponsored several UN resolutions between 
1977 and 1981 authorising associated CD deliberations.70 By March 1992, the MINREX 
Minister had assured his counterpart holding the AHC Chair, that “you can count on my 
personal dedication to the objective to work in pursuit of achievement of an effective, 
universal and non-discriminatory convention… you can count on the firm support of 
Cuba.”71 By November, the assurance was official: “The Government approved the signing 
of the Convention.”72 MINREX documents show that Cuba initiated the ratification process 
in August 1994, and deposited the treaty four days after the US in 1997.73 Given all that 
contributed to expectations of Cuban CWC rejection, endorsement presents a puzzle. 
 
4.2 INFLUENCE AS EXPECTED 
 
The initial answer to this puzzle may be found in six of the international norm diffusion 
attributes. Using the indicators set out in Figure 7, this section documents how the systemic 
 
66 Ibid, 1. 
67 Findlay, Peace, 17: “CWC accumulated an unprecedented 144 cosponsors, including, remarkably… Cuba.” 
68 Anon, “Apoya Cuba Proyecto en la ONU sobre la Cuestión de las Armas Químicas,” Granma (5:289, Wed 3 
Dec 1969), 6. 
69 MINREX, “Ref: 111.1.22- De: Dirección de Organismos y Conferencias Internacionales, A: Oficina del 
Ministro, Asunto: ‘Cuestion de las armas químicas y baceriológicas’,” 10 December 1971, 1,4. 
70 A/C.1/32/PV.29,11, A/C.1/34/PV.39,37, A/C.1/34/L.29, A/C.1/34/PV.42,42, A/C.1/35/L.38, A/C.1/36/L.36, 
A/C.1/36/PV.35,6, A/C.1/36/PV.42,3-5. 
71 MINREX, “RS/1319,” 1-2. 
72 MINREX, “RS/5676- De: Ana María González, A: Juana Silvera,” 9 Nov. 1992, 1. 
73 Embajada de Cuba, Dirección Jurídica, “RS/No. 27-3870- De: José Peraza Chapeau, Director Jurídico, A: 
Tomás Lorenzo, Jefe de Despacho, Ast: Ratificación por Cuba de la Convención sobre Armas Químicas,” 4 
August 1994, 1: “we initiate the rigorous constitutional procedure with a view to future ratification.” 
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attributes of world context, individual norm entrepreneurs and epistemic communities, the 
state-level attribute of national identity, and norm-related attributes of international 
concurrence, norm substance and domestic resonance influenced Cuban endorsement of 
the norm to eliminate CW, as anticipated within the analytical framework. 
 
4.2.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
4.2.a.i: World Context 
Four global issues were frequently referenced by diplomats as impacting negotiations for 
the norm to eliminate CW as represented in the CWC, according to associated indicators. As 
noted by the AHC Chair, “Negotiations never take place in a vacuum. They are influenced by 
developments in the political surroundings… growing international concern over the 
production, development, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons has increased the 
urgency with which the negotiators have worked.”74 First, the threat of both vertical and 
horizontal CW proliferation directly impacted norm development and Cuban support.75 In a 
draft note to the UNSG in 1990, and in likely relation to the US, MINREX acknowledged, 
“States exist that are broadening and perfecting new and more deadly generations of these 
instruments of mass extermination… Given this, the best contribution to the exercise of the 
most supreme of human rights, the right to life, is the adoption of a convention that 
prohibits and eliminates all chemical weapons.”76 Potential for horizontal proliferation was 




75 Vertical proliferation pertains to numerical/technological increases within one actor’s CW stocks; horizontal 
proliferation represents increase across number of actors possessing CW. Examples of proliferation concerns 
motivating CWC negotiations: CD/PV.29,31, CD/PV.263,7,12, CD/PV.385,27, CD/PV.360,15, CD/PV.270,10, 
CD/PV.332,15, CD/PV.310,15,38,46, CD/PV.484,31, CD/PV.315,21-22, CD/PV.342,15, A/C.1/40/PV.14,17, 
CD/PV.347,25, CD/PV.367,6-7, CD/PV.409,11, CD/PV.459,10, CD/PV.488,14, CD/PV.951,1, A/C.1/44/PV.12,33, 
A/C.1/36/PV.34,17, A/C.1/39/PV.27,27, A/C.1/39/PV.40,71, A/C.1/40/PV.19,53-54, A/C.1/40/PV.26,18, 
A/C.1/40/PV.28,8, A/C.1/43/PV.17,51, A/C.1/44/PV.15,13, Price, “Genealogy,” 84, Quester, “Deterrents,” 167-
8, James Goodby, “Arms Control in Changing Times” in Morel, Olson, Shadows, 265. 
76 MINREX, “RS 1829 - De: José Raúl Viera Linares, A: Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Asunto: Adjunto proyecto de 
nota para enviar al Secretario General de la ONU relacionada con la Resolución 1989/39,” 9 March 1990, 2. 
77 Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “RS/883- A: Isidoro Malmierca, Ministro de 
MINREX, De: Primer Secretario Encargado de Negocios, Humberto Rivero,” 22 Sept 1988, 1, CD/PV.191,13. 
78 Anon, “Comenzó reunión para firma de tratado sobre armas químicas,” Granma (29:10, Thu 14 Jan 1993), 5. 
79 Solés, “Convención,” 79: “The dissuasive value of the CWC in the terrain of chemical non-proliferation is one 
of the reasons that, in our judgement, renders it pertinent.” 
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Second, proliferation concerns were generated by particular incidents, especially 
allegations of CW use in South East Asia from 1981 and Iran/Iraq later that decade.80 
According to Findlay, “Iraq played an ironic role in bringing the CWC to fruition… Iraq 
reminded new generations about the grotesque nature of chemical warfare. Iraq also 
demonstrated the ease with which chemical weapons could be indigenously developed and 
produced… only a verifiable chemical weapons convention would be able to halt the 
proliferation of such weapons.”81 Iraqi CW use held particular import given the frequent, 
detailed, direct, and heart-wrenching accounts of CW consequences presented to the CD by 
Iranian delegates, who submitted countless reports, photographs, experts, witnesses and 
victims to attest and graphically describe their experiences: 
Let me share an experience with all representatives: the agony portrayed in the pictures 
of those little boys and girls who were victims of chemical weapons, which caused great 
pain and anguish until most of them perished. Let us not forget the horrible effects of 
these heinous weapons and the danger of their proliferation.82 
 
In doing so, Iran repeatedly “demonstrate(d) the urgency of the matter, and why we should 
act right now, for tomorrow is too late.”83 This resonated strongly within the CD, with 
countless delegates referencing the Iran/Iraq war to propel CWC negotiations forward.84 
The Belgian delegate, for example, responded that “the heart-rending and pressing nature 
of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons cannot have escaped anyone whose 
heart is in the right place."85 With respect to Cuba, Iraqi CW deployment framed a 
confidential plea from the USSR Ambassador to President Castro himself to support the 
 
80 Examples of such motivation: A/C.1/36/PV.42,16, A/C.1/37/PV.57,6-13, A/C.1/38/PV.6,14-15,22,37, 
CD/PV.154,8, CD/PV.166,9,18, CD/PV.171,19, CD/PV.191,12, CD/PV.241,14, CD/PV.260,10, CD/PV.290,11. 
81 Findlay, Peace, 2,10. Similarly: Morel, Olson, “Introduction,” xvii, Müller, et al, “Regime,” 67. 
82 A/C.1/43/PV.39,13. Also: A/C.1/44/PV.13,6, CD/PV.242,9-11, CD/PV.262,10,65,67, CD/PV.286,26-8, 
CD/PV.308,9, CD/PV.340,30-1, CD/PV.347,28-9, CD/PV.348,19-22, CD/PV.404,7, CD/PV.417,11-2, CD/PV.453,2-
5, CD/PV.514,6, CD/PV.635,50, A/C.1/39/PV.36,57-60, CD/PV.453,2-3, CD/PV.543,11: “there is not just an 
obligation, but a deep moral and inner urge for the abolishment and complete eradication of these barbarous 
weapons.” Also: Wunderlich, et al, “Reformers,” 267. 
83 CD/PV.417,12. See also: A/C.1/39/PV.40,71, CD/PV.454,12. 
84 Examples: CD/PV.271,25, CD/PV.404,16, CD/PV.351,24, CD/PV.303,8,14,32, CD/PV.256,18, CD/PV.274,10, 
CD/PV.455,11, CD/PV.247,10, CD/PV.351,26, CD/PV.453,13-14, CD/PV.478,6, CD/PV.349,10, CD/PV.250,18,36-
7, CD/PV.461,10, CD/PV.286,34, CD/PV.481,20, CD/PV.262,24,30,51,59, CD/PV.353,15, CD/PV.265,6, 
CD/PV.342,10-5, CD/PV.370,2-7, CD/PV.313,8, CD/PV.343,11, CD/PV.364,12, CD/PV.575,9, CD/PV.473,12, 
CD/PV.460,2-3, CD/PV.452,12-3, Goodby, “Arms,” 265, Robinson, “Origins,” 50, Smidovich, “Russian,” 57. 
85 CD/PV.244,18. 
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1989 CW Paris Conference,86 and was subsequently noted as a factor driving CWC 
negotiations by Cuban CD delegate, Solés.87 Nevertheless, given the CWC was not concluded 
for a further eight years, perhaps another delegate was correct in 1984, when he observed 
that “even the recent use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iraq and Iran has not 
generated sufficient momentum for the negotiations to reach a decisive stage.”88 
 
Third, the 1990/91 Gulf War provoked a “qualitative change” in CWC negotiations, as 
“the possibility that chemical weapons might be used added urgency to efforts to rid the 
world of such weapons. Long-held positions were reviewed and set aside, thereby opening 
up real opportunities for finalizing work on the Convention in 1992.”89 However the war’s 
impact was greater than simply generating renewed fear of CW proliferation and use. For 
the Gulf War also confirmed the redundancy of CW. US predominance demonstrated 
dramatically that “a stockpile of (chemical) arms could not act as a deterrent.”90 It was only 
after this realisation that the US, for example, executed a major policy shift, renounced 
certain roadblocks and brought negotiations to fruition.91 Cuban representatives 
understood, noting the war “was the definitive test for the USA that it could prevail in 
armed conflict without resorting to CW… it produced a change in US discourse… For such 
reasons, the interest in chemical disarmament that the countries of the South had 
maintained for many years, became an opportunistic priority for one of the greatest 
possessors of chemical weapons.”92 The Gulf War provided the catalyst, at the systemic 
level, for norm crystallisation, although with greater nuance than often acknowledged. 
 
 
86 Partido Comunista de Cuba Comité Central, “A: Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, De: Jorge Risquet 
Valdés, Asunto: Conferencia sobre la prohibición del uso del arma química,” 12 October 1988, 2. 
87 Solés, “Convención,” 31-32. National press, however, mentioned the issue only twice, implicitly referencing 
Iraq as non-threatening: Anon, “Diferencias acerca de Cumbre de la Tierra y Confirman Destrucción de Armas 
Quimicas Iraquies,” Granma (28:91, Wed 6 May 1992), 5, Anon, “hilo directo: Iraq; Informe de expertos de 
ONU,” Granma (28:187, Wed 9 Sept 1992), 5. 
88 A/C.1/39/PV.25,37. 
89 Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 20. See also: CD President: CD/PV.583,3,8, CD/PV.585,4, CD/PV.591,7,11, 
CD/PV.594,5,23, CD/PV.595,5, CD/PV.604,3, UNSG Personal Representative: CD/PV.586,2. 
90 Sri Lanka: CD/PV.617,23. Similarly: Germany: A/C.1/46/PV.31,11. Only Brazil, India, Pakistan recognised this 
earlier: CD/PV.202,21, CD/PV.232,12, CD/PV.237,11. 
91 4.3.a.ii: State Suasion, A/C.1/46/PV.30,19, CD/PV.602,10, Smidovich, “Russian,” 64, Robinson, “Origins,” 51. 
92 Solés, “Convención,” 33-4. 
 107 
Finally, mirroring outcomes in the forthcoming case studies, the end of the Cold War 
opened a broader window of opportunity and facilitated multilateral disarmament efforts. 
As delegates observed, the “removal of the 'iron curtain' has eroded traditional political 
barriers between East and West,"93 resulting in “what amounts to ‘landslide 
disarmament’.”94 A multitude of CD and UNGA First Committee members commented that 
CWC progress was only “possible because of a structural change in international 
relations.”95 The CWC, “which might not have been achievable if we still lived in the days of 
East-West confrontation at its darker stage, may well turn out to be the first significant 
multilateral convention of the new decade, which may belong to a new era.”96 Cuban 
delegates acknowledged the import of the end of the Cold War, affirming that “We are 
everywhere reminded that the international climate has changed and is perhaps more 
conducive to greater multilateral understanding and cooperation.”97 With specific regard to 
CWC negotiations, Solés subsequently wrote that the “disappearance of the USSR in 1992 
changed the bipolar paradigm… Research demonstrated the changes had influenced events 
in the ad hoc Committee that precipitated agreements with countries of the South, that the 
final phase of negotiations had arrived and that that was the moment for consolidating 
commitments.”98 Both specific and general world events thus impacted the development 
and Cuban endorsement of the international norm to eliminate CW, as anticipated in extant 
scholarship. The systemic diffusion attribute of world context had high influence. 
 
4.2.a.ii: INEs – Individuals, Epistemic Communities 
Individuals holding roles of AHC/CD Chair, Friends of the Chair, and indeed all AHC 
delegates were often credited by fellow diplomats for progressing CWC negotiations, 
including facilitating optimal logistical arrangements, establishing compromise text and 
 
93 CD/PV.532,7,13. 
94 CD/PV.611,8. Also: CD/PV.626,2, CD/PV.635,35, Müller, et al, “Agency,” “Change,” “State,” 150,157,300,338, 
349: mutual constitution of post-Cold War ‘golden decade’ and international arms control. 
95 A/C.1/47/PV.6,34. Other delegations: A/C.1/46/PV.30,9-10, A/C.1/47/PV.14,34, Findlay, Peace, 1,5: “largely 
the end of the cold War that powered the CWC towards final agreement. The end of the Cold War transformed 
both the structure and atmosphere of the CD.” 
96 CD/PV.546,3-4. Additionally: CD/PV.550,2, CD/PV.533,5, CD/PV.588,12, CD/PV.634,3, CD/PV.636,15, 
CD/PV.641,8, CD/PV.645,14, CD/PV.635,14-5. 
97 CD/PV.616,6. See also: A/C.1/45/PV.21,26: “the political environment in which our work is being carried out 
has evolved… the enhanced climate of détente… must, of course have influence on our work.”  
98 Solés, “Convención,” 34.  
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concluding deliberations section by section.99 Although such credit arguably adheres to the 
role rather than the person performing it, one individual attracted specific praise for 
overarching norm entrepreneurship: Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans.100 Through 
direct CD intervention calling for immediate action after CW attacks in 1988, initiation of the 
first global government-industry conference on the subject in 1989, establishment of 
regional initiatives to extend transnational understanding of and support for the CWC, 
introducing the penultimate model compromise draft convention, successfully arguing for 
prompt conclusion of negotiations in 1992, and, finally, writing to the Foreign Minister of 
every CD State to promote CWC adoption, Evans was credited for going above and beyond 
his duties as a state representative, and for sparking “the initiative that helped jump-start 
the negotiations earlier this year and move them into the end game.”101 According to Japan, 
the "visit of Senator Evans was like the encounter of our planet called the CD with a 
powerful meteor called Evans."102 With almost every indicator for this attribute thus 
present, individual norm entrepreneurship had relatively high impact on general norm 
diffusion, however also - as elaborated further in State Suasion below - in relation to Cuba. 
 
Epistemic communities held even greater general impact. As the US argued, "active 
involvement of technical experts will be needed for understanding both the technical 
dimensions of the tasks and the technical possibilities for accomplishing them.”103 Delegates 
noted that “Experience has shown that close interaction between technical experts and 
diplomats is essential.”104 Despite occasional inadequacy of access,105 and one rare incident 
of state resistance,106 scientific, technical, legal and military advisors played key roles in 
 
99 According to Figure 7. Examples of credit, including from Cuba: CD/1170,17, CD/PV.636,15,24-5, 
CD/PV.272,15,27, CD/PV.628,15, CD/PV.185,6-7, CD/PV.179,26, CD/PV.194,24,36, CD/PV.203,23, 
CD/PV.215,30, CD/PV.232,13, CD/PV.531,3, CD/PV.250,16, CD/PV.286,28, CD/PV.383,4-5, CD/PV.389,30, 
CD/PV.434,12-3, CD/PV.506,14, CD/PV.337,18-28, CD/PV.594,30, CD/PV.635,6-14, Findlay, Peace,15-9. 
100 A/C.1/47/PV.6,57, A/C.1/47/PV.16,37, CD/PV.617,32,40,42,46-8,50-1, CD/PV.619,6,27, CD/PV.621,9, 
CD/PV.635,6,34, Becker-Jakob, et al, “Citizens,” 207: Evans coined ‘good international citizenship’ to denote 
“states that conduct an ethically motivated foreign policy that… places internationalism and the ‘common 
good’ ahead of the pursuit of narrow material interests.” 
101 Quote: A/C.1/47/PV.4,23-4. See also: CD/PV.482,22, CD/PV.492,12-3, CD/PV.626,5, CD/PV.617,3-16, 
CD/PV.626,5, CD/PV.629,16, 4.3.a.ii: State Suasion. 
102 CD/PV.619,11. Also: A/C.1/47/PV.4,36. 
103 CD/PV.166,22. 
104 CD/PV.193,37. Similarly: Spain: CD/PV.323,15, Italy: CD/PV.491,11. 
105 For example, AHC Chair: CD/PV.337,25. 
106 Context indicates it was likely the US: CD/PV.192,29, CD/PV.195,43, CD/PV.199,16. 
 109 
norm formulation and progression. Direct epistemic contributions were provided via UN 
Groups of Experts reports on CW,107 workshops and seminars between experts and CD 
delegates,108 incorporation of experts within state delegations, ad hoc CCD and then regular 
annual CD meetings between diplomats and experts,109 and, finally, official ‘technical 
support’ for the AHC Chair from 1990.110 The full range of CD delegations praised specialist 
input into core CWC elements, including toxicity standards, technical monitoring methods, 
precursors, incapacitating agents, destruction and verification mechanisms.111 According to 
the Australian delegate:  
experts have come for informal meetings, for concentrated periods of technical 
consultations and, finally, as a team integrated into the activity of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group. There is no doubt in my mind that their presence has served substantially to 
advance our work, both by highlighting the technical problems which our efforts have 
identified and by showing the way to possible solutions.112 
 
Influence over Cuban decision-making was more complex, however, with Cubans 
reluctant to endorse the very scientists they blamed for CW development and deployment 
in Vietnam. Cuban press had previously condemned this scientific epistemic community,113 
and Cuban diplomats expressed opposition, alongside the G21, to the Chair’s official 
technical support.114 Nevertheless, Cuba appointed its own expert and former member of 
the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament and Group of Experts on 
Institutional Arrangements Relating to Disarmament as its CD representative from 1984 and 
relied heavily upon in-country military and other expertise regarding every aspect of the 
 
107 CD/PV.31,31-2, 4.3.a.i: International Organisations. 
108 CD/PV.19,6, CD/PV.31,9: “which enabled a very valuable flow of information and views to take place on the 
subject of chemical warfare, with a breadth and ease which was certainly new.” 
109 CD/1108,10, CD/727,1, CD/416,1, CD/PV.31,44-5, CD/PV.25,9, CD/PV.29,32, Caitríona McLeish, Maarten 
Lak, “Introduction & General Issues: Role of Civil Society and Industrial Non-State Actors,” Krutzsch, CWC, ft 4. 
110 CD/PV.546,4, CD/PV.575,3. 
111 Some of many e.g.: CD/PV.152,14, CD/PV.193,36, CD/PV.266,7, CD/PV.166,30, CD/PV.378,6, CD/PV.179,26, 
CD/PV.199,15, CD/PV.617,11, CD/PV.173,30, CD/PV.189,22, CD/PV.179,26, CD/PV.192,10, CD/PV.195,43, 
CD/PV.204,14, CD/PV.227,22, CD/PV.371,5, CD/PV.243,21, CD/PV.495,7, CD/PV.499,7, CD/PV.541,15, 
CD/PV.548,12, CD/PV.227,6. CD/PV.337,24-5, CD/PV.534,4,6-7, CD/PV.436,34, CD/PV.167,21,31: “We value 
very much the qualified opinion of our experts.. we have been using their assistance as frequently as possible.” 
112 CD/PV.225,29. 
113 Anon, “Declaracion final del III Simposio contra el Genocidio Yanqui en Viet Nam y su Extension a Laos y 
Cambodia,” Granma (8:127, Sat 27 May 1972), 2: “declared the scientists that participated in the research and 
genocidal plans as accomplices.” 
114 Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “RS-307- De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: 
Ministro MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca,” 29 March 1990, 1-2. 
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CWC.115 Epistemic influence was thus high, driving both the norm’s international 
development and Cuban endorsement. 
 
4.2.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
4.2.b.i: National Identity 
Analysis of state leader references to national values, principles and ambitions, per 
indicators for this attribute, reveal two aspects of Cuban national identity that aligned with 
the norm to eliminate CW.116 Indeed, they indicate this attribute played a role in driving 
Cuban norm endorsement, rather than merely operating as a filter of socialisation. First, the 
meta-norm of general international disarmament held ideological resonance with Cuban 
socialist identity,117 and particularly Cuba’s self-proclaimed role as vanguard of the concept 
‘disarmament for development’.118 This concept was described as a motivation for Cuban 
CWC endorsement,119 with the Cuban CD delegate explaining that “disarmament means not 
only a guarantee of the survival of humanity but also the possibility of greater resources 
being available for the economic and social development of the peoples who are now 
suffering the consequences of underdevelopment.”120 The notion that money saved on CW 
should instead be devoted to peoples in need aligned directly with Cuba’s touted foreign 
policy goals: 
article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba says that ‘our country is working for 
lasting peace in dignity… Fidel Castro appealed for ‘a tireless struggle for peace, for 
improving international relations, for halting the arms race, for reducing military 
 
115 CD/PV.240,6, Misión Permanente, “RS/338- A: Isidoro Malmierca, Ministro de MINREX, De: Embajador 
Carlos Lechuga Hevia,” 30 April 1987, 1, Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores, “RS/98- De: Nicolás, A: Roberto 
Robaina, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriorers, Ast: Convención para la Prohibición de las Armas Químicas,” 27 
April 1994, 2, Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador José,” 1: the analysis of Lt. Colonel García on each line of 
the 1990 draft treaty “provides important results for the work of our Mission and, especially, so that our office 
in Havana can adopt necessary decisions in this crucial moment of negotiations.” 
116 Refer: 4.2.c.ii: Norm Substance. 
117 CD/PV.4,8, CD/PV.603,3, MINREX, “RS/1319,” 1, CD/PV.4,8: “This supreme objective of ours in the matter 
of disarmament is consistent with Cuba's noble concept of peace.”  
118 A/C.1/47/PV.14,31, A/C.1/44/PV.41,28, A/C.1/44/PV.12,29-31, A/C.1/43/PV.17,43, A/C.1/42/PV.32,42, 
A/C.1/39/PV.25,18-25, CD/PV.243,34-5, CD/PV.281,15, CD/PV.292,16-8, CD/PV.386,18, CD/PV.221,13, 
CD/PV.393,2, CD/PV.439,3, CD/PV.336,38-9, describing weapons expenditure over development as a crime 
against humanity, Victorio Copa, “Mantendrá Cuba activo papel en favor del Tercer Mundo,” Granma (23:151, 
Mon 29 June 1987), 6: “there cannot be peace without development.” 
119 A/C.1/47/PV.31,56. 
120 CD/PV.163,20.  
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expenses drastically and for insisting that a considerable part of these sizeable funds be 
allocated to the development of the third world’.121 
 
In their very first CD speech, Cubans proclaimed their representation of all “peoples bravely 
struggling to overcome underdevelopment and poverty… (and so) wish to contribute as 
much as they can to the achievement of agreements which will allow the astronomical 
resources devoted to arms production to be used to combat the backwardness, destitution 
and hunger that still afflict a large part of mankind.”122 Although Cuba did not mention 
disarmament for development during CD CWC deliberations, the MINREX Minister publicly 
commended, at the 1989 CW Paris Conference, “that this measure of disarmament will 
bring a benefit to advance the Third World.”123 Upon conclusion of negotiations, the Cuban 
UNGA First Committee delegate also praised CWC “establishment of a delicate mechanism 
to ensure that the weapons will not be diverted from the peaceful uses so necessary for 
economic and social development.”124 The CWC thus aligned with Cuba’s proclaimed 
prioritisation of socio-economic development over armament investment in line with the 
purported fabric of its socialist identity. 
 
Perhaps of greater, albeit more implicit, significance, was that the CW disarmament 
campaign also matched Cuban anti-US imperialism, revolutionary identity. The norm to 
eliminate CW aligned nicely with the Cuban alter to the US ego. In the shadow of Vietnam 
and 1980s US resumption of CW development, the CWC provided the ideal platform from 
which Cuba could publicly denounce the US.125 Domestic Cuban press had equated US 
officials to Nazi war criminals for years over CW development.126 CWC negotiations 
presented the opportunity to elevate this rhetoric internationally. In private 
correspondence Cuban officials celebrated, for example, that socialist CWC initiatives “will 
reveal even more that the North American aggressors do not want to exclude chemical 
weapons from their arsenals of war, and will create additional possibilities for the fight 
 
121 A/C.1/38/PV.6,78: “That will be the policy guiding the work of the Cuban delegation in this Committee.” 
122 CD/PV.4,8. 
123 Anon, “Partidaria Cuba de destrucción de las armas químicas,” Granma (25:9, Wed 11 Jan 1989), 8. 
124 A/C.1/47/PV.14,28. 
125 Refer: 4.3.a.ii: State Suasion, 4.4.b.iii: Feedback Loop, 4.2.c.ii: Norm Substance. 
126 Luis Arce, “La Guerra Silenciosa de EEUU 2: Napalm- Arma de la impotencia del imperialismo 
norteamericano,” Granma (5:266, Thu 6 Nov 1969), 7, Luis Arce, “La Guerra Silenciosa de EEUU 4: Quienes son 
los productores de la muerte?” Granma (5:270, Tue 11 Nov 1969), 7, Anon, “Declaracion final,” 2. 
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against US violation of the Geneva Protocol.”127 The Cuban delegation was instructed to 
vote in favour of the 1971 UNGA draft resolution to pursue CWC negotiations and “to 
mention, in explication of the vote, the need for quick agreement on the total suppression 
of chemical weapons and their use by North American imperialism in Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos.”128 As will be seen during discussion of other attributes, Cuba frequently 
employed the CW prohibition norm to condemn US actions at the CD, whether in relaton to 
the US binary weapons programme, historical CW development/deployment, use of 
herbicides in Vietnam, or inability to guarantee CW absence from BNG.129 Cuba’s enmity 
towards the US and its very identity as a revolutionary adversary underpinned Cuban 
support for the norm to eliminate CW in the CWC, and held impact not as a socialisation 
filter, but in its own stead. 
 
4.2.c: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
4.2.c.i: International Concurrence 
Indicators for this attribute show that the substance of the international norm to 
eliminate CW matched prevailing international normative structures well. According to 
Müller, “Complementary norm construction outside the established regime institutions was 
important in all WMD regimes.”130 As “universally recognised international law,”131 the 
Geneva Protocol had “contributed significantly to the establishment of a strong taboo on 
chemical weapons."132 Repeated UNGA resolutions re-affirmed “the interest of States in the 
adoption of other measures that would facilitate the elimination of the danger of a chemical 
and bacteriological war,”133 maintained the salience of the issue throughout subsequent 
decades, and prompted, for example, the 1969 UNGA proposal from socialist countries for a 
 
127 MINREX, “Memorandum- A: Organismos Internacionales, De: Oficinas del Ministro,” 6 April 1971, 3. 
128 MINREX, “Ref: 111.1.22,” 3. 
129 CD/PV.261,8, Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “R/S No. 494- De: Embajador José 
Pérez Novoa, A: MINREX Ministro Ricardo Alarcón,” 14 October 1992, 2, Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador 
José,” 14, CD/PV.603,4. 
130 Müller, “Agency,” 339. 
131 MINREX, “Ref. 111.7-6- A: Oficina del Viceministro, De: Dirección de Organismos y Conferencias 
Internacionales, Asunto: Proyecto de Convención sobre la prohibición del Desarrollo, la producción y el 
almacenamiento de armas químicas y bacteriológicas,” 25 September 1969, 1. 
132 Smidovich, “Russian,” 55. 
133 MINREX, “Ref. 111.7-6,” 1. 
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convention.134 The CBW did likewise, incorporating an article which "affirms the recognised 
objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to 
continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective 
measures for the prohibition."135 Finally, concurrent UN measures - such as the 1981 UN 
Group of Experts report on alleged use of CW,136 UNSG-authorised Group of Experts 
investigations of alleged use in Iran/Iraq from 1984 and Special Commission from 1991,137 
1990 UN Group of Experts report on verification procedures,138 and initiatives to establish 
CW-free zones and Geneva Protocol implementation mechanisms - were frequently raised 
as further justifications for and reasons to hasten CD CWC negotiations.139  
 
Although Cuba, alongside a minority of other states,140 opposed certain initiatives such as 
Expert Group mandate extensions and interim Geneva Protocol verification mechanisms,141 
these nevertheless allowed the norm to develop in a well-nourished international normative 
environment. In fact, these initiatives “showed conclusively that fact-finding could be 
carried out expertly, impartially and with speed,”142 representing “a landmark in the history 
of this Organization, a precedent for the further involvement of the United Nations in 
inquiries of this sort.”143 Such complementary institutions, although not effecting Cuban 
socialisation, nevertheless implicitly paved the path toward CWC endorsement. 
Concurrence between norm content and global norm hierarchies was high, diminishing 
Cuba’s room for manoeuvre or rejection of the norm. 
 
 
134 Ibid, 1. 
135 Robinson, “Origins,” 48-9. Similarly: Müller, “Agency,” 338, CD/PV.9,19, CD/PV.31,38, CD/PV.2,37. 
136 A/C.1/37/PV.20,16. For impact in Cuba: Roberto Quiñones, “Los Planes Yankis Para La Barbarie Química 
(Final),” Granma (18:119, Sat 22 May 1982), 2. 
137 CD/PV.594,24, CD/PV.619,7, Smidovich, “Russian,” 67-9. 
138 CD/PV.532,17, CD/PV.548,13, CD/PV.554,16. 
139 Examples: A/C.1/39/PV.33,27, CD/PV.249,16, CD/PV.256,23, CD/PV.260,24, CD/PV.262,37, CD/PV.272,18-9, 
CD/PV.274,10, CD/PV.349,10, CD/PV.481,20, CD/PV.459,7. 
140 18 socialist/developing states voted against one such resolution, e.g.: A/C.1/36/PV.53,54-60. 
141 Cuban rejection: A/C.1/36/PV.52,56-7, following USSR at 16, who condemned the “scheme the goal of 
which was, by means of allegations against other States, to justify United States policy of expanding its 
arsenals with new types of chemical weapons.” Also: A/C.1/37/PV.47,63, A/C.1/37/PV.57,37-46,56-65, 
A/C.1/37/PV.58,27, A/C.1/39/PV.46,66-76,86-7. 
142 CD/PV.257,18. See also: A/C.1/39/PV.39,18,21, CD/PV.348,22, Robinson, “Origins,” 41. 
143 A/C.1/36/PV.44,101-2. 
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4.2.c.ii: Norm Substance 
In line with relevant indicators, almost every CD member referenced the undeniable 
compellability of, and ethical obligation to support, the norm to eliminate one of the most 
“reprehensible and morally unacceptable means of conducting armed conflict” during CWC 
negotiations.144 ‘Moral revulsion’ and civilisational rhetoric was frequently employed to 
support the prohibition of the savage and indiscriminate horror of CW.145 The US, for 
example, often cited the:  
broader moral prohibition against the use of these weapons… outlawed by the general 
opinion of civilized mankind… We cannot, therefore, allow the progress which we have 
made in civilization to be destroyed. To do so would be to begin a relentless slide back to 
a new dark age of mindless barbarism… This is why we seek a level of verification that 
will protect civilization, our allies, and indeed humanity itself from this terrible threat.146  
 
State suasion efforts relied upon the norm’s immanent power, with private memos from the 
USSR requesting Cuban support given CW “represent one of the most dangerous types of 
weapons of mass destruction… we must take the next step and achieve subscription of an 
international convention that foresees the total proscription of CBW for the life of human 
society.”147 Civilisational rhetoric also resonated within Cuba. Refracted through responses 
to US employment of CW in Vietnam, several Granma articles in the early 1980s referenced 
CW as “simply a weapon of physical and mental torture:”148 
that destroys all that lives or provokes illnesses and sufferings that cause a slow and 
atrocious death… This type of chemical and bacteriological aggression is so abominable 
and injures human sensibility so deeply it has been prohibited in various international 
treaties, none of which the US has ratified… the Pentagon and CIA yankees use beastly 
chemical and bacteriological weapons, that have been proscribed by civilisation and 
reason.149 
 
144 Price, “Genealogy,” 73-84. Examples of references: CD/PV.437,26-7, CD/PV.491,5-6, CD/PV.166,9, 
A/C.1/40/PV.4,47, CD/PV.441,17, CD/PV.588,10, CD/PV.506,28, CD/PV.195,46, CD/PV.202,14-5, CD/PV.213,7, 
A/C.1/39/PV.46,73-5, CD/PV.258,34, CD/PV.264,15, CD/PV.306,28, CD/PV.418,6, A/C.1/34/PV.10,14-5, 
A/C.1/39/PV.36,18-20, A/C.1/37/PV.20,16,45-6, CD/PV.178,22, Kelle, “Power,” 416, Robinson, “Origins,” 40: 
"perception widespread throughout different civilisations that fighting with poison is somehow reprehensible, 
immoral, utterly wrong… to resort to chemical warfare is to violate a taboo of a peculiarly deep kind.” 
145 Müller, et al, “Regime,” 72, Becker-Jakob, et al, “Citizens,” 232. 
146 CD/PV.191,11-13. See also: CD/PV.260,10, CD/PV.262,19, CD/PV.290,12, CD/PV.386,8, A/C.1/37/PV.57,17, 
A/C.1/39/PV.28,51, A/C.1/39/PV.36,2-5, A/C.1/34/PV.8,28-30, Vice-President Bush: “It is high time that these 
barbaric weapons were banished from the face of the earth.” 
147 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la URSS, “Memorándum,” 2 September 1969, 1. 
148 Arce, “La Guerra Silenciosa,” 7. Also: Anon, “Inaceptable ventilar en la ONU problemas de Viet Nam plantea 
Cuba,” Granma (5:272, Thu 24 Nov 1969), 8, Quiñones, “Los Planes Yankis (Final),” 2: “instrument most cruel 
and inhuman of all the measures employed by the north American government” causing biocide and ecocide. 
149 Roberto Quiñones, “La barbarie química y bacteriológica del Pentágono y la CIA,” Granma (17:196, Tue 18 
Aug 1981), 2. Also: “Los Planes Yankis Para La Barbarie Química [I],” Granma (18:97, Mon. 26 April 1982), 2, 
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Norm substance, and the need to “meet yet another aspiration of mankind, which is the 
elimination of such horrifying weapons,”150 was additionally referenced by Cuban delegates 
at the CD and UNGA First Committee,151 and in letters from MINREX to the AHC Chair and 
UNSG.152 Importantly, the desire to rid the world of CW horror was also evident in private 
MINREX correspondence,153 and Solés’ subsequent reflections.154 Immanent normative 
power proved influential. 
 
4.2.c.iii: Domestic Resonance 
Relatedly, norm content also held pre-existing resonance within Cuba as evidenced by 
sympathetic prior legislation, state rhetoric and press reporting. For decades, national 
media had closely followed, reported and condemned alleged US use of CW in Japan, 
Bolivia, Vietnam, Korea, Honduras,155 reported US provision of CW in El Salvador, the Congo, 
Afghanistan,156 and US storage and approval for use in countries around the Indian Ocean, 
Gulf of Arabia, and Pacific Ocean.157 A renewed wave of press attention followed 
announcement of the US binary weapons programme in 1982,158 which condemned the 
“monstrous” decision as “Only the demented can direct or accept such a possibility. Because 
this would inevitably lead to the immediate and long term destruction of human life. The 
survival of civilisation would be threatened.”159 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, 
 
“Los planes yankis para la barbarie química (III),” Granma (18:108, Mon 10 May 1982), 2, “Los planes Yankis 
para la barbarie química (IV),” Granma (18:111, Thu 13 May 1982), 2. 
150 CD/PV.336,38. Also: CD/PV.221,14,16. 
151 Including: CD/PV.4,11, A/C.1/45/PV.21,32, A/C.1/47/PV.14,28, A/C.1/43/PV.17,47-50, A/C.1/39/PV.46,76, 
A/C.1/38/PV.6,78, A/C.1/40/PV.39,28-9, CD/PV.243,37, CD/PV.603,3,6, CD/PV.439,4. 
152 MINREX, “RS 1829,” 1, “RS/1319,” 1: committed Cuba “solidly and firmly to the elimination and destruction 
of weapons that put in danger the very existence of humanity.” 
153 MINREX, “Memorándum,” 3. 
154 Solés, “Convención,” 79. 
155 Arce, “La Guerra Silenciosa,” 7, “La Guerra Silenciosa de EEUU 3,” 7, Anon, “Mas ‘Asesores’ Militares de E.U. 
para Operaciones Antiguerrilleras en Bolivia,” Granma (3:90, Fri 7 April 1967), 1,6, “Vietnam se ha convertido 
en la bandera de todos los revolucionarios,” Granma (4:258, Fri 25 Oct 1968), 7, “Experimento Yanki de Guerra 
Química en Honduras,” Granma (22:44, Sat 22 Feb 1986), 1, “Declaracion final,” 2, Quiñones, “La barbarie 
química,” 2, Marrero, “Con punto y aparte: Frente a crímenes e infundios,” Granma (25:3, Wed 4 Jan 1989), 8. 
156 Anon, “Denuncian el Empleo de Defoliantes y otros agentes químicos por la junta genocida militar de El 
Salvador,” Granma (17:177, Tue 28 July 1981), 5, Arce, “La Guerra Silenciosa de EEUU 2,” 7. 
157 Quiñones, “Los Planes Yankis,” 2, Ferrer, “Haz lo que digo,” 7. 
158 In February 1982, US President Reagan sought funds to reactivate the US CW programme with binary 
weapons, CW comprising two substances that combine to produce toxicity upon firing: Jorma Miettinen, 
“Chemical Weapons and Chemical Disarmament Negotiations,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals (13:2, 1982), 119. 
159 Juan Marrero, “La Muerte Quimica,” Granma (18:37, Mon 15 Feb 1982), 6. Also: “Con punto,” 8, Anon, 
“Producira EE.UU. una nueva arma química letal,” Granma (18:12, Sat 26 Jan 1982), 7, “Partidaria Cuba de 
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Granma followed and reported progress in CWC negotiations, heralding particularly the 
‘historic’ 1993 Paris Conference for adoption and official Cuban endorsement.160 Cuba was 
already party to related international law, including the Geneva Protocol, which it signed on 
24 May 1966161 and considered:  
constitutes without doubt a valiant international instrument for proscribing use of these 
inhuman weapons of mass destruction. The Government of the Republic of Cuba, which 
carries out policy based on humanitarian principles, and rejects and condemns use of 
CBW, adhered to the Geneva Protocol on the date around the revolutionary triumph of 
1959, and loyal to international obligations, complies scrupulously.162  
 
Cuba signed and ratified the CBW by 1976, lauded within Granma,163 as well as the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Environmental Modification with Military or Other Hostile 
Weapons (ENMOD) and Inhuman Weapons treaties.164 According to Solés, “Cuba is today 
party to all treaties that regulate the three types of weapons of mass extermination; Cuban 
CWC adherence is the result of application of a sustained and consequent political line… 
Cuba’s trajectory as State Party to these treaties demonstrates Cuban affection for 
international law.”165 Alongside private and public declarations of CW non-possession,166 
domestic resonance of the substance of the norm was relatively high. 
 
4.3 INFLUENCE YET NOT AS EXPECTED 
 
While the above-listed attributes influenced Cuban norm endorsement as anticipated in 
the analytical framework, four other attributes held significance however not quite as 
expected. This section documents how the systemic attributes of IO and state suasion held 
relevance, however not in the purely linear, positive or singular fashion frequently 
 
destrucción de las armas químicas,” Granma (25:9, Wed 11 Jan 1989), 8, “Producirá EE.UU. nuevas armas 
químicas,” Granma (25:13, Mon 16 Jan 1989), 1. 
160 Anon, “Comenzó reunión,” 5, “En la firma de tratado de desarme,” Granma (29:11, Fri 15 Jan 1993), 6, 
“Partidaria Cuba de destrucción de las armas químicas,” Granma (25:9, Wed 11 Jan 1989), 8. 
161 MINREX, “Ref. 111.7-6,” 1, Anon, “Declaración del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica de 
Cuba,” Granma (20:105, Fri 4 May 1984), 6. 
162 Letter to UNSG: MINREX, “RS 1829,” 1. 
163 Anon, “Suscribe Cuba convención sobre la prohibición de armas bacteriológicas,” Granma (8:89, Thu 13 
April 1972), 6. Also: Solés, “Convención,” 77. 
164 Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 300-1. 
165 Solés, “Convención,” 77-8. 
166 MINREX, “RS/1319,” 1, Solés, “Convención,” 80-1, CD/PV.603,4, A/C.1/46/PV.10,7, Comité Ejecutivo del 
Consejo de Ministros, “De: Carlos Lage Dávila, A: Ministro Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, Ref: Convención para la 
prohibición de la producción, almacenamiento, uso y destrucción de armas químicas,” 21 August 1991, 1. 
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considered in norm diffusion theories. It then demonstrates the unexpectedly strong impact 
of both MNCs and high salience on norm endorsement. Yet despite such influence over 
norm diffusion, this analysis reveals that none of these attributes in fact engendered state 
socialisation as anticipated in socialisation literature. 
 
4.3.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
4.3.a.i: International Organisations  
IOs played a crucial role in the development and Cuban endorsement of the international 
norm to eliminate CW according to relevant indicators, albeit not in the unilinear manner 
frequently characterised in norm literature. Certain international entities fostered the 
conducive normative environment, such as supportive UNSG statements and reports, which 
delegates, including Cuban, often referenced to promote norm progression.167 However, the 
UNGA held the greatest exogenous IO impact on overall norm progress, with repeated 
resolutions calling for Geneva Protocol adherence,168 and the 1978 UNGA First Special 
Session on Disarmament constituting “an important turning point in the efforts of the 
international community to put an end to the arms race and to create momentum which 
can set in motion a genuine process of disarmament.”169 The Final Document specifically 
“emphasized that an agreement on the elimination of all chemical weapons should be 
conducted as a matter of high priority,”170 and was reiterated by a range of CD delegates to 
promote CWC negotiations.171 Increasingly urgent and consensus-based UNGA resolutions 
annually renewed the CD CWC mandate,172 and were referenced by all delegates to hasten 
 
167 CD/PV.194,11, CD/PV.290,13, CD/PV.336,15, CD/PV.385,8, CD/PV.484,5-6, A/C.1/44/PV.15,13, 
CD/PV.248,7, CD/PV.31,31, Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “RS-012- De: 
Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: Ministro MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca,” 3 January 1990, MINREX, “RS 415- De: 
Viceministro Oscar Oramos Oliva, A: Ministro Isidoro Malmierca, Ref: Nota para ONU sobre derechos 
humanos,” 7 Mar 1990, URSS, “Memorándum,” 2, MINREX, “RS 1829,” MINREX, “Ref. 111.7-6,” 1-2. 
168 URSS, “Memorándum,” 2.  
169 CD Chair: CD/PV.1,8-9. Also: Müller, et al, “State,” 320, however 1982/1988 Special Sessions achieved little, 
according to Cuba: CD/PV.180,31, CD/PV.155,31, CD/PV.166,30, CD/PV.439,6, CD/PV.214,15. 
170 CD/PV.4,38.  
171 Examples: CD/PV.8,25, CD/PV.9,19, CD/PV.17,6-7, CD/PV.22,5, CD/PV.23,5, CD/PV.26,10, CD/PV.28,24, 
CD/PV.31,12,29, CD/PV.166,30, CD/831,1. 
172 A/C.1/39/PV.39,12, A/C.1/40/PV.39,23-27, A/C.1/41/PV.37,60-63, A/C.1/43/PV.36,6-7, A/C.1/44/PV.41,39-
40,42, A/C.1/45/PV.34,3-7, A/C.1/45/PV.36,31-35, A/C.1/46/PV.30,9-13. 
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negotiations.173 According to the Swedish representative, Hans Blix, “It is imperative to heed 
the annual resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly urging the CD to give the 
question of chemical weapons high priority. The CD, therefore, inherits a heavy 
responsibility to complete at last the work on a CW convention.”174 The Cuban delegate 
concurred:  
the Conference is, in our view, duty-bound to pay attention to the resolutions of the 
General Assembly. It is inadmissible that, year after year, the agreements reached in the 
Assembly, which reflect the attitudes and aspirations of the immense majority of the 
international community, should be cast aside. The Conference cannot operate in a 
vacuum. It must link its work with what is being demanded by that public opinion.175 
 
Yet it was the multilateral disarmament negotiating body of the CD that held the ‘but-for’ 
effect; without it, the CWC may not exist.176 The CD - including its secretariat and AHC - 
garnered particular praise, including from Cuba, for resolving key issues, identifying 
consensus, formulating treaty text and consolidating the norm.177 According to one 
delegate, the CWC “is undoubtedly the direct result of the Conference on Disarmament. 
This forum has provided new evidence of its ability to participate actively in laying down the 
foundations of world peace and security."178 Cuba certainly held the CD in high regard - 
undoubtedly in preference to unilateral US hegemony - noting upon CWC adoption “that, 
because of its multilateral nature, the Conference on Disarmament is the body that can and 
should conduct negotiations on disarmament matters.”179  
 
However, the CD may not have held quite such import without the CWC. For there was a 
symbiotic relationship between the IO and norm rarely considered in norm scholarship. The 
norm to eliminate CW justified the CD’s existence and secured its otherwise precarious 
credibility, just as much as the CD promoted the CWC. At each CWC delay, for example, 
 
173 Examples: CD/PV.4,38, CD/PV.29,23-31, CD/PV.152,24, CD/PV.166,26, CD/PV.193,43, CD/PV.236,41, 
CD/PV.244,18, CD/PV.303,25, CD/PV.337,29, CD/PV.453,13, CD/PV.481,7, CD/PV.535,15, CD/PV.617,7,18. 
174 CD/PV.2,50. Similarly: CD/PV.150,16. 
175 CD/PV.386,18. Also: A/C.1/41/PV.17,12,14-15, A/C.1/45/PV.21,32. 
176 The ‘but-for’ effect is a test in criminal and tort law to determine causation. 
177 Cuba: CD/PV.641,18. Others: CD/PV.215,30, CD/PV.262,35, CD/PV.271,25, CD/PV.337,25, CD/PV.343,10, 
CD/PV.353,26, CD/PV.383,4-5, CD/PV.416,8, CD/PV.485,8, CD/PV.530,9, CD/PV.617,14, CD/PV.635,30,34,49, 
Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 19, A/C.1/47/PV.42,37: “without a multilateral organ like the Conference its 
scope, the number of signatories and its usefulness as an instrument… would have been simply impossible." 
178 A/C.1/47/PV.7,25. 
179 A/C.1/47/PV.14,28-29. Also: CD/PV.4,8-9, CD/PV.439,3-4,6, A/C.1/45/PV.21,31. 
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delegates lamented the negative effect upon the CD.180 With CWC negotiations often the 
only avenue through which the CD claimed any semblance of success,181 its reputation - if 
not the very existence of multilateral disarmament forums generally182 - became a prime 
CWC motivating factor.183 According to the Australian delegate, for example, “Progress here 
in the next month towards a ban on chemical weapons is one of the achievements which 
could, in one stroke, both justify the existence of this Committee and constitute a tonic for 
the world.”184 Cuba concurred, constantly pushing for CWC progress to ensure CD 
credibility: the CD “is the only negotiating body freely established by the international 
community to carry out that task. It cannot constantly disappoint public opinion by failing to 
act on the topics of paramount importance.”185 Upon adoption, the AHC Chair announced 
that today “might be considered as one of the most important ones in the history of the 
Conference on Disarmament.”186 The norm to eliminate CW affirmed the CD as much as the 
CD consolidated the norm: the two needed each other for their very existence.  
 
Finally, the prospect of future IO engagement and insider access to UN institutions 
provided impetus to Cuban CWC ratification. Cuba had presented at least two candidates to 
work within the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) by 1994, 
“whose contracts in all cases depend in the first place, on us ratifying the Convention.”187 In 
a private memo the Vice-Minister argued, “It is necessary that we ratify the Convention 
before the end of the year given if we do not… all possibility of Cuban functionaries working 
in the Secretariat will be lost.”188 Following Cuban ratification, the MINREX Minister told the 
UNSG of pride that “my country signed said Convention on 13 January 1993 in Paris and has 
 
180 Examples: CD/PV.31,53, CD/PV.225,6, CD/PV.200,11, CD/PV.243,22, CD/PV.466,9, CD/PV.310,49. 
181 Such as: CD/PV.626,19-20, CD/PV.634,24, CD/PV.540,5, CD/PV.566,9, CD/PV.286,36, CD/PV.229,11, 
CD/PV.279,14, A/C.1/47/PV.42,103, A/C.1/39/PV.4,31,62,67, A/C.1/39/PV.15,4. 
182 Per CD/PV.308,10, CD/PV.350,13, CD/PV.491,11, A/C.1/45/PV.50,26,31, CD/PV.484,31, CD/PV.606,23. 
CD/PV.227,25, CD/PV.274,11, CD/PV.391,22, CD/PV.436,29, CD/PV.457,42, CD/PV.540,9, Disarmament Affairs, 
Yearbook, 41, A/C.1/46/PV.31,12-3: “the future of multilateral arms control and disarmament is at stake.” 
183 Per countless delegates: CD/PV.227,13, CD/PV.292,14, CD/PV.343,10-11, CD/PV.634,27, CD/PV.386,22, 
CD/PV.418,6, CD/PV.543,4, CD/PV.541,9, CD/PV.621,7, CD/PV.635,20,35: “what is at stake here is more than 
one disarmament agreement… the very capacity of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating forum." 
184 CD/PV.153,15. 
185 CD/PV.336,38. Also: CD/PV.636,8,19, CD/PV.641,4,10, CD/PV.642,6, A/C.1/47/PV.14,27. 
186 CD/PV.635,7. Similarly: CD President: CD/PV.635,99, CD/PV.643,4. 
187 Viceministro, “RS/98,” 1-2. Additionally: MINREX, “REF: SID 11.1.3- De: Robertico, A: Marcos,” 8 December 
1995, Viceministro, “De: Mary Flórez, Viceministra, A: Roberto Robaina, Ministro,” 11 December 1995, 1. 
188 Viceministro, “RS/98,” 1-2: “it will impact our future OPCW activity… countries that do not ratify the 
Convention and therefore, will not be parties to it, cannot occupy charges in the OPCW Secretariat.” 
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come to work in a very active way in all the negotiating processes… occupying high 
responsibilities in its subsidiary organs.”189 In accordance with relevant identifiers, IO impact 
on norm development and Cuban endorsement was high, albeit with slightly greater 
complexity than generally anticipated within extant analytical frameworks. 
 
4.3.a.ii: State Suasion 
State suasion was also pertinent to general and Cuban norm endorsement. However, in a 
twist rarely acknowledged in associated scholarship, it was neither all positive nor singular 
and, considered holistically, did not operate as a driver of socialisation. First, all CD member 
states impacted norm diffusion by expressing support, submitting Working Papers (WPs) 
and working on CWC negotiations.190 Considering associated identifiers, the influence of 
certain players stood out, such as the United Kingdom, which tabled draft conventions, 
hosted expert symposiums, held AHC Chairmanship, submitted crucial WPs regarding 
verification, declarations and challenge inspections, and, according to the British Foreign 
Secretary “has taken a leading role in efforts to secure disarmament in this field.”191 Other 
influential states included the Federal Republic of Germany, which hosted workshops and 
provided instrumental WPs,192 the Netherlands, which arranged technical training 
workshops, important WPs, informal consultations and became the OPCW host,193 Finland, 
which submitted the ‘Blue Book’ series of technical reports, offered OPCW laboratories, 
hosted workshops and provided Technical Secretariat training, 194 Norway, which regularly 
presented research programme results, text proposals, expert symposiums and training 
workshops,195 Sweden, which offered highly-commended WPs, chaired the AHC and 
informal consultations, and proposed the integrated verification approach,196 and Canada 
 
189 MINREX, “De: Jorge Bolaños Suárez, A: Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretario General ONU,” 21 Oct 1995, 1. 
190 CD/PV.262,49. 
191 CD/PV.241,15. Examples: CD/PV.633,6, CD/PV.337,29, CD/PV.280,18, CD/PV.202,16-17, CD/PV.165,10,15, 
37, CD/PV.421,9-10, CD/PV.243,21, CD/PV.377,4, CD/PV.500,2-21, CD/PV.601,15, Robinson, “Origins,” 48-9. 
192 Such as: CD/PV.5,34, CD/PV.30,6, CD/PV.266,7, CD/PV.279,16,20, CD/PV.550,18, CD/PV.601,14, CD/PV.175, 
32, CD/PV.256,17-8, CD/PV.328,7-8, CD/PV.447,4, CD/PV.541,10, Becker-Jakob, et al, “Citizen,” 220-3. 
193 Including: CD/PV.8,21, CD/PV.150,21-2, CD/PV.179,12-3, CD/PV.240,15, CD/PV.258,35, CD/PV.272,19, 
CD/PV.626,16-8, CD/PV.347,26-7, CD/PV.611,10-2, CD/PV.211,15, CD/PV.575,5-7, Findlay, Peace, 16. 
194 Examples: CD/PV.195,46-7, CD/PV.235,30, CD/PV.272,17, CD/PV.346,8, CD/PV.419,4, CD/PV.481,2-4, 
CD/PV.516,5-7, CD/PV.599,8-12, CD/PV.626,16-8, Cuban praise: A/C.1/46/PV.10,7, Goodby, “Arms,” 277. 
195 Such as: CD/PV.160,36, CD/PV.267,8, CD/PV.623,14, CD/PV.364,12, CD/PV.419,6,18, CD/PV.594,10. 
196 Including: CD/PV.167,36-37, CD/PV.232,13, CD/PV.258,35, CD/PV.331,11, CD/PV.385,22, CD/PV.250,16, 
CD/PV.386,24, CD/PV.434,9, CD/PV.575,3, CD/PV.591,8, CD/PV.596,12, Becker-Jakob, et al, “Citizen,” 227-231. 
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and Poland, which both chaired the AHC, sponsored mandate UNGA resolutions and 
submitted important WPs.197 According to Müller, these countries represented those “like-
minded countries bridging the North-South gap (that) commit jointly to positions that 
recognize both the need to make the regime more effective and the appropriateness of 
satisfying the South’s justice claims.”198  
 
A further, unanticipated, aspect of state suasion was embodied by the 1989 Paris 
Conference, which represented collective positive state action beyond IO parameters. 
Described as a “major breakthrough” with “historic consensus,”199 the Final Declaration 
urged the CD “to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues” to conclude the CWC,200 and 
was not only repeatedly praised for norm consolidation, but also served the CD “as a point 
of reference: we will be accountable in the coming weeks for the way in which we translate 
this political impetus into action.”201 Although resonating domestically,202 Cuban delegates 
remained sanguine internationally: “the influence of the political results of the meeting held 
in France early this year has not been felt, and that for that reason not much progress was 
made at Geneva.”203 This assessment proved accurate given the CWC was not adopted for 
another three years. The state bloc of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), represented by 
G21 delegates at the CD,204 reflected additional collective influence, given the NAM initiated 
the UNGA First Special Session, the original AHC proposal, and garnered frequent praise 
from Cuba for CW prohibition efforts.205 However, unlike the environmental norm case 
study (in chapter 6), NAM influence was limited here given lack of leverage: “Institutional 
 
197 Examples: A/C.1/47/PV.28,29, A/C.1/46/PV.30,8, A/C.1/45/PV.34,3, CD/PV.601,4, A/C.1/44/PV.39,3, 
A/C.1/43/PV.36,6, A/C.1/34/PV.10,14, A/C.1/36/PV.36,35, A/C.1/37/PV.37,31, A/C.1/38/PV.33,26, 
CD/PV.239,31, CD/PV.295,30, CD/PV.420,4, CD/PV.643,22, Becker-Jakob, et al, “Citizen,” 212-4. 
198 Müller, “Agency,” 363. 
199 UNGA First Committee President: A/C.1/44/PV.5,6, UNSG: A/C.1/44/PV.15,13. Also: Smidovich, “Russian,” 
56: “This unprecedented forum” is “the most important contribution.”  
200 CD/PV.484,5-6,10, CD/PV.532,5, CD/PV.485,8, CD/PV.487,4, CD/PV.491,5, CD/PV.488,21, CD/PV.509,4. 
201 French Foreign Minister: 4-5,14,20-23,29-31. Others that “regard this as a direct instruction to urgently 
redouble our efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the 
earliest date”: CD/PV.486,14, CD/PV.485,5,8, CD/PV.487,4,14, CD/PV.540,9, CD/PV.489,4, CD/PV.495,2, 
CD/PV.499,3, CD/PV.532,23, CD/PV.545,15, CD/PV.617,7, CD/PV.529,3-4,10-4, CD/PV.531,13, CD/PV.546,3, 
CD/PV.588,12, CD/PV.548,12, CD/PV.585,6. 
202 Anon, “Partidaria Cuba,” 8, “Comprométense al no uso de armas químicas,” Granma (25:10, Thu 12 Jan 
1989), 1. 
203 A/C.1/44/PV.12,31. Similarly: A/C.1/44/PV.5,61, A/C.1/45/PV.34,6, A/C.1/45/PV.36,26. 
204 Which Cuba occasionally co-ordinated: CD/PV.34,11-2. 
205 Examples: CD/PV.1,9, CD/PV.22,5, CD/PV.26,10, CD/PV.28,24, CD/PV.29,32, CD/PV.31,13, CD/PV.26,11, 
CD/PV.323,17, CD/PV.28,25, CD/PV.29,7, CD/PV.29,40, CD/PV.31,12,29,39, CD/PV.163,22, CD/PV.184,30. 
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positions and power resources are distributed asymmetrically, limiting the opportunity for 
weaker parties to exert influence.”206 Solés thus subsequently rued, “the objective disparity 
that separated then and separates today countries of the South from those of the 
developed North and the different capacities they have to influence and determine world 
events.”207 
 
Two individual countries, however, held particular positive impact over Cuban CW norm 
endorsement and came closest to operating as drivers of state socialisation. First, following 
the lead taken by its Foreign Minister at the individual level, Australia as a CD state 
delegation submitted multiple instrumental WPs, held subsidiary CD chairing duties and 
sponsored/introduced several UNGA resolutions urging CWC conclusion.208 Australia as a 
nation initiated the ‘Australia Group’ in 1985, that “brought together representatives of 
industrial nations which export certain relevant chemicals, to ensure that their industries 
were not associated, even inadvertently, with the production of chemical weapons,”209 
hosted the 1989 government/industry Canberra Conference on chemical exports and the 
CWC210 - praised for its success and significance in securing essential industry support211 - 
and was congratulated on its Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative, launched in 1988 to 
broaden CWC support and universality.212 Most importantly, however, Australian diplomats 
conducted a mini-world tour in 1992, consulting 33 CD delegation capitals to overcome final 
CWC hurdles and compile a model compromise draft convention.213 Described by Senator 
Evans as “an accelerator for the vehicle” of the CD,214 this penultimate draft was considered 
to “provide the necessary impetus and make a catalytic contribution to our collective efforts 
to conclude the chemical weapons convention this year.”215  
 
206 Müller, et al, “Regime,” 74. 
207 Solés, “Convención,” 33-34. 
208 Examples: CD/PV.225,31, CD/PV.232,13, CD/PV.271,21-3, CD/PV.357,22-24, CD/PV.441,18, CD/PV.554,30, 
CD/PV.571,15, CD/PV.618,6, A/C.1/42/PV.37,2-8,A/C.1/45/PV.34,8,A/C.1/46/PV.30,13-8, Goodby, “Arms,”277. 
209 CD/PV.492,13. Also: Kelle, “Power,” 404, Morel, “Verifiability,” 220. 
210 CD/PV.492,12-13, CD/PV.508,24. 
211 Including: CD/PV.508,9,23-4, CD/PV.525,4, CD/PV.545,7, CD/PV.541,9, CD/PV.548,12, CD/PV.588,12, 
CD/PV.617,7, A/C.1/44/PV.39,3, A/C.1/44/PV.5,6, CD/PV.532,5, Solés, “Convención,” 33, Will Carpenter, 
“Perspective of the Western Chemical Industry” in Morel,Olsen, Shadows, 117, Yearbook, 19. 
212 CD/PV.508,25, CD/PV.516,5, CD/PV.543,5, CD/PV.613,13, CD/PV.617,35, CD/PV.626,4-5,Findlay, Peace, 8-9. 
213 CD/PV.617,7-16,52, CD/PV.626,4, Findlay, Peace, 15-16. 
214 CD/PV.617,14. 
215 Sri Lanka: CD/PV.617,25,29. Others: 16-17,31-52, CD/PV.619,6,27-28,33, CD/PV.620,10-11, CD/PV.621,9, 
CD/PV.623,6-7,14, CD/PV.635,34,45, CD/PV.636,24-25, Morel, Olson, “Introduction,” xviii. 
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Crucially, for the purpose of this study, Australia also directly impacted Cuban decision-
making. In addition to detailed analysis of the Australian draft treaty by the Cuban Working 
Group on CW,216 and directly reflecting relevant indicators, MINREX archives confirm the 
visit of an Australian Ambassador to Havana in August 1992 which successfully secured 
Cuban CWC support. The Ambassador appeared to convince Cuba to accept preambular 
provisions regarding herbicides, rather than operative text recognition as previously 
demanded,217 delivered the Australia Group Declaration, which promised to review export 
control measures in response to Cuban and G21 demands “with the aim of removing such 
measures for the benefit of States parties to the convention,”218 and submitted Senator 
Evans’ letter seeking CWC endorsement to the MINREX Minister.219 Given Cuba became a 
CWC signatory party upon opening for signature, this direct state suasion presents 
positively. 
 
Second, as a CW-possessing close-ally and superpower, the USSR embodied a critical 
state in relation to both general and Cuban norm endorsement. The USSR submitted 
numerous WPs, suggestions and proposals, including the 1982 basic provisions draft treaty 
and 1983 CW production freeze; made several notable concessions - described as 
“breakthroughs”220 - in key areas including mandatory international on-site inspections, 
prohibition of use, declaration/destruction of stocks, and non-production verification; 
hosted an international CW destruction demonstration; provided and promoted 
declarations in the spirit of glasnost from 1988; pushed for extra AHC sessions to conclude 
negotiations quickly; and proffered key pronouncements such as “that chemical weapons be 
completely eliminated by the end of this century” in 1986, and unilateral stockpile 
 
216 MINREX, “RS-2865,” 1-6. 
217 4.4.b.iii: Feedback Loop, MINREX, “RS/18-1067- De: Director Asuntos Multilaterales, Pedro Núñez 
Mosquera, A: Ministro Ricardo Alarcón, AST: Entrevista con Embajador de Australia en Cuba,” 12 August 1992, 
1, CD/PV.286,31, MINREX, “RS 434,” 1-2: “his government understands our preoccupation with the question of 
chemical herbicides use as a weapon of destruction, but consider it already dealt with in ENMOD… I replied 
that for us the military use of herbicides was very important, exemplified by what happened in the Vietnam 
War… However, I promised the matter would be studied with great interest from a friendly country.” 
218 CD/PV.629,17. Also: CD/PV.635,5,11, Roberts, “CWC,” 6, MINREX, “RS 434,” 3. 
219 MINREX, “RS 434- De: Ricardo Alarcón, A: Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,” 17 August 1992, 1-2. 
220 A/C.1/37/PV.37,53, CD/PV.244,15, CD/PV.249,10, CD/PV.389,3. 
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elimination undertakings in 1989.221 According to its delegate, the “position of the Soviet 
Union with respect to chemical weapons is clear and unequivocal: the Soviet Union was one 
of the initiators of the proposal for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and it has 
done and is continuing to do everything in its power in any forum.”222 According to Cuba, 
the proposals from “the Soviet Union are so momentous that they cannot be ignored and 
the apparent headway being made in the negotiations to ban chemical weapons fosters 
some hope of arriving at a satisfactory agreement.”223 
 
MINREX archives reveal additional, targetted suasion by the USSR over Cuba. As early as 
1969 the USSR privately and successfully elicited Cuban support for the socialist UNGA CWC 
proposal,224 and in 1971 Cuba supported inclusion of a CW abstinence article in the draft 
Soviet CBW.225 Publicly, a 1972 joint USSR/Cuba statement “pronounced in favour of efforts 
for the achievement as soon as possible of a respective agreement for the prohibition and 
destruction of chemical weapons,”226 while Granma frequently lauded USSR proposals and 
announcements in support of CW prohibition at the CD.227 USSR influence was so strong 
that in 1981 the US contended that “In the 264 votes during the thirty-sixth session of the 
General Assembly when the Soviet Union was present and voted, Cuba cast its vote with 
Moscow 90.9 per cent of the time… So much for the independence of thought and national 
positions of countries such as these.”228 Such suasion continued, with Cuban diplomats 
 
221 CD/PV.341,8. Including: CD/PV.165,10, CD/PV.178,23-30, CD/PV.188,10-4, CD/PV.191,15, CD/PV.235,19-24, 
CD/PV.254,28, CD/PV.351,20, CD/PV.389,4-7, CD/PV.405,18, CD/PV.441,19, CD/PV.495,2, CD/PV.536,7, 
CD/PV.574,12, A/C.1/38/PV.13,12-6,29-30, Smidovich, “Russian,” 57-62, Müller, et al, “Winds,” 149. 
222 CD/PV.166,34. Other praise: CD/PV.176,8-37, CD/PV.179,10-13, CD/PV.187,14,24, CD/PV.409,5, CD/PV.202, 
15, CD/PV.197,9,14, CD/PV.258,35, CD/PV.286,23, CD/PV.365,6, CD/PV.458,11,15, CD/PV.500,18, CD/PV.385, 
32, A/C.1/37/PV.20,29-30,53, Fey, “Established,” 166-79, Robinson, “Origins,” 50, Findlay, Peace, 6: USSR 
“established precedents for the CWC and enticed the US into what became a chemical disarmament race.” 
223 CD/PV.336,37. Also: A/C.1/41/PV.17,17, CD/PV.336,38. 
224 URSS, “Memorándum,” 1, A/C.1/37/PV.20,46, Anon, “Apoya Cuba Proyecto en la ONU sobre la Cuestion de 
las Armas Quimicas,” Granma (5:289, Wed 3 Dec 1969), 6, Robinson, “Origins,” 49. 
225 MINREX, “Ref: 111.1.22,” 1, A/C.1/40/PV.26,14-15. 
226 Anon, “Comunicado Conjunto Cubano-Sovietico con Motivo de la Visita del Compañero del Castro a la 
Union Sovietica,” Granma (8: 161, Thu 6 July 1972), 6. 
227 Jose Guma, “Comienza mañana Conferencia de Ginebra para el Desarme,” Granma (21:29, Mon 4 Feb 
1985), 8, Anon, “Comenzó en Ginebra,” 8, Anon, “Propone la URSS programa concreto de eliminación de 
armas nucleares en todo el mundo,” Granma (22:12, Thur 16 Jan 1986), 1, Anon, “Declaración de Mijail 
Gorbachov,” Granma (22:12, Thur 16 Jan 1986), 5, Anon, “Inician la URSS y EE.UU conversaciones sobre 
control y eliminación de las armas químicas,” Granma (22:23, Wed 29 Jan 1986), 8, Ramon Martinez, 
“Comenzará la URSS en este año la destrucción unilateral de sus arsenales químicos,” Granma (25:7, Mon 9 
Jan 1989), 8, Ferrer, “Haz lo que digo,” 7, Anon, “Producirá EE.UU. nuevas armas químicas,” 1. 
228 A/C.1/37/PV.18,51. 
 125 
reporting USSR updates and recommendations for Cuba to follow suit,229 and private 
missives from the Soviet Ambassador direct to President Castro enlisting support for the 
1989 Paris Conference:  
We consider that steps for the convocation and realisation of the International 
Conference must have a serene character, of no confrontation… The Conference must 
constitute a serious step on the path towards earliest agreement of the Convention and 
the complete and global prohibition of CW… We express hope that Cuban friends 
support our focus towards this problem.230 
 
The USSR also held influence, both generally and indirectly upon Cuba, through its 
bilateral negotiations with the US, which paralleled, and were considered of great import to, 
CD CWC efforts.231 Despite some breakthroughs that generated Cuban praise,232 many 
delegations rued the CD’s over-reliance upon bilateral outcomes, denouncing their 
attachment “like juridical artificial limbs to the general text of the convention, generating a 
two-track method of negotiation” that was considered “harmful” as such "hierarchies" 
"legitimize an implicit veto,” especially given the “CW issue is not of a specifically bilateral 
nature.”233 CD deliberations frequently stalled whilst ostensibly awaiting bilateral 
progress,234 and many delegations, including Cuba, berated the slow pace, repeated 
breakdowns, resulting deadlocks and negative effect of this bilateral suasion over the 
CWC.235 Brazil, for example, lamented that “In such a climate, prospects for the early 
conclusion of a convention seem very slim” and make for a “rather grim assessment of the 
results of (this) session.”236 Remarkably, even bilateral consensus impeded the CWC. At the 
 
229 Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: Ministro 
MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca, Nota No. 165,” 27 February 1990, 1. 
230 Partido Comunista de Cuba Comité Central, “A: Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, De: Jorge Risquet 
Valdés, Asunto: Conferencia sobre la prohibición del uso del arma química,” 12 October 1988, 3. 
231Including by Cuba: CD/PV.168,16, Anon, “Inician la URSS y EE.UU conversaciones,”8, and others: CD/PV.2,60, 
CD/PV.5,16,24, CD/PV.547,4-5, CD/PV.22,5-6, CD/PV.195,48, CD/PV.31,18,20, CD/PV.551,4-5, CD/PV.292,15. 
232 Including CWC conclusion and stocks destruction commitments, glasnost and a CD negotiating environment 
increasingly “free of polemics”: CD/PV.339,22,33,39, CD/PV.347,24, CD/PV.351,20, CD/PV.555,16, CD/PV.342, 
9,15,33, CD/PV.386,4, CD/PV.525,3,20, CD/PV.588, 12, CD/PV.541,14-15, CD/PV.350,12-3, CD/PV.484,25. 
Cuban praise: A/C.1/43/PV.17,42-3,51-2, A/C.1/44/PV.12,27,31, CD/PV.439,2, Solés, “Convención,” 31,33. 
233 CD/PV.558,5, CD/PV.6,15,50, CD/PV.566,8, CD/PV.28,19,25, CD/PV.29,7,31, CD/PV.31,29-39, CD/PV.189,22. 
234 For example: CD/PV.31,21-4. 
235 Cuba: CD/PV.168,16. Others: CD/PV.31,35,42, CD/PV.199,16, CD/PV.287,15, CD/PV.202,22, CD/PV.323,20, 
CD/PV.308,24-5, CD/PV.282,9, CD/PV.286,23, CD/PV.306,27, CD/PV.588,12, CD/PV.284,12, CD/PV.239,25, 
CD/PV.284,17, CD/PV.323,21-5, A/C.1/36/PV.42,13, A/C.1/34/PV.10,41, A/C.1/38/PV.6,66, CD/PV.2,37. 
236 CD/PV.169,26-7. Others: CD/PV.323,17, CD/PV.176,10, CD/PV.194,20, CD/PV.236,34, Iran: CD/PV.262,10: 
“long and inconclusive” bilats are “hypocritical measures taken by the super-Powers, as the main producers of 
CW, in order to deceive world public opinion and evade their own direct responsibility for the use of CW.” 
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cusp of broad CWC acquiescence, a 1990 US/USSR joint agreement endorsed a CWC that 
incorporated new caveats and pandered to US demands that it was “essential that the 
United States retain the right to retaliate in kind to a chemical weapon attack.”237 Countless 
delegations, including Cuba, outright rejected these exemptions to an otherwise complete 
and comprehensive global CW prohibition.238 The result was an additional two year delay to 
CWC adoption.239 As Cuba observed:  
for many years there were obstacles which delayed our negotiations for the conclusion 
of the convention, among them the insistence on the right to retaliation and on the 
retention of 2 per cent of chemical arsenals. We feel satisfied that these obstacles have 
now disappeared, and we would be even more satisfied if this had been the result of the 
multilateral negotiations in the (CD) and not the outcome of bilateral agreements.240  
 
State suasion in the form of bilateral consultations between the two critical states thus 
delayed and hindered adoption of the international norm to eliminate CW as represented in 
the CWC, thereby holding negative impact, including over Cuban endorsement and potential 
state socialisation. 
 
Yet it was the other half of that bilateral suasion that held the greatest individual state 
influence over CWC negotiations and Cuban responses, although not necessarily in a 
positive manner. While scholarship often credits the US as “instrumental in negotiating this 
agreement,”241 a detailed analysis of CWC negotiations and Cuban responses reveals a 
distinctly negative immediate impact in what may be termed reverse state suasion: when 
state actions or decisions in fact disincentivise or delay norm endorsement. Despite positive 
public pronouncements, and some productive WPs, workshops and declarations,242 the US 
rejected treaty text negotiation proposals and majority demands for AHC mandate 
extensions and international inspection trials, despite UNGA resolutions, the Paris Final 
 
237 CD/PV.535,13. See also: CD/PV.534,13, CD/PV.538,13, CD/PV.567,12, Smidovich, “Russian,” 65, Robinson, 
“Origins,” 50, Müller, et al, “Regime,” ” 69. 
238 Cuba: CD/PV.603,4, A/C.1/45/PV.21,33, Comité Central, “Re: 3/32,” 3. Others: CD/PV.548,17, 
CD/PV.551,5,9, CD/PV.570,34, CD/PV.571,12, CD/PV.588,12, CD/PV.627,3, CD/1046,235, CD/PV.567,10. 
239 CD/PV.591,12, CD/PV.597,3, CD/PV.602,7, CD/PV.592,12-15. 
240 CD/PV.603,3. Similarly: MINREX, “RS/1319,” 2, A/C.1/46/PV.10,5. Others: CD/PV.595,5,20-21, CD/PV.596,3, 
CD/PV.597,15, CD/PV.598,2, CD/PV.605,17, Robinson, “Origins,” 50-51, Findlay, Peace, 7. 
241 Bloom, “Editorial,” 179. Similarly: Findlay, Peace, 6-7, Kelle, “Power,” 405. 
242 President Reagan: CD/PV.152,13. Vice-President Bush: CD/PV.191,11-2, CD/PV.244,22. US CD delegates: 
CD/PV.155,15, CD/PV.166,9, CD/PV.193,13, CD/PV.484,18-9, CD/PV.506,11, CD/PV.591,11, CD/PV.617,7, 
CD/PV.491,5, CD/PV.193,33-6, CD/PV.241,26-7, CD/PV.274,10,13, CD/PV.201,13-4. 
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Declaration, and majority CD delegation demands otherwise.243 The US recommended 
“resist(ing) the temptation to rush to signature by passing over the details,”244 and became 
the solitary state to repeatedly vote against UNGA resolutions that condemned the 
production of binary weapons and encouraged CWC negotiations.245 Many initiatives under 
the Reagan administration in fact delayed CWC agreement, attracting allegations they were 
deliberately designed to do so to justify the US binary weapons programme.246 Robinson, 
for example, records “it had seemed, even to the less cynical observers, as though the chief 
function of the all-important American participation in the talks was to justify to the US 
Congress the Reagan Administration's long-running quest for authority and funding to 
modernise the US chemical weapons arsenal by acquiring the newly developed 'binary 
munitions'.”247 Although potentially, inadvertently, propelling negotiations given increased 
proliferation concerns,248 the common reaction to the US development programme was 
concern over chemical arms race acceleration and CWC failure.249 Describing it “a tiresome 
farce,” the Iranian delegate, for example, asked:  
How is one to believe that the United States, which has allocated to chemical weapons 
some several billion dollars by 1987 and some eight more billion dollars for the following 
five years, really means what it says concerning the need for the prohibition of chemical 
weapons… The vast gap between words and deeds has made the climate of international 
meetings gloomy and bleak.250  
 
Cuba concurred, affirming that the “appearance of this new type of (binary) chemical 
armament will greatly complicate the achievement of the proposed instrument and will 
make the negotiation process concerning that instrument even more difficult.”251 Cuba thus 
 
243 US rejection: A/C.1/34/PV.42,42, A/C.1/36/PV.34,21, CD/PV.436,48, CD/PV.574,18-9, CD/PV.605,16, 
CD/PV.512,4-5. Cuban calls: CD/PV.439,4, A/C.1/44/PV.12,31. Others: CD/PV.438,14-5, CD/PV.450,11, 
CD/PV.529,10-14, CD/PV.490,9, CD/PV.535,11-14. 
244 CD/PV.478,7. Similarly: Findlay, Peace, 7. 
245 A/C.1/36/PV.42,27-8, A/C.1/37/PV.20,47, A/C.1/37/PV.42,18-20, A/C.1/39/PV.46,78-80. 
246 Several condemned hardening, if not regressing, US proposals “known to be unacceptable to us and which 
in some cases have a quite unrealistic and demagogic character”: A/C.1/38/PV.13,11-2, A/C.1/39/PV.23, 
CD/PV.243,25-6, CD/PV.235,18-21, CD/PV.253,29, CD/PV.394,8, CD/PV.418,17, CD/PV.448,8-9, CD/PV.198,8. 
247 Robinson, “Origins,” 50. Also, Goodby, “Arms,” 263-4, Sweden: CD/PV.150,26: “it is not acceptable that 
such negotiations be used as a smokescreen for the production of new chemical weapons.” 
248 E.g: CD/PV.154,14-5, CD/PV.169,16,34, CD/PV.207,12, CD/PV.453,13-4, CD/PV.360,16, CD/PV.446,25-6. 
249 E.g: CD/PV.201,13, CD/PV.359,8-9, CD/PV.309,10-5, CD/PV.419,18, CD/PV.166,35-7, CD/PV.314,15, 
CD/PV.360,20-4, CD/PV.179,10, CD/PV.229,11. 
250 CD/PV.242,8. Similarly: CD/PV.262,11, CD/PV.418,16, CD/PV.377,15. 
251 CD/PV.163,22. Also: A/C.1/42/PV.43,82, A/C.1/41/PV.17,12, A/C.1/40/PV.39,29, A/C.1/37/PV.18,6, 
CD/PV.168,14-6, A/C.1/38/PV.6,72, CD/PV.439,4, CD/PV.180,32: “a new obstacle in the way of negotiations on 
this important topic jeopardised all that had been achieved in earlier years… binary weapons.” 
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co-sponsored a series of UNGA resolutions calling for “refrain from any action which could 
impede negotiations… and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of new 
types of chemical weapons, including binary weapons.”252 
 
Similarly, despite prevailing narratives that CWC “negotiation gradually got under way, 
impelled partly by the submission from the United States of a new draft treaty,”253 the 1984 
draft US treaty actually stalled negotiations, proving “unacceptable not only for the Soviet 
Union but also for a significant number of States.”254 In the shadow, once again, of the 
Vietnam legacy, Cuba rejected the draft given the omission of herbicides,255 arguing that it 
“only tries to serve the base justification of growth of US capacity in this sphere. It also 
constitutes blackmail, via which it attempts to pressure socialist countries, progressives and 
all peace loving forces to accept ignominious yankee impositions.”256 The key impediment to 
CWC negotiations had previously been US insistence on mandatory on-site international 
inspections,257 however the 1984 draft treaty took the concept further by introducing the 
‘open-invitation’ verification concept: "a mutual obligation to open for international 
inspection on short notice all of its military or government-owned or government-controlled 
facilities."258 Although welcomed by some,259 and considered a ‘fillip’ in scholarship,260 the 
USSR, Cuba, and allies, rejected what they considered a blatantly unacceptable condition 
that manipulated verification as obfuscation “to block the negotiations”261 - “putting 
forward demands on unimpeded access to the territories of other States to continue to 
block the achievement of agreement on a chemical weapons ban.”262 According to Cuba: 
we are very far from being in a serious negotiating process, very far from replacing 
demagogic rhetoric and propaganda devices with specific achievements… It is due to the 
warlike behaviour of a great Power, the United States… What now needs to be examined 
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is whether the draft is a serious document or a text with hidden pitfalls designed 
precisely to prevent it from being adopted.263 
 
Goodby agreed, noting “US negotiators set out to sell their counterparts in the (CD) a 
verification scheme that, long experience had taught, had no chance of acceptance by the 
nation to which the scheme was plainly addressed - the Soviet Union - and was also 
impractical to the point of being utopian. As the scale of the American verification demands 
became clear, hesitations about the ‘anywhere, anytime’ principle grew into a major 
obstacle.”264 Yet even when the USSR conceded open-invitation verification in 1987, the US 
reneged, delaying progress even further.265 CWC verification mechanisms were not 
translated into agreed treaty text until the very conclusion of negotiations in 1992.266 The 
US hindered CWC negotiations, deferring norm endorsement by and potential socialisation 
of Cuba, in a type of reverse state suasion.  
 
However, US recalcitrance had a secondary effect upon Cuban norm endorsement, this 
time through what may be labelled ‘indirect inverse state suasion’: norm endorsement as a 
response to other state recalcitrance. Although rarely recognised in associated commentary 
or scholarship, it was the US that represented the CW threat for Cuba. In a revealing analysis 
on the history of CW prohibition, for example, Solés focused almost exclusively on US 
engagement with and policy regarding CW: President Nixon’s 1969 no-first-use 
announcement, 1975 Geneva Protocol ratification, 1975 declaration on herbicides as a 
method of war, 1980s research and development programmes, the 1984 draft convention, 
and 1990s technological advances.267 Indeed, "no State in the world in the whole history of 
mankind has used chemical weapons on such a scale as the United States.”268 Cuban efforts 
 
263 CD/PV.261,7-8: “it cannot serve as a smokescreen to conceal the lack of constructive dialogue.” Also: 
CD/PV.351,1, CD/PV.198,37, A/C.1/41/PV.17,17-20, A/C.1/37/PV.18,2-3, CD/PV.168,15: US “intended to give 
the impression that the objective sought is the strengthening of defence, when in fact it is to force negotiation 
from positions of strength,” “in line with the general strategy of imperialism.” 
264 Goodby, “Arms,” 264. 
265 CD/PV.428,3-5, CD/PV.450,11, Müller, et al, “Regime,” 71, Roberts, “CWC,” 5, Smidovich, “Russian,” 61, 
Morel, “Verifiability,” 221, Goodby, “Arms,” 265, Fey, et al, “Established,” 165,170, Robinson, “Origins,” 50-1: 
“United States was retreating from it, apparently seeking to protect its supersecret technology development 
programs in non-CBW military areas from liability to international inspection under the chemical treaty.” 
266 Findlay, Peace, 8, Robinson, “Origins,” 51, Krutzsch, et al, “Introduction,” 8. 
267 Solés, “Convención,” 94-8. 
268 USSR: CD/PV.166,40. Others: CD/PV.191,16, CD/PV.196,20, A/C.1/37/PV.20,48-50, A/C.1/37/PV.57,56-7, 
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in the CD focused deliberately on quelling this threat: “We have a firm proposal of 
continuing to fight decisively against the North American aggressors, revealing their 
intentions to legalise use of chemical weapons, including herbicides and defoliants, 
concentrating efforts on the signing of the Geneva Protocol and attaining strict compliance 
with its dispositions."269  
 
Yet the threat was considered much more direct. In July 1981 Castro publicly accused the 
US of waging a bacteriological war against Cuba,270 prompting a stream of government 
statements and press articles highlighting US CW investment.271 Granma reported, for 
example, that when a purported ex-CIA agent was “Asked about the possibility that some of 
the plagues and illnesses that affected Cuba during the previous years was a product of use, 
on the part of the US, of chemical and bacteriological weapons, Wolf admitted such 
possibility.”272 For this explicit reason, Cuba publicly supported general disarmament efforts 
and MINREX paid minute attention to US CWC commitments, with multiple annotated 
reports querying specific US undertakings. Most importantly, in the early 1990s, Cuban 
decision-makers came to realise that the CWC in fact provided the very solution they 
needed.273 “We must fight to guarantee that all possessors of chemical weapons are among 
the first signatories to the Convention,”274 given the CWC: 
obliges the possessors of chemical weapons to disarm themselves, including the 
paradigmatic enemy, the US... Without doubt, the chemical disarmament of the US is in 
concordance with the strategic interests of the Cubans... Cuban denunciations regarding 
suspicions of pig fever and successive outbreaks of dengue and sicknesses that affected 
 
269 MINREX, “Memorándum,” 2-3. Also: MINREX, “RS/18-1067,” 2, Quiñones, “Los planes Yankis (IV),” 2. 
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aparato para actuar contra Cuba,” Granma (17:177, Tue 28 July 1981), 5. See also: Anon, “Declaración del 
Gobierno Revolucionario de Cuba,” Granma (17:215, Wed 9 Sept 1981), 1. 
273 CD/PV.603,3, Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, 
A: Ministro MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca, Nota No. 185,” 28 February 1990, 5-11, MINREX, “Memorándum,” 2-3, 
Misión Permanente, “RS/338,” 2, MINREX, “RS-297,” 1, MINREX, “RS/18-1067,” 1-2, MINREX, “RS 434,” 1-2, 
Misión Permanente, “RS-260- De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: Ministro MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca,” 26 
March 1990, 1, Misión Permanente, “R/S No. 563,” 2. 
274 MINREX, “RS-2865,” 2. Similarly: Comité Central, “Re: 3/32,” 3. 
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and have prejudiced its economy and population, are a consequence of the hostile 
activity of the US. In these circumstances, the adequate application of the Convention 
constitutes a gesture of transparency for Cuba that also pays tribute to its national 
security.275  
 
Cuba’s statement in the final official AHC report therefore announced: “There is no doubt 
that postponement of the approval of this (CWC) text in the current circumstances of 
unilateral hegemony in the United Nations system could have unforeseen adverse 
consequences."276 Furthermore, the delay between Cuban CWC signature and ratification 
aligned almost directly with that of the US.277 The threat to Cuba originated not with general 
CW use, proliferation nor commonly referenced rogue states, but with the US. Endorsement 
of the norm to eliminate CW helped Cuba constrain US preponderance. 
 
The norm was ultimately viewed by Cuba as alleviating two additional elements of 
perceived US recalcitrance as well. The first pertained to Guatánamo. Although Cubans did 
not achieve their goal of “dismantling foreign military bases”278 via the CWC, they came to 
appreciate it could nevertheless provide reassurance by at least banning CW within BNG: 
“While usurping the Bay of Guantánamo, the US government will be obliged to exclude 
chemical weapons from it completely. We hope that this government and the rest of the 
signatories comply comprehensively to this condition.”279 The CWC also offered rare 
potential for BNG transparency, with expert Cuban analysis insisting that requirements for 
detailed installations’ declarations ‘be maintained without ceding’.280 Most crucially, the 
CWC offered an opportunity for direct Cuban access into BNG via challenge inspections.281 
Cuba resolved:  
we must demand that the entrance to the Base for any (OPCW) inspection team is 
through points of entry from Cuban territory defined by our Government; maintain the 
 
275 Solés, “Convención,” 78-81. Also: MINREX, “RS/1319,” 1. 
276 CD/1170,18. Also: CD/PV.603,4, A/C.1/46/PV.10,7. 
277 Viceministro, “RS/98,” 1: “we hold the disposition to (ratify) after US ratification,” Viceministro de 
Relaciones Exteriores, “RS/519- De: Eumilio Caballero, Director DAM, A: Fernando Ramírez, Ministro,” 9 March 
1995, 2, MINREX, “De: Jorge Bolaños Suárez, A: Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali,” 2: Once US and Russia “have 
ratified said Convention, Cuba will adopt corresponding measures to ensure universality.” 
278 CD/PV.4,12. 
279 Anon, “En la firma de tratado de desarme,” 6. Similarly: Anon, “Sostiene Alarcón entrevistas en Francia,” 
Granma (29:12, Sat 16 Jan 1993), 6: MINREX Minister “demanded that the north american administration 
exclude CW from (BNG), speaking before the convention on the prohibition of that ammunition.” 
280 Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador José,” Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores, “RS/286 -De: Eumillio 
Caballero, A: Roberto Robaina, Minister,” 10 February 1994, 1-2, MINREX, “RS/1319,” 2. 
281 Australian Ambassador: MINREX, “RS/18-1067,” 2. 
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right to name an observer to represent the Cuban State during the visit; and receive the 
report made by the referenced inspection team resulting from their labour. This is a right 
that Cuba holds given the Base is located in our territory and we must not renounce it.282 
 
The final leverage presented by the CWC for Cuba against the US ironically resulted from 
the CWC’s deliberate incorporation of economic blackmail. Cuba valued chemical industry 
development highly,283 yet continued to suffer under US sanctions.284 Securing economic 
and industrial development undertakings within the CWC was therefore a priority for Cuba. 
In an internal Central Committee memo, one of four key priorities was the “necessity that 
the Convention does not limit the commerce and development of the chemical industry nor 
the commercial operations of chemical substances whose use is not explicitly prohibited by 
the Convention.”285 Cuba, alongside G21 colleagues,286 vigorously pursued CWC provisions 
to ensure international economic cooperation, guarantee unimpeded access to scientific 
and technological advancements, and secure rights to unfettered industry development for 
peaceful purposes: “there should not be any additional verification machinery that could in 
practice establish a dual legal regime to monitor trade in chemicals for purposes permitted 
by the convention… economic and technological development of States parties should not 
be adversely affected under any circumstances.”287 Responses culminated in a relatively 
overt form of pecuniary bribery. According to the US, “there should be tangible benefits for 
those States that join the convention - and specific penalties for those who do not. 
Therefore, the United States will propose provisions for the convention that will require 
parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with States that do not become 
parties.”288 In responding to “concerns of both developed and developing countries (to) 
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provide important incentives to join in the draft convention,”289 and “open the door to 
expanded international trade and economic co-operation in the chemical sector,”290 the 
CWC thus bribed states with "provisions on the application of a strict export control regime 
for the transfer of certain chemicals to States not parties to the Convention.”291  
 
Initially, Cuban decision-makers lamented their lack of options: “we consider that Cuba 
will have no alternative other than to sign and ratify said convention to avoid 
marginalisation from trade of these substances.”292 However, they gradually realised that 
these provisions would in fact oblige the US to lift elements of the economic embargo 
against Cuba. Private MINREX documents noted that the US: 
Torricelli Law, that impedes or renders difficult Cuba’s commerce with other countries in 
respect of chemical substances, would be in frank violation of the provisions of (CWC) 
article (IV). The US is obliged by the Convention to revise their national regulations and 
modify or eliminate those in frank contradiction with the letter and spirit of the 
referenced international instrument.293 
 
According to an internal memo, with which “the Commander in Chief is ‘in plain 
agreement’,”294 both challenge inspections and commerce between state parties “are two 
matters in which the CWC provides us the possibility to hit elements of bilateral dispute 
with the US.”295 Although neglected in associated scholarship, a large part of the 
explanation behind Cuban CWC ratification was the establishment of economic and security 
defences against perceived US deviance, not socialisation as a result of state suasion. 
Singular, bilateral and multilateral state influence was indeed crucial, however with mixed 
positive, reverse and indirect inverse effect. State suasion proved complex. 
 
 
289 US: A/C.1/47/PV.4,25. 
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4.3.a.iii: INEs – MNCs 
The fact that CW may be created from common, independently harmless, commercial 
precursors developed by civilian industry rendered MNC involvement in CWC negotiations 
uniquely indispensable. According to the CD President, the “importance of cooperation from 
industry for the effective implementation of a Chemical Weapons convention, therefore, 
cannot be over-emphasized.”296 Although CD delegates disagreed on precise weight to 
attach industry recommendations,297 industry experts provided influential input into CWC 
negotiations,298 particularly in relation to verification mechanisms, trial inspections, and 
protection of commercial-in-confidence intellectual property rights.299 They did so first 
through individual CD delegation consultations,300 then through annual seminars with CWC 
negotiators, 1987-1991.301 Alongside the 1989 Government-Industry Canberra 
Conference,302 CWC negotiators “developed a precise and mutually enriching dialogue with 
the experts from industry,” and secured crucial industry support for the norm.303 Ultimately, 
industry representatives at the 1991 annual meeting agreed “to provide free access for 
international inspectors,” “anytime anywhere… (to) enable the adoption of random 
inspections in civil chemical facilities.”304 This proved critical to Cuban endorsement, with 
private MINREX documentation revealing it:  
could perhaps simplify the verification scheme and eventually reduce costs. Additionally, 
it could possibly benefit industry, which above all finds itself in an incipient state in 
developing countries, to… free them from consequences that previous proposals 
assumed for the production and commerce of certain chemical substances.305  
 
Domestically, however, MNCs held little influence over Cuban decision-makers, given 
MINREX requests for national industrial sector advice remained outstanding well after 
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treaty signature,306 and Cubans maintained disdain for foreign MNCs involved in chemical 
component production, with Granma previously designating them “war criminals.”307 MNCs 
were not the potential drivers of socialisation anticipated from this INE attribute. While 
MNC impact was thus unexpectedly high over general norm progression, it only held 
indirect import in relation to Cuba.  
 
4.3.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
4.3.b.i: Salience  
As detailed in the analytical framework, a range of scholarship considers norm 
endorsement more likely in the event of state indifference towards, and thus low salience 
of, the norm. However, considering indicators of salience within national statements, 
government correspondence and press reports,308 Cuban decision-makers paid great 
attention to negotiations for the international norm prohibiting CW. As early as 1960, Cuba 
desired a stake in relevant disarmament efforts, with internal government correspondence 
revealing concerns that the Committee of Ten “will substitute multilateral treatment for 
limited treatment by a group of great powers… And that is dangerous… because in the 
matter of disarmament everyone wants and needs to be heard."309 Cuban diplomats 
monitored bilateral and multilateral deliberations on the topic throughout the 1960-70s, 
and provided detailed reports on Committee of Eighteen progress and draft CW resolutions 
and conventions.310 Once Cuba became a CD member in 1979,311 it sent delegates to almost 
every session and gained CW AHC participation and voting rights.312 Diplomats sent MINREX 
headquarters exceptionally detailed technical reports and negotiations updates,313 and, 
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especially in the final year, participated actively in the AHC and CD.314 In 1990, Cuba 
established a national Group of Disarmament to consider questions and commitments 
arising from the CWC and commence preparations for national implementation.315 Cuba 
took CWC obligations and compliance extremely seriously. According to its CD delegate in 
1982, “States would, because their prestige was at stake, take all the necessary steps to 
guarantee strict compliance with an international agreement on the subject."316 Solés 
subsequently explained the “Cuban will to comply with its commitments of disarmament 
and non-proliferation” was a “principal position of the revolutionary Cuban government 
regarding its international commitments.”317 True to its word, Cuba implemented a range of 
national legislation to comply with CWC obligations following ratification.318 Salience was 
high. 
 
4.4 NEGLIGIBLE INFLUENCE 
 
While the attributes already discussed each had impact on Cuban endorsement of the 
norm to eliminate CW in one form or another, analysis of relevant indicators demonstrates 
that the remaining attributes had little. This section thus documents areas in which the 
overarching analytical framework - and arguments pertaining to socialisation - require 
revision. For regional suasion and some INEs at the systemic level, DSCs, DNEs and the 
feedback loop at state-level, and internal characteristics and origin at the level of the norm 
each possessed negligible influence over Cuban norm endorsement in this case. 
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318 MINREX, “RS/18-170- De: Director Asuntos Multilaterales, Pedro Nuñez Mosquera, A: Ministro Isodoro 
Malmierca: Para Aprobacion,” 19 February 1992, Solés, “Convención,” 82, MINREX, “RS/867,” 1. 
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4.4.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
4.4.a.i: Regional Suasion 
While parts of Latin America pursued status as “pioneer(s) in the universal quest for a 
safer world, which is contingent on the total banning of all kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction,”319 Cuba remained predominantly in self-imposed regional isolation. Cuba was 
not a member of the 1991 Mendoza Agreement, which banned the development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of CBW amongst certain Latin 
American states.320 It also maintained reticence towards the remaining core regional 
security agreement: 
Cuba has not been able to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for the simple reason that 
Cuba cannot unilaterally renounce the right to possess the weapons it may deem 
relevant for the defence of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as long 
as part of its territory is illegally occupied in the Guantanamo region.321 
 
No references by Cuban decision-makers were found to indicate any impact of regional 
support for or institutionalisation of the norm to eliminate CW. Regional suasion may have 
actually operated in reverse, with Cuba hosting the 1995 Regional Seminar on the National 
Application of CWC Provisions, to support and diffuse the norm within the region rather 
than vice versa.322 Cuba was not socialised by any regional drivers. Regional suasion was 
low. 
 
4.4.a.ii: INEs – INGOs, GCS 
Attribute indicators demonstrate that INGOs and GCS held little direct impact on CW 
prohibition, comprising the ‘yang’ to the generally influential MNC ‘ying’. As commonly 
acknowledged, “there are limits to what civil society can usefully do. These limitations result 
in part from chemical weapons issues being traditionally framed in terms of a State security 
discourse with only narrow scope for the involvement of non-state actors.”323 Direct impact 
 
319 A/C.1/47/PV.28,37. See also: CD/PV.635,49, CD/PV.641,15, CD/PV.642,21. 
320 Originally signed by Argentina, Chile, Brazil in September 1991, subsequently joined by Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Ecuador: A/C.1/47/PV.28,37, Smidovich, “Russian,” 59. 
321 A/C.1/39/PV.46,7-10: “Cuba cannot renounce that right as long as the only nuclear Power in this 
hemisphere pursues an increasingly hostile and aggressive policy towards Cuba, which has become more and 
more threatening in tone in recent months.” A/C.1/47/PV.27,31, A/C.1/47/PV.10,63, A/C.1/42/PV.37,46. 
322 MINREX, “De: Jorge Bolaños Suárez, A: Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali,” 1. 
323 Michael Crowley, et al, “Preserving the norm against chemical weapons,” Futures (102, March 2018), 133. 
 138 
at the CD was negligible. INGO communiques were only rarely placed on the record and the 
few representatives attending in observer capacity were seated in silence in the viewer 
gallery.324 Indirectly, and noting cross-over with epistemic community influence, reports and 
publications from ‘eminent international research institutions,’ the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, and Pugwash Conferences and workshops were occasionally 
referenced by CWC negotiators, with McLeish and Lak praising their provision of “a space 
that transcended the usual tensions between government, industry, and academia and 
facilitated communication. Because of its informal nature, the Pugwash Study Group 
became a place where scientists and technical experts could meet to hash out particular 
issues of importance for the future Convention.”325 The Cuban Ambassador sent MINREX 
one update on such a workshop.326 However, this was a solitary example.  
 
The only initial reference to GCS in CWC negotiations in fact queried the waning public 
interest.327 This began to change in the 1980s, with CD reference to GCS demands growing 
alongside increasing reports of CW use, development and deployment.328 Solés, for 
example, subsequently noted that Iraqi use of CW “sounded the alarm about the new 
dangers of CW proliferation and intensified pressure from international civil society to reach 
agreement on its prohibition.”329 By the 1989 Paris Conference, the CD President contended 
“International public opinion is looking at this subject with particular attention and 
sensitivity.”330 Yet this reflected indirect influence only.331 Despite registering in Solés’ 
solitary reference above, INGO and public opinion played only indirect, secondary roles as 
discursive devices encouraging CWC negotiations. They did not directly drive norm diffusion, 
norm endorsement or the socialisation of Cuba.  
 
324 CD/PV.635,2, CD/PV.7,17, CD/PV.228, CD/PV.484,6, CD/PV.186,13-4, CD/PV.248,17, A/C.1/47/PV.19,32. 
325 McLeish, Lak, “Introduction,” 39. Similarly: CD/PV.248,17, CD/PV.309,8, CD/PV.165,8, CD/PV.339,10, 
CD/PV.386,10, CD/PV.242,8, CD/PV.389,22, CD/PV.437,27, CD/PV.446,7,29, CD/PV.447,4-5, Krutzsch, 
“Introduction,” 13, Carpenter, “Perspective,” 116, J. P. Robinson, ‘Impact of Pugwash on the Debates over 
Chemical and Biological Weapons’ Annals of the New York Academy of Science (866, 1998), 224–52. 
326 Misión Permanente, “RS-306,” 1, attachment. 
327 Given GCS preoccupation with nuclear disarmament: CD/PV.153,18, CD/PV.175,35, CD/PV.190,22, 
CD/PV.227,25, CD/PV.150,26, CD/PV.643,22, Cuba: CD/PV.221,12. McLeish, Lak, “Introduction,” 46: 
“participation has not really involved the broader civil society group.” 
328 CD/PV.436,34, CD/PV.286,27, CD/PV.376,13, CD/PV.306,12, CD/PV.248,19, CD/PV.453,13, CD/PV.436,34-6, 
CD/PV.499,2-3, CD/PV.506,14, CD/PV.529,3, CD/PV.258,10, CD/PV.539,6, CD/PV.626,19, CD/PV.482,3. 
329 Solés, “Convención,” 32. Similarly: CD/PV.439,4. 
330 CD/PV.490,16. Also: CD/PV.484,22, CD/PV.509,4, CD/PV.533,6-7, A/C.1/44/PV.37,33, A/C.1/44/PV.15,13. 
331 Müller, et al, “State,” 296-305. 
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4.4.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
4.4.b.i: Domestic Structural Conditions 
Considering the relevant indicators, inadequate national infrastructure and 
material/monetary costs generated implementation concerns within Cuba, as already 
referenced.332 Cuban CWC ratification was also delayed awaiting Executive Council approval 
of national codification.333 However, Cuba had no intention of ratifying the CWC before the 
US,334 and DSCs, as understood in associated literature, did not significantly impede/enable 
nor uniquely impact either socialisation or Cuban norm endorsement. 
 
4.4.b.ii: Domestic Norm Entrepreneurs 
MINREX documentation and UN records reveal no reference by Cuban decision-makers 
to DNEs. Indeed, no CW-prohibition DNEs were identified at all. 
 
4.4.b.iii: Feedback Loop 
Cuban efforts to remould the international norm in accordance with its CW priorities 
failed.335 First, propelled by the legacy of Vietnam, Cuba insisted upon the explicit inclusion 
of herbicides within the CWC definition of CW. The matter had dominated national press,336 
and remained the focus of Cuban negotiations throughout CWC deliberations, with 
delegates reiterating the destructive consequences of its use in Vietnam and tabling and 
repeatedly referencing the report from the International Symposium on Herbicides and 
Defoliants in War.337 Expert Cuban advisors continued to demand incorporation: “The issue 
of herbicides and the prohibition of their use as a method of warfare has for many years 
been a position of the Cuban delegation and must be clearly reflected in the final text of the 
 
332 MINREX, “RS/867,” 1. 
333 Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Medio Ambiente, “De: Dra Rosa E. Simeon Negrin, A: José Peraza 
Chapeau, Director Juridico MINREX, Ref: Proyecto de Acuerdo en que se designa a este Ministerio como 
Equivalente de Autoridad Nacional,” 18 August 1995, 1, Viceministro, “RS/98,” 1-2. 
334 MINREX, “De: Jorge Bolaños Suárez, A: Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali,” 2. 
335 Other failures: CD/PV.628,16, CD/PV.635,9, Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 31, Kelle, “Conference,” 145-8. 
336 Anon, “Declaracion final,” 2, 4.2.c.iii: Domestic Resonance. 
337 CD/PV.322,8, A/C.1/39/PV.46,76, CD/636,44-5, CD/PV.196,9, CD/PV.416,2,14, A/C.1/38/PV.13,2-5, 
A/C.1/47/PV.11,8, CD/PV.201,22, CD/PV.213,7-10. 
 140 
convention to be adopted.”338 However Cuba ultimately compromised, accepting a single 
preambular reference to herbicides on condition of reiteration at the 1992 ENMOD 
Conference.339 
 
Second, Cubans were unable to secure their desired composition and representation 
within the CWC supervisory mechanism. Expert Cuban analyses of draft CWC treaties 
contained several directives to “must change” the proposed institutional structure, which 
had been based around permanent membership according to ‘national capacity of chemical 
industry and/or political factors’. A handwritten note alongside this draft provision by the 
Cuban expert demanded: “This must not be accepted; How will it be judged?” arguing that 
the criteria “must consider the geographic composition of personnel. In all countries, even 
small, scientific personalities will exist.”340 Cuban clearly delegates reiterated this, both in 
CD statements and official WPs: 
the structure, composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council are 
issues of special interest for the Cuban delegation… the executive body of the future 
Organization should not follow the undemocratic model found in other international 
organs whereby a distribution of posts in these bodies is imposed upon us, guaranteeing 
a very small number of countries a permanent presence there - a privilege which spares 
them from being subject, as the others are, to a democratic election process.341 
 
Yet Cuba failed. Fry confirms the “OPCW’s Executive Council is not without its inequalities… 
one factor in determining the composition of the Executive Council is the importance of the 
chemical industry in that State… a criterion that appears to stack the cards in favour of 
certain, more industrialised States, essentially exempting them from the regular rotation 
between States Parties.”342 Cuba was also unable to secure its preferred OPCW 
headquarters in Vienna rather than The Hague, which they hoped would have signalled “a 
 
338 CD/PV.628,16. See also: Misión Permanente, “RS/338,” 2 of Appendix, MINREX, “RS-297,” 1, MINREX, “RS-
2865,” 1, CD/PV.628,9, CD/PV.635,42, Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 27. 
339 CD/PV.635,13-4, CD/1170,17-8, A/C.1/47/PV.23,14-6, Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 29-30. 
340 Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador José,” 35,206-19, rejected all proposals with solely industrial or 
political criteria: “this article is weak. The industrialised want to assume direction of the Consultative Council 
as much as the Convention, etc, but not give anything in exchange.” Similarly: MINREX, “RS-2865,” 4, MINREX, 
“RS/1319,” 2: “on the basis of respect for the principle of equal geographic distribution, the representation of 
all States Parties must be guaranteed.” 
341 CD/PV.628,16: Cuba “cannot support such an arrangement, especially if the idea is reflected in the text of 
the Convention,” CD/PV.603,5, CD/1170,8. Others: CD/PV.421,20, CD/PV.529,12, CD/PV.634,19, CD/PV.617,4-
5,19-20, CD/PV.635,22,47-53,98, CD/PV.626,8,20-1, A/C.1/47/PV.31,51, CD/PV.634,29, Findlay, Peace, 12-8. 
342 Fry, “Sovereign,” 52. Similarly: Kelle, “Power,” 407-8, Müller, “Agency,” 340. 
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recognition of neutrality and not of NATO.”343 Third, Cuba held grave concerns regarding 
proposed verification mechanisms that: 
will have to be as minimal and as non-intrusive as possible without affecting the 
legitimate interests of States in the field of industry. Routine inspections will have to 
keep to the nature of the purpose for which they were conceived and, in our view, do not 
require elements that might be called for by challenge inspections… we believe that in 
one way or another this concern can and must find room in the text we agree.344  
 
Yet challenge inspections remained.345 Private Cuban analyses additionally reveal concerns 
over associated confidentiality provisions, with demand for requirement of no publication 
“that prejudices in any other form any State Party.”346 However, the confidentiality annex 
remained outstanding well after Cuban CWC signature.347  
 
Finally, Cuba, alongside a number of concerned developing states, desperately sought 
inclusion of an explicit undertaking within the CWC to remove extant Australia Group 
chemical export controls.348 Since 1985 this group of initially 15 industrialised nations had 
banded together to harmonise export controls on dual-use and precursor chemicals, 
associated pathogens, technologies, equipment, and technical assistance to mitigate CW 
proliferation.349 Nations beyond the group were excluded from critical chemical commerce, 
and chemical industries in developing countries suffered. The CWC gave excluded states an 
opportunity to rectify this, given export controls would prove redundant between State 
Parties. According to the Pakistan CD delegate, “developing countries should obviously not 
be subjected to the double jeopardy of additional measures outside the convention, such as 
the existing export controls practised by the ‘Australia Group’.”350 Cuba fought to ensure the 
explicit confirmation of free trade and export restriction removal within the CWC. Regarding 
the penultimate draft treaty, for example, “the Working Group considers that application of 
 
343 Misión Permanente, “RS-866- De: Embajador José Pérez Novoa, A: Ministro MINREX, Isidoro Malmierca,” 27 
August 1990, 1. Also: MINREX, “RS/2418- De: Carlos Frejos, Director a.i., A: Pedro Nuñez Mosquera, Director 
Asuntos Multilaterales,” 11 May 1992, 1, CD/PV.623,17, CD/PV.628,11. 
344 CD/PV.603,5: "we attach importance to the concern raised regarding the extant possibility of abusing this 
type of procedure.” Also: Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador José,” 36-7. 
345 CWC, Article IX. 
346 Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador José,” 67-8. Also: MINREX, “RS-2865,” 3. 
347 Telex, “De: Juridica Embacuba Holanda, A: DAM,” 4 December 1994, 1. 
348 Morel, Olson, “Introduction,” xviii, Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 23-4. 
349 Seeveratnam, “Australia,” 402-3, Morel, “Verifiability,” 220,231, Findlay, Peace, 9. 
350 CD/PV.617,21. See also: CD/1046,235, CD/951,1, CD/PV.517,9, CD/PV.624,7, CD/PV.514,6, CD/PV.625,5, 
CD/PV.635,51, CD/PV.627,5, A/C.1/41/PV.37,76, Müller, “Regime,” 68-74, Wunderlich, “Reformers,” 282. 
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guarantees for elimination of all currently existing international controls related to certain 
chemical substances, in particular those established by the Australia Group, must be made 
more precise.”351 A private letter from the MINREX Minister, “Highlighted also of additional 
importance that the convention does not contemplate limitations or restrictions to the 
international commerce of chemical substances whose use is not prohibited by the 
convention.”352 Although the Australia Group offered the aforementioned Declaration, 
which undertook to simply review its measures rather than remove them,353 this 
Declaration was far from definitive, not explicitly reflected within the CWC as demanded, 
and not adhered to following CWC entry-into-force.354 Indeed, Cuba continued to denounce 
‘unfulfilled justice claims’ and ‘unjust discrimination’ resulting from the continued existence 
of the Australia Group following CWC adoption.355 Although protesting until the end,356 
Cuba ultimately endorsed the CWC without major amendment reflecting its priorities.357 
Cuba was unable to reformulate the CWC in accordance with crucial preferences per 
relevant indicators. Feedback loop impact was low. 
 
4.4.c: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
4.4.c.i: Internal Characteristics  
Considering relevant indicators, the norm to eliminate CW embodied in the CWC was 
neither simple, clear, nor stable. Although the norm itself may be considered 
straightforward - the elimination of CW - immediate questions arise regarding what is 
meant by elimination (destruction of stocks? production facilities? precursors?), as well as 
the very definition of CW (singular precursors? dual use commercial substances? 
herbicides?). Translating the norm into an effective and broadly acceptable international 
 
351 MINREX, “RS-2865.” Also: Misión Permanente, “De: Embajador José,” 26. 
352 MINREX, “RS/1319,” 2. 
353 CD/PV.629,17, CD/PV.635,5,11, Roberts, “CWC,” 6. 
354 CD/PV.629,23, CD/PV.634,19, CD/PV.635,18,23,52, CD/PV.639,6, A/C.1/47/PV.9,8-10,41, A/C.1/47/PV.11,8, 
A/C.1/47/PV.4,57-66, Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 27,34, Feakes, “Introduction,” 22, Morel, “Verifiability,” 
231, Kelle, “Conference,” 151-3: Australia indicated the group “would cease operation once the CWC was fully 
operational. (Yet) The number of states participating in the AG has grown and the scope of its export controls 
has widened since then… Iran, Cuba and Pakistan – expressed their dissatisfaction.” 
355 Müller, et al, “Regime,” 70-2. For further: Kelle, “Conference,” 152-3, Müller, “Agency,” 340-1,346. 
356 A/C.1/47/PV.14,28. Six Cuban AHC WPs, June-Aug 1992: CD/1170,8-9,17-9, CD/PV.629,7-8, CD/PV.635,90, 
Disarmament Affairs, Yearbook, 27, CD/PV.628,15: CWC “requires essential adjustments.” 
357 CD/PV.635,34-8, Findlay, Peace, 17-8: AHC Chair “ignored new proposals from..nonaligned splinter group.”  
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treaty was even more complex. The CWC was the most complicated international security 
agreement of its time,358 relying upon detailed scientific, technical, industrial, military and 
legal expertise,359 yet also requiring a degree of flexibility to accommodate unpredictable 
technological advances.360 According to the Australian delegate, “I should like to recall just 
how complex and demanding the task is of concluding the chemical weapons convention… 
my interlocutors have been struck by the ambition of the enterprise here: its technical 
complexity and political sensitivity.”361 The internal characteristics of the norm did not 
promote ease of diffusion and did not enable state socialisation. If anything, this attribute 
held negative impact. 
 
4.4.c.ii: Origin  
Despite frequent references to the historical horrors of CW, particularly in World War I 
and Vietnam, any ostensible origin of the norm to eliminate CW held no visible impact over 
international consolidation and Cuban endorsement. Indeed, while CW development and 
use differed spatially and temporally, its elimination was always presented as a global effort 
for the sake of humanity.362 The attribute of origin, therefore, held minimal impact. 
 
4.5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS 
 
This chapter has documented which of the fifteen international norm diffusion attributes 
proved most influential over Cuban endorsement of the norm to eliminate CW and how. It 
demonstrates the significant, positive impact of six attributes in accordance with the 
analytical framework. These influential attributes included world context and individual and 
epistemic INEs at systemic-level, national identity at state-level, and international 
concurrence, norm substance and domestic resonance at the level of the norm. The chapter 
also identified seven attributes that held surprisingly negligible if not negative impact upon 
 
358 CD/PV.626,5, CD/PV.635,45, CD/PV.638,3. 
359 CD/PV.8,16, CD/PV.156,8,32, CD/PV.207,16, CD/PV.222,16, CD/PV.226,23, CD/PV.262,35, CD/PV.271,20, 
CD/PV.378,6, CD/PV.438,12, CD/PV.481,15-6, CD/PV.501,12, CD/PV.530,11, CD/PV.618,3, CD/PV.635,30. 
360 CD/PV.617,11, CD/PV.635,10, CD/PV.640,3, CD/PV.167,38, CD/PV.491,8. 
361 CD/PV.626,4: “This agreement has been in gestation for so long precisely because it is difficult to achieve 
the combination of political leadership, industrial support and bureaucratic acceptance that is needed across 
so many countries and by so many interested individuals and groups.” 
362 4.2.c.ii: Norm Substance. 
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both norm development and Cuban endorsement. These included regional suasion, INGOs 
and GCS at the systemic-level, DSCs, DNEs and the feedback loop at state-level, and internal 
characteristics and origin at the level of the norm. Should these results replicate in the other 
case studies, the overarching analytical framework will require refinement to better reflect 
explanations for norm endorsement by purported revisionist states. 
 
Of most interest, however, were the four attributes identified as holding crucial, yet very 
different from anticipated, influence over norm diffusion. Contrary to scholarship that 
considers their influence as possible yet rare, MNCs held a game-changing effect upon norm 
diffusion, opening the path to endorsement, including by Cuba. Similarly, it was high rather 
than low salience of the norm for Cuba that facilitated adoption. Finally, the systemic 
attributes of IO and state suasion held strong impact, however not in the purely linear, 
positive or singular fashion often anticipated in norm literature. Indeed, the chapter 
presented a new understanding of IOs as possessing a symbiotic relationship with the norms 
they facilitate. The principal IO required the norm to justify its own existence as much as the 
norm required it. The chapter also introduced novel conceptions of state suasion that 
incorporated collective action, ‘reverse state suasion’ and ‘indirect inverse state suasion’. 
While ‘reverse state suasion’ embodied state actions or decisions that disincentivised or 
delayed otherwise likely norm endorsement, ‘indirect inverse state suasion’ highlighted how 
the recalcitrance of one state encouraged norm endorsement by others. States thus possess 
capacity to hold very complex and occasionally adverse effects upon norm diffusion. 
Furthermore, contrary to common assumptions,363 it was the US that proved exemplary in 
this respect. In fact, the threat posed by the US in the CW field comprised the key motivator 
behind Cuban norm endorsement. Cuban decision-makers gradually realised the norm could 
help counter perceived US revisionism, ideologically, militarily and economically. 
 
In so answering why such a purported revisionist state endorsed an international norm, 
light has been shed on presumed socialisation processes. With attributes such as national 
identity, domestic resonance, international concurrence, norm substance and salience 
 
363 Quester, “Deterrents,” 175: “Americans are generally a legalistic and treaty-respecting people, inclined to 
attach more importance than other peoples to the idea that international problems can be solved by the 
negotiation of treaties,” with the CWC “intended to get other countries to match the U.S. in nonpossession.” 
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proving strong, regional suasion, INGOs, GCS, DNEs, internal characteristics and norm origin 
proving negligible, and IOs and state suasion holding incredibly complex yet occasionally 
adverse effects, certain purported socialisation filters and enablers held import while key 
socialisation drivers did not. Although they may have affected norm endorsement, the 
systemic drivers did not operate to socialise the state as anticipated. For rather than 
becoming socialised and no longer revisionist in its attitude toward prevailing international 
orders, Cuban endorsement of the norm to eliminate CW actually represented a means 
through which Cuba sought to socialise, or at least constrain, the perceived revisionism of 
the US. From the Cuban perspective, the US had breached the norm banning CW use for 
decades, had developed and tested CW not only in their own country but also potentially in 
and against Cuba, and appeared to obstruct CWC efforts at the CD.364 According to Cuba, “In 
such a way, sinister and immoral, the imperialist yankees act… They are the worst 
delinquents in the world.”365  
 
These results thereby question not only socialisation processes against purported 
revisionist states, but the very meaning and construction of revisionism in IR. According to 
Cuba, the US was the revisionist actor, harnessing revisionist allegations against others in 
order to hypocritically deflect from its own deviance and postpone norm diffusion. Granma 
denounced, for example, the “old Yankee trick of crying ‘thief!’ to try to wash its own hands 
and attribute to others the misdemeanours that it commits.”366 Cuban CD delegates 
condemned the US’ “false and tendentious allegations made about the use of chemical 
weapons in various regions… to condition public opinion in order to eliminate as far as 
possible any opposition to (their) new escalation of the chemical arms race.”367 Naturally, 
these statements reveal Cuba’s own attempts at revisionist ascription, to possibly also 
 
364 Fey, et al, “Established,” 171-2,195. 
365 Marrero, “Propaganda Mentirosa,” 6. Similarly: “Lluvia amarilla inexistente,” Granma (23:243, Fri 16 Oct 
1987), 6, “Con punto y aparte,” 8, Quiñones, “Los planes Yankis (IV),” 2, Anon, “Partidaria Cuba,” 8, 
A/C.1/40/PV.39,30, A/C.1/41/PV.37,67-68, A/C.1/45/PV.21,36. 
366 Quiñones, “Los planes Yankees (IV),” 2: when Reagan approved “resumption of CW production, Washington 
unleashed a great propaganda campaign of defamation and lies against the USSR.” 
367 CD/PV.168,15, CD/PV.261,8, Marrero, “Con punto y aparte,” 8: “imperialist propaganda tries… to implicate 
Third World countries… to justify new investments, and desperately impede the international conference.” 
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deflect and/or attain leverage in international politics.368 Yet this exposes revisionism as a 
subjective construct, potentially considered fact only when launched and accepted by the 
most powerful. As Granma astutely queried after the US threatened air strikes against 
reported Libyan CW facilities in 1989,369 “Who in the world community has happened to 
bomb the US in reprisal for having numerous factories of chemical weapons?... No one, of 
course.”370 Meanwhile, despite ratifying the CWC in ostensibly good faith, conceptions of 
Cuban revisionism in the field endured: CW scholarship continues to consider Cuba a ‘rogue 
state’ and the US as the norm’s greatest proponent.371 Cuba ultimately endorsed the norm 
to eliminate CW not as a result of socialisation, but in an attempt to expose exceptionalist 
US behaviour and contain the threat presented by perceived US revisionism. 
 
 
368 Ferrer, “Haz lo que digo,” 7, Anon, “Partidaria Cuba,” 8: MINREX Minister “labelled this conference a 
mockery while the US plans to bomb Libya under pretext a CW factory is being constructed… Washington tries 
to conceal a manoeuvre destined to muddy the negotiation process to achieve a CW convention.” 
369 Jonathan Tucker, “The Rollback of Libya’s Chemical Weapons Program,” Nonproliferation Review (16:3, 
2009), 372. 
370 Marrero, “Con punto y aparte,” 8. 
371 Hoyt, “Rogue,” 309, Müller, “Change,” 148-57, Kelle, “Conference,” 152-3, Fey, “Established” 164-6,172: 
“More than any other power, the United States… engaged proactively in establishing, strengthening, enforcing 
and advancing the norm of WMD nonproliferation, covering the whole spectrum of entrepreneurship.” 
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CHAPTER 5:  
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORM 
The Prohibition of Torture 
 
 




On the eve of commencement of official negotiations for the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 
(CAT),2 which comprises the ultimate consolidation of the international HR norm to prohibit 
torture,3 Cuban diplomats formulated a plan: a strategy to tackle what they perceived to be 
a “peculiar and intense” turn in international relations. According to a 1977 confidential 
MINREX report, the US “and by extension the ‘free’, capitalist, developed, western and 
 
1 Anon, “Rechazo en Latina América a validar secuestros de EE.UU. en el extranjero,” Granma (28:121, Tue 16 
June 1992), 3: ‘In the name of unipolarity, I take you prisoner.’ 
2 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201465/volume-1465-I-24841-English.pdf. 
3 Ahcene Boulesbaa, “An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” Dickenson Journal of International Law (4:2, 1986), 189, J. Donnelly, 
“The Emerging International Regime Against Torture,” Netherlands International Law Review (33, 1986), 
3,15,21-3, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 12, Chris Ingelse, The UN Committee against Torture (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2001), 3,83,390. 
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Christian world – (is introducing itself) as the supreme champion in the fight for respect for 
human rights all over the world. A necessary corollary of this intent is the constant attack on 
socialism… (a) volume and virulence of attacks… unleashed against the socialist community 
regarding human rights in our countries.”4 In order to “combat” this trend, and “promote 
confrontation” against “initiatives advanced by the enemy,”5 MINREX proposed a seven-
step plan through which Cuba would assume responsibility for rights traditionally attributed 
to the West.6 The plan included Cuban sponsorship of HR resolutions at international 
forums, hosting international HR symposiums, establishing a national HR Study Group and 
preparing:  
for deep discussion on these matters. Procedural manoeuvres to impede them are, even 
in the event of approval, a source of erosion of our capacity to influence other 
delegations and always leave the impression that effectively we have some darkness to 
hide; that is precisely one of the ‘images’ that the US and the Westerners we consider as 
a Group at the UN seek to project onto socialism… our delegations should take initiatives 
of this type in topics that have been assumed by Westerners as their undeniable 
dominion, such as that of torture and political prisoners.7 
 
Yet Cuban plans to assume leadership for promotion of the norm to prohibit torture failed. 
Despite adherence to the seven-step strategy throughout CAT negotiations in the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), signing the CAT one year after its opening for signature 
in 1986, and MINREX memos revealing an intent to ratify within the following year, Cuban 
ratification of the norm to prohibit torture pended a further nine years. For at the precise 
moment Cuba commenced consideration of CAT ratification, it became embroiled in an 
ideational battle that shattered its overarching HR strategy and CAT intentions.  
 
The reasons behind ultimate Cuban endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture may be 
elicited through analysis of this two-decade struggle. Once again, examination reveals that 
while some norm diffusion attributes held resonance as anticipated within the analytical 
 
4 MINREX, Dir. Organismos Internacionales, “Elementos Para Una Actualizacion de las Posiciones Cubanas en 
materia de Derechos Humanos en los Organismos Internacionales,” 21 Jan 1977, 1,5,7. Similarly: Campbell, 
Security, 138, Vincent, HR, 70: US “took account of HR not as something which, in the end, we all believe to be 
a good thing, but as something in regard to which we wanted something from the Soviet Union and its.. allies.” 
5 MINREX, “Elementos,” 16-7: contrasting USSR policy of HR rejection due to inadmissible foreign interference. 
6 Ibid, 9-10,20-8. 
7 Ibid, 18,23-4,28. Also: MINREX, “Ref: 132.4- De: Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Director de Organismos 
Internacionales, A: José R. Viera Linares, Viceministro, Asunto: Constitución de un Grupo de Estudio para 
cuestiones de derechos humanos,” 11 April 1979, 1. 
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framework, the majority in fact operated in unexpected and even adverse ways. Akin to 
Cuban endorsement of the norm to eliminate CW, national identity, international 
concurrence and norm substance proved influential as anticipated in the literature. Regional 
suasion, some INEs and the feedback loop did not. The remaining attributes proved 
significant albeit contrary to expectations, with all except surprisingly high salience holding 
distinctly negative impact. This case study therefore offers a crucial contribution to 
international norm and CAT-related scholarship from the purported revisionist state 
perspective. Extending conclusions drawn from the previous chapter, results demonstrate 
that the traditional socialisation drivers of IO, state, regional and INE (in conjunction with 
DNE) suasion - although promoting general norm adoption - had the opposite effect upon 
Cuba and substantially delayed Cuban norm endorsement.  
 
This chapter commences with an introduction that defines the norm embodied in the 
CAT, provides a general timeline of international diffusion, outlines reasons behind 
anticipated Cuban rejection, and details the dual puzzle of Cuban norm endorsement yet 
delay. Employing the indicators in Figure 7 as the basis for assessment, the chapter then 
evaluates the attributes that held influence as anticipated, followed by those that proved 
influential albeit in an unanticipated manner, and those with negligible effect. The chapter 
concludes with a preliminary review of results, consolidating which attributes held most 
power over Cuban norm endorsement in this HR study and considering what this might 
mean for conceptions of international norm diffusion, socialisation and revisionism in IR. 
 
5.1.a: Definition of Norm 
 
As with all international conventions, the CAT comprises a range of norms pertaining to 
both torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (OCIDTP). 
Given acknowledgement of the norm to prohibit torture in prior international treaties,8 the 
CAT’s purpose was centralisation and consolidation to achieve “more effective 
implementation of the existing prohibition under international and national law of the 
 
8 5.1.b: Timeline of Diffusion. 
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practice of torture… (making) more effective the struggle against torture.”9 As Donnelly 
observes, “the Convention against Torture thus lies within, and at the heart of, an 
increasingly complex web of international norms and procedures; it is a new and important 
focal point for the emerging international regime against torture.”10 The CAT codified extant 
customary international law, “outline(d) specific measures for achieving the aims set,” and, 
crucially, “impose(d) obligations of positive law upon States” through specific 
implementation mechanisms.11 The CAT’s “most positive contribution to the promotion of 
human rights ideals is its establishment of internationally accepted standards of conduct” to 
define and prevent torture.12  
 
The CAT’s primary focus is the norm to prohibit torture, reflected by its definition in 
Article 1 alongside Article 2(1) obligation to “take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture.”13 Article 2(2) reinforces this by 
explicating the norm’s non-derogable nature in which “No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever… may be invoked as a justification of torture.”14 With the CAT, the international 
norm to prohibit torture became a “universally valid rule (that) can be considered… a 
peremptory norm of general international law.”15 According to the UN Special Rapporteur 
(SR) on Torture, “Torture had been formally criminalized; an increasing number of States 
 
9 CAT Preamble. Also: Nigel Rodley, “Reviewed Work: The United Nations Convention against Torture: A 
Commentary,” Human Rights Quarterly (31:4, 2009), 1143, Ingelse, UNC, 3, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 177, 
Manfred Nowak, Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture (Oxford: Oxford Public 
International Law, 2008), 8, Donnelly, “Regime,” 15,21: ‘a single right convention.’ 
10 Donnelly, “Regime,” 3,21-3. Similarly: Ingelse, UNC, 389. 
11 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 1,8,12. Also: Ingelse, UNC, 3,83,390, Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 189. 
12 Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 207. 
13 CAT, Articles 1,2. See also: Averell Schmidt, Kathryn Sikkink, “Breaking the Ban?,” Journal of Global Security 
Studies (4:1, 2019), 105-6, Andrew Byrnes, “Committee Against Torture” in Philip Alston (ed), The United 
Nations and Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 517-9, Nowak, UNC, 161, Burgers, Danelius, 
UNCAT, 177-8, Ingelse, UNC, 66-83,186, Abdullahi an-Na’im, “Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining 
International Standards of HR” in An-Na’im, HR, 32. Four legal aspects: Ahcene Boulesbaa, The U.N. Convention 
on Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 7-9,15-39, 
Maxime Tardu, “The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,” Nordic Journal of International Law (56, 1987), 305-7. 
14 CAT, Article 2(2). See also: Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 78-88, Hathaway, “HR,” 1965. 
15 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 12. 
 151 
parties... had committed themselves to prosecuting and trying any person who had 
perpetrated torture.”16 Torture was “absolutely forbidden.”17 
 
5.1.b: Timeline of Diffusion 
 
Employment and criticism of torture was recorded as early as in ancient Greece, with 
institutionalisation of the practice spreading throughout Europe during the Middle Ages.18 
Increasing societal rejection, reportedly stemming from principles of the Enlightenment 
consolidated by the French Revolution, led to waves of national European decriminalisation 
from the mid-1700s, “to the extent that Victor Hugo could announce in 1874 that ‘torture 
has ceased to exist.’”19 However, the return of torture alongside totalitarian regimes and 
the horrors of World War II prompted dedicated international initiatives for prohibition.20 
The first milestone occurred with the Universal Declaration of HR (UDHR), formulated by the 
newly established CHR and adopted by the UNGA on 10 December 1948.21 Article 5, which 
states “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment,” was “the first instance of codification of the international ban on torture.”22 
However, it was not binding international law. Article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) rectified this by replicating it,23 and thus comprising the 




16 E/CN.4/1990/SR.23,9. Lutz, Sikkink, “HR,” 634: “Torture is the most widely outlawed HR violation.” 
17 Joseph Voyame, “La Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruel, 
inhumains ou dégradants” in Antonio Cassese (ed), The International Fight Against Torture (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), 47. Also: Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Kehl: 
Norbert Paul Engel, 2005), 157-8, S. Vera Lópes, “Panorama Sobre La Legislación En Materia De Genoma 
Hunamo En América Latina Y El Caribe,” Convention against Torture Initiative, 2017, 5, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 
69,79, Matthew Lippman, “Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review (17, 1994), 325: “no disagreement whatsoever on the fact that torture is absolutely forbidden.” 
18 Nigel Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
7-9, Lippman, “Development,” 275-81, Ingelse, UNC, 23-8, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 10. 
19 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 10. Similarly: Lippman, “Development,” 281-3, Ingelse, UNC, 28-30,387. 
20 Rodley, Prisoners, 9, Ingelse, UNC, 30, Lippman, “Development,” 283-9, An-Na’im, “Cross-Cultural,” 30. 
21 Article 5 adopted unanimously: A/Res/217A (III), Ingelse, UNC, 48. 
22 Ingelse, UNC, 30-48, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 11, A/Res/217A (III). 
23 UNGA, “Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 
Also: Arts 4(2),9,10(1), E/CN.4/SR.312, E/CN.4/193, A/C.3/L.675, A/2929,31, para 12-3, Nowak, UNC, 159-74. 
24 Ingelse, UNC, 51-2. 
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The third milestone was a confluence of UNGA Resolutions, propelled by increasing 
reports of torture during the 1970s.25 UNGA Resolution 3059 (XXVIII), 2 November 1973, 
rejected any form of torture or OCIDTP, placed the item on the UNGA agenda and 
requested an ECOSOC report for CHR consideration.26 Unanimous UNGA Resolution 3218 
(XXIX), 6 November 1974, requested submission of state reports on national measures to 
protect against torture and recommended development of international codes of ethics for 
law enforcement, medical practitioners, and Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners from the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders’.27 Critically, 1975 UNGA Resolution 3452 (XXX) comprised a Declaration defining 
and condemning torture as a denial of the UN Charter and violation of UDHR, proclaimed 
that “No state may permit or tolerate torture,” and prescribed that all states shall “take 
effective measures to prevent torture and OCIDTP from being practiced within its 
jurisdiction.”28 According to Ingelse, the unanimity of adoption without vote: 
gave the Declaration a considerable political and moral weight… it formed the first far-
reaching guideline for the implementation of the existing ban on torture… (and) was also 
the most important blueprint for the Convention against Torture… For the first time ever, 
a detailed definition of torture had been laid down in an international document.29  
 
However, as the UNGA Dutch delegate observed, the Declaration “did not purport legal 
obligations, it imposed a moral obligation on States to ensure that their national legislation 
would conform to the standards laid down in the declaration.”30 UNGA Resolution 
3453(XXX), adopted immediately after the Declaration, recognised this inadequacy and 
recorded “that further international efforts are needed to ensure adequate protection for 
all against torture.”31 The resolution requested the CHR recommend steps to ensure 
observance of the Declaration and formulate a body of principles to protect detainees and 
prisoners.32 
 
25 Nowak, McArthur, UNCAT, 2, Ingelse, UNC, 2,31,66, Lippman, “Development,” 290-6,304-7,334-5. 
26 Adopted without vote: A/9767. See also: Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 14, Ingelse, UNC, 68. 
27 A/10158, A/10158/Add.1, A/C.3/32/SR.34,4, Ingelse, UNC, 68, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 14-5, Rodley, 
Prisoners, 26-34: Cuba one of 25 states that spoke “uniformly in support of the draft declaration.” 
28 Adopted without vote: Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 17-8,191-4, Nowak, McArthur, UNCAT, 2, Ingelse, UNC, 2, 
Rodney, Prisoners, 20,30-9. Codes of ethics: Lippman, “Development,” 297-300. 
29 Ingelse, UNC, 69-70. Also: Lippman, “Development,” 300-3, J. Herman Burgers, “An Arduous Delivery” in 
Johan Kaufman (ed), Effective Negotiation (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 45-6. 
30 Rodley, Prisoners, 36.  
31 Adopted without vote: Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 18-23,195.  
32 Ingelse, UNC, 72, Rodley, Prisoners, 38-9, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 18-23. 
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Finally, on 8 December 1977, alongside three additional resolutions,33 UNGA Resolution 
32/62, co-sponsored by Cuba in likely concordance with their overarching HR strategy, 
proclaimed “that further international efforts are needed to ensure adequate protection for 
all against torture… a further significant step would be the adoption of an international 
convention against torture,” and requested the CHR commence work on such.34 The 1978 
CHR authorised an Open-Ended Working Group (WG) to “draw up the first draft of a 
convention on torture,”35 which met each year between 1978 and 1984.36 On 6 March 1984, 
the CHR adopted Resolution 1984/21 and transmitted a draft convention prohibiting torture 
to the UNGA Third Committee with only two items bracketed.37 The Third Committee 
adopted an agreed text following last-minute wrangling, and sent it to the UNGA Plenary for 
approval.38 On 10 December 1984, Resolution 39/46 “Adopts and opens for signature, 
ratification and accession the Convention against Torture… (and) Calls upon all 
Governments to consider signing and ratifying the Convention as a matter of priority.”39 The 
Convention entered into force on 26 June 1987, following the requisite twenty instruments 
of deposit on 27 May 1987.40  
 
5.1.c: Why Cuban Rejection was Anticipated 
 
A wealth of scholarship presumes that liberal, democratic states – as opposed to 
communist, authoritarian or purported revisionist states - endorse international HR 
norms.41 Cuba under Castro additionally represented one of the single-party regimes that 
 
33 UNGA Resolutions 32/63, 32/64, 32/65. 
34 Adopted without vote: https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/32/62. Also: A/32/222, 
A/C.3/32/SR.34-42, A/32/355, A/33/197, A/34/145, A/34/145/Add.1-3, A/35/370/Rev.1,-/Add.1, A/36/426-
/Add.1, A/37/263, Rodley, Prisoners, 40-2, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 33-4,196. 
35 UNGA Resolution 32/62: E/1978/34;E/CN.4/1292,31-2. 
36 A/RES/38/119, UNGA Resolution 39/46 Preamble, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 31, Tardu, “UNCAT,” 303, 
Nowak, McArthur, UNCAT, 4-5, Rodley, “Reviewed Work,” 1143. 
37 A/C.3/39/SR.44, UNGA Resolution 39/46, Preamble. 
38 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 106,250-1. 
39 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 33,106,251. See also: Ingelse, UNC, 82, Burgers, “Delivery,” 52. 
40 Ingelse, UNC, 83. 
41 Helfer, Slaughter, “Adjudication,” 278, Hathaway, “Cost,” 1837-40,1852, Moravcsik, “Origins,” 217-52, 
McKeown, “Regress,” 12, Khagram, et al, “Santiago,” 17-8, Schimmelfennig, “Calculation,” 40-1, Donnelly, HR, 
209, Hathaway, “HR,” 1953-5,2019-20, Elkins, et al, “Rights,” 88, Goodliffe, Hawkins, “Commitment,” 362. 
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studies predict would reject the CAT given lack of domestic pressure and aversion to 
sending concessional signals to citizenry.42 Hawkins, for example, claims these are: 
some reasons why international pressures are often ineffective – as they have been in 
recent years against China, Indonesia, Iraq, Cuba and even tiny Haiti. The impact of 
international pressures depends as much on domestic politics as it does on the intensity 
and scope of the pressures themselves… each country lacks a strong tradition of Western 
democracy and respect for human rights, making it easier for authoritarian elites to base 
their legitimacy on other factors.43  
 
Evidence presented throughout this chapter reveals a multitude of reasons for anticipated 
Cuban norm rejection. Generally, as Hathaway recognised, “Human rights treaties impinge 
on core areas of national sovereignty without promising obvious material or strategic 
benefits.”44 Indeed, Nielsen and Simmons find that neither material (aid, trade, investment), 
nor intangible (legitimacy, recognition, praise, inclusion) benefits stem from HR treaty 
ratification in general, and the CAT in particular.45 The following aspects particularly 
contributed to expectations of Cuban CAT rejection. 
 
5.1.c.i: Financial Burden 
CAT Articles 17-18 specify State Party responsibility for expenses associated with both 
the Committee Against Torture and Conferences of Parties.46 This generated concerns 
during negotiations that the resulting financial burden “might make it difficult for the less 
affluent States to decide to become parties to the convention.”47 Even after it entered into 
force, CHR Resolution 1988/31 specifically acknowledged “the financial burden to be carried 
by States parties under the Convention against Torture… is an onerous one, especially for 
developing countries, and may delay its universal acceptance.”48 Frequent CHR resolutions 
were also forced to reiterate “the importance of strict adherence by States parties to the 
obligations under the Convention regarding the financing… (and) Urge States parties that 
have not yet paid their assessed contributions to fulfil their obligations forthwith.”49 
 
42 Vreeland, “Institutions,” 70. 
43 Hawkins, “Responses,” 426. 
44 Hathaway, “HR,” 1938. Also: Hathaway, “Cost,” 1823. 
45 Nielsen, Simmons, “Rewards,” 197-208. 
46 CAT, Articles 17(7),18(5), Tardu, “UNCAT,” 316, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 112. 
47 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 87. 
48 E/1988/12;E/CN.4/1988/88,85-6. 
49 E/1992/22;E/CN.4/1992/84,74.  
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Confidential MINREX reports indicate “the referenced economic cost for Cuba” directly 
impacted Cuban decision-making, comprising one argument against immediate ratification: 
participation in the Convention would imply expenditure of an undefined amount, since 
States Parties will suffer expenses of… meetings of State Parties and of the Committee… 
Consequently, the Working Group proposed the convenience of waiting for the 
Convention’s entry-into-force in order to, knowing the experience of other countries, 
determine how much the expenditure would add up to.50 
 
Similar to CWC concerns, potential CAT financial costs weighed heavily on Cuban decision-
makers and disincentivised initial norm endorsement. 
 
5.1.c.ii: Compliance Costs 
Decision-makers held concerns regarding compliance costs as well. As Hathaway 
explains, “When deciding whether to ratify a treaty, a country will take into account the 
expected compliance costs - that is, how much the country will change its behavior as a 
result of the ratification… those for whom compliance is likely to be easier appear to be 
somewhat more likely to commit.”51 With regard to the CAT, there is a general obligation on 
signatories “for affirmative action” to implement prescribed measures to prevent torture,52 
with “a great number of specific obligations”53 including enforcement of domestic legislative 
criminalisation and additional administrative, judicial or other measures, provision of legal 
remedies including compensation to victims, adherence to non-refoulement, provision of 
personnel training and education, and universal jurisdiction.54 The latter requires every 
State Party to investigate, take into custody, and extradite or prosecute alleged torturers, 
irrespective of the territory in which the offence occurred, the nationality of the offender or 
victim, or the state within which the offender was detained, so long as one of these factors 
apply.55 Noting the opening image to this chapter from Granma, which specifically 
 
50 MINREX, “De: Olga Miranda Bravo, Directora Jurídica, A: Oficinas del Ministro, Ref: Memorandum RS/175 de 
10.1.87, Ratificación Convención contra la Tortura,” 21 January 1987, 1-2. 
51 Hathaway, “Cost,” 1834-6,1842,1856. 
52 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 1, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 45-55,65-79,296.  
53 Voyame, “Convention,” 47. Also: Nowak, Covenant, 179-82, Rodley, Prisoners, 132-3, Nowak, McArthur, 
UNC, 8-11, Tardu, “UNC,” 311-5: “Convention therefore involves a thorough overhaul of many national codes.” 
54 CAT, Articles 3-10,14, Ingelse, UNC, 3-4,84, Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 207-8, Byrnes, “CAT,” 514, Nowak, 
McArthur, UNC, 10, Tardu, “UNCAT,” 313-4, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 2-3,58-79,279. 
55 Territorial, active, passive, and presence personality principles: CAT, Arts 5-7, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 35-
6, Boulesbaa, 175-7,220-3, Donnelly, “Regime,” 4: “most striking substantive provisions of the Convention.” 
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denounced rendition and prosecution of citizens in foreign jurisdictions as kidnapping, 
universal jurisdiction was likely a controversial obligation for Cubans.56 
 
The precise burden of the CAT compliance system, monitored by the Committee Against 
Torture, remains contested. The four implementation mechanisms– compulsory state 
reports,57 an opt-in individual complaint procedure,58 an optional and reciprocal state 
complaint mechanism,59 and an, at that time novel and unique, opt-out Committee 
investigation procedure60– have been characterised as “a realistic method of enforcement 
of internationally accepted HR principles,”61 “strong and innovative,” offering “the best 
chances for impartiality and effectiveness,”62 constituting “a credible commitment,”63 and 
“as strong as any international implementation procedure in the field of HR.”64 Yet they 
have also been viewed as “lack(ing) the teeth necessary for real enforcement,”65 and “to call 
it even an 'implementation' mechanism is probably too strong.”66 According to Hathaway, 
the CAT has one of “the weakest enforcement mechanisms,” “proven woefully 
inadequate,”67 which opens the door to lip-service ratification for purely reputational 
rewards.68 However, like the CWC, internal MINREX documentation indicates Cubans took 
international HR legal obligations exceptionally seriously, with compliance concerns 
comprising the second justification for Cuba’s initially delayed CAT ratification. The national 
Working Group recommended, “Our Penal Code is not adjusted to the exigencies of the 
Convention; what is necessary before ratifying the same is to do a study on the possibilities 
of modification of said Code.”69 Conscious of its international obligations, requirement for 
 
56 Liliana Obregón, “Between Civilisation and Barbarism” in Falk, et al, IL, 122: “Latin American governments 
feared that HR would become an excuse for interventions from the communist bloc and then from the USA.”  
57 CAT Art 19, Committee Against Torture Guidelines A/46/44 (1991) Annex III,VII, A/46/44 (1991) Annex VI, 
A/46/44 (1991) Annex VIII, CAT/C/SR.88 (1991), Byrnes, “CAT,” 525-9, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 253,260-2. 
58 CAT Art 22, Donnelly, “Regime,” 7,19, Byrnes, “CAT,” 536, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 287-92. 
59 CAT Art 21, Byrnes, “CAT,” 523-4,530-4, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 62,265,272-7,284-5,294. 
60 CAT Arts 20,28, Tardu, “UNCAT,” 318, Donnelly, “Regime,” 6, Byrnes, “CAT,” 524,530-2, Ingelse, UNC, 3-4. 
61 Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 194. 
62 Tardu, “UNCAT,” 315,319. 
63 Nielsen, Simmons, “Rewards,” 200. 
64 Donnelly, “Regime,” 6-7. 
65 Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 293-4,298, Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 204-7,211. 
66 Donnelly, “Regime,” 10-1,17-9,23. Also: Ingelse, UNC, 9,16,84,390. 
67 Hathaway, “Cost,” 1847,2008,1988,2014. 
68 Hathaway, “HR,” Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 205, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 274, Donnelly, “Regime,” 20-1. 
69 MINREX, “Ref: Memorandum RS/175 de 10.1.87,” 1. Also: 5.3.b.iii: Salience. 
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substantial domestic legislative change, and the four implementation mechanisms, Cuban 
CAT ratification was considered unlikely. 
 
5.1.c.iii: Ostensible Ideological Dissonance 
As elaborated further in section 5.3.c.iii, and despite its overarching HR strategy detailed 
above, Cuba held ideological concerns over HR norms that exacerbated expectations of 
norm rejection. Reflecting the critique of HR as a form of Western imperialism,70 Cuba 
remained apprehensive regarding perceived Western HR imposition.71 Cuba aligned with 
“the ideological counterpoint in non-Western societies that alleged HR standards are more 
properly understood to be disguised hegemonic claims by the West that, in a postcolonial 
era, are no longer entitled to respect and should more properly be repudiated.”72 In specific 
relation to resisting civil and political rights at the CHR, the MINREX Vice-Minister advised 
the Vice-President that “it will be Cuba who assumes the responsibility to take this type of 
action… (while others) assume the comfortable position of hiding behind our initiatives. 
Nevertheless, our delegation will act with all diligence to reinforce and extend opposition to 
Western initiatives.”73 In 1992 the Vice-President publicly affirmed “we cannot permit the 
imposition of someone else’s models to our realities… We must reject the political 
manipulation to which these noble themes are subject… we will resist, for Cuba and for all 
of humanity.”74 Given such fundamental ideological dissonance and revisionist assertions, 
official Cuban endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture appeared unlikely. 
 
5.1.c.iv: Allegations of Breach 
Finally, as detailed below, there was an immense upsurge in allegations of Cuban HR 
abuses in the years prior to CAT ratification, including in relation to torture.75 According to 
Amnesty International (AI) between 1992-1994, for example, “Reports of ill-treatment and, 
 
70 Chowdhury, “Norms,” 111,114, Vincent, HR, 102-5: “an ideology, which looks after western interests while 
pretending to a selfless concern for the interests of others.” See also: Jennifer Welsh, “A normative case for 
pluralism,” International Affairs (87:5, 2011), 1202.  
71 E/CN.4/1989/SR.47/Add.1,21: Cuba rejected US “desire to impose its dictates on the Commission.” 
72 Falk, “Cultural,” 45. Contra: Moravcsik, “Origins,” 237: HR designed to mitigate “a Communist future.” 
73 Viceministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, “De: Rene Anillo, A: Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Vicepresidente del 
Consejo de Estado,” 28 January 1978, 2. 
74 Juan Bosque, “Discurso de Juan Almeida Bosque,” Granma (28: 183, Fri 4 Sept 1992), 5. 
75 Refer: 5.3.a.ii: International Organisations, 5.3.a.iii: State Suasion, 5.3.iv: INEs – INGOs, 5.3.b.ii: DSCs. 
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in isolated cases, torture were more frequent than in recent years.”76 From the first draft 
CHR resolution expressing “deep concern over the specific and detailed allegations of 
serious human rights violations in Cuba” in 1987,77 to the 1989 CHR report that recorded “a 
total of 137 complaints of torture,”78 to appointment of an SR on Cuba in 1992,79 and an in-
country High Commissioner for HR visit in 1994,80 Cuba became the intense focus of HR 
violation inquiries. Such allegations fuelled expectations of Cuban rejection of the torture 
norm. 
 
5.1.d: Endorsement Conundrum 
 
Cuban CAT ratification on 17 May 1995 therefore came somewhat as a suprise, with 
Cuba one of only six Caribbean states to have ratified it as of 2017.81 Cuba had added itself 
to the growing list of signatories within one year of opening for signature on 27 January 
1986,82 and upon adoption the Cuban CHR delegate: 
wished to reiterate its absolute rejection of the use of any form of torture… such 
inhuman practices, which were contrary to the peace and well-being of mankind. Cuba 
had sponsored numerous proposals leading up to the adoption of that instrument. The 
international community must continue to defend HR and to take the necessary legal and 
practical measures to put an end to torture.83 
 
Internal memos show that within one year of Cuba’s signature, the MINREX Legal Director 
recommended “presenting ratification of the Convention Against Torture to the Council of 
Ministers.”84 The MINREX Vice-Minister approved, confirming “I consider it would be very 
convenient if we could speed up this transmission on our part and not be amongst the last 
to ratify it, if not the opposite.”85 A handwritten note on the memo, purportedly from the 
 
76 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Reports, 1992-1994 (London: Amnesty International 
Publications, 1992-1994), 97-9,108,111-3. 
77 E/1987/18;E/CN.4/1987/60,213. 
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84 MINREX, “Ref: Memorandum RS/175,” 3. Similarly: MINREX, “RS:042- De: María de los A. Flores, Oficina 
Viceministro Roa, A: Isidoro Malmierca, Ministro,” 9 January 1987, 1. 
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MINREX Minister himself, questioned, “When can we present ratification of the Convention 
Against Torture to the Council of Ministers?”86 In January 1987, key Cuban decision-makers 
thus pushed for prompt CAT ratification. Yet ratification stalled. Two conundrums are 
therefore raised in relation to Cuban endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture. First, 
echoing the overarching research puzzle, why did Cuba ratify the CAT against each of the 
above-listed expectations? Second, why was there such a significant delay between internal 
government intentions to ratify and the act of ratification? The following analysis of each 
international norm diffusion attribute provides important answers. 
 
5.2 INFLUENCE AS EXPECTED 
 
Evaluation of indicators for the fifteen international norm diffusion attributes reveals 
that only three had influence over norm endorsement as anticipated. Furthermore, not one 
was a systemic-level socialisation driver. This section documents how the state-level 
attribute of national identity, and norm-related attributes of norm substance and 
international concurrence held influence over norm endorsement as expected in the 
analytical framework. 
 
5.2.a: State-Level Attributes 
 
5.2.a.i: National Identity 
Cuban attempts to disrupt traditional East/West HR dichotomies and assume 
responsibility for the norm to prohibit torture in line with its overarching HR strategy 
fostered alignment between Cuban national identity and the norm. Analysis of national 
discourse indicates that Cuba did so by employing the norm to consolidate Cuban identity in 
contradistinction to the US. National media, for example, pounced upon every opportunity 
to condemn reports of US torture. In 1978 Granma reported the CIA “organising schools of 
torture” in Uruguay,87 and, when describing violations elsewhere in 1984 noted they 
comprised “examples with a common denominator; the support of the US in the 
 
86 Ibid, 1,3. 
87 Gabriel Molina y Hector Pardo, “En el Tribunal Internacional La Juventud Acusa al Imperialismo,” Granma 
(14:185, Fri 4 Aug 1978), 3. 
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commitment of all these HR violations.”88 This article concluded the “US is, for this reason, 
the principal culprit of the length and breadth of human rights violations on Earth.”89 
Granma regularly reported “torture precincts” in US police stations,90 US prisons,91 and that 
risk of death in the latter was three times higher than on a US motorway.92 Each US 
execution received individual Granma attention, alongside observations that capital 
punishments violated international treaties, encompassed tortuous ‘inadmissible suffering’ 
and discriminated against minority groups.93 Cuba similarly condemned the US at the CHR, 
and repeatedly refused to, for example, “recognise the moral authority of a government 
that has affirmed continued support for UNITA bandits.”94 
 
To distinguish itself from the ‘yankee imperialists’ and prior Batista rule, the Castro 
regime thus aligned its ethos directly with respect for the norm to prohibit torture. In a 
1989 national speech, for example, after condemning the CIA:  
in contradiction to those attitudes, the Commander in Chief said that our Security, which 
did not fight for the interests of imperialism but for the people and their support, never 
remotely let itself be carried away by practices of that nature, nor in physical violence 
with the prisoner; never, without exception, let itself be dragged into torture… not only 
given their own conscience and education, but also because they knew these were the 
inviolable principles of the Revolution.95  
 
Amnesty International confirmed this in the early years, with its 1977 report recording that 
“Accounts by former prisoners… tend to corroborate official statements to the effect that 
torture is deliberately and systematically prevented under the present regime.”96 Cuban 
representatives replicated the narrative of respect for the norm to prohibit torture as Cuban 
national identity on the international stage as well. At a 1991 CHR Plenary intervention, for 
example, the delegate affirmed: 
 
88 Joaquin Rivery, “Día de los Derechos Humanos,” Granma (20:290, Mon 10 Dec 1984), 8. 
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91 Teresa Valdez, “Derechos Humanos en USA,” Granma (26: 247, Thur 18 Oct 1990), 6, Cotayo, “Hablará 
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The Cuban revolution was proud of the fact that none of the insidious acts of aggression 
directed against the Cuban people… had succeeded in sapping the determination of the 
authorities not to engage in such practices, notwithstanding what was being said by 
persons who were fomenting anti-Cuban campaigns.97  
 
The first Cuban report to the Committee Against Torture similarly asserted “The Cuban 
revolution was forged in… a humanist practice of respect for prisoners, rejection of crime 
and torture and any other flagrant violation of HR. This revolutionary ethic forms the very 
foundation of conduct for the Cuban socialist state.”98 Analysis of indicators shows that 
Cuba promoted its national identity alongside the norm to prohibit torture throughout CAT 
negotiations and beyond, rendering the attribute of national identity of high import. 
 
5.2.b: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
5.2.b.i: Norm Substance 
According to Lutz and Sikkink, “A full explanation of the justice cascade must include 
attention to the power of the principled ideas that undergird it.”99 Much constructivist norm 
literature presumes “there is something inherent in HR norms such as the one against 
torture that leads to their widespread (and, one can presume, continuing) acceptance by 
liberal states.”100 This was indeed reflected in a great deal of international discourse 
surrounding the norm against torture, which reiterated its unquestioned and non-derogable 
nature.101 According to Hawkins, “States are not merely mouthing words without meaning; 
rather, a good many of them actually believe that torture is such a heinous crime.”102 
Donnelly concluded, “Torture is one of the few areas of genuinely universal consensus in the 
field of HR; as the representative of Spain put it in the Commission on HR, torture is 
something 'that governments always denied and never justified’.”103 Meanwhile, Ajami 
 
97 E/CN.4/1991/SR.31,2. 
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100 McKeown, “Regress,” 7. 
101 5.1.a: Definition of Norm, Lutz, Sikkink, “HR,” 634, Schmidt, Sikkink, “Breaking,” 106. 
102 Hawkins, “Institutions,” 783. 
103 Donnelly, “Regime,” 3. 
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listed the norm as second of only four HR concerns that embody “maximum feasible 
consensus at this time.”104 As contended by the SR on Torture: 
There is hardly any international legal norm which is so widely acclaimed as the 
prohibition of torture… The general revulsion against torture which finds expression in 
this network of instruments and mechanisms undoubtedly stems from the fact that 
torture is one of the most ignominious violations of HR.105 
 
Importantly, although related scholarship often limits the impact of norm substance to 
‘liberal states’, per the second quote above, Cuban discourse also reflected respect for and 
acknowledgement of the immanent power of the norm. Within the CHR, the Cuban 
“Government condemned the use of any form of torture which, in its view, constituted one 
of the most abominable violations of human rights and an infringement of the most 
precious achievement of the Cuban revolution, namely, human dignity.”106 Similarly, in 
public speeches, Castro “pointed out the ethic with which Security employees worked and 
will always work… no-one will have to speak within 20, 30 or 50 years, of crimes committed 
in this age, of disappearances or of torture.”107 This was not solely public propaganda, given 
private MINREX documents reported the CAT “was studied by a Working Group at the 
request of this Organ, based on the fact that the Convention constitutes an achievement in 
the fight against torture.”108 The substance and underlying power of the norm to prohibit 
torture played an important role within both international and Cuban norm endorsement. 
 
5.2.b.ii: International Concurrence 
As already implicitly acknowledged within the introduction and timeline of diffusion, 
crystallisation of the international norm to prohibit torture aligned directly with a period 
described by Lutz and Sikkink as an ‘HR norms cascade’: “a broad norms shift between the 
late 1970s and the mid-1990s that led to increased regional consensus concerning an 
interconnected bundle of HR norms, including the norms against torture and 
disappearance.”109 The norm had been represented in earlier, alternatively-focused 
 
104 Falk, “HR,” 22: right to survive first, condemnation of apartheid third, right to food fourth. 
105 E/CN.4/1992/17,101. 
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international agreements, such as the 1948 Genocide Convention,110 1949 Geneva 
Conventions,111 and non-binding 1955 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners,112 as well as regional initiatives across the globe, including the 1969 OAS 
American Convention on HR.113 The norm developed against the backdrop of increasingly 
attentive UN discourse on HR, evidenced by a range of ECOSOC resolutions granting CHR 
power to investigate gross violations in the 1960s/1970s,114 culminating in what Kamminga 
termed a ‘watershed’ moment: “the decisions taken with regard to Chile marked the 
beginning of an era in which the existence of an international element was no longer 
considered a necessary precondition for a response by the United Nations.”115 By 1985 the 
UNSG affirmed: 
It is now accepted in practice that infringements, wherever they may be, are of common 
concern… Any remaining controversy is no longer about the circumstances under which 
the United Nations may hold states accountable, but about the manner in which it may 
do so.116 
 
The prohibition of torture became a hot topic within such a permissive normative 
environment. Torture resonated broadly and repeatedly at the CHR throughout CAT 
negotiations, on a range of items including self-determination, hostage-taking, disappeared 
persons, scientific and technical developments, states of siege or emergency, and 
totalitarian ideologies, while inquiries were raised into allegations of torture in a variety of 
countries, and a UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture and UN Special Representative on 
Torture were established.117 The norm to prohibit torture was consistent with prevailing 
norm hierarchies and international concurrence was high. 
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5.3 INFLUENCE YET NOT AS EXPECTED 
 
This section explores the diffusion attributes that held influence over Cuban norm 
endorsement, yet in a manner contrary to that expected. Analysis reveals that although 
crucial and positive for general norm endorsement, rather than driving Cuban socialisation 
most of these attributes in fact hindered Cuban endorsement and prolonged Cuban CAT 
ratification. This section documents how this occurred, commencing with the systemic 
attributes of world context, IOs, state suasion and INGOs, followed by DNEs and DSCs at 
state-level. The section then considers how the state-level attribute of salience had impact 
contrary to that anticipated and concludes with the complex influence of domestic 
resonance and origin at norm-level. 
 
5.3.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
5.3.a.i: World Context 
According to indicators for the world context attribute, two global events impacted the 
“broad norm shift” within which the norm to prohibit torture became institutionally 
consolidated.118 First, reports of torture in certain Latin American regimes in the 1970s 
raised public awareness and placed pressure on state leaders to codify the norm 
internationally.119 The “widely documented cases of torture and enforced disappearances in 
Chile”120 are frequently accorded catalyst status, having attracted a great deal of attention 
within both the UNGA and CHR.121 Conversely, “a transformation occurred in the 
composition and behavior of political actors”122 in Latin America in the 1980s, particularly in 
post-Falklands war Argentina, “which replaced the military regime, instructed its delegation 
to work for the Convention, and in particular to emphasise universal jurisdiction and a 
 
118 Lutz, Sikkink, “Justice,” 3, Lutz, Sikkink, “HR,” 638, 5.2.b.ii: International Concurrence. 
119 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 13, Ingelse, UNC, 66, Lutz, Sikkink, “HR,” 657. 
120 Nowak, McArthur, UNCAT, 2. Also: Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 14, Rodley, Prisoners, 21-5,43-5. 
121 Examples: UNGA Resolutions 3218 (XXIX), 3219 (XXIX), each UNGA Third Committee report November 
1977, E/1978/34;E/CN.4/1292, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 14-6. 
122 Lutz, Sikkink, “HR,” 633,657. 
 165 
strong system of supervision.. (This) resulted in a shift in the centre of balance in the 
negotiations”123 and cleared the path for CAT adoption. 
 
Second, the end of the Cold War consolidated the broader HR norms shift as civil and 
political rights, including the prohibition of torture, increasingly transcended those of, for 
example, “full respect for the political, economic and social realities of the societies 
represented in the United Nations.”124 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
adopted by the World Conference on HR in 1993 specifically resolved that “it is the duty of 
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect 
all HR and fundamental freedoms.”125 Political, civil and human rights thus began to trump 
not only communal and economic rights, but also tolerance of alternative governance 
practices. By 1994, the SR on Cuba concluded that:  
No matter what form it takes, a country’s political system cannot be maintained if it 
means that the human rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens defined in 
international instruments are being systematically violated. Moreover, the interpretation 
of these rights cannot be the sole prerogative of the authorities of the State.126 
 
This had direct and unequivocal repercussions for Cuba and HR norm endorsement, 
albeit not in the constructive manner anticipated in socialisation literature. For, paralleling 
the broader norms shift, the end of the Cold War dramatically altered the CHR equilibrium 
and transformed what had once been a relatively balanced tit-for-tat between Cuba and the 
US into US dominance.127 This had immediate impact on Cuban HR policy, elaborated in 
detail below, as it rendered Cuba the subject of CHR investigations and effectively diverted 
it from CAT ratification. According to the MINREX Vice-Minister in 1992, the altered world 
context adversely intensified a prejudiced international spotlight on Cuba: “Mr. ROA KOURI 
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(Cuba) said that the position of hegemony obtained by the United States of America as the 
only surviving super-Power, together with the notorious pressures it had exerted, had led to 
the adoption the previous year of an arbitrary and discriminatory resolution directed against 
Cuba.”128 As demonstrated next, this only served to divert Cuba from CAT endorsement and 
impede potential state socialisation via norm endorsement. Ironically, therefore, post-Cold 
War consolidation of US-led liberal hegemony fostered the norm to prohibit torture 
generally, while simultaneously deferring Cuban endorsement. 
 
5.3.a.ii: International Organisations 
Analysis of indicators demonstrates that several IOs played important roles in the 
international diffusion of the norm to prohibit torture, including the UNGA Plenary and 
Third Committee, UN Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 
and UN Committee on Crime Prevention and Control.129 According to Rodley, “the right not 
to be subjected to torture has received more attention than any other from 
intergovernmental organisations.”130 However, it was the CHR that proved crucial, both for 
norm consolidation and as the battleground for Cuban endorsement. First, like the CD in the 
previous chapter, the CHR was held in extremely high regard by Cuban decision-makers, 
who already considered CHR re-election and ongoing membership as a “vital” component of 
their seven-step HR strategy to “Attain the greatest possible participation by Cuba in the 
specialist multilateral forums in the field of human rights.”131 Although Burgers and Danelius 
observe that “the smaller delegations often found it difficult to make an expert available for 
the (Working) Group’s deliberations,”132 Cuba sent multiple-person delegations to each 
session,133 and, in likely concordance with its overarching strategy, repeatedly co-sponsored 
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annual CHR resolutions authorising WG resumption.134 Cuba’s full CHR and WG participation 
and voting rights for the duration of CAT negotiations gave it prime access and opportunity 
to engage in the crucial formulation and development of the norm to prohibit torture. 
 
The CHR commenced negotiations in 1978, with MINREX recording that the “open 
working group that began analysis of a Swedish draft Convention against Torture… in which 
Cuba actively participated, laboured diligently.”135 Yet the 1978 WG report records “All 
speakers were of the opinion that the work of drafting a convention should be expedited, 
but there were differing views as to how this should be done.”136 MINREX concurred, 
“Despite the existence of five working groups... permitting more dedicated time to examine 
(the draft CAT), not much advancement was made regarding the same.”137 According to ex-
ante first-hand Western reports, it was primarily Western countries that proffered proposals 
at the 1979 WG, culminating in a revised Swedish draft convention that was “well received 
by the governments concerned.”138 MINREX documented a slightly different perspective, 
however, recording that “Cuba participated actively” given “the positions assumed by 
Westerners… demonstrate very active and dangerous initiatives on various questions.”139 
The only definitive agreement in 1979 was authorisation of the resumption of the WG in 
1980.140 Despite resolution of several matters,141 the three key disputes over non-
refoulement, universal jurisdiction and the supervisory mechanism stagnated and 
prevented norm progress throughout the 1980-1983 CHR sessions.142 The CHR proved 
essential to ironing out these differences in 1984, however, and managed to complete and 
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adopt the draft treaty with only two bracketed items referred to the UNGA.143 The CHR had 
achieved its objective to produce a draft CAT for UNGA adoption.  
 
Considering particularly the second indicator for this attribute,144 the CHR thus 
represented an integral forum for the international consolidation and general endorsement 
of the norm to prohibit torture. However, the CHR was also the vehicle through which 
Cuban ratification was impeded, rendering the IO of simultaneously detrimental effect. For 
within one month of the series of high-level government communiques recommending 
Cuban CAT ratification in January 1987,145 one year after Cuba’s signature, Cuba’s HR 
strategy was upended and CAT ratification postponed. In February 1987 the US tabled a 
draft CHR resolution calling for consideration of “the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Cuba.”146 From this point forward, Cuban diplomats became 
utterly preoccupied with HR self-defence rather than CAT ratification.147 Although the 1987 
US initiative failed,148 intensification of allegations in 1988 forced Cuba to invest precious 
resources in its defence.149 MINREX more than doubled its CHR delegation, which now 
included the Vice-Minister himself.150 Cuban diplomats focused on submitting equivalent 
allegations and a draft resolution against their accuser, reported results of a recent 
European Parliament inquiry into Cuba that concluded “None of us… were able to ascertain 
anything in the line of hard facts relating to torture or disappearances,” and proactively 
invited the CHR Chairman to visit and report on the Cuban situation himself.151 As a result, 
Cuba wrested a level of control at this session and the 1988 draft resolution against it was 
withdrawn.152 Nevertheless, Cuba spent the remainder of the year, and the 1989 CHR 
session, focused on responding to and defending itself against a breadth and depth of CHR 
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Chairman enquiries.153 The gravity with which Cuban diplomats considered and acted upon 
these allegations was profound. Not one accessible MINREX document referenced Cuban 
CAT consideration, let alone ratification, during this period.  
 
Cuban investment in self-defence over and above official norm endorsement appeared to 
initially bear fruit. The 1989 CHR resolution accompanying the Chairman’s report on Cuba 
complimented Cuba “for the co-operation extended to the mission in carrying out its visit 
and the reaffirmation of the desire of the Cuban authorities to continue co-operation in the 
human rights sphere,” requesting only that the Government of Cuba “analyse the 
observations made by the mission in its report” and “co-operate with the Secretary-General 
in maintaining their direct contacts.”154 This was a far cry from the alternative US-sponsored 
draft resolution that sought continuation of the Cuba inquiry, an additional report, and 
inclusion of the specific question of Cuba as a stand-alone item on the next CHR agenda.155 
Tellingly, with the resulting hiatus in the CHR inquiry, MINREX resumed CAT ratification 
consideration. A memo to the MINREX Minister noted “On 2 January 1990, the Secretary of 
the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers circulated amongst its members, in 
individual consultation, the proposal to ratify the Convention against Torture.”156 The memo 
recommended that “a definitive decision is taken on this affair, to communicate it, 
forthwith, to the Secretary of the Executive Committee,” and that “in our opinion, the 
suggestion to proceed to ratification must be reiterated.”157 A direct correlation presents 
between the easing CHR focus on Cuba and resumed Cuban focus on the CAT. 
 
However, allegations against Cuba intensified at the 1990 CHR.158 The extent of 
consequent diplomatic disruption for Cuba was evident in a lengthy internal report from 
 
153 See: MINREX “RS: 111.63,” 1989, 1-3, E/CN.4/1989/46,7,14,25-6,Annex XIV, E/CN.4/1989/75, 
E/CN.4/1989/SR.41,11-3,17,20, E/CN.4/1989/SR.44,13, E/CN.4/1989/SR.56/Add.1,3, E/CN.4/1989/SR.41,9-
10,20, E/CN.4/1989/SR.44,13, E/CN.4/1989/SR.41,10. 
154 However the report proffered neither conclusions nor recommendations: E/1989/20;E/CN.4/1989/86,179, 
E/CN.4/1989/46,7-8,10,14-7,25-7,55, E/CN.4/1989/SR.41,9. 
155 E/1989/20;E/CN.4/1989/86,179, E/1989/20;E/CN.4/1989/86,232-6, E/CN.4/1989/SR.56/Add.1,2-7.  
156 MINREX, “De: Dra. Olga Miranda Bravo, Directora Jurídica, A: Isidoro Malmierca, Ministro, Ast: Ratificación 
de la Convención contra la Tortura,” 3 April 1990, 1. 
157 Ibid, 1,5. 
158 E/1990/22;E/CN.4/1990/94,37-8,110, E/CN.4/1990/76, E/CN.4/1990/77, E/CN.4/1990/SR.27,3,18, 
E/CN.4/1990/SR.30,8, E/CN.4/1990/SR.32,2-10, E/CN.4/1990/SR.52/Add.1,7-8. 
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delegates to the MINREX Minister mid-CHR session, which documented extensive efforts to 
garner support and identify procedural impediments to block the “Anti-Cuban 
Manoeuvres”:  
The Cuban delegation worked arduously with regional groups explaining their 
arguments… Our delegation worked also so that the group of Non-Aligned countries met 
and took positions in this respect… the Cuban delegation worked so that the 
representatives of different groups were opposed to any new anti-Cuban attempt… Our 
delegation intervened (in the Group of Latin American Heads of Mission-GRULA meeting) 
to reiterate its position and highlight Plenary and President incapacity to propose 
substantive action, which requires previous Commission approval… The African and 
Eastern European groups met and adopted the same position as GRULA.159 
 
However, in a new development, former socialist allies joined the list of otherwise primarily 
Western Cuba-denouncers.160 According to the Cuban delegate, the 1990 “resolution was 
indeed discriminatory against Cuba, and it was a matter for particular regret that countries 
like Bulgaria, which had in the past always stood at Cuba's side, had been persuaded 
otherwise. As to Czechoslovakia's and Poland's decision to join the resolution's sponsors, 
that was hardly surprising in view of the apparent ease with which those countries changed 
their political principles.”161 Cuban diplomats spent the remainder of 1990 once again 
fixated on self-defence, “maintaining ongoing contacts, both written and oral” with the 
UNSG and organising “a joint committee established specially for the purpose (of carrying) 
out a detailed study of the report of the mission which visited Cuba in September 1988.”162 
The trail of Cuban CAT ratification again grew cold. 
 
Thus, as the CHR commenced consideration of the CAT Optional Protocol,163 Cuban 
diplomats were side-tracked and on the back foot in terms of CAT ratification.164 CHR focus 
on Cuba ballooned 1991-1995, with both INGOs and states - bolstered by former Cuban 
allies - calling attention to reported HR abuses and demanding appointment of an SR to 
 
159 Misión Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas, “De: José Pérez Novoa, A: Isidoro Malmierca, 
Nota No. 140,” 19 February 1990, 5-6 of attachment entitled ‘On Anti-Cuban Manoeuvres’. 
160 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, added to Austria, EC, Australia, Japan, Norway, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, US, for example: E/CN.4/1990/SR.12,2, E/CN.4/1990/SR.33,9, E/CN.4/1990/SR.41,4,10, 
E/CN.4/1990/SR.42/Add.1,3,16, E/CN.4/1990/SR.52/Add.1,8. 
161 E/CN.4/1990/SR.52/Add.1,9. Also: E/CN.4/1990/93,2. 
162 E/CN.4/1991/28,2,4. Also: E/CN.4/1991/28,10. 
163 E/CN.4/1991/66,1, E/1991/22;E/CN.4/1991/91,188. 
164 Examples: E/CN.4/1991/SR.40,17, E/CN.4/1991/SR.41,3-4, E/CN.4/1991/SR.41,17. 
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investigate.165 MINREX became absorbed in fervent defence on a multitude of fronts. First, 
against the UN SR on Torture after being named subject of ‘urgent action’ requests for the 
first time since the creation of the post each year between 1991-1995.166 Second, 
responding to CHR Resolutions on the HR situation Cuba, which established a ‘special 
representative’ in 1991 and formal SR in 1992, whose mandate was extended each year for 
the remaining period under analysis.167 Cuba even submitted a draft resolution to the UNGA 
in 1992 requesting invalidation of the entire SR appointment.168 Third, Cuba attempted to 
justify, downplay or simply prevent publication of reported HR violation allegations, 
including torture, against it at the CHR.169 Fourth, Cuba hosted the UN High Commissioner 
for HR in-country in 1994.170 The prime symbol of Cuban plight arguably occurred in 1993, 
however, when even its staunch former ally Russia publicly “deplored the repressive acts 
against domestic opponents and HR defenders in Cuba… His delegation regretted Cuba’s 
refusal to receive the Special Rapporteur and to cooperate with the Commission.”171  
 
The validity or otherwise of allegations against Cuba are beyond the scope of this study. 
What is not, however, is their impact. Vehement and repeated allegations of HR abuses 
against and revisionist ascription of Cuba in the CHR contributed to Cuba’s delayed official 
endorsement of the international norm to prohibit torture.172 1987 Cuban intentions to 
ratify the CAT collapsed alongside their overarching strategy to re-align international HR 
discourse and not only endorse but become a vanguard for norms such as the prohibition of 
torture. Instead of pursuing the latter, Cuba reverted to traditional reiteration of socio-
economic rights and “principles of non-selectivity, impartiality and objectivity.”173 Cuba 
 
165 E/CN.4/1991/SR.43,4-5, E/1991/22;E/CN.4/1991/91,250, E/CN.4/1992/SR.40,11, E/CN.4/1994/SR.64,14-5. 
166 E/CN.4/1991/17,17, E/CN.4/1992/17,16, E/CN.4/1993/26,34-8, E/CN.4/1994/31,42-3, E/CN.4/1995/34,30. 
167 E/1991/22;E/CN.4/1991/91,11,157,250-2, E/1992/22;E/CN.4/1992/84,10,141-3,280-1, E/1993/23; E/CN.4/ 
1993/122,30-1,194-6,362, E/1994/24;E/CN.4/1994/132,201-2,384-5, E/1995/23;E/CN.4/1995/176,192-4,387. 
168 Miguel Lozano, “Refuta Cuba en ONU procedimientos aplicados bajo presión de EE.UU,” Granma (28:250, 
Tue  1 Dec 1992), 11, Anon, “En ONU: Impugna Cuba,” 5. 
169 Example: E/CN.4/1992/27,28, E/CN.4/1992/SR.34,19-20, E/CN.4/1992/SR.34/Add.1,1-5, E/CN.4/1993/39,3-
4,29-30, E/CN.4/1993/SR.65,10-1, E/CN.4/1994/51,7-19, E/CN.4/1994/SR.49,13-4, E/CN.4/1995/SR.47,15-6. 
170 E/CN.4/1995/SR.47,15, E/CN.4/1995/52,22, E/CN.4/1995/SR.50,20, E/CN.4/1995/SR.56,12, AI, 1994, 110. 
171 E/CN.4/1993/SR.54,3. 
172 Some of many: E/CN.4/1991/SR.28,18, E/CN.4/1991/SR.40,5,32-3, E/CN.4/1992/SR.24,4-5, 
E/CN.4/1992/SR.39,4-8, E/CN.4/1993/SR.35,11-6, E/CN.4/1993/SR.52,12,18, E/CN.4/1995/SR.51,14. 
173 E/CN.4/1992/SR.48,11, E/1992/22;E/CN.4/1992/84,99-101, E/CN.4/1993/SR.63,3-4,8-9,12, 
E/1993/23;E/CN.4/1993/122,186-8, E/CN.4/1993/SR.33,8, E/CN.4/1994/SR.34,5-6, E/CN.4/1995/SR.32,6-7. 
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ultimately ratified the CAT on 17 May 1995,174 following substantial delay caused, in part, by 
the battleground that the CHR had become. In this instance, rather than comprising a driver 
of norm diffusion and state socialisation, the primary IO served to impede official Cuban 
norm endorsement. 
 
5.3.a.iii: State Suasion 
The driver of the CHR vehicle in this respect was the US, effecting a different, somewhat 
intensified, case of reverse state suasion. Cuba had held concerns regarding the potential 
manipulation of HR by the US to promote ulterior foreign policy aims, particularly within the 
CHR, since at least the 1970s.175 Internal MINREX communiques reveal consternation from 
Cuban diplomats regarding the proportionally greater number of Western countries in the 
CHR than the UNGA,176 and perceived US attempts to obstruct Cuban influence and capacity 
within the same. Cuban diplomats condemned US singling out of Cuba with ‘unfounded 
accusations’177 and argued that  “This extortionist attitude of the US was (designed) 
exclusively to provoke difficulties for the Cuban delegation.”178 At the CHR, Cuban diplomats 
“emphasized the need to reorient the Commission's activities so as to prevent certain 
elements from monopolizing them for their own ends.”179 Granma went so far as to 
condemn ‘UN polarity’, reporting that “the US insists on using each form or organ of the UN 
to impose its will, as has occurred particularly with the CHR.”180 The newspaper alleged the 
very location of UN headquarters rendered it an instrument of US hegemony.181 
 
In practice, each draft CHR resolution that targeted Cuba for HR abuses between 1987 
and 1994 was introduced and sponsored by the US.182 In 1988 alone, the US submitted no 
 
174 E/CN.4/1996/34,4. 
175 MINREX, “Elementos,” 1,5,7. 
176 Ibid, 11, Viceministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, “De: Rene Anillo, A: Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, 
Vicepresidente,” 28 January 1978, 3, Lozano, “Refuta Cuba en ONU,” 11: “running over Commission of Human 
Rights’ norms, where US took advantage of that organ’s composition to impose its point of view.” 
177 Ibid, 8-9. 
178 MINREX, “Informe sobre el 34th Periodo de Sesiones,” Theme 5 attachment,6, Theme 12 attachment,3. 
179 E/1980/13;E/CN.4/1408,289. 
180 Astudillo, “Solos o acompañados,” 3. 
181 E/CN.4/1993/39,34, Anon, “Apoya Cuba revision de acuerdo que confirmo a EE.UU sede de la ONU,” 
Granma (20:286, Wed 5 Dec 1984), 5: “US interprets its function as headquarters of the world organisation as 
a way to apply political and discriminatory measures against member countries.” 
182 Examples: E/1987/18;E/CN.4/1987/60,212-3, E/1988/12;E/CN.4/1988/88,230-1, 
E/1989/20;E/CN.4/1989/86,179,232-6, E/CN.4/1990/SR.12,2, E/CN.4/1990/SR.33,9, E/CN.4/1990/SR.41,4,10. 
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less than three official letters condemning Cuba, including from President Reagan himself.183 
In a hint of the tightening net to come, new US-sponsored resolutions began to appear on 
the CHR agenda that, although not specifically targeting Cuba, referenced implicit Cuban 
weaknesses in areas such as judicial impartiality, detention without trial or charge, right of 
movement, elections, national HR institutions, and political prisoners.184 Cuba’s delegate 
repeatedly responded with regrets:  
that certain speakers had tried to give a mendacious picture of the human rights 
situation in his country… those statements formed part of the disinformation and 
destabilization campaign being waged by the detractors of the Cuban Revolution, who 
had been endeavouring for years to bring Cuba back to… a period when the expression 
"human rights" had had no meaning in the country… His delegation once again stated 
that detainees in Cuban prisons had never been subjected to ill-treatment or torture.185  
 
Cuba devoted significant resources to rebuffing such “unfounded and malicious” allegations 
and perceived victimisation at the hands of the US,186 contending that the “Government and 
the people of Cuba categorically reject all attempts at discrimination and singularisation of 
Cuba to please the US.”187 Indeed, the 1992 draft Cuban UNGA resolution requesting SR 
invalidation was based upon claims of “US pressure” and unfounded allegations: Cuba 
would “not cooperate with the special rapporteur considering its illegal and spurious 
mandate was a product of Washington’s political pressures.”188  
 
Cuba also invested immense time and resources to responding in kind, submitting 
extensive annual draft CHR resolutions denouncing the investigation and calling for an 
equivalent against the US.189 However, this yearly and relatively balanced play between the 
 
183 E/CN.4/1988/54,2, E/CN.4/1988/61, 3 of attachment 2, 2 of attachment 1, E/CN.4/1988/77,2-4: US 
President: “One of the principal HR violators in the western hemisphere, Cuba, has escaped attention for many 
years - but no more. The United States sponsored a resolution last year asking that violations in Cuba be 
placed on the agenda of the Commission, and we will do so again.” 
184 E/1989/20;E/CN.4/1989/86. 
185 E/CN.4/1989/SR.33,5-6. 
186 E/CN.4/1991/28,10. See also: E/CN.4/1989/SR.44,13, E/CN.4/1989/SR.41,10, E/CN.4/1989/SR.44,13, 
E/CN.4/1989/SR.41,9-10,20: MINREX Vice-Minister: “his country had been the target of hostility, pressure and 
aggression from eight successive United States Governments, which had sought to isolate Cuba diplomatically, 
stifle it economically and rob it of its best specialists… the United States had succeeded in mobilizing a small 
group of persons ready to pour out an incessant stream of lies to the members of the mission.” 
187 MINREX, “RS: 111.63,” 1-3. 
188 Lozano, “Refuta Cuba en ONU,” 11. Also: Anon, “En ONU,” 5. 
189 1987 Cuban resolution against the US, for example, covered several pages and allegations ranging from US 
“policy of aggression, threats and economic coercion and sanctions” against others, to racist, fascist, 
repressive policies against own: E/1987/18;E/CN.4/1987/60,138,215-7. 
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US and Cuba changed dramatically from 1991. Cuban resolutions suddenly lost traction, US 
resolutions grew in support, and Cuba became engulfed in a vortex of denial and disavowal. 
By pressuring Cuba in this way, state suasion as understood in socialisation literature had 
the opposite of its intended effect. The constant attacks upon Cuba in the CHR denied Cuba 
capacity for positive norm endorsement, and diverted Cuba from CAT ratification.190 
Ratification occurred only after the anti-Castro Presidencies of Reagan and Bush, and with 
the prospect of defrosting relations under Clinton. US influence thus provoked the 
redirection of Cuban efforts from the strategy of ‘Western’ HR norm adoption, including 
torture, to the defence of Cuba against HR allegations, in another case of reverse state 
suasion. 
 
The only indication of positive state suasion over Cuban endorsement of the norm to 
prohibit torture was an indirect bandwagon effect. In a 9 January 1987 memo to the 
MINREX Minister, the office of the Vice-Minister reported a meeting of the Coordination of 
Experts on HR from Socialist Countries at which various representatives had signalled their 
intent to announce CAT ratification. In light of this, the Vice-Minister reminded his superior, 
“We must not forget that, once entered into force the Convention will create a Committee 
that must ensure its application, in which eventually Cuba might aspire to equal 
membership as other socialist countries anticipate.”191 On 21 January, the MINREX Legal 
Director agreed. He noted that given “the interest manifested now by some socialist 
countries in ratifying, which would give us the opportunity to form part of the Committee 
against Torture, we suggest the convenience of elevating these considerations.”192 Mirroring 
Cuban anticipation of OPCW membership in the previous chapter, the prospect of IO 
engagement also has relevance in this respect. A fear of being left behind, from both the 
socialist state cohort and CAT supervisory mechanism, comprised indirect suasion from like-
minded socialist countries and a reason for Cuban CAT ratification. 
 
 
190 Examples: memo from MINREX Vice-Minister to all Vice-Ministers/Directors: MINREX, “De: Rolando López 
del Amo, Viceministro, A: Todos los Viceministros y Direcciones del MINREX, Circular No. 4: Situación del Tema 
Cuba en la Comisión de Derechos Humanos,” 8 March 1991, 1-7: analysing CHR voting patterns on Cuban 
resolutions, Misión Permanente de Cuba en las Naciones Unidas, “RS/813- De: Carlos Zamora Rodríguez, A: 
Isidoro Malmierca, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,” 12 April 1991: analysing ECOSOC for same. 
191 MINREX, “RS:042,” 1. 
192 MINREX, “Ref: Memorandum RS/175,” 2-3. 
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In terms of overall norm development, several states played an influential role. Sweden, 
labelled “CAT’s original sponsor,”193 promoted international agenda inclusion, the original 
draft convention, and subsequent crucial amendments.194 The Netherlands co-sponsored 
many resolutions, proposed the stand-alone implementation and fact-finding committee 
and facilitated informal consultations to overcome stalemates.195 According to the UNSG, 
Sweden and the Netherlands were the “godfathers of the Convention.”196 As previously 
discussed, it was ultimately Argentinean support, after the 1984 change of government, that 
broke final deadlocks and pushed the norm toward official treaty adoption.197 However, it 
was the Soviet states, particularly the USSR and Ukraine, that played decisive norm 
parameter defining roles and garnered specific credit from Cuba.198 As MINREX noted, “The 
socialist countries, particularly the USSR, has also worked on the draft, taking care not to 
appear opposed to the document, (and) intervening in the debates from a fundamentally 
technical-legal focus.”199 Along the way, countless other CHR states naturally influenced the 
norm’s substantive formulation, however there is no information to suggest these states 
impacted Cuban endorsement.200 Overall, therefore, state suasion held mixed influence 
over the norm to prohibit torture. Crucially, however, for the purpose of this research, it 
once again entailed distinctly negative effect upon Cuban norm endorsement, serving 




193 Rodney, “Reviewed,” 1145. 
194 UNGA Res 3059 (XXVIII) 1973, 3218 (XXIX) 1974, 3453 (XXX) 1975: E/1980/13, E/CN.4/1408,311, 
A/39/499/Add.2,2, E/CN.4/L.1576,15, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 14,18-9,33-4, Rodley, Prisoners, 20,34, 
Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 6-8, Hawkins, “Institutions,” 787. 
195 E/1982/12/Add.1, E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,16, A/C.3/39/SR.44, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 14,18-9,75-6,102. 
196 Peter Kooijimans, “Role and Action of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture” in Cassese, Fight, 58. 
197 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 92. 
198 Further: 5.4.b.i: Feedback Loop, A/39/PV.93,1668, E/CN.4/1984/SR.33,4-6, E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,6-8, 
E/CN.4/1983/63,8-16, E/CN.4/1984/72,9-11, A/C.3/39/SR.56,17, A/C.3/39/SR.49,12, A/C.3/39/SR.56,9, 
A/C.3/39/SR.60,10, E/1982/12/Add.1, Kamminga, Accountability, 59,107-11,126, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 9-
10,16,54-6,75-9,87-101, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 6,213,249,271-2, Ingelse, UNC, 81, Burgers, “Delivery,” 48-50. 
199 MINREX, “REF: 132.4,” 9-10. Also: E/CN.4/L.1470,4-11, Burgers, Danelius, 40-51. 
200 Panama to Switzerland, Senegal to Brazil, India to Costa Rica: E/1982/12/Add.1, E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,16, 
E/CN.4/1983/WG.2/WP.12, A/39/499/Add.2,2, E/CN.4/L.1576,2, E/CN.4/1984/72,4-5,9-11, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 
16-9,190,211,283, Burgers,Danelius, UNCAT, 32,57-70,81-92, Ingelse, UNC, 74, Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 192-3. 
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5.3.iv: INEs – INGOs 
INGO involvement in the general consolidation of the international norm to prohibit 
torture has been extensively recounted,201 with some commentators contending “it is less 
the state structure than the array of transnational voluntary associations (NGOs) that have 
exposed human rights failures.”202 INGOs contributed a little to norm formulation within the 
UDHR and ICCPR, and maintained international attention upon and pressure to commence, 
progress and enact CAT negotiations, alongside other international codes of ethics and 
monitoring mechanisms, including the SR on Torture.203 Considering indicators, a large 
number of accredited INGOs attended and spoke at CHR sessions during the CAT negotiating 
period,204 with Burgers contending they participated “practically on an equal footing with 
commission members.”205 Some, such as Amnesty International, operated as observers at 
the CHR WG and received credit for specific proposals, inclusion of certain principles and 
changes in state attitudes towards the CAT.206 Indeed, most analyses recognise AI as the key 
“powerful mover for change,”207 with “the godmother being beyond any doubt Amnesty 
International.”208  
 
However, in terms of Cuban CAT ratification, INGO influence echoes that of IOs, state 
suasion and world context, appearing to have the opposite of the intended effect. First, 
rather than being influenced by INGOs - for which no evidence was found - private MINREX 
documents indicate Cuba instead sought to strategically employ INGOs for its own ends to 
promote its own priorities. When recommending Cuba focus on hosting international HR 
symposiums as part of its seven-step strategy, for example, MINREX recognised the 
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potential for NGO input, but only “in a careful process of selection and with a program 
adequate to our interests.”209 Second, akin to the effect of US influence, the consistent 
intercession of a growing list of INGOs at the CHR calling for investigation into Cuba added 
to the pressure that postponed Cuban CAT ratification.210 Cuba devoted further time and 
resources to publicly rebut each and every INGO accuser, whether through staunch denials 
or increasingly personal attacks.211 In one of countless examples, the Cuban representative: 
accused the United States authorities of financing the International Association of 
Educators for World Peace (INGO) and referred to past events in the life of (its 
spokesperson), who had received CIA financial backing and had been arrested by the 
Cuban authorities as he was preparing to launch a terrorist campaign in Cuba.212  
 
Instead of driving Cuba to ratify the CAT, the only recorded responses from Cuba to INGOs 
were condemnatory and dismissive. Even the above-referenced INGO spokesperson 
acknowledged that, “The Commission's naming of countries which violated HR was a 
powerful instrument of dissuasion… The allegations against the Cuban régime had, 
however, produced no appreciable lasting improvement in the HR situation there.”213 
Indeed, rather than altering their stance, Cuban diplomats instead sought to minimise if not 
reverse INGO influence. As one delegate argued, “The mendacious statements made to the 
Commission by certain organizations… did nothing to enhance the prestige of non-
governmental organizations. Perhaps the time had come for the Commission to review the 
role of such organizations.”214 
 
Internal MINREX documentation reveals Cuba’s opinion that such INGO HR “monopolies” 
only “serve the interests of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racists and those that practice 
apartheid.”215 A MINREX Director specifically referred to NGOs “as an instrument of attack 
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sobre Seminario sobre Instituciones Nacionales y Locales de Protección y Promoción de los Derechos 
Humanos,” 4 January 1979, 7-8. See also: Vincent, HR, 103, Welsh, “Pluralism,” 1202. 
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against the socialist countries,” with “Amnesty International, for example, being determined 
to use the death penalty question as an element of critique, as well as insisting that ‘they 
should be let in everywhere to see what is happening’.”216 Annual AI reports provided 
fodder for CHR accusations against Cuba,217 identifying “isolated reports of torture” in Cuba, 
1991-1996.218 AI was nevertheless not among the INGOs that regularly denounced Cuba at 
the CHR,219 and there is no information to indicate it directly impacted Cuban decision-
making regarding the CAT. Although Cuban diplomats paid stern attention to INGO 
condemnation of Cuba they did not appear to respect INGOs enough for INGOs to hold any 
positive influence.220 INGO impact on both Cuban norm endorsement and socialisation was 
in fact adverse, contrary to expectations in associated literature. 
 
5.3.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
5.3.b.i: Domestic Norm Entrepreneurs 
Much HR norm evolution scholarship, such as the boomerang pattern and spiral model, 
highlight the critical impact of DNEs on norm endorsement, particularly in conjunction with 
systemic attributes.221 Lutz and Sikkink, for example, credit 1970s Latin American DNEs with 
aiding “international HR groups by providing accurate evidence of violations that they could 
use when appealing to other governments and inter-governmental organizations to exert 
pressure to stop the violations.”222 The process of this “powerful form of naming and 
shaming”223 was reflected to a certain extent in relation to Cuba and the norm to prohibit 
torture, however the outcome was not. DNE reports of Cuban HR violations were submitted 
 
216 MINREX, “Ref: 132.4.D,” 10. 
217 E/CN.4/1994/SR.29, E/CN.4/1994/SR.50. Franklin, “HR,” 50: “HR NGOs often have an indirect influence, as 
their reports or condemnations are cited by governmental leaders, intergovernmental organizations.” 
218 AI, Annual Reports, 1991-1996, 73-5,97-100,108-110,111-4,110-2,131-4 respectively. 
219 Although identifying others by name, AI only condemned Cuba once in 1993: E/CN.4/1993/SR.29,16.  
220 MINREX nevertheless reported INGO meetings despite no evidence of membership/official attendance: 
“Declaración Final de los Asistentes a la Reunión Constitutiva de la Asociación Latinoamericana para Los 
Derechos Humanos,” 20-23 Nov 1979, “Informe de los Asistentes a la Reunión Constitutiva de la Asociación 
Latinoamericana para Los Derechos Humanos,” 11-13 Aug 1980, Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, 
“Actividades del CICR por lo que Respecta a Visitas a las Personas Privadas de Libertad,” 2-3 April 1990. 
221 Keck, Sikkink, Activists, 12-3, Risse, et al, Power, 17-32. 
222 Lutz, Sikkink, “Justice,” 8. 
223 Franklin, “HR,” 56. 
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directly to the CHR,224 referenced in resolutions,225 countless INGO and state statements,226 
and reports from AI, the CHR WG, UNSG, and SRs on Cuba.227 Rather than encouraging 
Cuban CAT ratification, however, HR DNEs fed into the overarching CHR campaign against 
Cuba and effectively deferred Cuban norm endorsement, impeding potential socialisation. 
Given this, and contrary to expectations in the analytical framework, any DNE influence over 
Cuban endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture was indirect and surprisingly 
detrimental. 
 
5.3.b.ii: Domestic Structural Conditions 
A range of scholarship on HR treaty ratification contends that states endorse HR norms 
for domestic political objectives. These include arguments such as Moravcsik’s locking-in-
rights gains, Vreeland’s increased domestic legitimacy, and Nielson and Simmons’ 
contention that “a much closer look at the strategies and tactics governments employ 
domestically to keep a grip on their rule will provide much more purchase on the politics of 
HR treaty ratification.”228 Analysis of prevailing DSCs in Cuba in the early 1990s, however, 
indicate that akin to DNEs, DSCs also played an indirect yet fundamental role in prolonging 
Cuban norm endorsement. These conditions - known as Cuba’s ‘Special Period’ - provided 
fuel for Cuba’s detractors and momentum to CHR investigations. For in the absence of 
political, economic and diplomatic support from the former Soviet-bloc, alongside re-
amplification of US sanctions, “Suddenly, Cuba was brought to its knees by a catastrophic 
economic crisis” - Cuba’s welfare system, including provision of basic goods, food, medicine 
and services, collapsed.229 The collateral effect of such economic degradation reportedly 
included increased domestic agitation, frustrated immigration opportunities and impeded 
 
224 E/CN.4/1988/61,2-3, E/CN.4/1988/77,2,4, E/CN.4/1989/46, Annexes XXII,XXVI,XXVII. 
225 E/1988/12;E/CN.4/1988/88,230-1, E/1989/20;E/CN.4/1989/86,232, E/1990/22;E/CN.4/1990/94,110, 
E/1991/22;E/CN.4/1991/91,251, E/1992/22;E/CN.4/1992/84,142, E/1993/23;E/CN.4/1993/122,195, 
E/1994/24;E/CN.4/1994/132,201, E/1995/23;E/CN.4/1995/176,194, E/1996/23;E/CN.4/1996/177,218-9. 
226 Examples: E/CN.4/1988/84, E/CN.4/1989/SR.42,3,9, E/CN.4/1989/SR.43,5-6, E/CN.4/1990/SR.33,9,14, 
E/CN.4/1991/SR.40,5,32, E/CN.4/1991/SR.43,4,11, E/CN.4/1992/SR.39,4,8,12,17, E/CN.4/1993/SR.35,11-2, 
E/CN.4/1993/SR.55,12,14, E/CN.4/1994/SR.26,17, E/CN.4/1994/SR.54,10,22, E/CN.4/1995/SR.50,17. 
227 AI, Annual Reports 1987-1996, 151-2,106-7,118-9,76-7,73-5,97-8,108-9,111-2,110,131 respectively, 
E/CN.4/1989/46,14,26-8, E/CN.4/1991/28,4, E/CN.4/1992/27,3,29, E/CN.4/1993/39,30-2, 
E/CN.4/1994/51,9,26-8, E/CN.4/1995/52,3,6-7,22. 
228 Moravcsik, “Origins,” Vreeland, “Institutions,” Nielsen, Simmons, “Rewards,” 206. 
229 Kayla Fory, “Dissecting My Cuban Experience,” Journal of Human Behaviour in the Social Environment (25, 
2015), 48. Also: Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “Balance Económico-Social de 50 Años de Revolución en Cuba,” América 
Latina Hoy (January, 2010), 49-50,59. 
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rights, thus propelling HR abuse allegations and, naturally, the CHR investigation into 
Cuba.230 According to the 1992 SR on Cuba report, for example: 
The already serious difficulties caused by the economic and commercial embargo 
imposed on Cuba in recent decades have now been augmented as a result of the radical 
change in the relations between the countries with which Cuba had established political, 
economic and commercial links that were the basis of its development policies. This 
change has led to a serious deterioration in Cuba's economic life… Unfortunately for the 
cause of human rights, the Cuban authorities have decided to confront this difficult 
economic situation by stepping up their repressive control of alleged opponents of the 
regime, the majority of whom are seeking non-violent changes in circumstances which 
they find intolerable.231 
 
With the Special Period, Cuba’s DSCs indirectly and negatively impacted official Cuban 
endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture. 
 
5.3.b.iii: Salience 
Aligning with norm scholarship that contends states may endorse international norms as 
a form lip-service when holding them in high indifference, Hathaway and others have 
argued that HR treaties, and the CAT in particular, are uniquely positioned to play not only 
an instrumental but expressive role in international politics. An expressive role exists when 
reputational benefits outweigh minimal compliance costs. According to Hathaway, “When a 
country joins a human rights treaty, it engages in what might be called "position taking," 
defined here as the public enunciation of… a pleasing statement not necessarily intended to 
have any real effect on outcomes.”232 It is therefore arguable that the CAT’s expressive role 
explains Cuban ratification: 
When countries are rewarded for positions rather than effects - as they are when 
monitoring and enforcement of treaties are minimal and external pressure to conform to 
treaty norms is high - governments can take positions that they do not honor, and 
 
230 AI, Report 1991, 73, Fidel Castro, Ignacio Ramonet, Fidel Castro: My Life (New York: Scribner, 2007), 424-5, 
Joaquín Roy, “Cuba: Transición, Sucesión, Estabilidad, Seguridad,” América Latina Hoy (52, 2009), 19-20. 
231 E/CN.4/1992/27,29. Also: E/CN.4/1992/SR.34,19-20, E/CN.4/1992/SR.34/Add.1,4, E/CN.4/1995/52,6-7,20, 
E/CN.4/1993/39,31-2: 1993 SR report: “Cuba is going through one of the most difficult periods in its recent 
history so far as the economic situation is concerned. The level of living has deteriorated to a point where 
basic services such as public transport have reached levels close to a standstill.… the Government seems to be 
resorting to repressive measures to silence any expression of discontent or independent opinion, however 
moderate it may be. The persecution of individuals is being carried on, sometimes even at trifling levels, and 
with a callousness which, in the eyes of an impartial observer, would seem patently out of proportion.” 
232 Hathaway, “HR,” 2005-7. 
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benefit from doing so… Countries that take the relatively costless step of treaty 
ratification may thereby offset pressure for costly changes in policies.233  
 
This conception of “window dressing rather than a serious commitment to implement 
respect for human rights in practice” - in which states endorse particularly HR treaties given 
low-cost reputational benefits - comprises one of the few scholarly explanations other than 
socialisation for why purportedly revisionist states endorse HR norms.234  
 
Lopez-Levy similarly rejects notions of socialisation and describes Cuban endorsement of 
international norms during this period as tactical adjustments for obfuscation purposes. He 
argues that Cuba maintained its revolutionary posture, yet hid it under the radar via CAT 
ratification during a period of increased external pressure and isolation. Cuba 
moderated/radicalised its public image as required in response to US power asymmetry. 
Survival logic necessitated ostensible moderation, however ongoing rivalry sustained 
resistance in practice. Referencing Halliday, Lopez-Levy contends a “revolutionary state will 
never abandon revolutionary actions,” despite Cuba publicly reformulating and adjusting 
them to evade attention during this period, in what Lopez-Levy labels ‘peaceful revisionism’. 
Cuba sought to maintain its revolutionary posture, whilst avoiding the revisionist label.235 
Hafner-Burton, et al, therefore conclude “Repressive states want the legitimacy that the 
human rights treaties confer on them more than non-repressive states because they are 
under tighter scrutiny for their practices.”236  
 
However, such arguments of norm acquiescence in the event of low salience to escape 
adverse international attention rely on several contentions that simply do not align with 
Cuban endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture. First, these contentions require a level 
of indifferent, if not insincere, intent on the part of the ratifying state. According to 
Hathaway, “In nations in which there tends to be little or no internal pressure for 
 
233 Hathaway, “HR,” 1941. 
234 Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, “HR,” 1378, Emilie Hafner-Burton, et al, “International Human Rights Law and the 
Politics of Legitimation,” International Sociology (23:1, 2008), 115-41, Zartner, Ramos, “HR,” 87, Vreeland, 
“Institutions,” 78-9: it “raises the interesting possibility of international legitimacy as a further payoff from 
entering into the CAT” resulting in “Westernization of a dictatorship.” 
235 Dr. Arturo Lopez-Levy, Cuban government political analyst, 1992-1994: interview at International Studies 
Association Annual Conference, Toronto, 29 March 2019. Arturo Lopez-Levy, “International Socialization of a 
Revolutionary State: Has Cuba's Foreign Policy Moderated?” ISA Conference Paper, Toronto, 28 March 2019. 
236 Hafner-Burton, et al, “HR,” 132. Also: Nielsen, Simmons, “Rewards,” 199. 
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enforcement of the treaty commitments - such as nondemocratic nations - this benefit is 
unaccompanied by any substantial costs. This makes it possible for the nation to engage in 
disingenuous expression of commitment to the norms embodied in the treaty by ratifying 
the treaty with no intention of complying.”237 However, the norm to prohibit torture held 
high salience for Cuban decision-makers, evidenced not only by the aforementioned internal 
MINREX significance attached to CAT compliance,238 but by Cuba’s overall HR strategy. 
Cuban decision-makers attended and hosted international symposiums in support of the 
norm,239 actively engaged at the CHR,240 and sought establishment of a national HR Study 
Group given:  
the importance that all questions related to HR, in all their diversity, acquire every day… 
demands on our part deep and careful preparation and exhaustive analysis… Once the 
Group is constituted, it must immediately elaborate the thematic programme that should 
be its object of study, prioritised according to importance and urgency. Within this, 
questions related to the convention on torture.241  
 
Cuban decision-makers were not indifferent towards the norm to prohibit torture. 
 
Second, such arguments presume international legitimacy and reputation benefits result 
from low-salience lip-service ratification, given the treaty acts as “a shield for increasingly 
repressive behaviors after ratification.”242 Yet an intensive study by Nielsen and Simmons 
reveals that in this precise case “The only implicit acknowledgement of a treaty ratification 
is a negative reference to Cuba’s ratification of the CAT which the United States criticizes as 
‘the Cuban Government… attempting to project an image of greater openness and 
willingness to cooperate with the international community on HR’ while simultaneously 
 
237 Hathaway, “Cost,” 1839. Similarly: Krasner, Sovereignty, 32. 
238 MINREX, “Ref: Memorandum RS/175,” 1, MINREX, “De: Dra. Olga Miranda Bravo,” 1-3. 
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1978, MINREX, “REF: 132.4,” MINREX, “De: René Anillo, A: Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Vicepresidente del Consejo 
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18,45,72,111, E/CN.4/L.1576, E/CN.4/1982/30, E/CN.4/1983/60, E/CN.4/1984/SR.50,2,9. 
241 MINREX, “Ref: 132.4, Asunto: Constitución de un Grupo de Estudio,” 1. 
242 Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, “HR,” 1378. Also: Zartner, Ramos, “HR,” 74-5, Hawkins, “Responses,” 407-8. 
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cracking down on HR activists.”243 Cuba’s CAT ratification ceased neither broad international 
condemnation nor the SR investigation into Cuba.244 Third, these claims presuppose “little 
reputational cost from failing to observe the obligations assumed” via treaty 
membership.245 However, as already documented, Cuba suffered a great deal of 
reputational censure from allegations of norm breach even prior to CAT ratification, and 
MINREX documentation reveals attention was devoted, confidentially, to guaranteeing 
compliance. MINREX was highly conscious of both legal obligations and reputational 
ramifications, with a 1990 private memo documenting debate over the consequences of 
ratification with a reservation to ensure compliance, or not ratifying at all.246 Ultimately, the 
MINREX Legal Director recommended that postponing or not ratifying would hold greater 
negative reputational consequences for Cuba than ratifying with reservation in accordance 
with their legal priorities.247 Private correspondence reveals that Cuban decision-makers 
were highly conscious of, and appeared committed to ensuring, compliance with CAT 
undertakings. 
 
Fourth, these arguments contend “the current treaty system may create opportunities 
for countries to use treaty ratification to displace pressure for real change in practices.”248 
However, if this was indeed the case, it begs the question why Cuba waited eight years to 
ratify the CAT following the first draft CHR resolution against it. Fifth, low-salience 
arguments contend states “may seek to use international commitments, including treaty 
ratifications, to gain political advantage at the domestic level in what may be termed a 
"reverse two-level game.”249 However, unlike the other norm cases analysed in this thesis, 
domestic recognition of Cuban endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture - both 
 
243 Nielsen, Simmons, “Rewards,” 205: “ratification does not reduce criticism.” 
244 Pressure remained, with ongoing SR on Torture, WG on Arbitrary Detention, SR on Promotion and 
Protection of Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression inquiries: E/CN.4/1996/60,26, E/CN.4/1996/35,16, 
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E/CN.4/1996/35/Add.1,Addendum,34, E/CN.4/1996/177,27,351-2,218-20. 
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signature and ratification - remained entirely and conspicuously absent in national press.250 
Finally, contrary to expectations of socialisation, Cuba’s revolutionary posture, evidenced in 
aforementioned CHR and national press rhetoric, hardly moderated during this period. 
Cuban decision-makers were far from indifferent towards the norm to prohibit torture, and 
CAT ratification was neither insincere nor a result of perceived reputational benefits at nil 
cost. Against scholarly expectations, salience was high. 
 
5.3.c: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
5.3.c.i: Domestic Resonance 
Indicators for this attribute reveal domestic resonance of the norm to prohibit torture in 
Cuba is complex. On the one hand, the norm was not definitively codified in domestic 
legislation as required under CAT auspices.251 Publicly, Cuban diplomats argued that Article 
57 of the 1979 Cuban Constitution, which designated that “The arrested person or prisoner 
is inviolable in his personal integrity,”252 inherently incorporated “the equivalent to the right 
not to be subjected to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”253 
However, the 1994 SR Report on Cuba determined “that those rights may be exercised only 
when, in the eyes of the authorities, that would not involve any challenge to the status quo 
or to the official ideology… A logical corollary to those constitutional precepts is the 
punishment of any act that can in any way be contrary to the status quo.”254 Privately, 
internal MINREX communiques conceded that while “no political reasons exist to impede 
it… Convention signature was authorised,” legal obstacles remained.255 Ratification was 
 
250 Nil Granma reference 2 weeks either side of key dates, despite general CHR reference: Anon, “Hilo directo: 
Los temas centrales de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU,” Granma (22:28, Tue 4 Feb 1986), 5. 
251 CAT requires codification of torture as a criminal offence, then absent in Cuban legislation: 
E/CN.4/1989/46,16-7, E/CN.4/1986/15,20, Lópes, “Panorama,” 6. 
252 E/CN.4/1989/46,Annex XIX,27, also Art 58: “No violence or pressure of any kind can be used against people 
to force them to testify… those responsible for the violation will be punished as outlined by law.” 
253 E/CN.4/1986/15,18-9. See also: E/CN.4/1985/SR.3,7, E/CN.4/1996/60,Annex,32: MINREX Minister: “We 
have cooperated extensively in the implementation of laws which ensure all constitutional and procedural 
guarantees, and very recently we acceded to the Convention against Torture, even though we neither practise 
torture nor allow it. By sovereign decision of Cuba, in 1987 we approved the drafting and adoption of a new 
penal code; in 1990 we hosted an important worldwide event of the United Nations on penal law and, more 
recently, we began a process of decriminalization and a search for alternative forms of punishment.” 
254 E/CN.4/1994/51,5. 
255 MINREX, “Ref: Memorandum RS/175,” 1 (emphasis mine). 
 185 
postponed until dissonance between national Cuban law and the CAT was resolved. The 
norm did not, therefore, align precisely with pre-existing legal hierarchies in Cuba. 
 
On the other hand, and in line with its overarching HR strategy, Cuba had hosted the First 
International Symposium on Penal Systems in 1979. Cuba submitted the symposium report 
to the 1980 CHR, which concluded that “penal treatment should be based on respect for 
human dignity and… should, therefore, be implemented without any torture.”256 Cuban 
representatives frequently deplored reports of torture at the CHR and supported associated 
resolutions that reportedly comprised “the fundamental aspect upon which Cuba centred 
its work, from the beginning,” and regarding which “the Cuban delegation actively 
participated trying to achieve the greatest political content possible within the text, 
combating USA attempts to weaken it.”257 Domestic press was similarly forthright in 
condemnations of torture, quickly denouncing reports of the practice in other countries.258 
Granma hailed Cuban sponsorship of UNGA resolutions condemning HR violations,259 and 
quickly defended Cuba against allegations. For example, Granma reported that 1987 US 
accusations against Cuba relied upon “known terrorists and saboteurs,” ignored “irrefutable 
proof of the scrupulous respect for all HR in Cuba,” and overlooked US HR violations against 
its own minority groups.260 Granma praised Cuba’s CHR invitation “to send an observer to 
assess the HR situation… a fact without precedent in the annals of this UN organ.” It 
reported the Cuban delegate “dismantling delirious declarations formulated in the 
afternoon hours by US representatives,” and affirmed:  
torture and clandestine executions do not exist in Cuba; no death squadrons or political 
repression with dogs, puppies, or tear gas, as used by many Western so-called 
democracies… the treatment of prisoners is humane and not cruel, degrading or 




257 MINREX, “Informe sobre el 34th Periodo de Sesiones,” 1-3. 
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los periodistas perseguidos,” Granma (16:216, Wed 3 Sept 1980), 4, Anon, “Cuba sera la sede del XXIV 
Congreso Internacional de Psicologia,” Granma (20:211, Fri 7 Sept 1984), 5. 
259 Anon, “Intenta EE.UU mediar entre el regimen de Pinochet,” Granma (20:288, Fri 7 Dec 1984), 6. 
260 Forteza, “Entra en una etapa crucial,” 5. 
261 Casals, “Introduce EE.UU.,” 1,6. 
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However, in direct juxtaposition to the lauding of Cuban CBD signature and at least 
reference to the same in relation to the CWC, not one article was found within Granma that 
mentioned either CAT adoption on 10 December 1984,262 its opening for signature on 4 
February 1985,263 Cuba’s signature on 27 January 1986,264 its entry-into-force on 27 June 
1987,265 or Cuban ratification on 17 May 1995.266 This was despite contemporaneous 
reports of other CHR developments and HR norms around those dates.267 While domestic 
press thus condemned torture and staunchly denied accusations against Cuba, it remained 
silent on the CAT. While Cuban decision-makers denounced torture internationally and 
recommended CAT ratification internally, a dissonance remained between CAT 
requirements and domestic Cuban law. Given these complexities, alignment between the 
norm to prohibit torture and pre-existing Cuban norm hierarchies is indefinitive. 
 
5.3.c.ii: Internal Characteristics 
Unlike the norm to prevent OCIDTP in CAT Article 16, the norm to prohibit torture is 
relatively well defined, compliance obligations are specific, universal application is clear and 
non-derogability explicit.268 According to Lutz and Sikkink, “In addition to being obligatory, 
the norm against torture also is precise… (The CAT contains) detailed definitions of torture 
and the obligations of states to prevent and punish it.”269 The norm is thus internally strong, 
stable, clear, specific, prominent, compelling and universal, which likely contributed to its 
broad international endorsement.270 However, the CAT’s specificity actually contributed in 
part to delayed Cuban ratification,271 given previously referenced concerns over legislative 
compliance requirements.272 Overall, internal characteristics therefore played an influential, 
yet mixed, role in endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture. 
 
262 3-17 December 1984. 
263 1-12 February 1985, although one article denounced use of snakes to torture prisoners in Brazil: Anon, 
“Usan serpientes como tortura en Brasil,” Granma (21:29, Mon 4 Feb 1985), 7. 
264 Only Anon, “Hilo directo,” 5. 
265 Although 27-28 June 1987 were missing. 
266 16-27 May 1995. 
267 “Anon, “Aprueban resolución sobre derechose del niño,” Granma (30:50, Fri 11 Mar 1994), 4, Casals, 
“Introduce EE.UU.” 1,6, Forteza, “Entra en una etapa crucial,” 5, Anon, “Hilo directo,” 5. 
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Assessment of indicators related to this attribute reveal the impact of origin on Cuban 
norm endorsement is similarly complex. HR’s historical underpinnings are frequently 
considered Western in both source and nature.273 This has led to a perceived ideological 
divide between Western, liberal, individual, civil and political rights, and Marxist-Leninist, 
economic, social, cultural, and communal rights:274 a juxtaposition between protection of 
rights against the state versus rights to protect the state.275 According to Nordahl, “the 
Marxian HR theorist is naturally suspicious of what the elites and the intelligentsia (Western, 
state ‘socialist’, Third world, or Fourth World) say about human rights,”276 and should thus 
resist and revolt against HR propagation of capitalist oppression: 
Marx did not himself believe that a great deal could be done to improve the state of HR 
within the existing structures of most societies. Most societies are class, and thus 
exploitative, societies, with repressive state apparatuses… For these societies, including 
liberal capitalist societies, fundamental improvement in HR requires social revolution and 
the construction of fundamentally different societies.277  
 
Vincent notes the additional relevance of the North-South dichotomy at the time, where 
“the East-West debate takes place between established systems, two varieties of ‘have’ 
countries, whereas the North-South dispute is between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’… (HR) is not 
a mere conversation, but a project from which one side looks to gain materially at the 
expense of the other.”278 
 
As ideologically both ‘East’ and ‘South’, Cuba was in a delicate position. Cuba employed 
‘ordering discourses’279 in attempts to sustain the significance of economic and social rights, 
with recommendations to “Drive concrete initiatives, anathema to the adversary, regarding 
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economic rights, such as the indivisibility and interdependence of civil and political rights 
with economic, social and cultural rights,”280 which Cuban delegates reinforced at the 
CHR.281 The purportedly liberal capitalist origin of HR also contributed to Cuban reticence 
over key texts, including the ICCPR and UDHR, which “have limitations and problems of 
principle since they have origin in agreements of universal character in which elaboration by 
bourgeois governments at the UN played an important role... The Declaration contains no 
mentions of rights of the people, nations or States.”282 Cuba’s lack of ICCPR ratification 
directly impacted CAT ratification, given MINREX advice that “Our country should conclude 
studies of the Pacts and decide on their ratification before the Convention, given the latter 
has as its base the former.”283 These perspectives, alongside aforementioned Cuban 
concerns of HR as a form of Western imperialism and tool of US hegemony,284 evidence 
Cuban anxieties over the perceived origin of the norm to prohibit torture. These anxieties 
are reflected holistically in a Cuban speech to the CHR the year of CAT adoption: 
There had been much theorizing about respect for HR, with undue emphasis on 
supposed non-compliance with certain civil and political rights, but most speakers on the 
matter represented States that were responsible for denying basic HR to many people… 
Because of illiteracy, hunger, poverty and racist, colonialist and neo-colonialist 
oppression, millions died each year without ever learning the meaning of a human right… 
Those whose actions helped keep nations in a state of deprivation were not morally 
qualified to speak of HR. Responsibility for developing nations' economic and social 
problems rested largely with the forces of colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, 
racism and apartheid… it was hard to see how nations which had for so long robbed 
others of their wealth could speak so grandly about humanitarianism.285 
 
However, Cuban concerns over norm origin resulted in an outcome opposite to that 
anticipated. Instead of rejecting a purportedly Western civil and political norm, Cuba 
attempted to usurp responsibility for it and rupture perceived Western/Eastern, 
Liberal/Marxist, North/South, civil and political/economic and social rights dichotomies. 
 
280 MINREX, “Reunión Consultativa,” 2-3,7-8. Also: MINREX, “De: René Anillo,” 1: “it is not possible to enjoy 
civil and political rights without enjoying economic, social and cultural rights, economic questions vital to us 
return to the core of future treatment on the theme.” 
281 E/CN.4/1990/SR.20,9: “Cuba did not share the view of those who would like to stress civil and political 
rights… all rights - civil, political, economic, social and cultural - must be given equal attention.” 
282 Misión Permanente, “Apuntes Sobre las Posiciones de los Social-Demócratas en Relación a los Derechos 
Humanos,” 1 September 1983, 5. Also: MINREX, “De: René Anillo,” 1. 
283 MINREX, “Ref: Memorandum RS/175,” 1. 
284 5.1.c: Why Cuban Rejection was Anticipated, 5.3.a.iii: State Suasion. 
285 E/CN.4/1984/SR.18,16-7. 
 189 
Private MINREX memos detail the ideological justification to do so given only a “founding in 
Marxism-Leninism implies the elimination of exploitation of man by man, and (thus) 
capacity to guarantee real and effective implementation of HR and fundamental freedoms 
for all members of society.”286 Additional MINREX documents record Cuban attempts to 
secure socialist support for this endeavour, with MINREX representatives announcing at the 
1978 Meeting of HR Experts from Socialist Countries:  
The principle purpose of the invitation that gave rise to this meeting, is to narrow even 
more the bonds that unite socialist countries in all fields and now in the sphere of HR, 
which the imperialist enemy is trying to use as an instrument of intervention in the 
internal affairs of our countries to undermine the good prestige of socialism in world 
public opinion. We consider the exchange of criteria amongst our delegations will 
contribute extraordinarily to demonstrate the cynical and false campaign of capitalist 
countries and in particular the US, developed against socialist countries regarding HR.287  
 
Although ultimately failing in relation to the norm to prohibit torture, Cuba walked a fine 
line attempting to disrupt prevailing narratives and traditional HR dichotomies via HR norm 
promotion in the CHR throughout this period.288 Norm origin thus held high impact on 
Cuban deliberations regarding the norm to prohibit torture, however it was not a cause for 
rejection as anticipated in scholarly accounts. 
 
5.4 NEGLIGIBLE INFLUENCE 
 
With most norm diffusion attributes thus holding significant albeit far from positive 
influence, only three attributes remain outstanding. Analysis of indicators for each of these 
reveal relatively negligible impact on Cuban endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture. 
Interestingly, results mirror some of those from the previous chapter. This section therefore 
documents the minimal influence – over both Cuban norm endorsement and purported 
socialisation - of the remaining systemic attributes of regional suasion and INEs, and the 
state-level attribute of the feedback loop. 
 
 
286 Misión Permanente, “Apuntes Sobre las Posiciones,” 2-3. 
287 MINREX, “Palabras de Apertura,” 1. 
288 One example is particularly emblematic regarding Cuba’s UNGA Resolution on Right to Development as an 
HR: MINREX, “De: René Anillo,” 1: “Its approval constitutes a victory that saw negotiations from the Cuban 
delegation with capitalist as much as Non-Aligned countries… The vote isolated the US and evidenced before 
the Commission the hypocrisy of the North American campaign in matters of HR.” 
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5.4.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
5.4.a.i: Regional Suasion 
Given the confluence of regional HR conventions and commissions from the 1960s, norm 
scholarship frequently credits regional HR bodies for the promotion of snowballing public 
support for and endorsement of the norm to prohibit torture.289 Indeed, Lutz and Sikkink 
contend the post-1985 surge in Latin American HR treaty ratification “can only be explained 
by the occurrence of a genuine norms shift that rippled through the region.”290 UN records 
certainly report some Latin American delegates drawing attention to regional influence in 
the field.291 However, Cuba was expelled from the OAS in 1962 and was therefore not party 
to either the 1959 Inter-American Commission on HR, the 1969 American Convention on 
HR, the 1979 Inter-American Court of HR, or the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture. Regional organisations had little impact on Cuban endorsement of the 
torture norm.292 This was acknowledged by the MINREX Vice-Minister in 1992 when:  
Mr. ROA KOURI (Cuba) said that regional arrangements for the promotion and protection 
of human rights could make a major contribution to the effective exercise of such rights… 
provided, of course, that the regional arrangements in question were genuinely regional, 
but that was not, in his opinion, the case of the Organization of American States, from 
which Cuba had been illegally excluded.293 
 
Cuban delegates had in fact denounced the Inter-American Commission on HR as “merely a 
tool of the United States.”294 Much like its relationship with INGOs, Cuba sought to employ 
regional initiatives, when opportune, to promote its own stance rather than vice versa. 
Granma, for example, reported that Cuba’s re-election to the Vice-Presidency of the 1993 
Latin American and Caribbean forum on HR: 
demonstrates the situation of the island in relation to HR is not like that described by 
detractors of the Cuban Revolution… Even though during the last two years our enemies 
have tried to pretend that we do not cooperate with the UN system of HR, the fact we 
 
289 Fruhling, “Culture,” 269-70, Donnelly, “Regime,” 22, Hathaway, “HR,” 1995-96,2016-19. 
290 Lutz, Sikkink, “Justice,” 15. Also: Lutz, Sikkink, “HR,” 638, Obregón, “Civilisation,” 112-23. 
291 Ecuador: A/C.3/32/SR.41, Uruguay: Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 10. 
292 Inter-American Commission on HR, OAS, “American Convention on HR, Signatories and Ratifications,” 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm, Department of International Law, 
OAS, “Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Signatories and Ratifications,” 
https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-51.html, OAS, “Inter-American Commission on HR,” 




have been elected for the Vice-Presidency of this conference demonstrates the 
contrary.295 
 
In this manner - and unlike expectations in associated literature - on the rare occasion 
regional bodies were relevant to Cuban HR norm endorsement, they were relevant as a tool 
for Cuban foreign policy rather than for socialisation or norm endorsement. Given this, 
regional suasion was negligible. 
 
5.4.a.ii: INEs – Individuals, Epistemic Communities, MNCs 
Following INE indicators, specific individuals have been credited with consolidation of the 
international norm to prohibit torture, such as the Swedish CHR delegate for his role in 
initially prompting and drafting treaty texts, and Dutch delegate for his role as WG chair and 
informal negotiator overcoming stalemates.296 However, while their influence over some 
state delegations is recorded,297 there is no information to indicate that Cuba was one of 
these. Furthermore, these individuals arguably only held impact through their role as state 
delegates in the relevant IO, rather than unique exogenous entrepreneurship. As such, 
individual norm entrepreneur suasion is considered negligible. No evidence was also found 
to indicate any MNC impact on either diffusion, endorsement or the socialisation of Cuba in 
relation to the norm to prohibit torture. 
 
With regard to epistemic communities, particular legal advocacy networks certainly 
contributed to general norm development, including formulation in both the ICCPR and 
CAT.298 The International Association for Penal Law, for example, convened expert drafting 
committees and proposed one of the two original draft conventions,299 while the 
International Commission of Jurists submitted multiple proposals and textual amendments 
directly to the CHR during negotiations.300 However, once again, there is no evidence that 
they played a role in Cuban norm endorsement. Indeed, the Granma image at the start of 
 
295 Fernando Alonso, “Elegida Cuba para ocupar vicepresidencia en foro sobre derechos humanos,” Granma 
(29:14, Wed 20 Jan 1993), 5. 
296 A/C.3/39/SR.56,13, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 91-2, Tardu, “UNCAT,” 303. 
297 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 95. 
298 E/CN.4/528,36: International Group of Experts on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. 
299 In conjunction with ICJ, AI, International Committee of Red Cross: E/CN.4/NGO/213, Rodley, Prisoners, 48, 
Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 39, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 25-6. 
300 Alongside codes of ethics promotion: E/CN.4/L.1470,4, E/CN.4/1984/72,2, E/CN.4/1984/SR.34, 
E/1982/12/Add.1;E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,14, Tardu, “UNCAT,” 303, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 19,32,40. 
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this chapter implied Cuban opposition to such legal advocacy networks that “pioneered the 
strategies, developed the legal arguments, often recruited the plaintiffs and/or witnesses, 
marshalled the evidence, and persevered through years of legal challenges” to contribute to 
the extradition and surge of legal proceedings against HR and torture-related crimes in the 
1980s.301 Thus, although holding a level of impact on general norm endorsement, epistemic 
communities held minimal influence over Cuba in terms of either endorsement or 
socialisation. 
 
5.4.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
5.4.b.i: Feedback Loop  
Consideration of associated indicators reveals no direct evidence of Cuban attempt to 
reformulate the torture norm via the feedback loop. However, despite early MINREX 
emphasis on “taking maximum advantage” to secure “our own criteria” within the CAT,302 
clues indicate Cuba was likely part of primarily failed attempts. First, internal MINREX praise 
for USSR technical-legal suggestions303 imply Cuba likely supported USSR proposals 
regarding extradition and non-refoulement, which “caused problems of principle for a great 
many delegations,”304 represented one of the three core issues that stalled negotiations 
between 1980-1983, and was ultimately subject to compromise.305 Second, the CHR became 
divided between states opposed in principle to universal jurisdiction,306 and those insisting 
on its necessity “to deal with situations where torture is a State policy and, therefore, the 
State in question does not, by definition, prosecute its officials who conduct torture. For the 
international community to leave enforcement of the Convention to such a State would be 
essentially a formula to do nothing.”307 Cuba’s official position on universal jurisdiction 
during this time is unclear, although the opening Granma graphic to this chapter indicates 
 
301 Lutz, Sikkink, “Justice,” 1-33. 
302 MINREX, “Reunion Consultativa,” MINREX, “Palabras de Apertura,” 1, MINREX, “Reunión de Expertos en 
Derechos Humanos de los Países Socialistas: Tema 4,” 6-7. 
303 MINREX, “REF: 132.4- Informe sobre el 35 periodo de Sesiones,” 9-10, E/CN.4/L.1470,4-11, Burgers, 
Danelius, 40-51. Compare: An-Na’im, “Conclusion,” 428. 
304 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 54-6,61-4. Also: E/CN.4/1367, E/CN.4/L.1470,9-10, Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 195. 
305 E/CN.4/1984/72,4-5: USSR and China withdrew proposals/reservations “to facilitate consensus.” 
306 Argentina, Uruguay, Senegal, Australia, Brazil, USSR: E/1982/12/Add.1;E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,6-8, Burgers, 
Danelius, UNCAT, 78-9, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 213, Burgers, “Delivery,” 47-9. 
307 E/1982/12/Add.1;E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,5-7. Also: Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT,78-9, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 214. 
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that at least Cuban press was opposed to transnational prosecution via rendition.308 Records 
indicate that by 1982 Argentina and Uruguay were isolated in their opposition to universal 
jurisdiction,309 and in 1984 - following Argentinean change of government - this opposition 
collapsed entirely.310 
 
Third, following 1981 UN legal advice preventing the ICCPR compliance body from 
additionally supervising the CAT,311 a dichotomy arose between CHR states that rejected 
mandatory international monitoring for implementation “assured by each State Party within 
the context of its legal system,”312 and states that argued “implementation procedures were 
an indispensable part of the treaty” given “self-enforcement has been shown to be a 
failure.”313 The latter states demanded a stand-alone supervisory committee with 
mandatory fact-finding powers.314 Although Cuba’s official stance is once again unclear, 
given its previously outlined concerns over international control, Cuba likely occupied a 
position within the second group. As Ingelse explains:  
Two groups of States soon emerged. On the one side were Western States and several 
Third World States. This group was working to achieve a strong supervisory mechanism. 
On the other side was a group of States from the former East Bloc and most of the Third 
World States which, while rejecting torture… were unwilling to subject themselves to a 
strong international supervisory mechanism… (and) far-reaching and uncontrollable 
infringement of the domestic jurisdiction… Supervision remained a major stumbling block 
during negotiations.315 
 
However, at the 1984 CHR the USSR “informed the Group that, in a spirit of compromise, it 
would no longer insist on giving all elements of the implementation system an optional 
character… However, it maintained its fundamental objections against the mandatory 
character of the proposed Article 20 concerning inquiries.”316 The USSR and Ukraine also 
 
308 Cuba unnamed in UN documentation, MINREX archives unavailable for this period. 
309 E/1982/12/Add.1;E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,8, Burgers, “Delivery,” 49, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 79. 
310 A/C.3/39/SR.56,12, E/CN.4/1984/72,5-7, Burgers, “Delivery,” 49, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 94-5, Lutz, 
Sikkink, “HR,” 659, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 197-8,216-7, Ingelse, UNC, 77. 
311 E/CN.4/L.1576,14, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 75-6, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 243. 
312 USSR: E/CN.4/1983/63,8-9. See also: Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 75-6,87-9, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 249. 
313 E/CN.4/L.1576,14-5. Also: E/1982/12/Add.1;E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,12-3, E/CN.4/1983/63,9, Boulesbaa, 
“Analysis,” 195, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 243-9, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 77. 
314 E/1982/12/Add.1;E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1,10-8, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 75-88, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 246-
8,270,281-3,289, Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 200-2. 
315 Ingelse, UNC, 75. 
316 E/CN.4/1984/72,9-10. See also: Boulesbaa, “Analysis,” 197, Burgers, “Delivery,” 49-50, Boulesbaa, UNCAT, 
271, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 97-8, Kamminga, Accountability, 59,107,110-1,126. 
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insisted on authorising the Committee Against Torture to make only ‘general comments’ 
rather than ‘comments or suggestions’ in Article 19.317  
 
This prompted the USSR to lead a movement at the November 1984 UNGA Third 
Committee - post-CHR yet pre-UNGA CAT adoption - that threatened to return the draft 
convention to the CHR negotiating table in ongoing protest over Articles 19-20.318 Cuba was 
part of this effort. At the UNGA Third Committee on 26 November 1984, the Cuban delegate 
announced: 
Cuba had urged the prohibition and condemnation of the use of torture and had 
supported from the beginning the idea of drawing up a draft convention against torture. 
Her delegation shared the view that it was important for an instrument of that nature to 
be adopted by consensus. To that end, some of the proposed articles, such as articles 19 
and 20, would require further consultation.319 
 
In this matter, and this matter alone, Cuba and allies achieved feedback loop success. Given 
concerns over indefinite adjournment of UNGA adoption,320 and following urgent informal 
consultations,321 a resolution to endorse the draft convention that omitted ‘or suggestions’ 
from Article 19 and added the Article 28 opt-out procedure for Article 20, was submitted to 
the UNGA Third Committee “strictly conditional upon the withdrawal of all other 
amendments.”322 Following brief suspension for consultation, “The CHAIRMAN said that, if 
he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to adopt draft 
resolution L.40, as orally revised, without a vote. It was so decided.”323  
 
An internal MINREX memo subsequently recorded that “the Cuban delegation that 
participated in the UNGA Third Commission where (the CAT) was adopted, played an 
important role in the negotiations and adoption of the text.”324 However, Cuba did not 
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319 A/C.3/39/SR.50,13. 
320 Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 103, Burgers, “Delivery,” 51-2, Nowak, McArthur, UNCAT, 5, Ingelse, UNC, 81. 
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323 A/C.3/39/SR.60,10-11. See also: A/C.3/39/SR.61, Burgers, Danelius, UNCAT, 106. 
324 MINREX, “Ref: Memorandum RS/175,” 1. 
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achieve reformulation precisely as desired and maintained concerns following CAT adoption 
given “article 20 contradicts our position of not accepting verification on our territory, 
except when a sovereign decision on our part exists in this respect.”325 Indeed, overall 
feedback loop failure led to the subsequent MINREX debate regarding CAT reservation.326 
Finally, equal geographic representation within the Committee against Torture was 
additionally not secured in the CAT, as likely also desired by Cuba.327 Given such key failures, 
the feedback loop comprised a relatively insignificant factor behind Cuban HR norm 
endorsement. 
 
5.5. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS 
 
This chapter has assessed the impact and manner of operation of the fifteen norm 
diffusion attributes with regard to Cuban endorsement of the HR norm to prohibit torture. It 
reveals the strong and positive impacts of national identity, norm substance, international 
concurrence, salience and origin. Cuba endorsed the CAT given deliberate overt alignment 
between Cuban national identity and the norm, public recognition of the norm’s immanent 
power, repeated sponsorship of resolutions to secure its international codification, and an 
initial attempt to usurp responsibility for its diffusion to disrupt and counter perceived 
origin dichotomies. The only initial reasons preventing immediate CAT ratification according 
to private MINREX documents were concerns over cost and legal capacity to comply, which 
intrinsically also revealed the salience and gravity with which Cuba considered the norm at 
the time.  
 
While domestic resonance proved complex, of most interest once again was that 
traditional socialisation drivers, alongside some facilitators and enablers, may have 
promoted norm endorsement generally but had the opposite effect upon Cuba.328 All 
systemic attributes, alongside DNEs, DSCs, the feedback loop and internal norm 
characteristics, had either negligible or adverse effects. Indeed, several of these attributes 
 
325 MINREX, “Ratificación de la Convención contra la Tortura,” 5. 
326 Ibid, 3,5. 
327 Byrnes, “CAT,” 512. 
328 Nielsen, Simmons, “Rewards,” 199,206. 
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effectively postponed purported revisionist norm endorsement. Hiatus in MINREX 
consideration of CAT ratification aligned directly with the periods in which Cuba suffered 
most scrutiny, and felt the impact most severely from these attributes at the CHR. By 
looking at the process of norm diffusion, rather than intentions or outcomes, it becomes 
evident that the systemic-level socialisation drivers proved counter-productive in this 
instance. As Kim notes generally, “third parties with strong economic leverage, namely, the 
US government… generally do not have repression-reducing, moderating effects on 
dictatorships.”329 In fact, it was the very ascription of revisionism that deferred Cuban norm 
endorsement, ironically yet inevitably strengthening revisionist accusations in the process. 
As Geis and Wunderlich observe, “initiation of ‘enemy relations’ by US actors significantly 
contributed to and reified the very ‘roguish’ behaviour of states that were later on 
stigmatized as ‘rogues’. Exaggerated threat perceptions and a fear of communism… led the 
US to adopt hostile attitudes towards countries such as Cuba.”330 
 
This again raises questions regarding conceptions of revisionism in IR. From the Cuban 
perspective, it was targeted by the US through defamation and deflection: defamation in 
the sense of stigmatising those who did not mirror dominant behaviour and attitudes, and 
deflection via diverting attention from the US’ own roguish practices. In relation to the 
former, for example, Granma reported that Iran “today accused the United States of 
utilising the pretext of HR for ‘hitting those countries in disagreement with the politics of 
the White House’.”331 In relation to the latter, according to Castro, “the imperialists increase 
their hostility and campaigns against Cuba, which has seen with what fury they try to 
impute to us, in speaking of torture in our country, the things that they do in all parts of the 
world.”332 Echoing Falk - who argues that “Such selectivity in protest activity introduces an 
element of hypocrisy and manipulativeness into most statist (and even international 
 
329 Kim, “Mobilizing,” 62. 
330 Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 467-8. Similarly: Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 19, Hoyt, “Rogue,” 309, 
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331 Anon, “Líder espiritual iraní denuncia falsedad de política norteamericana,” Granma (28:92, Thu 7 May 
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institutional) approaches to HR”333 - Cuban diplomats condemned their US accusers for 
hypocrisy and “alarming symptoms of a double standard and double morality.”334  
 
As observed in the previous chapter, Cuba pursued similar strategies, repeatedly 
launching accusations of revisionism against its accusers - fellow states, INGOs and even UN 
officials – in an effort to deflect and counteract attention.335 Yet what was initially equally 
weighted, mutual demonisation between the US and Cuba336 - “each side has the capacity 
to wound the other: the East the West on equality, the West the East on liberty”337 - 
became US domination as the world context changed. As Rajagopal notes, “the end of the 
Cold War marked the birth of a new hegemonic role for HR”338 - and for the US. According 
to Bloomfield, “the temporal context matters in the sense that exogenous events or 
contingencies such as shifts in the global distribution of power or crises affect the roles 
actors play and how they play them.”339 Altered power asymmetries at the end of the Cold 
War promoted US ascription of Cuban revisionism and rendered parallel Cuban efforts 
against the US futile.340 According to Granma, “it is those who have domination over the 
great means of international publicity that attempt to distort reality (and) present us in a 
way that does not correspond with reality.”341 As Zarakol observed, “states are not equal 
when it comes to normative weight.”342 By the time Cuba officially endorsed the norm to 
prohibit torture, as it had always intended given the aforementioned effective attributes, it 
had failed in its ambitions to harness the norm, and its revisionist status in the field of HR 
became largely unquestioned. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NORM 








This final empirical chapter seeks to rectify the omission noted by Hurrell and Kingsbury, 
that “theoretical accounts of international environmental law have often paid rather little 
explicit attention to the political bargaining processes that underpin the emergence of new 
norms of international environmental law, to the role of power and interest in inter-state 
negotiations, and to the range of political factors that explain whether states will or will not 
comply with rules.”2 It does so by assessing the reasons behind Cuban endorsement of the 
international environmental norm to conserve biological diversity embodied in the 1992 
 
1 Anon, “Reitera Bush su negativa a firmar tratado de biodiversidad,” Granma (28:114, Sat 6 June 1992), 1. 
2 Andrew Hurrell, Benedict Kingsbury, “The International Politics of the Environment” in Andrew Hurrell, 
Benedict Kingsbury (eds), The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 12. 
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United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).3 Paralleling results from previous 
chapters, and further questioning arguments pertaining to state socialisation, this chapter 
once again reveals Cuban attempts to harness the norm as their own and shame the US. The 
chapter highlights the primary contribution of the state-level attributes and contended 
socialisation filters comprising national identity and the feedback loop. Surprisingly, it was 
Cuba’s very revisionist identity as an anti-capitalist, anti-US, Third World protector and 
advocate of the norm following reformulation that led to Cuban norm endorsement. 
Findings of further import pertain to reaffirmation of the symbiotic relationship between 
IOs and norms, IOs operating as platforms for ulterior state agendas that revise the norm 
rather than socialise the state, collective and indirect inverse state suasion and the 
surprising significance, once again, of MNCs, high salience, domestic resonance and DSCs, 
although not quite as expected within extant frameworks. 
 
The chapter commences with background defining the norm, outlining the timeline of 
international diffusion, reasons for anticipated Cuban rejection and the resulting puzzle of 
Cuban norm endorsement. Substantive empirical analysis is then undertaken in respect of 
each diffusion attribute, commencing with those operating in accordance with expectations 
from the analytical framework. These include the systemic attribute of world context, state-
level attributes of national identity and the feedback loop, and norm-related attributes of 
domestic resonance, norm substance and international concurrence. Attributes that had 
influence, however not quite as anticipated, are then analysed: IOs, state suasion and MNCs 
at systemic-level, salience and DSCs at state-level, and internal characteristics at the level of 
the norm. Empirical analysis concludes with assessment of the attributes holding negligible 
impact, including regional and remaining INE suasion at systemic-level, DNEs at state, and 
origin at the level of the norm. The chapter concludes with a preliminary review of results, 
confirming which attributes held most influence over Cuban norm endorsement in this 
environmental instance, and what this may mean for norm diffusion, revisionism and 
arguments pertaining to socialisation in IR. 
 
 
3 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1992/06/19920605%2008-44%20PM/Ch_XXVII_08p.pdf.  
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6.1.a: Definition of Norm 
 
The CBD encompasses a confluence of norms and, as will be shown, mutated well 
beyond its original mandate to incorporate commitments to additional norms, such as 
sustainable use and equitable sharing of biotechnology and genetic resources.4 Biodiversity 
conservation nevertheless remains at the heart of the Convention, listed as the first of three 
objectives in Article 1.5 According to the Preamble “the intrinsic value of biological diversity” 
as “a common concern of humankind,” renders it “vital to anticipate, prevent and attack the 
causes of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity at source.”6 While confirming 
sovereign rights over resources,7 the CBD departs from the previous norm of natural 
resource exploitation however states deem fit,8 to affirm that “States are responsible for 
conserving their biological diversity and for using their biological resources in a sustainable 
manner,” in order to “conserve and sustainably use biological diversity for the benefit of 
present and future generations.”9 The Executive Director of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) argued biological conservation remained the central CBD focus, “all the 
rest is the methodology of how to conserve.”10  
 
The precise meaning of biodiversity and mechanisms for conservation, however, 
remained contested. According to Guay, “Scientists do not even all agree on its scientific 
 
4 Vicente Sánchez, “Convention on Biological Diversity” in Vicente Sánchez, Calestous Juma (eds), Biodiplomacy 
(Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies, 1994), 10,228-9, Marian Miller, The Third World in Global 
Environmental Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 122,126, Alan Boyle, “Rio Convention on Biological 
Diversity” in Michael Bowman, Catherine Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological 
Diversity (London: Kluwer Law, 1996), 35-8,49, Philippe Le Prestre, “Emergence of Biodiversity Governance,” 
Désirée McGraw, “Story of the Biodiversity Convention,” Louis Guay, “Science and Policy of Global Biodiversity 
Protection” in Philippe Le Prestre, Governing Global Biodiversity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 2,5,7,11,24,209. 
5 CBD, 3, Koester, “Biodiversity Convention Negotiation Process,” Environmental Policy & Law (27:3,1997), 176. 
6 CBD, 1. Also: R. Nayar, David Ong, “Developing Countries, ‘Development’ and the Conservation of Biological 
Diversity” in Bowman, Redgwell, IL, 245-6. 
7 CBD, 1,4, David Hunter, et al, International Environmental Law and Policy (New York: Foundation Press, 
2002), 934, Sánchez, “CBD,” 10, Philippe Le Preste, “Long Road to a New Order” in Prestre, Biodiversity, 325. 
8 Michael Bowman, “Nature, Development and Philosophical Foundations of the Biodiversity Concept in 
International Law” in Bowman, Redgwell, IL, 6-7. 
9 CBD, 1,2, Arts 7-14,26. See also: Boyle, “Convention,” 39-40, Preste, “Road,” 321, Hunter, et al, IELP, 935,945, 
Michael Bowman, Catherine Redgwell, “Conclusions” in Bowman, Redgewell, IL, 291. 
10 McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 24. Also: Gabriel Michanek, “National Protection of Biological Diversity” in Ellen 
Basse (ed), Environmental Law (Copenhagen: Gadjura, 1997), 301, Bo Kjellén, “UNCED Process” in Gunnar 
Sjöstedt, et al (eds), International Environmental Negotiations (Stockholm: SCPCR, 1993), 227. 
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definition, or more precisely, they are often reluctant to give it a definition.”11 McConnell 
confirmed that during initial CBD negotiations, “everyone was using the shortened term- 
biodiversity - but with as yet little clear understanding of its meaning.”12 Whilst 
acknowledging its nebulous parameters, Article 2 defines ‘biodiversity’ as the “variability 
among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part.”13 Although 
conservation is not defined, ‘sustainable use’ is listed as “the use of components of 
biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of 
biological diversity.”14 Importantly, the CBD preamble affirms that “where there is a threat 
of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such.”15 The crux of 
the Convention is thus that “such a threat exists, even though the exact magnitude of the 
underlying causes of biodiversity loss, and the nature of its impact, may be subject to 
debate,” and this threat must be mitigated through specific conservation measures.16 
Labelled “a milestone in an ongoing process for the conservation and wise use of the 
world’s biodiversity,”17 the CBD therefore “establishes for the first time a unifying 
conceptual and practical framework for international efforts concerning the conservation 
and sustainable utilisation of the living natural resources of the planet.”18 By ratifying the 
CBD, states thus endorsed the international environmental norm to conserve biological 
diversity and to be held accountable to obligations to comply. 
 
 
11 Guay, “Science,” 209. See also: Vandana Shiva, Biodiversity (Pulau Pinang: Third World Network, 1992), 23. 
12 Fiona McConnell, The Biodiversity Convention (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 5. Similarly: Hunter, 
et al, IELP, 912, Hurrell, Kingsbury, “Politics,” 13,41. 
13 CBD, 1,3. Also: Miller, World, 109-12. 
14 CBD, 4. 
15 CBD, 1. 
16 Prestre, “Biodiversity,” 3; CBD, 1,2, Arts 7-14,26: commitments on national identification and monitoring, 
national protection programs, in/ex situ conservation, environmental impact statements, national reports. 
17 Brazilian NGO SOS Mata Atlantica in Pratap Chatterjee, Matthias Finger, The Earth Brokers (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 42. Also: Hunter, et al, IELP, 911, Sánchez, “CBD”, Vicente Sánchez, Calestous Juma, 
“Introduction” in Sánchez, Juma, Biodiplomacy, 2,4,7,16. 
18 Bowman, Redgwell, “Conclusions,” 289,290. See also: Prestre, “Biodiversity,” 1, Boyle, “Convention,” 33, Ulf 
Svensson, “Convention on Biodiversity” in Sjöstedt, et al, IEN, 190. 
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6.1.b: Timeline of Diffusion 
 
Although not expressed in explicit terms of biodiversity conservation, measures to 
protect natural resources are recorded in edicts as early as 1900BC.19 Specie-specific 
conservation measures existed within an array of international agreements since the first 
officially recorded in 1875.20 Global discourse surrounding the norm gradually increased 
from the 1960s, with 1982 UNGA Resolution 37/7: World Charter for Nature comprising the 
first international recognition of the specific norm of biodiversity conservation.21 Associated 
commentary recognised, however, that “These principles, which are not legally binding in a 
formal sense, represent moral or social rules which, if they are to have the force of law, 
must be transformed by the international community into the terms of conventions or into 
customary international law.”22 The 1987 World Commission on Environment and 
Development Brundtland report Our Common Future,23 in conjunction with two UNEP 
environmental reports,24 provided the catalyst for deliberations at the UNEP Governing 
Council (GC) and kick-started CBD negotiations.25  
 
UNEP GC Decision 14/26, adopted by consensus at the 14th Session, 8-19 June 1987, 
requested establishment of “an ad hoc working group of experts to investigate, in close 
collaboration with the Ecosystems Conservation Group and other international 
organizations, the desirability and possible form of an umbrella convention to rationalise 
current activities in this field.”26 The norm was refined and CBD consolidated in three 
subsequent sessions of an Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity (EBD 
WG), 1988-1990, two sessions of an Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts 
 
19 Bowman, “Nature,” 7. 
20 UNEP/GC.15/Inf.2, UNEP/GC.16/Inf.4, Charles Okidi, “International environmental law and national 
interests” in Sánchez, Juma, Biodiversity, 34. 
21 A/RES/37/7, Hunter et al, IELP, 911,932, 6.2.c.iii: International Concurrence. 
22 Bowman, “Nature,” 9,18: although approved 111 votes to 1, 18 abstentions. 
23 World Commission on Environment and Development, Report: Our Common Future, http://www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf, paras 7,9,11,53,57, McConnell, Biodiversity, 3-4, Bowman, Redgwell, 
“Introduction,” 2, Bowman, “Nature,” 9, Sánchez, “CBD,” 8, Koester, “Biodiversity,” 177. 
24 UNEP/GC.14/14/Add.1: recommending international protected areas, in/ex situ conservation, common 
heritage of mankind, conservation education, research, cooperation, assistance, UNEP/GC.14/9,7: ‘The 
biological diversity crisis’ represented “extinction of species at an unprecedented rate,” recommending a 
World Conservation Strategy to “stimulate the conservation of living resources.” 
25 UNEP/GC.14/26,4-6, McConnell, Biodiversity, 3, Boyle, “Convention,” 35, Sánchez, “CBD,” 8. 
26 Albeit “cautiously”: UNEP/GC.14/26,17,58-59,Annex I, McConnell, Biodiversity, 5,Annex A. 
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on Biological Diversity (LTEBD WG), 1990-1991, and five additional sessions of an 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity (INC), 
1991-1992. The convention was adopted by 91 states, including Cuba, at the Nairobi Final 
Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 22 May 1992.27 The CBD opened for signature on 5 June at the 1992 UN 
Conference for Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Earth 
Summit, with Cuban signature and ratification relatively quickly following suit.28 The CBD 
entered into force on 29 December 1993.29 
 
6.1.c: Why Cuban Rejection was Anticipated 
 
6.1.c.i: ‘Laggard’ States 
Cuba was expected to reject this norm for reasons additional to its general status as a 
purported revisionist state. Scholarship anticipated that when it comes to environmental 
norms, “Success is much more pronounced within the developed countries than the 
developing countries.”30 Rather than a “Powerful government lead(ing) the way in some 
areas, pressed by concerned publics under the influence of perceived environmental crises,” 
Cuba was more likely a “laggard state” likely to evade norm endorsement.31 According to 
Björkbom, “You have to use a much wider set of arguments to bring ‘recalcitrant’ nations to 
pay heed… non-cooperative national governments must be made to understand the need of 
assessing the costs of their ‘intransigence’ on a particular environmental issue from the full 
range of their national interests.”32 Lupis concurred, “in the South, State action is probably 
due to pressure from the outside coupled with highly warranted financial incentives.”33 
Given such incentives were dubious at best in relation to the CBD, Cuban norm 
endorsement presented as unlikely.  
 
27 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Handbook of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(London: Earthscan Publications, 2001), Section IX,399-400. 
28 12 June 1992, 8 March 1994 respectively: 6.1.d: Endorsement Conundrum. 
29 Sánchez, “CBD,” 12. 
30 Robert Keohane, et al, “Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions” in Peter Haas, et al (eds), 
Institutions for the Earth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 15. 
31 Keohane, et al, “Effectiveness,” Marc Levy, et al, “Improving the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Institutions” in Haas, et al, Institutions, 12-3,16-7,399.  
32 Lars Björkbom, “International Environmental Diplomacy in a Wider Context” in Sjöstedt, et al, IEN, 41 (sic). 
33 Ingrid Detter de Lupis, “Role of States in International Environmental Regulation,” ibid, 78. 
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6.1.c.ii: Financial/Compliance Costs 
Immediate costs outweighed potential material benefits in the CBD. Sjöstedt explains, 
“Due to the fact that the benefits of an agreement will usually accrue but in the distant 
future, the related costs will become pushed into the forefront when the stipulations of an 
environmental treaty are analysed, and particularly when it is assessed in domestic political 
processes.”34 Indeed, Cuba’s March 1994 National Report to the CBD listed ten principal 
commitments assumed under CBD auspices, each of which entailed substantial costs.35 The 
only potential material benefit comprised an interim funding mechanism administered 
through the much maligned and developing-states-rejected Global Environmental Fund 
(GEF), alongside indeterminate undertakings regarding sovereign ownership over and 
compensation for extraction of genetic material.36 Indeed, the precise financial institutional 
structure and technology transfer terms remained unresolved upon CBD adoption, pending 
Conference of State Parties negotiation.37 Cuba and developing country allies did not secure 
the new financial fund and international economic order they had demanded.38 In 1999, 
Cuba thus complained that the “international assistance received for conservation projects 
and protection of biological resources has been poor… Most projects have been carried out 
through national efforts… due to influence of the hostile US policy against Cuba, Cuba 
receives no financing from either the IDB, World Bank or IMF.”39 In ratifying the CBD, Cuba 
committed to a norm entailing unknown costs in the absence of immediate, direct or even 
foreseeable material benefits. 
 
 
34 Gunnar Sjöstedt, “Special and Typical Attributes of International Environmental Negotiations,” ibid, 29. 
35 República de Cuba, “Informe Nacional a la Cuarta COP del Convenio Sobre Diversidad Biológica,” National 
Report for the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2: national strategies/plans of action for conservation/ 
sustainable use, monitoring mechanisms, ecosystems restoration/protection, strengthening National System 
of Protected Areas, legislative, political, institutional enactment, biosecurity regulation compliance, 
information dissemination, national research, education, training, outreach. Also: Hunter, et al, IELP, 937. 
36 “UNCED 1992: Daily Issue no. 5- 6 March 1992, Daily Issue no. 26- 5 April 1992, Daily Issue no. 27- Summary 
of Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the UNCED Preparatory Committee,” Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2: 1-
13, 1992), Sam Johnston, “Financial Aid, Biodiversity and International Law” in Bowman, Redwell, IL, 286. 
37 CBD, Arts 15-6,19-21, McConnell, Biodiversity, 70-1,82-4,90,95-7,131. 
38 Bernstein, “Ideas,” 473-5. 
39 Repúblic of Cuba, “Status as of 1999- Cooperation,” Agenda 21 National Country Information. 
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6.1.c.iii: Potential Ideological Dissonance 
Expectations of Cuban norm rejection were furthered by contemporaneous developing 
state claims that the norm represented neo-colonial exploitation via ‘bio-imperialism.’40 In a 
book published the year the CBD was adopted, Shiva explained: 
Physical violence might no longer be the main instrument of control, but control of the 
Third World’s biodiversity for profits is still the primary logic of North-South relationships 
on bio-diversity… They threaten to create a new era of bio-imperialism, built on the 
biological impoverishment of Third World… dominant approaches to biodiversity 
conservation suffer from the limitations of a northern bias, and a blindness to the role of 
the North in the destruction of biodiversity in the South.41  
 
Similarly, that same year the Malaysian Prime Minister denounced that “Now that the 
developed countries have sacrificed their own forests in the race for higher standards of 
living, they want to preserve other countries’ rain forests - citing a global heritage - which 
would indirectly keep countries like Malaysia from achieving the same levels of 
development.”42 Crucially, for the purpose of this research, the Cuban government agreed. 
In a personal message to UNCED, where the CBD opened for signature, President Castro 
argued that: 
negotiations around a convention on biodiversity… have aroused a concern particular to 
underdeveloped countries. They all seem to indicate that developed countries, and 
especially the US, hope to reach an agreement that guarantees them free access and 
more control over that which is the national and sovereign resource of underdeveloped 
countries… any convention on biodiversity that favours the interests of industrialised 
countries preferentially… could not only represent a threat to the sovereignty of 
underdeveloped countries, but could also constitute a legal instrument serving to 
reinforce conditionality of economic aid to the Third World... How will the Third World be 
able to protect its natural resources and, in particular, its biological diversity, to serve its 
own development?"43 
 
Given such staunch concerns that the CBD might facilitate uncompensated Northern access 
to Southern biological resources, and thus consolidate the very structural inequalities that 
Cuba so vehemently opposed, the stage appeared set for Cuban rejection of the norm to 
conserve biodiversity. 
 
40 Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen Gonzalez, “North-South Divide in International Environmental Law” in Shawkat 
Alam, et al (eds), International Environmental Law and the Global South (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 5-10, Nayar, Ong, “Developing,” 236, Bowman, “Nature,” 18. 
41 Shiva, Biodiversity, 14-23,27-8: “corporations, governments and aid agencies of the North continue to create 
legal and political frameworks to make the Third World pay for what it originally gave.” 
42 Nayar, Ong, “Developing,” 236. Also: Atapattu, Gonzalez, “Divide,” 5-10. 
43 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” 6. 
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6.1.d: Endorsement Conundrum 
 
Given these factors, commentators expressed surprise at the attention and support 
devoted by Cuba to international environmental norms, including biodiversity conservation, 
at UNCED. Kjellén, for example, reported that “Paradoxically it was Fidel Castro who 
received the loudest applause and most public attention.”44 Indeed, only seven days after its 
opening-for-signature, Castro officially signed the CBD, authorising ratification a mere two 
years later on 6 June 1994.45 The reasons behind this apparent ‘paradox’ and Cuba’s swift 
environmental norm endorsement against expectations presents a puzzle worth 
investigating. 
 
6.2 INFLUENCE AS EXPECTED 
 
 Six norm diffusion attributes present initial answers to this conundrum, holding 
influence over diffusion and endorsement in the manner outlined in the analytical 
framework. Once again, systemic-level socialisation drivers hardly feature in this category. 
While the systemic attribute of world context and norm-related attributes of domestic 
resonance, norm substance and international concurrence play out as anticipated in 
associated literature, the most portent attributes pertain to those of national identity and 
the feedback loop at state-level. 
 
6.2.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
6.2.a.i: World Context 
As acknowledged by former-WG Chair, Veit Koester, all CBD negotiators were “partly 
inspired by events in other international environmental fora… The evolution of a major 
international legal instrument will never take place in total isolation. At least in the 
 
44 Kjellén, “UNCED,” 221 (emphasis mine). 
45 United Nations Treaty Collection Depository, Convention on Biological Diversity: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8&chapter=27, Gustavo 
Robreño, “Ovacionado Fidel en la Cumbre,” Granma (28:119, Sat 13 June 1992), 8. 
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environmental field, there will always exist or be linkages to parallel events.”46 
Consideration of indicators reveals the most relevant world context was UNCED, at which 
the CBD opened for signature. First, UNCED provided a definitive deadline for the conclusion 
of negotiations and norm endorsement as reiterated by decision-makers at multiple UNEP 
GCs,47 and prescribed in UNGA Resolution 44/228.48 The final INC operated under immense 
pressure to conclude the CBD given the rapidly approaching UNCED deadline the following 
fortnight.49 Koester contends the INC “would never have been able to finish in time without 
the Rio-deadline… It is also tempting to state that with that momentum lost, it is rather 
doubtful that a convention on biodiversity would have existed by now.”50  
 
Second, UNCED indirectly broadened the scope and content of the norm represented in 
the CBD given its prioritisation of socio-economic development, new financial mechanisms, 
and biotechnology/resource transfers alongside environmental protection.51 In this context, 
the norm was also subject to parallel UNCED Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) 
discussions regarding Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration.52 Third, UNEP and UNCED held 
relevance given their “venues forced two of the key developing countries, Kenya and Brazil, 
into the role of mediators, brokering a united front”53 in CBD support. As evident further 
below, UNCED also provided the arena and platform for particular Cuban endorsement as 
well.54 Finally, negotiators recorded the impact of political pressure generated by the “spirit 
of Rio” to encourage norm endorsement from certain states.55 Sánchez therefore later 
described UNCED PrepComs and CBD INCs as “parallel processes,” which heavily impacted 
each other.56  
 
 
46 Koester, “Biodiversity,” 177,181. See also: McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 14. 
47 UNEP/GC.16/21/Add.3,7, UNEP GC Decision 16/42: UNEP/GC.16/27,Annex I,24-25,101, UNEP/GC.16/26,10. 
48 A/RES/44/228, especially Part I,12(e),12(f),15(d),15(f), Boyle, “Convention,” 35. 
49 Svensson, “Biodiversity,” 177: “serious risk that the Convention would not be ready in time for signature.” 
50 Koester, “Biodiversity,” 179. Also: Boyle, “Convention,”35, Hunter, et al, IELP, 933, McGraw, “Biodiversity,”7. 
51 McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 14-5. 
52 Chatterjee, Finger, Brokers, 41. 
53 Koester, “Biodiversity,” 179. Similarly: McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 15. 
54 Refer: 6.2.b.i: National Identity, 6.3.a.i: International Organisations. 
55 Johnson, Summit, 102.  
56 Sánchez, “CBD,” 8. 
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An additional, and now very familiar, aspect of world context also held high influence, 
although not in the direct or cataclysmic manner frequently considered in environmental 
norm scholarship.57 The ostensibly permissive effect of the end of the Cold War once again 
broached prior East/West divides and “had a considerable impact on the UNCED process… 
the sterile and rigid positions taken by East Bloc countries in the past would have made the 
negotiations more difficult.”58 It also facilitated G77 influence, which had a remarkable and 
unanticipated impact on norm development and endorsement, especially from the Cuban 
perspective, as elaborated further below.59 Finally, as Kjellén observes “the psychological 
impact of the events was even more important for the negotiation. The fall of Soviet 
communism had proven that change is possible, that also the most rigid systems or 
ideologies cannot live forever… Rio was the first major UN Conference in a new era of world 
history.”60 World context thus impacted diffusion and endorsement of the norm to conserve 
biodiversity, in line with the analytical framework. 
 
6.2.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
6.2.b.i: National Identity 
A detailed assessment of indicators for this attribute reveals the norm to conserve 
biological diversity embodied in the CBD resonated strongly with Cuban national identity in 
at least three ways. First, the norm aligned with Cuban identity as a socialist state opposed 
to the purported scourges of capitalist consumer societies. In his 12 June 1992 speech to the 
UNCED Plenary,61 for example, President Castro blamed ‘consumer societies’ for rendering 
humankind one of the biological species in danger of extinction and denounced that: 
 
57 Lupis, “States,” 81: an “accident may propel immediate international activity to regulate environmental 
behaviour.”   
58 Kjellén, “UNCED,” 234-5. Also: Hurrell, Kingsbury, “Politics,” 21, Gunnar Sjöstedt, Uno Svedin, “International 
Environmental Negotiations” in Sjöstedt, IEN, 253. 
59 Refer: 6.3.a.ii: State Suasion, Juma, Sánchez, “Conclusion,” 311: “The ideological vacuum created by the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc created new opportunities for the developing countries to be more assertive.” 
Compare: M. Rafiqul Islam, “History of the North-South Divide in International Law” in Alam, et al, IEL, 39. 
60 Kjellén, “UNCED,” 236. 
61 “UNCED 1992: Daily Issue no. 11,” Ramón Martínez, “Dos discursos acapararon la atención el primer día,” 
Granma (28:119, Sat 13 June 1992), 7, Susana Lee, “Regresó Fidel,” Granma (28:121, Tue 16 June 1992), 1, 
Robreño, “Sin esfuerzo,” 5, Anon, “Transmite la Televisión hoy a las 9 documental sobre la presencia de Fidel 
en la Cumbre de Río,” Granma (28:128 Thur 25 June 1992), 1, Gustavo Robreño, “Desde la Cubre de la Tierra; 
Cinco minutos electrizantes,” Granma (28:120, Sun 14 June 1992), 4. 
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With only 20 percent of the world's population, these societies consume two-thirds of 
the metals and three-fourths of the energy produced in the world. They have poisoned 
the seas and rivers, polluted the air, weakened and punctured the ozone layer... The 
forests are disappearing. The deserts are expanding… Numerous species are becoming 
extinct.62 
 
Castro reiterated socialist and developing country demands for greater distribution of 
wealth and technology, although not associated lifestyle and consumption habits, from 
consumer societies to the Third World: “Let us use all the science necessary for pollution-
free sustainable development. Let us pay the ecological debt, and not the foreign debt.”63  
 
This theme was a focus of Castro’s 53 page, personally signed, written message to 
UNCED, simultaneously re-published word for word in Granma.64 While recognising the 
responsibility of humankind broadly, and conceding the role of Third World poverty and 
capitalist exploitation, Castro argued “It is not possible to blame the Third World countries 
for this. Yesterday, they were colonies; today, they are nations exploited and pillaged by an 
unjust international economic order.”65 Castro pointed the finger of blame squarely at 
capitalist societies, explicating in great depth the manner in which the “concept of the 
'green market', which reveals the presence of the disastrous neoliberal stamp on 
environment and development discussions, tends to favour economic agents interested in 
legitimising the right to cause environmental harm, and to commercialise that right.”66 
Castro targeted neoliberal IMF policy failures, the danger of reliance upon such agencies 
moving forward, and, ultimately, the need to reject neoliberal policies of deregulation, 
privatisation and profit.67 In specific relation to biodiversity conservation, Castro argued that 
“efforts to balance external commercial equilibrium at all costs expedites increasing 
volumes of exportation at the expense of overexploitation of renewable and non-renewable 
 
62 Fidel Castro, “Speech by Cuban President Fidel Castro at the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro on 12 June-recorded,” 
FL1206173592 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1615 GMT 12 Jun 92, translated by the Castro 
Speech Data Base, Latin American Network Information Center, 4,5, Castro, Life, 393,397. 
63 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” 6. 
64 Ibid, 1-8, Robreño, “Ovacionado Fidel,” 8. 
65 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” 2,4. 
66 Ibid, 7. 
67 Ibid, 7: such policies “minimise the role of the State in the ecological sphere and ignore the contradiction 
that exists between commercial interests in the short term, which tend to accelerate natural resource 
degredation, and the necessary conservation of said resources, for society interests in the long term.” 
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natural resources.”68 Supported by detailed statistics on specific environmental problems, 
Castro condemned developed and industrialised nations, where “life patterns that stimulate 
irrational consumption, and propitiate waste and destruction of non-renewable resources, 
multiply, on a scale without precedent, previously unimaginable effects and tension on local 
and global physical environments.”69 Complementing Cuban socialist identity, Castro 
concluded “No one can argue today in good faith that the first factor of global 
environmental deterioration is not the model of economic behaviour created and extended 
by the most developed societies... A lifestyle based on irrational desire for consumption and 
absurd squandering of resources is the principle enemy to the environment in our days."70 
 
Reflecting Cuba’s socialist identity, Castro recommended Northern countries uphold the 
greater share of “differing degrees of responsibility,”71 and proposed a two-tiered solution: 
(first) successfully substitute the wasteful and consumerist culture of the industrialised 
world and high income sectors in underdeveloped countries, for a mode of life that, 
without sacrificing what is essential for current material levels, seeks most rational use of 
resources and significant reduction of aggression against the environment… (second), 
facilitate a radical change in the socioeconomic conditions of the Third World and, 
accordingly, life conditions of huge impoverished populations, by transforming the 
current system of international economic relations and socio-economic structures that in 
most underdeveloped countries favour the existence of those many layers of the hungry, 
sick, dispossessed and ignorant.72 
 
Echoing G77 CBD demands,73 Castro specified finding a just and durable solution to the 
external debt problem, restructuring global economic relations, ensuring adequate financial, 
technological and resource transfers, removing commercial barriers for equal trade 
conditions, securing MNC commitments, removing privatised patents and protection 
regimes, committing to additional flows of capital under favourable conditions, and 
rejecting debt-for-nature swaps:74  
The developed and rich world is now responsible for settling its ecological debt with the 
underdeveloped and poor part of humankind by means of cooperation, financial and 
 
68 Ibid, 7. 
69 Ibid, 2: “the most harm to the global ecosystem has been occasioned by consequences of patterns of 
development pursued by most industrialised countries.” 
70 Ibid, 4. 
71 Ibid, 2,4,7. 
72 Ibid, 3. 
73 Refer: 6.3.a.ii: State Suasion. 
74 Ibid, 3-6,8. 
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technical help, and transfer of clean environmental technologies. Doing this would be 
nothing more than an act of historical justice and, finally, a demonstration of good 
judgement and contribution to wellbeing and subsequent development.75 
 
This alignment of anti-capitalist identity with environmental protection and biodiversity 
conservation was also emphasised by other Cuban decision-makers. Having previously 
undertaken to “ask the industrialised nations to account for their high degree of 
responsibility for the deteriorating planetary environment and looting of natural resources, 
which have imposed truly irrational patterns of consumption and lifestyles,”76 the President 
of the Cuban Academy of Sciences and UNCED representative, Dr. Simeón, observed the 
unsustainable habits of industrialised consumption during her 6 June 1992 announcement 
of Cuban intent to sign the CBD.77 The “confrontation between the overexploited and 
impoverished South and the arrogant and industrialised North,”78 was also a key Granma 
theme throughout UNCED, focusing on the deleterious impact of neoliberal economies and 
governance regimes and Northern (especially US) culpability for and responsibility to rectify 
global environmental degradation.79 As one editorial noted, “the lifestyle of rich nations is 
ecologically irrational and their development cannot presently be labelled as 
‘sustainable’.”80 Castro continued to employ biodiversity loss as condemnation of consumer 
societies and neo-liberal globalisation fifteen years later: “Saving the species will be a titanic 
undertaking, but it will never be possible through economic and social systems in which the 
only things that count are profit and advertising.”81 In this manner, the anti-capitalist 
socialist revolutionary identity of Cuba played a large role in not only Cuban endorsement, 
but Cuban spearheading of the norm to conserve biodiversity. 
 
75 Ibid, 4. 
76 Orfilio Peláez, “A las puertas de ECO’92: Defender el derecho a la vida; entrevista con Rosa Elena Simeón,” 
Granma (28:105, Tue 26 May 1992), 3. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Nidia Diaz, “Cumbre de la Tierra: La esencia de sus debates,” Granma (28:94, Sat 9 May 1992), 6. Similarly: 
Anon, “Comenzó con polémico tema última ronda negociadora de la Cumbre de Río,” Granma (28:96, Wed 13 
May 1992), 5, Gustavo Robreño, “Desde la Cumbre de la Tierra: A punto de caer las cortinas se perfilan los 
acuerdos,” Granma (28:120, Sun 14 June 1992), 1, Javier Rodríguez, “Comienza hoy ECO’92,” Granma (28:111, 
Wed 3 June 1992), 1. 
79 Ramon Madruga, “ECO’92: Neoliberalismo y deterioro ambiental,” Granma (28:111, Wed 3 June 1992). 
80 Anon, “De ecológicamente irracional califican modo of vida de países ricos,” Granma (28:112, Thu 4 June 
1992), 1. Also: Peláez, “A las puertas de ECO’92,” 3, Diaz, “Cumbre de la Tierra: La esencia,”6, Ramón Madruga, 
“ECO’92: Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo Bajo Enfoque Integral,” Granma (28:106, Wed 27 May 1992), 5. 
81 Castro, Life, 356,397-9: “all efforts to preserve the environment are incompatible with the economic system 
imposed on the world, that ruthless neoliberal globalisation… those models of consumption are incompatible 
with the world’s limited and non-renewable essential resources and the laws that govern nature.” 
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The context in which the norm evolved aligned with a second, also now familiar, aspect 
of Cuban national identity: personification of the staunch and resolute foe of ‘yankee 
hegemony’. This was implied by Simeón when Granma reported her announcement that the 
CBD “is just and balanced and it would be lamentable if powerful countries - in an implicit 
reference to the US - unjustly denounce its contents or pretend to use interpretative 
formulas to deteriorate its spirit.”82 It also featured in Castro’s UNCED speech, when he 
appeared to call for readjustment of the very world order:  
Now that the alleged threat of communism has disappeared and there are no longer any 
more excuses for cold wars, arms races, and military spending, what is blocking the 
immediate use of these resources to promote the development of the Third World and 
fight the threat of the ecological destruction of the planet? Let selfishness end. Let 
hegemonies end… Tomorrow it will be too late.83  
 
Yet it was Granma that most consistently and emphatically highlighted the Cuba/US 
dichotomy in relation to the norm to conserve biodiversity. As the US refused to sign the 
CBD, Cuba became the model international citizen battling US recalcitrance. On the opening 
day of UNCED, for example, Granma reported Castro arrived to a “crowd of adoring fans 
and journalists” with “ECO’92 participants noting this is a very favourable moment for his 
visit. They recognise Cuban positions at the forum here contrast severely with the rejection 
and subsequent conduct of the US.”84 Granma contended UNCED “will be a favourable 
scene to corroborate whether the unipolar world imposed by Washington also emerges as 
the worst predator for the future of humankind.”85 As backlash to US CBD rejection 
reportedly increased, so did celebrations in Cuban press.86 No less than 11 separate articles 
 
82 Anon, “ECO’92: Cuba demanda compromisos firmes que beneficien a países pobres,” Granma (28:114, Sat 6 
June 1992), 12. 
83 And support ‘disarmament for development’ in chapter 4: Castro, “UNCED Speech,” para 7. 
84 Anon, “Cumbre de Rio: Confirman participación 93 jefes de Estado y/o gobierno,” Granma (28:94, Sat 9 May 
1992), 12. Also: Javier Rodríguez, “Enjuician en Brasil posiciones yankis sobre ECO’92,” Granma (28:95, Tue 12 
May 1992), 5, Anon, “Adopta Bush Medidas Adversas a Esfuerzos Ecologistas,” Granma (28:100, Tue 19 May 
1992), 13, “ECO’92: Cuestión clave pendiente: las finanzas,” Granma (28:101, Wed 20 May 1992), 5. 
85 Diaz, “La esencia,” 6. Similarly: “Habla el Embajador de Brasil en Cuba,” Granma (28:102, Thu 21 May 1992), 
4, Javier Rodríguez, “Abogará Brasil por discutir en ECO’92 miseria del Tercero Mundo,” Granma (28:97, Thu 
14 May 1992), 5, Anon, “De ecológicamente irracional califican modo of vida de países ricos,” Granma (28:112, 
Thu 4 June 1992), 1, “ECO’92: Salvar el Planeta, Voluntad expresada en la jornada inaugural,” ibid, 5, “ECO’92: 
Destructivo para el planeta modo de vida de industrializados,” Granma (28:107, Thu 28 May 1992), 4, “Critican 
en Brasil a Bush por negarse a firmar acuerdo sobre biodiversidad,” Granma (28:111, Wed 3 June 1992), 8. 
86 “UNCED 1992: Daily Issue no. 11,” McConnell, Biodiversity, 111, Anon, “Inauguró Collor de Mello,” 7, 
Martínez, “Dos discursos,” 7, Robreño, “Ovacionado Fidel,” 8. 
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lauded the resulting ‘abandonment’ of the US at UNCED.87 Granma reported anti-Bush 
protests in Río under the banner ‘Bush Go Home’, alongside Greenpeace labelling the US 
President an ‘Environmental Degenerate’.88 Indeed, the primary UNCED outcome heralded 
in a post-event Granma analysis was “the political and diplomatic harm suffered by the US, 
the absolute isolation in which it remained on themes like biodiversity.”89 Once again, the 
‘anti-yankee imperialist’ aspect of Cuban national identity proved particularly portent to 
Cuban norm endorsement. 
 
Finally, the biodiversity conservation norm complemented Cuban national identity as 
self-proclaimed Third World protector and guarantor of developing countries’ interests. 
According to Article 12(ch) of the 1976 Cuban Constitution, Cuba “advocates the unity of all 
countries of the Third World against the imperialist and neocolonialist policy seeking 
limitation or subordination of the sovereignty of our peoples, and aggravation of economic 
conditions of exploitation and oppression in underdeveloped nations.”90 According to the 
MINREX Vice-Minister in 1987, “his country will maintain its active role favouring 
development of cooperation between Third World states.”91 Cuba therefore played a role 
presenting developing countries’ concerns as a united G77 front. At UNCED, for example, 
Simeón confirmed Cuba’s aspiration to unite underdeveloped countries in defence of 
communal principles and problems.92 Granma subsequently hailed G77 coordination as 
playing a “fundamental role at the Conference,”93 focusing on unified Third World demands 
to share Northern biotechnological benefits obtained from Southern biodiversity, establish a 
biodiversity fund, and formulate a code of conduct for genetically modified organisms.94 
 
87 Javier Rodriguez, “Estados Unidos podría quedar aislado en ECO’92,” Granma (28:113, Fri 5 June 1992), 1, 
“Culmina ECO’92 con Declaración de Río,” Granma (28:121, Tue 16 June 1992), 8, Ramón Martínez, “En su 
última fase Cumbre de la Tierra,” Granma (28:115, Tue 9 June 1992), 1, “Dos discursos,” 7, Anon, “Africa 
Quiere Ser Escuchada en la Cumbre de Rio,” Granma (28:115 Tue 9 June 1992), 5, “Reitera Bush su negativa,” 
1, “Posición europa completa aislamiento de Estado Unidos,” Granma (28:116, Wed 10 June 1992), 8, Gustavo 
Robreño, “Desde la Cumbre de la Tierra: Comenzaron a llegar los mandatorios a Brasil,” Granma (28:117, Thu 
11 June 1992), 1, “Fidel en Brasil,” Granma (28:118, Fri 12 June 1992), 1, “A punto de caer,” 1. 
88 Gustavo Robreño, “Fidel en Brasil: Tenemos un gigante amigo,” Granma (28:120, Sun 14 June 1992), 1, 
“Fidel en Brasil,” 1, Anon, “Posición europa,” 8, “Inauguró Collor de Mello,” 7. 
89 Robreño,“balance y perspectivas,” 5. Also: “Ovacionado Fidel,” 8, Javier Rodríguez, “Culmina ECO’92,” 8. 
90 Cuba's Constitution of 1976 with Amendments through 2002, Oxford University Press, 2018.  
91 Copa, “Mantendrá Cuba activo papel,” 6. 
92 Anon, “ECO’92: Salvar el Planeta,” 5, Robreño, “balance y perspectivas,” 5. 
93 Robreño, “A punto de caer,” 1. 
94 Robreño, “Ovacionado Fidel,” 8, Diaz, “Cumbre de la Tierra,” 6, Anon, “Africa Quiere Ser Escuchada,” 5. 
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Cuba thus also sought to incorporate developing country socio-economic priorities within 
the CBD. First, Cuba supported each of the concerns and demands expressed by the G77 
during CBD and UNCED negotiations. In May 1992, for example, Simeón concurred with the 
G77,95 and announced that the fundamental purpose of UNCED was to defend “the right of 
man to a life in set conditions of food, housing, education, health and work,” ensure 
adequate financial and technical transfers from the North, and secure state sovereignty 
over natural resources.96 In his UNCED message, Castro similarly emphasised the symbiotic 
relationship between underdevelopment and environmental degradation, noting the 
detrimental impact of increasingly unequal income, technological capacity, economic 
growth, population growth, and dangers of urbanisation between North and South.97 Castro 
argued that the “ecology-development coupling is not interpreted as an irreconcilable 
dichotomy, but as interconnected elements.”98 With specific regard to biodiversity, Castro 
acknowledged overexploitation and lack of compensation for natural resources resulting 
from underdevelopment and poverty in the South and demanded rectification in 
international agreements.99 Granma also maintained focus on the interdependence of the 
environment and sustainable development, and defended “the principle in which you 
cannot have an ecologically healthy world if it is socially and economically unjust.”100  
 
In these respects, the context in which the norm to protect biodiversity developed 
complemented Cuban revisionist identity as Third World protector and vocal opponent of 
and counterpoint to predominant consumerist industrialised modes of capitalist imperialist 
society. Ideology was critical. Cuban endorsement of the norm to conserve biodiversity 
reinforced the stark juxtaposition between the US and Cuba, consolidating Cuban socialist 
and revolutionary identity instead of rendering Cuba vulnerable to socialisation. 
 
95 Refer: 6.3.a.ii: State Suasion. 
96 Rather than biodiversity as heritage of mankind, which “is nothing more than an intent to impose a new 
mode of neocolonialism”: Peláez, “A las puertas de ECO’92,” 3, Rodríguez, “Culmina ECO’92,” 8, Robreño, 
“balance y perspectivas,” 5. 
97 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” 3-4. 
98 Ibid, 7. 
99 Ibid, 3-4. 
100 Diaz, “Cumbre de la Tierra,” 6. Also: Madruga, “ECO’92: Neoliberalismo,” 4, Anon, “ECO’92: Pobreza la peor 
de las contaminaciones,” Granma (28:108, Fri 29 May 1992), 5, Anon, “ECO’92: Los niños y la degradación 
ambiental presentes en la Cumbre de la Tierra,” Granma (28:115, Tue 9 June 1992), 5. 
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Reinforcement of revisionist national identity and not socialisation led to Cuban norm 
endorsement in this case. Indeed the last, but not least, key UNCED outcome articulated by 
Granma pertained to “the bankruptcy, once more, of the myth about the supposed 
‘isolation’ of the Cuban Revolution, evidenced by the warm reception of Fidel (and) the 
ovation at his pronouncements… that provided confirmation, additionally, of the authority 
and prestige of our country in the bosom of the international community.”101 Cuba’s 
international reputation mattered. However, contrary to socialisation arguments, it was 
precisely its revisionist reputation - unifying and spearheading resistance to US and 
capitalist modes of society as Third World protector - that promoted Cuban endorsement of 
this international environmental norm. 
 
6.2.b.ii: Feedback Loop 
Unlike the previous two chapters, the feedback loop played a crucial role in this case. For 
Cuba held a very different and much more expansive understanding of the norm than that 
of simple conservation. For Cuba, biodiversity conservation incorporated the prevention of 
commercial appropriation and exploitation of Southern biodiversity from Northern 
biotechnology.102 According to a Granma article devoted exclusively to the norm, 
biodiversity conservation mattered because the Northern practice of sequestering, 
patenting and dominating markets based on raw genetic material from the South: 
must not signal the massive extinction of traditional seeds, and much less be dominated 
in an exclusive and closed manner by multinational corporations… because the most 
powerful consortiums already manage the highest performance seed banks and deny, for 
financial and political reasons, access to those seeds to countries that supplied the 
genetic material… Genetically modified seeds are necessary but must be made with the 
just participation of the Third World in the results and not unilaterally and arbitrarily as 
being done by multinational corporations to solely obtain rapid profit and growth.103 
 
Conception of biodiversity conservation as the pursuit of biotechnological equity was 
reinforced in several other Granma references that reported the CBD as “trying to create 
mechanisms for the preservation and rational exploitation of millions of species of plants, 
 
101 Robreño, “balance y perspectivas,” 5. 




animals and insects.”104 Cuba understood the biodiversity conservation norm not simply as 
one of species protection but one of ensuring access to benefits obtained from their 
exploitation.  
 
Rather than becoming socialised into norm endorsement, Cuba, alongside G77 allies, was 
able to substantially re-mould and socialise the norm instead. As early as 1989, the UNEP GC 
instructed the CBD WG to consider, despite US objections,105 biotechnological and “financial 
transfers from those who benefit from the exploitation of biodiversity, including through 
the use of genetic resources in biotechnology development, to the owners and managers of 
biological resources.”106 UNGA Resolution 44/228 of 22 December 1989, which officially 
authorised UNCED preparations, concurred noting that both biodiversity conservation and 
environmentally sound biotechnology management “are among those (issues) of major 
concern in maintaining the quality of the Earth’s environment and especially in achieving 
environmentally sound and sustainable development in all countries.”107 As demonstrated 
in detail in State Suasion below, analysis of indicators reveal the feedback loop resulted in 
explicit CBD guarantee of national sovereignty over natural resources rather than 
biodiversity as a heritage of humankind, fair and equitable financial, technological and 
resource transfers, and provisions concerning biotechnology - matters well beyond the 
biodiversity conservation provisions originally envisioned. The former INC Chair explains:  
The process that led to the adoption of the Convention was initiated with the conviction - 
particularly among developed countries - that it would be an all-encompassing 
convention on the conservation of species: a convention on parks and reserves. From the 
very beginning of the negotiations this approach proved to be incomplete and began 
changing to include aspects of the complex environment/development interaction. 
Consequently, as negotiations progressed, the character of the proposed convention was 
modified, and the process became much more complicated than had originally been 
envisaged.108  
 
Although compromises were made and some goals unattained, the substantial reworking 
and expansion of the norm’s very parameters within the CBD evidenced a feedback loop 
 
104 Anon, “Comenzó con polémico tema última ronda negociadora de la Cumbre de Río,” Granma (28:96, Wed 
13 May 1992), 5 (emphasis mine). Similarly: Robreño, “Ovacionado Fidel,” 8: CBD “establishes right of 
countries to rational exploitation and preservation of flora and fauna.” 
105 McConnell, Biodiversity, 11. 
106 UNEP/GC.15/12, Annex 1,165-6. Also: UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/3/5, 1. 
107 A/RES/44/228: Part I, paras 12 (e),12(f),13. See also: Bernstein, “Ideas,” 472. 
108 Sánchez, “CBD,” 9. Similarly: Chatterjee, Finger, Brokers, 41. 
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that reflected the successful incorporation of priority Cuban goals. Norm endorsement was 
facilitated, not by the socialisation of the state but the socialisation of the norm in 
accordance with state demands. Feedback loop impact was high. 
 
6.2.c: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
6.2.c.i: Domestic Resonance 
According to Lang, “The main factor determining the action of government in 
international environmental co-operation is, obviously, the national environmental policy of 
a government.”109 Associated indicators reveal that biodiversity conservation already 
resonated strongly within Cuban norm hierarchies. Prior state-led environmental initiatives, 
institutions, national legislation, regional and international agreements, and even the Cuban 
Constitution affirmed:  
The State protects the country’s environment and natural resources. It recognises the 
close links between sustainable economic and social development to make human life 
more rational and ensure the survival, well-being and security of present and future 
generations… It is the duty of citizens to contribute to water and atmosphere protection, 
and conservation of soil, flora, fauna and all the rich potential of nature.110  
 
A National Commission for Protection of the Environment and Rational Use of Natural 
Resources was created in 1977, and by 1980 similar commissions were reportedly 
established in every municipality throughout the country.111 Law number 33 of 10 January 
1981 further authorised “basic principles for conservation, protection, improvement and 
transformation of the environment and rational use of natural resources.”112 A National 
System of Protection was approved in 1990,113 and by 1992 Cuba had endorsed a variety of 
associated norms at both international and regional levels.114 Between 1980 and 1994, 
 
109 Winfried Lang, “International Environmental Co-operation” in Sjöstedt, et al, IEN, 17. 
110 1976 Cuban Constitution, Article 27.  
111 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” 7. 
112 República de Cuba, “Le Ley 33 de 10 de enero de 1981: De Protección del Medio Ambiente y el Uso Racional 
de los Recursos Naturales”, Roberto Quiñones, “Celebran foro Cuba ante la Cumbre de Río,” Granma (28:106, 
Wed 27 May 1992), 2: Cuba’s National Report to UNCED: “natural resources are the common heritage of 
society… to which comprehensive attention has an obligatory character and laws and statutory orders exist.” 
113 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” 7.  
114 Convention for Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972, CBW 1972, United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea 1982, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora 1973, Convention for protection and development of the marine environment of Greater Caribbean 
region 1983, Spaw Protocol 1990: Cuba, “Status as of 1999– Cooperation.” 
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biodiversity conservation was reported from grassroot to government levels of Cuban 
society, with university graduates, media programmes, educational systems, and other 
environmental initiatives reportedly focused on biodiversity.115  
 
Simeón thus lauded “the environmental situation in Cuba as privileged, where serious 
problems of air contamination and water sources do not exist.”116 Simeón credited Cuba as 
having worked for decades on many Agenda 21 items, including protected areas for 
flora/fauna preservation and not only ceasing deforestation but increasing forestry.117 
Indeed, another prevailing theme of Castro’s UNCED message pertained to Cuba’s own 
environment and development achievements.118 With usual consummate detail, Castro 
depicted Cuban advances in biodiversity protection, reforestation, medicine, health, 
education, labour, technical and professional qualifications, protected areas, energy 
production, agricultural innovations, self-sufficiencies, industry, transport and economic 
equality. As a conscientious and valuable global citizen, Castro offered to share such 
environmental expertise with the international community: 
The scientific research and qualified human resource potential at Cuba’s disposal permits 
translation into concrete actions, through collaboration… in programmes of 
environmental and social assistance to Third World countries. A first proposal, therefore, 
is the offer of technical personnel… to afford all possible cooperation in the sphere of 
scientific research, where Cuba has achieved considerable advances.119 
 
Cuban reports contended the only limitation to otherwise unquestionable biodiversity 
conservation commitment was “of a financial nature and mainly due to the country’s 
economic situation, aggravated by the blockade imposed by the United States.”120  
 
 
115 Cuba, “Status as of 1999– Decision-Making,” Castro, Life, 397, Katiuska Blanco, “Pioneros en la Protección 
del Medio Ambiente,” Granma (28:101, Wed 20 May 1992), 1. 
116 Peláez, “A las puertas de ECO’92,” 3. 
117 Ibid, 3, Quiñones, “Celebran foro Cuba,” 2, Anon, “Cuba demanda compromisos,” 12, Jesús Mena, “Estudian 
ecosistema de la bahía de Cienfuegos,” Granma (28:109, Sat 30 May 1992), 2. 
118 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” 7: “Concern with protection and conservation of natural resources, considered 
the heritage of all peoples, began in Cuba from the 1959 revolutionary triumph… environment and natural 
resources are the common heritage of society, and constitute, thus, a fundamental interest of the nation.” 
119 Ibid, 7-8. 
120 Cuba, “Status as of 1999– Challenges.” 
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Great importance was also attached domestically to the now-associated matter of 
biotechnology.121 Biotechnology programmes were developed during the 1980s, alongside 
the 1982 Biological Research Centre, inaugurated “with the most advanced technology” by 
Castro in 1986.122 Granma reported that “given the uncontrollable advance of genetic 
engineering and biotechnology in highly industrialised nations, (Castro) took (these) series 
of measures to drive biotechnology as one element contributing to the country’s 
development.”123 By 1992 scientific faculties, research facilities and pre-university 
biotechnology courses were reportedly extended across the country,124 with Granma 
heralding outcomes on par with Western genetic engineering methods and concomitant 
regional influence.125 Cuba had undertaken joint technological transfer ventures,126 and 
hosted Biotech Havana ’92, “a demonstration of the mature level and adequate extension 
of Cuban achievements in this discipline.”127 Given this, both traditional and broader 
understandings of the norm to conserve biodiversity complemented pre-existing Cuban 
norm hierarchies and this attribute held significant impact. 
 
6.2.c.ii: Norm Substance 
Despite scholarly contentions doubting the immanent power of environmental norms,128 
indicators reveal the content of the norm to conserve biodiversity held high influence over 
general and Cuban norm endorsement. The multifaceted necessity of the norm rendered it 
extremely compelling, as Guay notes, “There are strong reasons why we should be 
concerned about biodiversity loss. These reasons are economic, ecological, cultural, and 
cognitive.”129 The norm possessed inherent, intrinsic and instrumental value as evident 
within the CBD text. While the Preamble explicitly recognises its intrinsic and aesthetic 
 
121 Castro, Life, 356: “We worked a great deal within traditional genetics, and then later began to see the 
possibilities of genetic engineering, which we also began to use.” 
122 Silvia Martínez, “Investigadores de Sanidad Vegetal,” Granma (28:116, Wed 10 June 1992), 2, Orfilio Pelaez, 
“El presente del país comienza a ser un presente de hombres de ciencia,” Granma (25:23, 27 Jan 1989), 3. 
123 Ibid, 3. 
124 José Martin, “Ciencia en la Ciudad Héroe,” Granma (28:108, Fri 29 May 1992), 3, Aldo Madruga, 
“Preuniversitarios en biofábricas,” Granma (28:109, Sat 30 May 1992), 2. 
125 José de la Osa, “Alta eficacia de vacuna cubana antihepatitis B,” Granma (28:118, Fri 12 June 1992), 8. 
126 Miller, World, 120. 
127 José de la Osa, “Biotecnología ’92, pasado mañana,” Granma (28:114, Sat 6 June 1992), 1. Also: “Anuncian 
Biotecnología Habana ’92 en Junio,” Granma (28:101, Wed 20 May 1992), 1. 
128 Björkbom, “Diplomacy,” 41: “The environmental argument, however forceful and convincing it might be, 
has rarely been sufficiently strong on its own merits to change national environmental policies.” 
129 Guay, “Science,” 223. 
 220 
value, the majority of the text references instrumental values and utilitarian priorities.130 
The internal value of biodiversity preservation was so strong it overcame other deficiencies, 
as Guay explains: “Despite uncertainty regarding many aspects of the science of 
biodiversity, governments felt obliged to act.”131 The Brundtland Commission put it simply, 
“As regards the convention on biodiversity, differences over access to genetic resources and 
relevant biotechnologies should be reconciled. The issue at stake is survival.”132  
 
The power of the norm directly impacted decision-makers, with UNEP GC Decision 14/26 
that established the WG recognising the explicit “need for adequate protection and 
preservation of biological diversity, because of both the intrinsic and the economic value of 
the species concerned.”133 Similarly, UNEP GC Decision 15/34 confirmed that “for 
environmental, ethical, social, economic and technical reasons, the conservation and 
utilisation of biological diversity is more than ever essential for… continued functioning of 
the biosphere and human survival.”134 When the UNEP Executive Director took a stand 
against outstanding negotiator recalcitrance at the final INC, it was based upon the very 
argument that the “world’s biological diversity was a million times more important than 
saving face or maintaining an untenable negotiating line.”135 Values inherent to the norm 
resonated with decision-makers and contributed in a high degree to international 
endorsement. 
 
This included in relation to Cuba, as reflected in Castro’s personal message to UNCED. 
First, Castro focused on very detailed, highly statistical, accounts of causes, status, 
consequences and possible solutions to a range of environmental issues, including 
biodiversity conservation.136 Second, Castro promoted the urgency to act: “accelerating and 
growing environmental deterioration is, today, possibly the gravest long-term danger that 
 
130 CBD, 1-4, Bowman, “Nature,” 15-20,28, Hunter, et al, IELP, 917-8, Boyle, “Convention,” 34: biodiversity 
“should be conserved, it has been argued, on moral grounds, ‘because all species deserve respect regardless of 
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131 Guay, “Science,” 226. Similarly: Hurrell, Kingsbury, “Politics,” 14. 
132 Johnson, Summit, 39. 
133 UNEP/GC.14/26,17.  
134 UNEP/GC.15/12,Annex 1,165-6. 
135 McConnell, Biodiversity, 90-2. 
136 Castro, “Mensaje de Fidel,” especially 2,8. 
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faces all human species, and particularly what is called the Third World… it is the worst 
threat before all of humankind.”137 Third, Castro devoted an entire section of his message 
specifically to biodiversity. Castro outlined rates and causes of extinction, “linked, as 
perhaps none other of the many related to the ecological crisis, to the phenomenon of 
underdevelopment,” consequences of biological extinction, and potential solutions, 
including access to scientific and technical advances and establishment of a South forum for 
conservation and development.138 Castro expressed strong support for the CBD, recognising 
the immanent power of the norm itself: 
There is no doubt that the convention on biodiversity… constitutes a valiant effort on the 
path of protection as much for the current and future riches enclosed within biodiversity 
as for the secure and rational use of results from biotechnology research.139 
 
Considering the relevant indicators, norm substance exerted strong influence over both 
general and Cuban norm endorsement. 
 
6.2.c.iii: International Concurrence 
Noting the indicators for normative complementarity, the content of the norm to 
conserve biodiversity grew within an increasingly conducive international environment. The 
1968 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Intergovernmental 
Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for Rational Use and Conservation of Resources 
of the Biosphere, 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment Stockholm Declaration, and 
Action Plan for Human Environment each reiterated the significance of environmental 
conservation.140 Specific reference to “genetic diversity” and protection of “essential 
ecological processes and life-support systems” first appeared in the 1980 International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Conservation Strategy,141 with focus 
intensifying in the second report, Caring for the Earth,142 and aforementioned UNGA 
Resolution 37/7, which first internationally recognised the specific norm of biological 
 
137 Ibid, 2. 
138 Ibid, 7-8. 
139 Ibid, 2,8. 
140 Miller, World, 113, Sánchez, “CBD,” 8, Bowman, “Nature,” 7-8. 
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diversity conservation.143 The term ‘biodiversity’ first appeared in 1985 in preparation for a 
US scientific forum, which Guay contends “was highly instrumental in transforming 
biodiversity loss into an environmental and public issue. The message took shape and 
reached major national institutions.”144 The simultaneous circulation of a draft IUCN 
convention to governments, NGOs and UNEP generated further interest and became a 
guide for subsequent action.145 With the Brundtland report providing the final catalyst for 
CBD negotiations,146 UNCED presenting the official deadline for conclusion, and both 
emphasising the paramountcy of environmental norms such as biodiversity conservation, 
the stage was set for international norm endorsement. The norm nested well within 
prevailing international norm hierarchies that prioritised transnational environmental 
concerns. International concurrence proved significant.147 
 
6.3 INFLUENCE YET NOT AS EXPECTED 
 
This section considers the attributes that held strong influence over norm endorsement 
from the Cuban perspective, yet in a manner different to that anticipated in extant 
literature. It commences with systemic attributes including IOs, which once again held a 
symbiotic relationship with the norm but also provided a platform for ulterior state agendas 
that promoted norm reformulation, state suasion, which once again incorporated collective 
and indirect inverse impact, and MNCs, which on this occasion held stronger influence than 
generally anticipated in norm literature. Once again, however, none of these purported 
socialisation drivers operated as such. This section then demonstrates the high yet complex 




143 A/RES/37/7, Hunter et al, IELP, 911,932. 
144 Guay, “Science,” 226. 
145 IUCN General Assembly Resolution 16/24: McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 10, Hunter, et al, IELP, 932. 
146 WCED, Our Common Future, especially paras 7,9,11,53,57, McConnell, Biodiversity, 3-4, Bowman, Redgwell, 
“Introduction,” 2, Bowman, “Nature,” 9, Sánchez, “CBD,” 8, Koester, “Biodiversity,” 177. 
147 Bernstein, “Ideas,” 497-500. 
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6.3.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
6.3.a.i: International Organisations 
While several IOs held impact over the international emergence of the norm,148 the 
primary organ responsible for institutionalisation of biodiversity conservation was UNEP, 
commencing with UNEP GC Decision 14/26 to establish a WG on the topic. The first UNEP 
EBD WG in November 1988 recommended a stand-alone, legally binding, international 
mechanism that was not simply an umbrella convention or rationalisation of pre-existing 
treaties and programmes.149 This was endorsed at the following UNEP GC 15th Session, May 
1989, at which “Many representatives and observers expressed their concern about 
biological impoverishment.”150 The three 1990 EBD WGs focused on the need for and cost of 
technological transfers, funding mechanisms and genetic resources/technology access. A 
consensus was reached that “Those who enjoy most the economic benefits of biological 
diversity should contribute equitably to its conservation and sustainable management; a 
new partnership should be developed and in this context funding for developing countries 
should be characterized as co-operation among countries.”151 The UK UNEP delegate, 
McConnell, records that although “experts felt that biotechnology was probably too difficult 
a subject for the convention, it was remitted to a sub-group.”152 The final EBD WG resolved 
to convene a LTEBD WG to, rather obtusely, “consider the content of detailed draft 
elements in preparation for the actual negotiation of draft articles.”153 
 
The LTEBD WG held two sessions, 1990-1991. Its Chair, Koester, subsequently described 
this as “almost a ‘waste-of-time-phase.’”154 According to McConnell, “the meeting was 
frustrating and unproductive, and frequently very tedious… There was little sense of 
achievement among the departing delegations, except perhaps among the few who had 
 
148 Refer: 6.2.c.iii: International Concurrence. 
149 UNEP/Bio.Div.1/3,4-6, Koester, “Biodiversity,” 176,186. 
150 UNEP GC Decision 15/34, UNEP/GC.15/CW/L.6, UNEP/GC.15/12,43-7,68,73,Annex 1,166, 
UNEP/GC.15/8/Add.3,6-7, UNEP/GC.15/9/Add.2,3,8. Also: Svensson, “Biodiversity,” 164. 
151 UNEP/Bio.Div.2/4,3. 
152 McConnell, Biodiversity, 14. 
153 UNEP/Bio.Div.3/Inf.7. Additionally: Koester, “Biodiversity,” 178. 
154 Koester, “Biodiversity,” 178, UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/1/4, UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/1/4/Add.1, 
UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/2/5. 
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taken part in the hope that there would be no progress.”155 Nevertheless, draft provisions 
on industrialised states’ financial obligations and national conservation requirements were 
considered and authorisation was granted to finally establish an INC to officially commence 
treaty negotiations.156 Disputes remained in the five INCs, 1991-1992, over basic definitions, 
objectives, biotechnology and financial mechanisms.157 All but the latter two issues were 
overcome by the final session, at which it “looked as if a reasonably presentable 
conservation text had been agreed, even if it was weaker than the UK would have liked 
because of further qualifications introduced by both the US and G77.”158 The final INC 
operated under a tight deadline: it was technically scheduled to conclude the day prior to 
the Conference for Adoption of the Convention, which in turn was planned within two 
weeks of UNCED and intended CBD opening-for-signature.159 Although running two days 
over schedule, following increased tensions over perceived bullying of developing countries 
at the recently concluded Climate Change INC and ongoing disputes over biotechnology and 
financial arrangements,160 agreement was reached on key provisions, including in situ/ex 
situ conservation, environmental impact assessments, incentives, jurisdictional scope, 
national strategies, biodiversity as a common concern rather than heritage of humankind, 
and Conferences of Parties.161 In the early hours of 22 May 1992 the Convention text was 
finalised and presented for adoption at the Final Act Conference later that day. 
 
In this respect, and in accordance with the analytical framework, UNEP and its WGs/INCs 
were crucial for the international diffusion and crystallisation of the norm. However, UNEP 
did not necessarily impact Cuban norm endorsement. Cuba was unrepresented at the UNEP 
 
155 McConnell, Biodiversity, 24,26,33. 
156 UNEP GC Decision 16/42 adopted by consensus: UNEP/GC.16/27,20, Annex I,101, UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/2/2, 
UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/2/5, McConnell, Biodiversity, 42-4. 
157 McConnell, Biodiversity, 46-7,50,65-7,71-3, Boyle, “Convention,” 35, Svensson, “Biodiversity,” 175. 
158 McConnell, Biodiversity, 71. 
159 Svensson, “Biodiversity,” 177, McConnell, Biodiversity, 83. 
160 McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 13, Koester, “Biodiversity,” 179, McConnell, Biodiversity, 83-7, Svennson, 
“Biodiversity,” 182-3,187-9: “the fury that many of the developing countries, in particular Malaysia and India, 
felt over having been pushed into an unwanted solution in the final hours of the climate negotiation made the 
deliberations in Working Group II on this issue even harder. A rational and constructive dialogue on this issue 
proved impossible until the very last hours of the final session of INC.” 
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GC 14th-15th Sessions,162 the first and second EBD WGs,163 and all LTEBD WGs.164 One Cuban 
representative attended the third and final EBD WG, although UN records do not identify 
particular state contributions.165 Cuban delegates attended at least the second and fourth 
INCs, however attendee records for the first and third are missing. Cuba was an intermittent 
member of both INC WGs, although official documentation provides no detail on specific 
Cuban contribution.166 Whilst it is therefore difficult to envisage how the norm to conserve 
biodiversity could have attained broad international endorsement without it, there is 
simultaneously no evidence of specific UNEP influence over or socialisation of Cuba. 
Furthermore, akin to the CD in chapter four, there was both give and take in the 
relationship between the norm and UNEP. For, as McGraw explains, “Having ‘lost’ the 
climate change negotiations to the UN General Assembly, UNEP was anxious to justify its 
institutional existence, highlighted by UNCED as uncertain. A convention on biodiversity, an 
increasingly important focal point in both scientific and policy communities, presented such 
an opportunity.”167 The norm thus became indispensable for UNEP, as UNEP was 
indispensable for the norm.  
 
The IO that held greatest impact on specific Cuban norm endorsement was in fact 
UNCED, despite UNCED PrepComs holding minimal effect on the norm beforehand.168 This 
was not solely because the CBD successfully opened for signature at UNCED on 5 June 
1992,169 that outstanding concerns for Agenda 21 biodiversity and biotechnology chapters 
were resolved and approved at UNCED,170 or that “By the end of the Summit the convention 
had been signed by an unprecedented 156 countries,”171 rendering “the biodiversity 
convention… generally considered the biggest success of the entire UNCED process.”172 It 
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was because of the import and effect UNCED had for Cuba. As already evidenced by Castro’s 
personal UNCED attendance, passionate Plenary speech and devoted written message, 
Cuba held UNCED in particularly high regard and invested serious resources into UNCED 
representations.173 UNCED provided the ideal platform from which Cuba publicly asserted 
its priorities, goals and values, preached its credentials as a good international citizen, and 
proffered socialism as the ideological answer to global problems.174 In accordance with 
norm scholarship, one of the key diffusion attributes at systemic-level was indeed that of 
IOs.175 However, rather than driving socialisation of a purported revisionist state as often 
anticipated,176 IOs instead promoted an agenda and provided a forum for debate of 
perceived revisionist viewpoints. Naturally, the capacity for IOs to serve as platforms for the 
pursuit of state interests is largely unquestioned in IR scholarship. What is oft-neglected in 
norm literature that considers IOs as norm ‘transmission belts’,177 however, is the potential 
for that capacity to promote revisionist viewpoints that substantially reformulate the 
international norm itself.178 As in previous chapters, IOs impacted norm diffusion and Cuban 
endorsement, however not quite in the manner commonly envisaged. IOs needed the norm 
as much as vice versa, and IOs also provided the platform for the propagation of alternative 
norm agendas, priorities and ambitions. 
 
6.3.a.ii: State Suasion 
If confined to predominant conceptions of state suasion, indicators demonstrate this 
attribute would hold low import in the case of Cuban endorsement of the norm to conserve 
biodiversity. For other than draft Convention proposals from Sweden, including a 
contingency plan that overcame last minute stalemates at the final INC, and co-optation of 
both Kenya and Brazil as norm mediators given their roles as UNEP/UNCED hosts, positive 
state suasion remained low.179 In fact, once again, the individual state that appeared to 
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174 6.2.b.i: National Identity. 
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most heavily impact Cuban norm endorsement was the US, perversely through its CBD 
recalcitrance in another case of indirect inverse state suasion.180 This was evident within the 
numerous Granma reports glorifying the isolation of the US as Cuba became the vanguard 
of CBD advocacy.181 Singular, positive state influence - whether hegemonic or middle power, 
material or ideational, direct or indirect - was not required for either general or Cuban 
endorsement of the norm to conserve biodiversity. 
 
Nevertheless, state suasion held immense impact on the norm to conserve biodiversity 
and associated Cuban endorsement, if it is once again extrapolated to include collective 
effort. This was due to the geographically disparate yet ideationally united composition of 
states that held the core biological material at issue, was most affected by conservation 
costs, and identified and acted upon its leverage. The G77 was able to present a relatively 
united position and employ state suasion to, rather than socialise Cuba, socialise the norm 
to facilitate Cuban endorsement.182 According to Miller, “Third World countries were quick 
to identify the interests they had at stake in the evolving biodiversity regime. They pursued 
these interests aggressively in the processes of problem definition and bargaining.”183 Such 
influence commenced with the March 1989 Declaration of Brasilia, from the Sixth 
Ministerial Meeting on the Environment in Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
recognised the urgent need for balance between development and conservation, rational 
use of resources, state sovereignty over natural resources, reversal of global resource 
transfers, free access to environmental research and technology, and the need for a ‘New 
International Economic Order’ with increased financial contributions and additional financial 
institutions to fund developing country environmental projects. Aligning almost directly with 
Castro’s subsequent UNCED message, the Declaration specified:  
 
180 “UNCED 1992: Daily Issue no. 11,” McConnell, Biodiversity, 111, Anon, “Inauguró Collor de Mello,” 7, 
Martínez, “Dos discursos,” 7, Robreño, “Ovacionado Fidel,” 8. 
181 Rodriguez, “Estados Unidos podría quedar aislado,” 1, Anon, “Critican en Brasil a Bush,” 8, “Reitera Bush su 
negativa,” 1, “ECO’92: Cuba demanda compromisos,” 12, “Posición europa,” Martínez, “En su última fase 
Cumbre de la Tierra,” 1, 6.2.b.i: National Identity. 
182 Sam Johnston, “North South Tensions Within the Convention on Biological Diversity” in Basse, 
Environmental, 260-2: “most of the world’s biodiversity is found in developing countries… A feature which 
provided developing countries with unprecedented leverage in the negotiations for the CBD”- “the fact that 
most of the world’s biodiversity is located in the developing world gives developing countries an usually strong 
bargaining position.. developing countries used this unprecedented leverage to demand genuine concessions.” 
Also: Koester, “Biodiversity,” 185, McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 28, McConnell, Biodiversity, 16,31,62. 
183 Miller, World, 122. 
 228 
The serious environmental problems the world is facing today derive mainly from 
industrialisation models and patterns of consumption and waste adopted in the 
industrialised countries, which gave rise to the accelerated deterioration of the planet’s 
natural resources… [we] urge industrialised countries to assume their full responsibility 
commensurate with their financial and technological resources for reversing the 
environmental degradation process.184  
 
McConnell records the Declaration’s impact on CBD negotiations, given developing 
countries thereby “made it clear that if biotechnology was excluded they would oppose any 
new convention.”185 The Declaration was explicitly endorsed by UNEP GC Decision 15/16 as 
a “frame of reference for international co-operation with developing countries.”186  
 
Developing countries’ unity was bolstered by subsequent proclamations, such as the 
Langkawi Declaration on the Environment, from the 1989 Meeting of Commonwealth Heads 
of Government, which sought balance between environmental protection, economic growth 
and sustainable development, and approved biodiversity conservation on condition of the 
elimination of aid/development conditionalities and trade barriers.187 Of particular note 
were the Ministerial Conferences of Developing Countries on Environment and 
Development (MCDCED), with the 1991 Beijing Declaration enunciating demands regarding 
sovereign equality and non-interference, state rights over resources, and a new and 
equitable international order. In specific reference to CBD negotiations, the Declaration 
encouraged access to and transfer of biotechnology, and promoted interconnectedness of 
conservation and development.188 The final UNEP EBD WG explicitly reflected this, recording 
developing country calls for additionality of funds, concessionality of assistance, new 
financial mechanisms and assumption of all incremental costs by developed countries.189 It 
also recorded an “Obligation for developed countries to transfer technology to the gene-rich 
but technology-poor developing states on a non-commercial and preferential basis,”190 
which became an immensely controversial yet fundamental aspect of CBD negotiations, 
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ultimate element of the convention, widely acknowledged reason for US refusal to ratify, 
and, in accordance with specific Cuban demands, crucial factor behind Cuban 
endorsement.191 Such a unified approach gave the G77 negotiating power. McConnell, for 
example, records LTEBD WG tensions and stalemates, with “Regular G77 statements 
warn(ing) that there would be no negotiations before WEOG (Western European and Others 
Group) countries committed themselves to fund all conservation action in developing 
countries.”192  
 
Then came the 1991 South Centre brochure, Environment and Development: Towards a 
Common Strategy of the South in the UNCED Negotiations and Beyond.193 At its outset, the 
brochure recognised the crucial opportunity presented by UNCED for developing countries 
and the power that they held.194 UNCED: 
provides the South with an opportunity to exercise considerable leverage and bargaining 
power… The South’s stake in the environment-related negotiations cannot be over-
emphasised. The outcomes of these negotiations can profoundly affect, for years to 
come, the development prospects of the South. Developing countries thus need to 
coordinate their strategies and policies and to combine their negotiating resources, if 
their interests are to be protected and if the voice of the South is to be heard.195 
 
Echoing Cuban priorities, the report detailed four overarching South goals for UNCED: 1) 
global economic reform, 2) changing Northern habits of production and consumption, 3) 
poverty alleviation and environmental protection, and 4) new democratic institutions. It also 
specified two goals for the biodiversity negotiations: 1) a special system of international 
property rights and biological resource compensation, and 2) Southern access to 
 
191 6.2.b.ii: Feedback Loop, Miller, World, 123, Nayar, Ong, “Developing,” 238, McConnell, Biodiversity, 45-
7,52-5, Guay, “Science,” 228, Boyle, “Convention,” 46. 
192 McConnell, Biodiversity, 25,16,30. 
193 Established by NAM in 1987 as the South Commission, with a Cuban Advisory Committee Member: South 
Centre, Environment and Development: Towards a Common Strategy for the South in the UNCED Negotiations 
and Beyond (Geneva: Atar Printers, 1991), Preface. See also: Chatterjee, Finger, Brokers, 30-2. 
194 South Centre, Environment, 19. Additionally: “UNCED Prepcom IV: Daily Issue nos. 23,26,27,” Bernstein, 
“Ideas,” 472-6, McGraw, “Biodiversity,” 7,29, Hurrell, Kingsbury, “Politics,” 14,39-41, Hunter, et al, IELP, 195, 
Nayar, Ong, “Developing,” 235-7. 
195 South Centre, Environment, i,1: “some developing countries have greater importance in the eyes of the 
North in deliberations on the global environment”- “Global action on the environment cannot succeed without 
the full participation and collaboration of the South. Indeed, UNCED is an international conference where the 
North is seeking environmental concessions from the South, and where the South can make such concessions 
in return for firm commitments by the North to restructure global economic relations.” 
 230 
biotechnology.196 Mimicking strategies of the “well-organised North,”197 the report outlined 
mechanisms to achieve these goals, including establishing monitoring teams, expert task 
forces, specialised G77 negotiators, MCDCED meetings, concessions bargaining via issue 
linkages, information and educational campaigns targeting the North and strengthening 
links with Southern NGOs.198 
 
The brochure also reflected alignment with Cuba’s more expansive understanding of the 
biodiversity norm, expressing concern that the “convention on biodiversity, in contrast, 
seeks to appropriate national resources for universal access and use… The biodiversity 
convention raises even more disturbing questions than the climate convention as far as the 
South and global equity are concerned.”199 Whilst acknowledging CBD success in terms of 
securing national sovereignty over resources, the report expressed concern regarding 
unequal biotechnology access and lack of compensation for Southern genetic materials.200 
Ultimately, the report recommended the South unite to:  
reject the proposed biodiversity convention in its present form, and insist that any 
negotiation on biodiversity should be linked to a negotiation on biotechnology and more 
generally to intellectual property rights… In sum, if the international community 
considers it necessary to adopt actions to avoid the erosion of the world’s genetic pool, 
then the rights of the owners of the genetic pool must be duly recognised. Agreements 
to be negotiated should establish rights and obligations not only in relation to the 
conservation and management of biodiversity, but also as regards the use of the 
resulting knowledge and technology.201 
 
The considerations and directives contained in the South Centre report directly mirrored 
those of Cuba and heavily impacted the formulation and ultimate endorsement of the norm 
to conserve biodiversity. Indeed, Chatterjee and Finger contend the approved Rio 
Declaration and Agenda 21 reflect the precise philosophies and ideologies contained within 
it.202 As for the CBD, subsequent INC WGs were reportedly so disrupted over resulting 
G77/European Community tensions over financing, technological transfers and 
biotechnology that even the definition of biological diversity could not be narrowed to less 
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than five alternative options.203 The greatest impact across all INCs was thus attributed to 
this collective of states. According to McConnell, the “G77 negotiating line was in effect 
‘We’ve got most of it: you want it; you’ll have to pay for it.’ The successful promotion of this 
line was all the more surprising in view of the diversity of style and policies within the three 
regional groups that made up the G77.”204  
 
The G77 consolidated its position prior to UNCED at the second MCDCED, April 1992,205 
where Humphreys recounts the “Malaysian prime minister, Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, 
pleaded for South unity in his opening speech: ‘The voice of the individual developing 
countries will be drowned. It will be different if they speak together with one strong voice in 
Rio.’ Revealingly, he enquired, ‘What use is there of an Earth Charter if there is no real 
advance on the critical issues of finance and technology?’”206 The meeting resulted in the 
Kuala Lumpur Declaration,207 which reflected Cuban priorities when calling for the CBD’s 
early conclusion but on condition of re-affirmation of state sovereignty and equality, 
developing country responsibility, “the need for sustained economic growth and 
development of developing countries,” new, additional, transparent and democratic funding 
measures, biotechnology and research transfers, and the “sharing of commercial profits and 
products devised from the genetic material” of developing countries.208 According to the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, which documented daily UNCED progress and outcomes, the 
Kuala Lumpur statement “was significant in that it sent to developed countries a strong and 
unified message of the Southern position related to key UNCED issues”209 including 
biodiversity conservation. It had direct impact on UNCED PrepComs, with the Bulletin 
recording the need to address “Resolution of the North-South debate. During PrepCom III 
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the recurring conflict between North and South prevented substantive discussions on the 
central issues.”210 It likely also influenced both OECD and EC responses, which pledged 
cooperation with developing countries on trade and aid policies and addressed “a number 
of the changes in the North-South relationship that must be made to ensure that the goals 
of sustainable development are met.”211 Finally, it resulted in direct and explicit outcomes 
for the CBD, such as adoption of the G77 financial proposal as the basis for subsequent 
negotiations.212  
 
Via “the ability to define common positions, speak with one voice, build coalitions with 
other states, and in doing so ensure their positions are included in the final texts,”213 
developing countries were able to substantially “modify the biodiversity agenda.”214 By 
extending the norm from biodiversity conservation to biotechnology development, rejecting 
existing financial mechanisms, calling for fair and equitable sharing of benefits, reaffirming 
state sovereignty and a range of other matters,215 the G77 aligned with Cuba and defied 
contemporary assumptions: 
that international negotiations are characterised by a strong imbalance of power… 
developing countries have been clearly inferior to industrialised nations, which have 
usually largely set the agenda between themselves and also determined the crucial 
elements of the outcome… Many of the poorer Third World countries have become 
completely marginalised in the negotiations; they have remained passive and have 
evidently had difficulties even to understand their own interests.216 
 
Yet, according to McGraw, “although the development of a biodiversity convention was 
originally a Northern government/NGO initiative, the South was better able to exercise its 
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bargaining power throughout the negotiations.”217 McConnell concludes “the G77 could 
undoubtedly claim to have set the agenda and shaped the content of the convention.”218   
 
Such developing country influence particularly affected Cuban endorsement, given Cuban 
membership of and participation within both the G77 and South Centre, the distinct overlap 
between Cuban and G77 goals, and Cuban focus upon developing country unity at 
UNCED.219 Thus, when the Granma special envoy reported salient outcomes from UNCED, 
he included the “cohesion between Third World countries, independent of ideologies and 
political regimes, around powerful common interests found within these spheres of human 
activity for the future of the Planet.”220 Ultimately regarded as one of the primary ‘veto 
coalitions’ in CBD negotiations,221 the conglomerate body of developing nations represented 
by the G77 therefore comprised the closest equivalent to a ‘critical state’ in the diffusion 
and Cuban endorsement of the norm to conserve biodiversity. Considering indicators, 
collective G77 state suasion, in conjunction with the feedback loop, played a prominent role 
in both the formulation and Cuban endorsement of the norm. Overall, although it once 
again did not operate to drive socialisation, state suasion nevertheless significantly 
impacted norm endorsement, albeit via rarely acknowledged indirect inverse influence and 
positive collective efforts. 
 
6.3.a.iii: INEs – MNCs 
According to Chatterjee and Finger, the only INE entity that really influenced outcomes at 
UNCED was the business and industry sector, presenting “themselves as the solution rather 
than as the problem,” and keeping items detrimental to their interests off the agenda.222 
They became ‘partners in dialogue’, rather than targets of discussions.223 Attribute 
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indicators support this, with the 1991 Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) 
established to “provide advice and guidance to the UNCED secretariat on initiatives and 
activities undertaken by business and industry in respect of the preparatory process for the 
1992 Conference,” and the February 1992 World Industry Council for the Environment 
created to lobby business interests on environmental issues.224 These MNC initiatives had 
close links to UNCED and its Secretary-General Maurice Strong. As Bruno notes, 
“Throughout the UNCED process, the BCSD had special access to Strong, access which was 
unavailable to non-governmental organizations.”225 Other MNCs financially sponsored 
UNCED and the associated Global Forum,226 which Chatterjee and Finger describe as “a 
tactic from which they reaped considerable benefits. In particular, it helped defeat 
recommendations from within the UN… that would have called for a much stricter 
monitoring and regulation of corporations, replacing them with the much weaker idea of 
‘self-policing’.”227 According to Third World Resurgence, MNC suasion was so pervasive that 
“the thrust of the biodiversity convention - as well as that of chapter 16 of Agenda 21 
dealing with biodiversity and biotechnology - is exactly the same as a document prepared by 
the biotechnology industry for UNCED.”228 However, when it came to Cuban norm 
endorsement, MNCs only provided a target for Cubans to rally against, evident in domestic 
press and Castro’s UNCED message.229 Rather than operating as a driver for socialisation, 
MNC influence upon Cuba was thus indirect and inverse, proferring a reason for Cuban 
endorsement given the CBD’s equitable biotechnology provisions, despite Cuban demands 
for greater MNC regulation.230 MNCs held larger influence than expected over general norm 
development, however only indirect inverse import over Cuban endorsement. 
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6.3.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
6.3.b.i: Salience 
Indicators for this attribute demonstrate the norm of biodiversity conservation held high 
salience within Cuba. According to one Cuban National Report on Biodiversity: 
Cuban national territory is a representative and unique example of regional and global 
heritage. Cuba constitutes the island with the most biodiversity in the Antilles, as much in 
total wealth of species as in degree of endemic quality… use of biological diversity 
components constitutes the foundation of the country’s economic development 
programmes.231  
 
Alongside the national identity concurrence and high domestic resonance already outlined, 
Cuban decision-makers devoted much time and resources to considerations and 
representations regarding the norm. Official UNCED preparations commenced in February 
1991 with establishment of the National Preparatory Committee for UNCED, which included 
the Cuban Academy of Sciences, National Commission for Environment Protection, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and State Commission for Economic Collaboration, alongside a range of 
additional specialists. It reported on, presented and promoted Cuban engagement, 
experiences and positions on environment and development issues.232 Cuba sent delegates 
from the highest levels to UNCED, including President Castro, to deliver Cuba’s environment 
and development message and sign the CBD.233 UNCED and environmental issues were 
accorded voluminous and in-depth attention in Granma: at least one article featured on the 
topic every day from May to mid-June, 1992.234 Granma frequently referenced the CBD as 
one of the principal UNCED documents and highlighted the significance of rapid signature by 
a majority of countries.235 According to Cuba’s subsequent CBD National Report:  
Cuba participated actively in all processes of elaboration and negotiation for the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and preparatory process for the Rio Summit, where 
the Convention was signed by the President of the Republic on 5 June 1992. Since that 
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moment, Cuba commenced work to achieve ratification and implementation of the 
Convention at the national level.236  
 
Contrary to norm endorsement given low salience and indifference as anticipated in the 
analytical framework, Cuba took the norm to conserve biodiversity very seriously and 
considered the CBD of high salience.  
 
6.3.b.ii: Domestic Structural Conditions 
DSCs again played a role in Cuban norm endorsement, albeit indirectly and different to 
that anticipated in relation to revisionist or socialist states. Given the already documented 
strong resonance of the norm amongst relevant political elites - especially President Castro 
who considered “the biggest threat that weighs upon humanity is that of environmental 
degradation”237 - it was rapidly adopted. Norm endorsement was thus not obstructed but 
rather promoted by the one-party system in this instance, with DSCs holding an 
unexpectedly positive indirect but influential effect.  
 
6.3.c: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
6.3.c.i: Internal Characteristics 
Indicators also reveal the somewhat unexpected impact of the norm-related attribute of 
internal characteristics. Contrary to dominant predictions that stable, clearly defined norms 
are more likely to be endorsed, it was precisely the malleability and lack of precision of the 
norm to conserve biodiversity that proved critical in this instance.238 The veil of uncertainty 
surrounding the meaning of biodiversity conservation facilitated greater satisfaction of 
otherwise divergent interests.239 According to McGraw, “Through a complex bargaining 
process, the CBD reflects a network of compromises. The Convention’s adoption can be 
attributed not so much to the fact that both industrialised and developing countries found 
many areas of common ground. Rather, it demonstrates that each negotiating group had a 
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substantial portion of their respective vital demands met within the framework of the 
agreed text.”240 Le Prestre concurs, “the basic legitimacy of the CBD was secured during the 
negotiations through the multi-purpose character of the Convention itself. Industrialised 
states were able to focus the regime on conservation and access to genetic resources, while 
developing countries secured sovereignty over natural resources, differentiated 
responsibilities, benefit-sharing, and sustainable use.”241 The norm could be, and was, 
framed equally legitimately in terms of economic benefits,242 capacity to incorporate initially 
exogenous Cuban/G77 demands,243 and intrinsic value.244 McGraw concludes: “it is doubtful 
that the CBD could have been concluded according to its existing terms in current conditions 
of greater issue clarity.”245 Recalling the very specific biotechnology-related definition 
attributed to biodiversity conservation in Cuba, alongside priorities outlined in Castro’s 
message to UNCED, it is questionable whether Cuba would have ever endorsed the norm 
had it remained limited to its stricter definition of conservation alone.  
 
Neither specificity nor prominence seemed to impact norm endorsement as often 
contended.246 Despite growing concurrence within necessary international circles as already 
recognised, broader resonance did not prevail. McConnell, for example, contended that “A 
global opinion poll at the end of 1991 of those travelling the Road to Rio might have 
produced the following results… Will the biodiversity convention be ready?  
- 10 per cent: yes  
- 20 per cent: possibly  
- 70 per cent: don’t know (or care).”247  
According to McGraw, “the CBD reached its peak in popularity when the US announced it 
would not sign in Rio. Since that time, the Convention has received negligible coverage in 
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the mainstream media - especially when compared to its ozone and climate change 
counterparts… both the breadth and depth of biodiversity make it difficult to define a clear 
problematique. In essence biodiversity lacks ‘issue salience’.”248 Koester agreed, attributing 
lack of public interest to both competing diversionary events and the scientifically complex 
and contested character of the norm. However, Koester contended it was precisely the 
absence of public interest and prominence that allowed the norm to fly safely under the 
radar and achieve consensus.249 Indicators thus reveal it was the malleability and 
understated characteristics of the norm, rather than clarity, specificity, prominence or strict 
resilience, that proved key to Cuban endorsement. 
 
6.4 NEGLIGIBLE INFLUENCE 
 
While the above-listed attributes held suasion over Cuban endorsement of the norm in 
unexpected ways, analysis of indicators for the remaining attributes reveal minimal impact. 
Closely mirroring previous chapters, these attributes once again include systemic-level 
purported socialisation drivers of regional suasion and remaining INEs, state-level DNEs and 
norm-related origin.  
 
6.4.a: Systemic Attributes 
 
6.4.a.i: INEs – Individuals, Epistemic Communities, INGOs, GCS 
INEs held minimal influence, particularly over Cuban norm endorsement, contrary to 
expectations.250 As in the previous two chapters, particular individuals - the UNEP Executive 
Director, INC President and WG Chairs - attracted credit for treaty negotiations.251 The 
Executive Director’s overt framing of the norm according to economic benefits, for example, 
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likely held suasion,252 while his interventions overcame last minute deadlocks to conclude 
CBD negotiations. McConnell records the Director abruptly cancelling hamstrung WGs at the 
final INC and calling a Plenary at which he “would tolerate no opposition… once the 
Chairman had brought down his gavel on clean text it would not be revisited in any 
circumstance.”253 Yet such influence once again resided firmly within the roles and 
parameters of IO structures and state representation, rather than autonomous individual 
entrepreneurship. 
 
With regard to epistemic communities, scientists attracted credit for the initial 
international emergence of the norm. As Guay notes, “Discussed in the 1970s and 1980s at 
national and international scientific conferences, biodiversity came to the forefront of 
national and international news in the late 1980s and early 1990s. International scientific 
institutions, such as the International Council of Scientific Unions, were key actors in this 
process. A message on the importance of biodiversity loss has been building.”254 However, 
although relevant to initial agenda setting,255 the impact of scientific communities declined 
once the norm was officially subsumed under UNEP auspices. Indeed, influence diminished 
such that only some UNEP and UNCED delegations even incorporated scientific experts.256 
Although this improved at later PrepComs, and scientific experts were called to attend, 
scheduling obstacles frequently stymied their contribution.257 Indicators in this respect 
suggest William Zartman was correct when he contended that the “much-vaunted epistemic 
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INGO influence followed a similar path. As previously noted, the IUCN maintained early 
momentum,259 and reportedly proposed preparations for an umbrella biodiversity 
convention at the UNEP GC 14th session, where the IUCN General Assembly called for “a 
legal instrument on in situ biological diversity similar in spirit and scope to other 
international conventions reflecting the principles of universal resources.”260 This resulted in 
UNEP GC Decision 14/26, which IUCN also amended,261 that authorised the WG and 
specifically referenced “the need to support actively the efforts currently underway within 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources to develop a 
convention for the in situ preservation and conservation of biological diversity.”262 The IUCN 
tabled a draft convention and advised it would continue to work closely with the EBD WG at 
the UNEP GC 15th session.263 However, this is when relevant indicators and the impact of 
this attribute ceased. Proposals for IUCN to assume a leading role were rejected by 
numerous delegations, claiming “that a non-governmental organisation, however eminent 
or well-supported, could not be permitted to usurp the functions of governments or an 
intergovernmental UN body like UNEP.”264 Although the UNEP Secretariat undertook to 
consider IUCN and other competent NGO proposals moving forward,265 there is little 
evidence of further influence.  
 
Between 11 and 30 INGOs attended UNEP GCs, but with observer status only.266 INGOs 
did not attend EBD WGs and the LTEBD WG rejected the draft IUCN treaty given that 
“because it was both idealistic and mandatory in its approach it managed to offend 
practically everyone.”267 INGO influence was conspicuously absent during the INC period, 
with CBD negotiators frequently reporting overwhelming public indifference.268 Substantial 
INGO impediments remained at UNCED PrepComs. According to McConnell, under UNGA 
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Resolution 44/228 that authorised UNCED, “Non-governmental organisations were to be 
tolerated, if at all, only if they had been formally accredited to the UN.”269 Consequently, 
only 30 attended the first PrepCom where they wasted countless time and effort attempting 
to improve access.270 INGOs were also excluded from the formative ‘informal’, ‘informal 
informal’, and even ‘informal informal informal’ meetings that held most impact over norm 
consolidation.271  
 
Nevertheless, the UNCED secretariat established an NGO liaison unit and ‘Centre for Our 
Common Future’, which sponsored consultations with “environmental and developmental 
NGOs, business and industry, trade unions, professional associations, scientific and 
academic institutions, women’s organisations, youth groups, religious and spiritual groups, 
indigenous peoples’ organisations, and other citizens groups.”272 As access improved, so did 
INGO lobbying “every day in the corridors by interested and generally knowledgeable 
people from industry, campaigning groups, women’s organisations, local authorities, and so 
on.”273 By the final Prepcom, approximately 1,500 NGOs held UNCED accreditation,274 
“Press interest was growing and (in stark contrast to the INC) there were literally hundreds 
of observers from the business community, local government, environmentalists, 
development agencies, women’s groups and others.”275 Johnson concludes that, overall, 
NGOs “were treated extremely well. They were made to feel they had a real contribution to 
make (even though in practice they were firmly excluded when the negotiations came down 
to the wire at five minutes to midnight as was so often the case).”276 However, the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin continued to record “considerable grumbling by NGOs over the issue 
of access to the official PrepCom meetings,”277 which manifested in innumerable obstacles, 
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including guards refusing entry to pre-approved NGOs, inability to table documents, 
ticketing obstructions, last minute changes to agendas and weakening of texts pertaining to 
NGO participation.278 Chatterjee and Finger conclude that rather than reflecting any genuine 
impact, INGO engagement at UNCED PrepComs was in fact a manipulated façade, “a means 
to use NGOs for public relations purposes… If there was no substantive outcome in terms of 
conventions and documents, UNCED was at least an exercise in mobilisation and co-
optation.”279 
 
As for UNCED itself, accredited NGOs received some of the 20,000 passes issued to 
attendees, although the simultaneous NGO Global Forum attracted more.280 Nevertheless, 
despite frequent lauding of and calls for increased NGO participation within UNCED 
Ministerial speeches,281 NGO participation remained obstructed.282 NGOs were excluded 
from the biodiversity WG,283 which also ignored the ‘Ten-point plan to save the Earth 
Summit’ presented by over fifty NGOs.284 A leading INGO Director conceded that “Most 
NGOs would have to concur that citizens’ groups barely scratched the surface of the official 
documents. Bits and pieces were tinkered with and modified here and there, but the 
structure of the agreements, the context within which they were considered, and the level 
of political and financial investment, all conformed to governments’ expectations, not 
NGOs.”285 INGO influence was more often obstructed, repressed and ultimately segregated 
via the Global Forum, “best described as a circus or colossal mess.”286  
 
Additionally, evaluating relevant indicators, there is no information to suggest any INGO 
impact on Cuban decision-making. Whilst INGOs directly influenced a minority of state 
delegations, Cuba was not among them.287 Although Granma occasionally reported GCS 
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UNCED involvement, particularly protests against the US,288 INGOs were once again only 
reported in support of established Cuban stances, rather than vice versa driving socialisation 
or norm endorsement.289 Indeed, INGO influence is pertinent for its absence rather than 
prominence in Castro’s UNCED message. Throughout 53 pages, Castro offered only the 
briefest nod to NGO impact: “A phenomenon that contributes in a certain way to this 
(ecological) conscience at a global level, has been the emergence and activity of a growing 
number of non-governmental environmental organisations, some of which are 
characterised by their combativeness and progressive reach of influence.”290 In specific 
reference to the CBD, Juma and Sánchez, the former CBD INC Chair, conclude it was well 
“recognised that NGOs did not play a major role during the negotiations for the 
Convention.”291 Overall, INEs thus remained primarily on the periphery of biodiversity 
conservation norm diffusion, particularly with regard to Cuban endorsement.292   
 
6.4.a.ii: Regional Suasion 
Contrary to scholarly expectations,293 yet similar to the previous two case studies, 
regional suasion drove neither norm endorsement nor state socialisation. Cuba was a 
member of the 1983 Latin American Network of Technical Cooperation in National Parks, 
Other Protected Areas, Wild Flora and Fauna,294 and hosted the 1990 V Latin America 
Botanical Congress.295 However, considering the relevant indicators, no evidence was found 
to indicate influence from regional organisations or normative structures over Cuban 
endorsement of the norm to conserve biodiversity. Indeed, Cuba itself reported that “In 
reality, there is no regional integration and cooperation strategy on biological diversity, and 
this is one of the biggest problems within the Caribbean environment.”296 Regional suasion 
proved insignificant. 
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6.4.b: State-Level Attributes 
 
6.4.b.i: Domestic Norm Entrepreneurs 
Contrary to general expectations,297 indicators reveal no DNE influence over Cuban 
endorsement of the norm to conserve biodiversity. The issue reportedly resonated at 
grassroot levels when Cuba claimed approximately 60 domestic NGOs supported 
biodiversity conservation.298 However, in a socialist state such as Cuba the one-party system 
ostensibly is civil society and such NGOs are subsumed directly into state governance 
apparatus.299 This accords with Böhmelt’s findings that environmental NGOs are least 
effective within single-party regime states, which likely provide environmental public good 
services independently,300 in this instance through party-aligned grassroot organisations. 
Such minimal DNE impact was particularly the case at a time when some of the most 
powerful environmental protest movements and NGOs in the South were actually dedicated 
to combating Northern development schemes: an obvious redundancy in Cuba.301 DNEs 
thus had little impact on Cuban endorsement of the norm to conserve biodiversity or Cuban 
socialisation. 
 
6.4.c: Norm-Related Attributes 
 
6.4.c.i: Origin 
As already discussed, serious concerns were raised regarding the potential for Western 
‘bio-imperialism’ via the norm to conserve biodiversity.302 However, the intense 
reconfiguration and reformulation of the norm during CBD negotiations, via the feedback 
loop and state suasion, rendered the ultimate impact of origin on norm endorsement both 
generally and in the case of Cuba negligible. 
 
 
297 Böhmelt, “Groups,” 318. 
298 Cuba, “Status,” Castro, Life, 397. 
299 Candace Johnson, “Framing for Change: Social Policy, the State, and the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas,” 
Cuban Studies (42, 2011), 35-51: DNEs “handed down from above” as agents of the revolutionary leadership. 
300 Böhmelt, “Groups,” 315-35. 
301 Chatterjee, Finger, Brokers, 76. 
302 Ruth Gordon, “Unsustainable Development” in Alam, et al, IEL, 58. 
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6.5: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS 
 
This final case study has documented which of the fifteen international norm diffusion 
attributes exerted most influence over Cuban endorsement of the norm to conserve 
biodiversity and how. State-level attributes pertaining to the feedback loop and national 
identity were key. Being “recognised as equal partners in negotiations or to have their 
normative claims incorporated into a reshaped version of the current world order” played 
an important role in relation to the feedback loop, complementing Wunderlich’s conclusions 
that “even alleged norm-breakers are able to get the normative order reshaped in line with 
their visions.”303 Simultaneously, it was Cuba’s identity as a purported revisionist state that 
drove norm endorsement. Although rarely acknowledged in general scholarship, 
Wunderlich’s research uncovers revisionist state perspectives that “given the highly unjust 
nature of the international order, shaped largely by Western (and notably US) preferences, 
defiance of US hegemony and the promotion of alternative normative visions is a moral 
duty and this means it can be regarded as a form of norm entrepreneurship.”304 This proved 
pertinent in the case of the biodiversity norm, as Cuba (and allies) reformulated it to align 
with divergent national identity priorities. Perhaps the most surprising outcome therefore, 
is that it was precisely Cuba’s revisionist identity - not only ascribed but actively self-
promoted - that drove not solely endorsement but leadership by Cuba of the norm. In this 
manner, this chapter presented the most overt example of an international norm 
empowering a purported revisionist state. Cuba embraced and in some sense comandeered 
the norm to conserve biodiversity in order to promote its brand of ‘revisionism’ and shame 
the US. 
 
This once again places doubt upon arguments pertaining to socialisation. Particularly, 
although some of the remaining attributes influenced norm diffusion and endorsement, 
none did so as socialisation drivers or enablers. At the systemic-level, IO and state suasion 
proved significant, however IOs again possessed a symbiotic relationship with the norm and 
on this occasion were employed by Cuba as a platform for ostensibly revisionist priorities 
 
303 Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 90,95. Wunderlich, Rogue, 272: ““rogue states” are in a position to change 
norms within the established normative structures, making use of classical strategies of norm entrepreneurs.” 
304 Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 90. 
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that socialised the norm rather than the state. State suasion was crucial, however only in 
terms of indirect inverse US suasion and collective state suasion via G77 norm 
reconstruction. Contrary to socialisation literature, neither IOs, states, world context, MNCs 
or the range of INEs operated as socialisation drivers, although all but the latter impacted 
general norm endorsement in some substantive way. In relation to remaining state-level 
attributes, high rather than low salience again facilitated norm endorsement, DSCs held 
unanticipated relevance given elite norm support, and DNE influence was low. Norm-related 
attributes proved important, with norm substance, international concurrence and domestic 
resonance again holding high impact, while internal characteristics were significant, albeit 
due to the malleability, imprecision and low visibility of the norm rather than its resilience, 
strength and prominence. Norm origin proved irrelevant following substantial norm 
reformulation by a range of actors.  
 
Cuban endorsement of the norm to conserve biodiversity also has important 
ramifications for conceptions of revisionism in IR. With US refusal to sign the CBD, Cuba 
exploited its revisionist identity to become the poster child for environmental protection, 
placing itself at the vanguard of norm endorsement. This begs the question regarding which 
state was revisionist in this instance: Cuba, which publicly supported and endorsed the 
broadly accepted norm, or the US, which was the only UNCED state not to do so. 
Revisionism as a construct of the superiorly positioned is clear. The US suffered little 
enduring international repercussions for norm refusal in a decade of consolidating US 
hegemony. Meanwhile, Cuba remained cast as the revisionist: a UN official compiling 
membership of the Small Island Developing States in 1994 reported, for example, “We 
wanted Cuba’s political strength… They could be a useful nuisance … If Western powers 
wanted to change something that small islands were putting forward then you had Cuba as 
a scapegoat …‘Look at these crazy Cubans. What can we do with them?’”305 Reflecting 
conclusions from previous chapters, despite proactive norm endorsement, underlying 
international hierarchies had trapped Cuba in a cycle of perceived revisionism, whilst US 
power to ascribe yet simultaneously avoid revisionist ascription grew. 
 
 
305 Corbett, et al, “Entrepreneurship,” 19. 
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Figure 13: ‘Even for us the world is unipolar too.’1 
 
This thesis has analysed the empirical puzzle of international norm endorsement by 
purported revisionist states. It documents conclusions among scholarly and policy circles 
that revisionist states are not likely to endorse international norms in the absence of 
material incentives or state socialisation. It explores three empirical cases that demonstrate 
this is not always case. Employing Cuba as the paradigmatic revisionist state case study, it 
assesses the reasons behind Cuban endorsement of three international norms within a 
framework of fifteen reported norm diffusion attributes. This penultimate chapter assesses 
the results. Findings reveal that international norms are not always modes of socialisation 
that co-opt purported revisionist states as often anticipated in associated literature. 
Although impacting norm endorsement in various ways, the diffusion attributes operated 
neither as drivers, filters nor enablers of socialisation. Instead, their operation in these cases 
show that international norms were harnessed and ultimately endorsed by a purported 
 
1 Anon, “Hasta para nosotros también el mundo es unipolar,” Granma (28:92, Thu 7 May 1992), 6. 
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revisionist state in attempts to constrain, shame or otherwise hold the prevailing hegemon, 
the US, to account. The very tools of hegemony and purported socialisation were 
appropriated by a perceived revisionist state for employment against the hegemon. In the 
process, this research raises questions regarding the very meaning of revisionism in world 
politics. It reveals conceptions of revisionism as subjective - indeed performative - 
constructs, rendered operational as devices of hegemonic consolidation only in the hands of 
the most powerful, thus simultaneously reflecting and propagating the stratified power 
relations underlying international politics.  
 
This chapter commences with cross-case comparison and assessment of the impact and 
manner of operation of each international norm diffusion attribute. Conclusions are then 
drawn, culminating first in provision of a revised international norm diffusion framework, 
then consideration of implications for claims regarding socialisation, followed by the 
argument that international norm endorsement comprised a form of revisionist 
empowerment in these instances. The chapter then contemplates what this might mean not 
only for norm diffusion but for conceptions of revisionism, concluding that revisionism is a 
subjective construct, that its successful ascription represents a privilege of the superiorly 
positioned, and that its employment likely consolidates hegemony. 
 
7.1 INTERNATIONAL NORM DIFFUSION 
 
7.1.a: International Norm Diffusion Attributes 
 
At the outset of formulating empirical observations from cross-case comparison, and 
bearing in mind the methodological goals outlined in the research design, it is worth 
considering Haas’s argument that, “Remaining true to a typological commitment demands 
that the traditional canons of causal theorising be sacrificed to a less economical procedure 
that foregoes the search for clusters or straight paths as unique explanations.”2 For, as 
Smetana caveated, there are “inherent limits of generalizing from three empirical cases.”3 
 
2 Haas, Knowledge, 11. 
3 Smetana, Deviance, 218. 
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The norm diffusion attributes unquestionably possessed divergent weights of suasion across 
time, geography and norm issue area, and findings clearly offer evidence of equifinality. 
Diverging processes of norm contestation and multiple causal pathways combined to result 
in norm endorsement by a purportedly revisionist state. As Towns observed, “there is no 
one master process that can account for all cases of policy diffusion.”4 The significance of 
attributes including DSCs, the feedback loop, origin and some categories of INEs, for 
example, differed vastly across the three cases. There was no precise replication or 
definitive overarching pattern or trend. Nevertheless, complex causality, or equifinality, in 
revisionist state norm endorsement is an important finding in and of itself. According to 
George and Bennett, “various kinds of complex causal relations are central concerns of the 
social sciences” and “present in many social phenomena”5 given the very object of study - 
the political and social world - comprises few independent or isolated causal mechanisms. 
This research thus unveils a conjunction of variables that led to norm endorsement by a 
purported revisionist state, producing “a differentiated empirically based theory that 
identifies different causal patterns that produce similar outcomes.”6  
 
Although a “factor’s necessity and causal weight may vary considerably across cases or 
types of cases,”7 it may still be compared and assessed to determine level and consistency 
of influence. Thus, as Kratochwil argued, “we cannot pick one explanatory model and 
consider it standard. Far from suggesting, therefore, that ‘anything goes,’ the upshot of this 
argument is that pragmatic criteria play a much greater role in social science explanations.”8 
Acknowledging “certain caveats regarding sample size. It is possible that some of the broad 
conclusions drawn here are artifacts of the particular set of cases on which they are 
based,”9 such ‘pragmatic criteria’ may nevertheless be distilled across the cases. Indeed, 
similarities and consistencies, indicated in the following compilation of results, disclose 
important insights: 
 
4 Towns, “Norms,” 185. Similarly: Cortell, Davis, “Understanding,” 85, Müller, “Agency,” 339-40,362: “We have 
not observed a general cyclic pattern of norm development; norm change takes different forms.”  
5 George, Bennett, Case, 12,106,157. 
6 Ibid, 26,161. 
7 Ibid, 27. 
8 Friedrich Kratochwil, How Do Norms Matter? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 37. See also: Bowman, 
“Nature,” 14. 
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Figure 14: Table of outcomes showing levels of influence of international norm diffusion 
attributes - those featuring in the same category of influence across each of the three case 
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Figure 15: Consolidated table of influence of international norm diffusion attributes - 
those featuring in the same category of influence across each of the three cases highlighted 
in red, those featuring in two of the same highlighted in blue. 
 
As evident from Figures 14 and 15, various attributes performed at a consistent level of 
influence across the three observation studies. National identity at state-level and norm 
substance and international concurrence at the level of the norm held consistently high 
impact upon norm endorsement as anticipated within the analytical framework. Both world 
context at systemic-level and domestic resonance at the level of the norm featured in two 
of the three cases. In terms of attributes that held influence yet operated in a manner 
different to that anticipated, both IOs and state suasion featured consistently at systemic-
level alongside salience at the level of the state. MNCs at the systemic, DSCs at the state, 
and internal characteristics at the level of the norm each held influence in unexpected ways 
in two of the three cases within this category. Finally, regional suasion at systemic-level had 
consistently minimal impact across all three studies, while the remaining attributes - INEs, 
feedback loop, DNEs and origin - featured in two out of three cases with negligible impact.  
 
When assessed solely according to level of impact on Cuban norm endorsement - 
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Figure 16: Table showing attributes with greatest overall impact on revisionist state norm 
endorsement in each case study 
 
These results reflect the overall import of two attributes at each level: IO and state suasion 
at systemic, national identity and salience at state, and norm substance and international 
concurrence at the level of the norm. In each case, a complex interplay of systemic, state 
and norm-level attributes therefore proved critical. The overarching analytical framework 
for international norm diffusion thus requires some amendment when it comes to 
revisionist state norm endorsement.10 
 
7.1.b: Revised Analytical Framework 
 
First, a synthesis of the three levels of attributes should not be neglected: systemic, state 
or norm characteristics alone will likely prove insufficient in generating norm endorsement 
by revisionist states. At norm-level, the impact of origin may be de-prioritised: origin proved 
irrelevant in relation to the CWC, had the opposite of the anticipated response when Cuba 
sought to adopt rather than reject the norm in the CAT, and proved redundant following 
norm reconfiguration in the CBD. The significance of internal characteristics was complex, 
given the norm was neither simple, clear, stable nor definitive in the CWC, required 
malleability for success in the CBD, and postponed Cuban endorsement given specificity in 
the CAT. Domestic resonance was pertinent yet similarly complex, with some indicators 
present yet others absent in each study. Norm substance and international concurrence, 
however, proved essential. Each case entailed a mutually reinforcing confluence of powerful 
 
10 Sandholtz, “Contestation,” 143: “case studies can also feed back into theory, thus advancing the theory-
building enterprise.” 
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and compelling norm content alongside strong international concurrence. These two norm-
level attributes in particular led to points at which the highlighted state and systemic 
attributes held impact.  
 
At state-level, each norm ostensibly aligned with Cuban national identity. Indeed, the 
process paralleled that recognised by Symons and Altman in which “political actors make 
distinguishing moves: first they rhetorically link national identity to the state’s position in 
respect of an international norm. If this deepening of the connection between the norm and 
collective identity is successful, the norm may gain sufficient salience for a second step, of 
adopting a more distinctive collective position.”11 Surprisingly, this alignment incorporated 
elements of Cuba’s purportedly revisionist, revolutionary identity.12 Whilst acknowledging 
the fluidity, dynamism, potential for manipulation and diverging conceptions of national 
identity,13 each case clearly revealed the import of Cuba’s anti-‘yankee imperialist’, alter-to-
the-US-ego self. Cuba’s socialist identity also played a role, in relation to disarmament for 
development with the CWC, attempts to subsume the purportedly Western, liberal, civil and 
political norm against torture in the CAT, and Cuba’s staunch anti-capitalist, environmental 
protector and developing countries’ defender role with the CBD.14 It was Cuba’s very 
identity as a revisionist state that led to norm endorsement.  
 
Relatedly, and contrary to dominant expectations in the literature, each norm actually 
held high salience with Cuban decision-makers.15 The norms, legal obligations and 
compliance requirements were considered very seriously by MINREX and Cuban 
government officials, and a great deal of time, effort and resources were invested in their 
consideration and ultimate endorsement. There was additionally no evidence of localisation 
or alternative domestic reformulation of the norms ultimately endorsed in the treaties to 
indicate any local, subversive or everyday resistance.16 Given this, none of the norms were 
 
11 Symons, Altman, “Polarization,” 67. 
12 Epstein, “Infantilisation,” 80,82: prior focus “on socialisation leads to… downplaying the identity stakes 
altogether… the essentialisation of identities and the infantilisation of the socialisee are in fact two sides of the 
same conceptual coin.” 
13 2.3.b.ii: National Identity, Epstein, “Infantilisation,” 82, Campbell, Security, 12. 
14 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 170. 
15 Wunderlich, Rogue, 272: “Another conjecture, namely that “rogue states” have a low overall interaction 
capacity, also cannot be maintained.” 
16 Groß, “Global,” 312-3,328-9. 
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endorsed as a form of lip service or due to mere indifference. While the feedback loop 
proved highly significant in the CBD study, given it primarily failed in the other two cases it is 
considered not essential for revisionist state norm endorsement. DSCs held no significance 
in relation to the CWC, indirect adverse impact on the CAT and an unexpectedly positive 
impact on CBD endorsement. It is therefore also considered relatively dispensable. Finally, 
contrary to expectations in associated literature that “Domestic actors are also more likely 
to achieve real change in the most repressive states,”17 the remaining state-level attribute 
of DNEs had an indirect adverse impact on Cuban CAT endorsement - which was the only 
occasion it held any influence at all. 
 
At systemic-level, the complexity, plurality, multilinearity and potential for adverse 
impact of each attribute must be acknowledged. World context proved significant as 
anticipated in relation to both specific events and broader windows of opportunity, 
however it also had the capacity to indirectly yet negatively impact Cuban norm 
endorsement in relation to the CAT.18 INEs proved influential for general norm 
development, particularly in initial stages although less so upon norm assumption by an IO. 
However, they held little positive impact on purported revisionist state endorsement. 
Indeed, Cuban decision-makers harboured deep distrust towards most categories of INEs, 
considering them agents or satellites of the US hegemonic project. According to the 1994 
Cuban CHR delegate, “if there was a common objective in Cuba, it was to keep the people 
united and, above all, to prevent any outsiders, such as that NGO, from interfering with the 
country’s destiny, a right reserved for the Cuban people.”19 The CAT and CBD studies 
indicate that both INGOs and regional institutions in fact played a role contrary to that 
anticipated, with Cubans either dismissing their relevance or seeking to employ them in 
support of Cuban positions rather than vice versa. While MNCs had surprising influence over 
the CWC and CBD generally, they had indirect impact on anti-capitalist Cuban decision-
makers, by clearing the path to endorsement or providing a target for Cubans to rally 
against. 
 
17 Friman, “Introduction,” 23. 
18 Müller, et al, “Change,” 141: “While scholars often invoke exogenous events as explanations for institutional 




IO and state suasion proved significant albeit not quite as expected. Cuba maintained 
high regard for - and eager desire to participate in - the negotiating forum and future 
supervisory institution for each norm, rendering IO engagement an important component of 
Cuban foreign policy. However, IOs also had a symbiotic, mutually constitutive relationship 
with the norm in both the CWC and CBD, where the relevant IO harnessed the norm to 
justify its existence just as much as the norm relied upon the IO as a forum for 
development.20 Furthermore, rather than unidirectional norm diffusers, IOs were also 
important platforms for the promotion of revisionist priorities, including by Cuba, resulting 
in substantial norm reformulation.21 In terms of state suasion, while positive, and also 
collective, examples were found, there was additionally evidence of the opposite in each 
case, albeit with divergent effects.22 With regard to the CAT, state suasion proved distinctly 
damaging, resulting in the delay of Cuban norm endorsement through what was labelled 
reverse state suasion. With the CBD and CWC, however, such negative influence ultimately 
resulted in indirect inverse state suasion as Cuba endorsed the norms to rally against 
perceived US recalcitrance.  
 
Norm diffusion frameworks thus require refinement in accordance with these findings to 
better reflect cases of revisionist state endorsement. Without discounting the potential ad 
hoc influence of omitted attributes,23 and bearing in mind the complexity, multilinearity and 
capacity for adverse effect, an amended analytical framework of attributes that most 
consistently impact norm endorsement by revisionist states may be presented as follows: 
 
 
20 McNeill, St. Clair, Poverty, 3,10. 
21 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 20, Müller, et al, “State,” 322-6: UN “not an entrepreneur in itself.. (UN) 
bodies instead act as a forum, an arena, a factory, or a facilitator for the entrepreneurship projects of others. 
Even so, the UN is an indispensable institution for norm dynamics.” 
22 Supporting Müller, “Agency,” 363. 
23 Haas, Knowledge, 10-11: “We will not seek to cull from our large list of descriptive variables those clusters of 
traits that most frequently ‘predict’ (norm endorsement). Many of the descriptive variables will be shown to 
be weakly associated with any pattern, any regularities,” even though they “may turn up as more powerful in 
some later analysis or some new set of historical circumstances.” 
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Figure 17: Revised analytical framework for the impact of international norm diffusion 
attributes on purported revisionist state norm endorsement 
 
This particular configuration of international norm diffusion attributes most consistently 
influenced Cuban norm endorsement in the three observation studies. Given Cuba’s status 
as the paradigmatic revisionist state, this conjunction of variables also likely reflects norm 
endorsement by the general revisionist state population to which Cuba pertains. Moreover, 
and as highlighted in the research design, given the least likely nature of the revisionist case 
itself, these results may additionally extend to other states generally. However, considering 
this single state case study and perspectivist approach, further work is required to 
determine the precise level of generalisation and universalisability. Two further conclusions 
may be drawn in addition to the contribution proffered by this distillation of key attributes 




First, mirroring recent research, international norm endorsement did not result from or 
in state socialisation.24 Classic socialisation drivers of IO, state, INE (in conjunction with DNE) 
 
24 Chapter 2: critical fourth wave, Almagro, “Boomerangs,” 7-8, Zarakol, “World,” 313, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 
169: “international shaming does not always work… as in the case of Cuba, Iran, or Belarus, international 
shaming and sanctions have no effect.” 
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and regional suasion did not operate in the positive, persuasive, identity-altering manner 
anticipated in relevant literature. In fact, these attributes proved either negligible or 
perversely held the opposite effect. Rather than socialising states into norm endorsement, 
IOs, for example, provided platforms for ulterior agendas, and, in relation to the CAT, held a 
distinctly adverse effect resulting in the deferral of Cuban norm endorsement. With regard 
to state suasion, Cuba endorsed norms to rally against perceived US recalcitrance, rather 
than being induced into socialisation. Similarly, when not entirely negligible, most INEs, 
DNEs and regional entities actually had impact opposite to the socialisation anticipated. 
With the CAT and CBD they were employed by Cuba to reaffirm or support Cuban stances 
rather than influence Cuban decision-making, and with the CAT they indirectly postponed 
Cuban endorsement. Contrary to a wealth of associated scholarship, including the norm life 
cycle framework, boomerang pattern and spiral model, INEs and DNEs exerted no positive 
influence over norm endorsement by or the socialisation of a purported revisionist state. 
Without these systemic attributes operating as socialisation drivers, state and norm-level 
attributes functioned as neither filters nor enablers. They impacted norm endorsement in 
diverging ways, however did not contribute to state socialisation. Furthermore, Cuban norm 
endorsement was not a case of past identity “actively erased by the infantilisation of the 
socialisee.”25 Cuban national identity as socialist, revolutionary, foe of the US and champion 
of developing country interests not only remained unchanged, but in fact comprised one of 
the key motivators behind Cuban norm endorsement in each observation. These results 
provide further empirical support to recent research that “Norm-internalisation does not 
always lead to socialisation.”26 By analysing the process behind norm endorsement rather 
than simply the outcome,27 it becomes clear that socialisation neither provoked nor resulted 





25 Epstein, “Infantilisation,” 82. 
26 Zarakol, “World,” 313. 
27 Per Hadden, Seybert, “Norm,” 250: “we seek explanations centering on norm definition as a process, rather 
than on institutionalization as an outcome.” 
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7.1.d: Norm Endorsement as Resistance 
 
International norms were therefore not tools of hegemonic socialisation “reflecting the 
interests of the most powerful states”28 designed to pull revisionist states into line as often 
anticipated in related scholarship.29 Asking why a purported revisionist state in fact 
endorsed international norms in the absence of socialisation thus generates the second key 
conclusion regarding revisionist state norm endorsement: international norms were 
employed and endorsed by Cuba in attempts to constrain and counter the US. Norms 
maintained their instrumental role,30 however they were engaged by the purported 
revisionist to empower resistance against the hegemon, rather than socialise in the reverse 
direction. Each of the international norms under analysis were perceived by Cuba as 
mechanisms to restrain, shame or otherwise rein in US “belief in US exceptionalism and 
moral significance, if not superiority.”31 Cuba did not enact the covert everyday resistance 
described by Scott,32 nor represent the type of small state norm entrepreneur that relied on 
competent performance of vulnerability to attain benefits by creatively exploiting its low 
ranking in international hierarchies.33 Although it sought to achieve the same outcome - in 
which “the stigmatizer becomes perceived as the transgressor” - Cuba also did not resist or 
reject the norms via processes of counter-stigmatisation, normalisation, naturalisation, 
applicatory rejection or justificatory rejection.34 Additionally, Cuba did not propagate 
“alternative norms which radically deviate from the prevailing Western liberal concept of 
normative order” as anticipated from revolutionary norm entrepreneurship in Wunderlich’s 
recent and similarly-focused study.35 Furthermore, unlike Gramscian expectations, Cuba 
 
28 Foot, Walter, “Global,” 332,344,347. Similarly: Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, “Recognition,” 4,16: “actors who 
define what is ‘normal’,” Adler-Nissen, “Self,” 35: “how socialisation produces and upholds a particular 
ontology for the norm entrepreneur,” Symons, Altman, “Polarization,” 86: norms as “agents of international 
homogenization,” Cortell, Davis, “Clash,” 6: “success of the hegemon in socialising the target state has been 
argued to rest on whether domestic elites are receptive to the hegemon’s norms.” 
29 Ikenberry, Kupchan, “Socialization,” 283-315, Towns, “Norms,” 186: “Norms are thus seen as an important 
intervening variable - they help major powers diffuse policies internationally.” 
30 Lantis, Wunderlich, “Resiliency,” 575.  
31 Fey, et al, “Established,” 165.  
32 Scott, Weapons, 29,31,289-303,321-2,338: “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups… (include) 
passive noncompliance, subtle sabotage, evasion, and deception.”  
33 Corbett, et al, “Entrepreneurship,” 1-22. 
34 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 153, Smetana, Deviance, 42-6,79,226: Cuba sought neither deviant image 
reconstruction through problematic attribute correction, justification of rule-violating behaviour, discursive 
norm acceptance yet applicatory rejection, nor rejection of the norm’s legitimacy. 
35 Wunderlich, Rogue, 72. 
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‘penetrated and demystified the prevailing ideology’36 yet rather than seeking to overturn 
the establishment via exogenous revolution, instead attempted to work from within and 
hijack the very apparatus of hegemonic co-optation and consolidation - international norms 
- against the prevailing hegemon.  
 
These attempts were most overt with regard to the norm to conserve biodiversity, when 
Castro stood on the world stage and denounced Western capitalist responsibility for 
environmental degradation, lauded socialist ideology as the environment and development 
saviour, and endorsed the CBD in direct and very public contrast to the US, which refused to 
do so.37 The appropriation of international norms for such purpose was less public but 
privately stronger with the norm to eliminate CW, in which Cuban decision-makers gradually 
recognised the capacity of the CWC to not only provide opportunity for public 
condemnation of US CW development and deployment, but to also legally enforce removal 
of the US blockade, open Guantánamo to international inspectors, and prevent feared US 
biochemical attacks against Cuba. Attempted employment of international norms for 
revisionist empowerment was less obvious with the norm to prohibit torture. However, 
Cuba’s original attempt to subsume the norm under the auspices of socialist responsibility 
was a direct and deliberate effort to constrain and reverse increasing US influence, and the 
norm provided opportunities for denunciations and draft resolutions against the US year-
after-year. In a revealing insight, Cuban press referred to this battle as one between David 
and Goliath:  
The hostility of the giant Goliath overflows with hateful mortal fear. David, in the 
meantime, increases his register of followers, friends and sympathisers. And waits, 
knowing and alert, slingshot in hand. This biblical passage was reproduced just yesterday, 
in Geneva, in the CHR.38 
  
Norms in these cases were viewed by Cuba as the slingshot in their epic battle with Goliath.  
 
 
36 Scott, Weapons, 317. 
37 Bharat Desai, Balraj Sidhu, “Quest for International Environmental Institutions” in Alam, et al, IEN, 153: 
“International law has evolved into a protector, to some extent, of the small and weak states, rather than 
serving only as the handmaiden of powerful states.” 
38 Astudillo, “Solos o acompañados,” 3. 
 260 
While this explanation for revisionist state norm endorsement may be novel to 
mainstream norm scholarship, it resonates with related observations. As acknowledged by 
Falk et al, for example, “international law, as with all law, is a two-edged reality and, with 
political and moral imagination, can be used advantageously by the weak to resist the 
plunder and invasions of the strong.”39 Similarly, Wunderlich observes “Revolutionary norm 
entrepreneurs can also act subversively if they use the prevailing rules, but in the long term 
aim to undermine or overthrow the current system.”40 According to Adler-Nissen, “This 
would provide a striking example of counter-stigmatization and demonstrate how a 
subordinate, “weak” state actually has room to manoeuvre in international society” - 
through a process of “symbolic interactionism” the agency of those “constituted as 
transgressive, the weak or deviant” is recognised, and it becomes “necessary to see various 
forms of dominance and structural inequalities as interactional processes, that is, always 
constituted by the weak in some way or another.”41 In this instance, the purported 
transgressive sought to harness, if not hijack, prevailing norms against the stigmatiser in 
attempted ‘norm entrapment’. Such potential for norm entrapment was recognised by 
Ikenberry, et al, who anticipated that “weaker states may engage a unipole by enlisting its 
participation in new or modified institutional arrangements in order to constrain or tie it 
down.”42 This conclusion thereby builds on scholarship that considers international norms 
as ‘weapons of the weak’,43 providing means for otherwise disempowered states to shape 
IR,44 and balance the power of the most dominant through common standards of 
behaviour.45 As Busby and Greenhill explain, “one way relatively weak actors compensate 
for material deficiencies in interactions with more powerful counterparts is by harnessing 
the power of norms and employing them as nonviolent instruments of persuasion.”46  
 
 
39 Falk, et al, “Introduction,” 5. Similarly: Hurd, “Breaking,” 209, Rajagopal, “Counter-hegemonic,” 63,68: Third 
World “use international law as an explicit counter-hegemonic tool of resistance.”  
40 Wunderlich, Rogue, 269. 
41 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 169, “Self,” 37-8 respectively. 
42 Ikenberry, et al, “Unipolarity,” 19-21. Similarly: Haas, “Words,” 213: “a coalition of weaker states may wish 
to (maintain regimes), sometimes in opposition to a hegemon.” 
43 Abbott, Snidal, “Law,” 447-8, Acharya, Rethinking, 240, Thakur R2P, 181-2, Sikkink, “Latin,” 391. 
44 Acharya, “Idea-shift,” 1158-9, Acharya, Rethinking, 11-4, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 169. 
45 Sikkink, “Latin,” 391, Abbott, Snidal, “Law,” 447-9, Ikenberry, “Unipolar,” Haas, “Words,” 213. 
46 Joshua Busby, Kelly Greenhill, “Ain’t that a Shame?,” Friman, “Conclusion” in Friman, Leverage, 105-7,203. 
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In this manner, the examples presented here are not unique. Indeed, other research 
contends that Canada, for example, promoted the Ottawa Convention to reportedly “stick it 
to the U.S.”47 In this instance, however, this was attempted by a purported revisionist state. 
Foot and Walter’s peripheral observation therefore remains pertinent: “States can and do 
use norms strategically and for purposes for which they were not directly designed — for 
example, to enhance social status and international image or to rebuke the behaviour of 
others and to cast doubt on the legitimacy of their words or deeds.”48 Similarly, Towns 
argues, “States that are low in rank may become the first to develop and adopt a policy, 
attempting to rise in rank within a given order or as a challenge to or rejection of that 
order.”49 Noting the deliberate focus on depth over breadth in this single state-focused 
study, alongside potentially unique aspects of the US/Cuba relationship, the precise level of 
generalisability regarding this particular conclusion requires further research. Nevertheless, 
this case demonstrates at the very least that those perceived to be revisionist may seek 
empowerment through attempted commandeering of international norms against the 
superiorly positioned. 
 
This conclusion challenges not only expectations in realist, liberal, and mainstream 
constructivist literature, but also core critical theories which anticipate that prevailing ideas, 
norms, interests and institutions reflect and propagate those of the dominant group: Carr’s 
hegemonised harmony of interests in which theories of social morality are “an ingenious 
moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and 
maintain their dominant position;”50 Gramsci’s false consciousness;51 Campbell’s “scripting 
of identity proffered by those with greater access to social resources;”52 Cox’s “Institutions 
(that) may become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves 
both to the representations of diverse interests and to the universalisation of policy;”53 and 
postcolonial contentions that “the powerful use those rules as means to get others to 
 
47 Cottrell, “Legitimacy,” 241-2. 
48 Foot, Walter, “Global,” 334,347 (emphasis mine). 
49 Towns, “Norms,” 189,204 (emphasis mine). 
50 Edward Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-39 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 71-5. See also: Robert Cox, 
“Social Forces, States and World Orders,” Millennium (10:2, 1981), 139-40, an-Na’im, “Cross-Cultural,” 27-8. 
51 Forgacs, Gramsci, 192, Scott, Weapons, 39,315,357. 
52 Campbell, Security, x. 
53 Cox, “Social Forces,” 137. 
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submit.”54 This research reveals a different form of resistance, one that attempts to employ 
the very rules of the game against the prevailing champion. As noted by Zarakol, “Emulation 
and non-compliance are at times the two sides of the same coin.”55 
 
This by no means dismisses ongoing, overarching tensions “between those who believe 
that international law - or some version of a global legal system - is an important part of 
establishing justice, and others who believe that international law in any form may be 
incurably tainted by colonialism, beset by ideology and hegemony, and may in the end 
legitimise the very structures that produce injustice in today’s world.”56 Indeed, Cuban 
attempts to harness these norms for such purposes were far from successful,57 and the 
ultimate result may well be overall co-optation into and propagation of an unjust, unequal 
international system.58 Nevertheless, the attempts show that “Great powers do not always 
get what they want, and norm change… can emerge against their preferences.”59 
Furthermore, purported revisionist states may endorse norms for precisely that reason. As 
Rajagopal observes, “counter-hegemonic uses of (norms) co-existed with hegemonic 
uses.”60  
 
The overarching answer to the question of why a purported revisionist state endorsed 
international norms is neither direct material benefits nor socialisation. Considering the 
results of these three norm studies with Cuba as the paradigmatic revisionist state, 
international norms were endorsed in order to denounce, contain or otherwise discipline 
the prevailing hegemon. In this instance, from this perspective, international norms did not 
constitute part of “the battery of means then deployed to obtain that deviant actors toe the 
 
54 Chua, “Against,” 97-101. Similarly: Said, “Foreword,” vi, Mgbeoji, “Civilised,” 154,159, Anghie, “Evolution,” 
36-48, Inayatullah, Blaney, “Constructivism,” 26, Falk, et al, “Introduction,” 4-5, Rajagopal, “Counter-
hegemonic,” 64,66,68, Simpson, Powers, 49,52, Jabri, “Colonial,” 43-4,50-2: norms “products of frameworks of 
knowledge and hermeneutic meaning that confer legitimacy to these practices of domination.” 
55 Zarakol, “World,” 313. 
56 Falk, et al, “Introduction,” 5-6. Also: Anghie, “Evolution,” 45, Inayatullah, Blaney, “Dark Heart,” 164-9. 
57 Per Hurd, “Breaking,” 196, Friman, “Conclusion,” 211,217, Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 21, unlike potential 
considered in Towns, “Norms,” 204, Friman, “Introduction,” 25, referencing Busby, Greenhill. 
58 Goffman, Stigma, 139: counter-stigmatiser “may find that he is necessarily presenting his militant efforts in 
the language and style of his enemies… the more he separates himself structurally from the normals, the more 
like them he may become.” Similarly: Wunderlich, Rogue, 273-4: “the alleged “black sheep” turn out to be a 
“sheep in wolf’s clothing”… that can be (re-)integrated into processes of norm diffusion.” 
59 Müller, “Agency,” 362. 
60 Rajagopal, “Counter-hegemonic,” 64,66. 
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line.”61 Norms were employed and endorsed by a purported revisionist state to restrain the 
prevailing hegemon. 
 
7.2 REVISIONISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
While norms themselves were not successful underlying mechanisms of hegemonic 
consolidation in these instances, an alternative device was: that of defining and ascribing 
revisionism in world politics. Analysing the micro-processes behind international norm 
diffusion from the perspective of a purported revisionist state has opened “up to question 
the way in which those (more powerful) parts of the world that shape and promote norms 
define the (less powerful) rest.”62 Three observations may be made. First, results support 
research regarding the façade of deviance in world politics. Revisionism is a subjective, 
indeed performative, construct. Second, broadly acquiesced allegations - or the ‘stickiness’ 
of revisionism - represent a privilege of the superiorly positioned such that the latter not 
only have the power to name and define, but also the capacity to avoid being tarred by the 
same brush. In doing so, third, such ascriptions serve to propagate prevailing power 
relations and consolidate hegemony in alignment with Foucault’s ‘knowledge-power’ 
nexus.63  
 
7.2.a: Revisionism as a Subjective Construct 
 
Each case presented in this thesis documented assumptions in English language 
scholarship that the US, and its allies, lie in juxtaposition to entities deemed revisionist; that 
revisionism adheres either to those challenging the international order, rejecting 
international norms, resisting neo-colonial structures and/or possessing autarkic domestic 
regimes. Yet results in each study reveal revisionist allegations were based upon selective, 
arbitrary, and ultimately subjective ‘meaning-making processes’. As Goffman originally 
explained, “We construct a stigma theory, an ideology to explain (the stigmatised’s) 
 
61 Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 5. 
62 Julia Gallagher, “Chopping the World into Bits,” International Theory (6:2, 2014), 335 (original brackets). 
63 Smetana, Deviance, 51, Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 4, Almagro, “Boomerangs,” 8-9,22. 
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inferiority and account for the danger he represents.”64 According to Schultz, revisionist 
ascription “is a symbolic act that embodies judgment and seeks to associate the target with 
all that is reprehensible in the human character and human history. It is designed to tarnish 
the name and remove its bearer from the circle of civilised society.”65 Conceptions of 
revisionism are thus a matter of idiosyncratic “perceptual construct,”66 held by Cuba against 
the US just as much as vice versa. Both states established what Campbell described as “a 
geography of evil that inscribe(d) the boundaries of inside/outside,”67 with the other most 
definitively located on the outside.  
 
This is nothing new or surprising in international politics.68 Indeed, the marking of a 
constitutive ‘other’ may be necessary for the very construction of international social 
order.69 In this manner, the “propagation of theories designed to throw moral discredit on 
an enemy… reflecting moral credit on oneself” is as old as, and natural to, politics itself.70 As 
Kirchheimer observed, “Every political regime has its foes or in due course creates them.”71 
However, what was balanced tit-for-tat between Cuba and the US ended alongside the Cold 
War, with the loss of Cuba’s support-base and US engagement in a “fervent casting around 
for new dangers in the form of countries such as Iran, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, and other so-
called ‘rogue states’.”72 Homolar explains, “the foundations of the contemporary US 
preoccupation with the problem of rogue states were formed in the elite political contests 
over competing narratives to define the nature of the post-Cold War era that occurred 
 
64 Goffman, Stigma, 15,140. Also: Mona Sheikh, “Appointing evil in international relations,” International 
Politics, (51:4, 2014), 496-7, Anna Geis, Christopher Hobson, “The existence and use of ‘evil’ in international 
politics,” International Politics (51:4, 2014), 419-20, Smetana, Deviance, 29,38,226, Müller, “Evilization,” 476, 
O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” 297,311, Wunderlich, Rogue, 62, “Delegitimisation,” 81-4,89,95.  
65 Schultz, “Caught,” 39. Similarly: Smetana, Deviance, 218. 
66 Hoyt, “Rogue,” 298,304-6,310. 
67 Campbell, Security, 130,196. See also: Smetana, Deviance, 39, Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 470. 
68 O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” 295,298, Evers, “Transgression,” 789, Zarakol, “World,” 313-7, An-Naim, “Cross-
Cultural,” 24, Towns, “Norms,” 188-9,204, Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 458-63, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 149,170, 
Mgbeoji, “Civilised,” 153-4, Simpson, Powers, 4,315, Campbell, Security, 3,73,169-70, Smetana, Deviance, 
30,38-9,55,227: “deviance-making is ‘a fundamental force at the core of society, not merely at the fringes’,” 
Müller, “Evilization,” 478: “Evilization is a procedure that we find across cultures.” 
69 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 144-50,170-1, Zarakol, “World,” 313-28, Tannenwald, “Taboo,” 463, Ramirez, 
“Analysis,” 326, Towns, Women, 51-2,190-1, Zimmermann, “Same,” 103-4, Adler-Nissen, Tsinovoi, 
“Misrecognition,” 6: quoting Ringmar: “through practices of recognition, affirming sameness, and through 
practices of non-recognition, affirming difference, that international society came to constitute itself as such.” 
70 Carr, Twenty Years’, 69. 
71 Simpson, Powers, 319. 
72 Campbell, Security, 3,8,193-6,209. Also: Wunderlich, Rogue, 58, Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 18. 
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within the US defence policy community.”73 According to Hoyt, the “‘Rogues’ have 
supplanted the ‘Reds’.”74  
 
7.2.b: Revisionist Ascription a Privilege of the Powerful 
 
This generates the second conclusion regarding revisionism: although ascription is open 
to all, success is not. Despite marked exceptions,75 as the world context changed 
perceptions of Cuban revisionism appeared to become reified and undisputed. Cuba had 
endorsed the CWC to control perceived US recalcitrance, spearheaded CBD adoption, and 
initiated processes to ratify the CAT. However, Cuba had entered “the world of antagonists 
and rebels that, once declared antagonistic to civilised negotiation, become assigned an 
immutable quality of villainy.”76 Especially within the CHR but also in relation to CW, 
renewed, vehement ascription of Cuban revisionism primarily stuck, whilst ascriptions of 
hegemonic recalcitrance from the purported revisionist predominantly fell on deaf ears. 
Changing power asymmetries and underlying global hierarchies likely explains this. With the 
end of the Cold War it was the US that had “the ‘leverage’ that comes with control of 
information, symbols, accountability processes, and practices of shaming.”77 In its then 
dominant position, “the United States as the liberal superpower of the world is able to 
shape international discourses and practices on security to a considerable extent.”78 And it 
did so in relation to conceptions of Cuban revisionism. 
 
Goffman thus observed that to identify stigmatisation, “a language of relationships, not 
attributes, is really needed.”79 The hierarchical nature of said relationships, or what Adler-
Nissen terms an “asymmetric power relationship,”80 requires emphasis. Sheikh identified 
 
73 Homolar, “Rebels,” 706-9,722. Additionally: O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” 295-8,304. 
74 Hoyt, “Rogue,” 297,301,307. 
75 Aforementioned G77 unity with the CBD, eight of 52 other CHR members voting against the 1994 Cuba SR 
inquiry resolution, and Iranian, Cuban, Pakistan unity against the Australia Group after the CWC, for example. 
76 Chua, “Against,” 101. See also: Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 87-8 regarding Cuba, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 
146, Smetana, Deviance, 30,32,47-9: “the stigma becomes a part of the transgressor’s identity: the label 
transmutes the quality of the original ‘act’ to suggest that the individual is somehow naturally deviant.” 
77 Inayatullah, Blaney, “Constructivism,” 28. Also: Towns, Rumelili, “Pressure,” 761, Simpson, Powers, 67,70, 
Chan, “States’,” 12, Smetana, Deviance, 49-55,218-9, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 154,172, Hurd, “Breaking,” 197. 
78 Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 460-1. Similarly: Campbell, Security, 12-3,33,132-6,170. 
79 Goffman, Stigma, 13 (emphasis mine). See also: Zarakol, “World,” 314. 
80 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 151, Adler-Nissen, “Self,” 36. 
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“the privileged position of the powerful when it comes to the right to name 
threats/phenomena as evil” via “hegemonic discourse,”81 which Smetana labels ‘stigma 
power’: “the successful construction of deviant categories largely relies on the power 
configurations in respective social orders.”82 Simpson observes this as “part of a particular 
tradition of Great Power prerogative and privilege,”83 which, at the end of the Cold War, 
resided firmly with the ‘inner core’ of the liberal international order and the US.84 Although 
neither spatially nor temporally universal, and with potential for outright refutation, such as 
from other purported revisionist states, or nuanced responses, such as from the EU, Geis 
and Wunderlich conclude that given its superior positionality at that time, “the question of 
which country counts as a ‘rogue state’ ultimately rests with the United States.”85 By 
reconstructing “the perspective of resistance” this study provides additional insight into the 
“asymmetrical power relations that are solidified in international institutions;”86 in this 
instance, reliance of taken-for-granted assumptions of revisionism upon underlying 
hierarchies. 
 
7.2.c: Revisionist Ascription as Hegemonic Consolidation 
 
The consequences of successful revisionist ascription are not limited to target impact 
however. The US - as a type of ‘norm antipreneur’ - actively defended normative status quos 
in these case studies,87 and maintained “its exceptionalist impulse… a related self-
perception as the ‘ultimate custodian of international order’… (which) has sometimes 
encouraged US policymakers to ignore certain norms in defending the existing global order, 
and on occasion to act as ‘norm revisionists’.”88 Steele in fact concludes the US is one of 
 
81 Sheikh, “Evil,” 497,502-3. Similarly: Goffman, Stigma, 137. 
82 Smetana, Deviance, 31,220-9: “Stigma power relates to the inherently political and power-laden nature of 
deviance-making and the respective stratifications and hierarchies in social orders.” 
83 Simpson, Powers, x,17-8,348. Such prerogative represents (neo)imperialist ‘resurgent colonial rationality’: 
Jean Cohen, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization,” Political 
Theory (36:4, 2008), 595, Julia Gallagher, “Civilising norms and political authority in Africa” in Epstein, Against 
IR, 57-8, Mgbeoji, “Civilised,” 152, Jabri, “Colonial,” 39-41,45, Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 89-90,95. 
84 Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, “Recognition,” 17-8, Simpson, Powers, 6,21, Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 81-3,89, 
Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 172, Müller, “Evilization,” 479-81, Wunderlich, Rogue, 57-63. 
85 Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 465-6. Also: Wunderlich, Rogue, 3,62, Smetana, Deviance, 222: recognising “key 
importance of the US in the initiation, course, as well as outcome of the process of deviance (re)construction.” 
86 Daase, Deitelhoff, “Reconstructing,” 19. 
87 Bloomfield, “Antipreneurs,” 311,324-6. 
88 Foot, Walter, “Global,” 344,347. Echoing chapter 2 recognition of hegemonic revisionist tendencies. 
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those countries or groups that reject norms in a different way: not because they are 
Western or non-Western, but because norms in general are an affront to their 
supposedly exceptional nature… this case is one not merely of contestation, but of flat 
out rebellious or celebratory rejection of a norm.89  
 
Yet US recalcitrance is oft-neglected in mainstream norm scholarship, and even less 
acknowledged in prevailing real world discourse. Through the performance of revisionist 
ascription, the US avoided broadly acquiesced tarring by the same brush.90 Geis and 
Wunderlich explain, the “politicized use of ‘evil’ and ‘rogues’ in the US security policy 
discourse leaves no room for internalizing ‘evil’ or ‘roguish’ intentions or actions within the 
self. One’s own identity as an actor is excluded from critical review and is kept clean of all 
negative aspects.”91 The US attained the special deviant position identified by Goffman in 
which “a confirmed high position in some small close-knit groups can be associated with a 
license to deviate and hence to be a deviator… The eminent… can be free, then, to be 
deviators precisely because their deviation can be fully discounted.”92  
 
Successful revisionist prescription not only protected the US but consolidated US 
hegemony. The performativity associated with such power-laden constructions are 
important in this respect given that “Adjectives such as ‘revisionist,’ ‘anti status-quo’ and 
‘unilateral’ are often used as a rhetorical device to construct perceived reality and shape 
popular discourse. These terms are deployed to represent any opposition to an incumbent 
hegemon as necessarily a threat to the interstate system as a whole.”93 In the three cases 
presented in this thesis, it was not international norms that performed the hegemonic 
consolidation role of Carr’s harmony of interests or Gramscian cultural hegemony: it was 
broadly acquiesced ascriptions of revisionism.94 Much like Cox’s argument that “Theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose,”95 the same may be said for revisionist 
ascriptions, representing almost precisely what Bially Mattern and Zarakol refer to as 
 
89 Steele, “Broadening,” 134-6. Similarly: Cuba: CD/PV.359,39-40. 
90 Campbell, Security, 90,169,199,219. 
91 Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 469. Similarly: Wunderlich, Rogue, 63. 
92 Goffman, Stigma, 167-8. See also: Deitelhoff, Zimmermann, “Norms,” 10, Bloomfield, “Antipreneurs,” 321, 
Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 154: “very powerful states may feel they can ignore international shaming.” 
93 Chan, “States’,” 12. Also: Simpson, Powers, x,xi, Wunderlich, Rogue, 62. 
94 Smetana, Deviance, 51. 
95 Cox, “Social Forces,” 128. 
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intersubjective manifestations of organised inequality.96 Revisionist ascription was 
performed as a “central strategy of rule to preserve the status quo:”97  
by using the ‘rogue state’ concept to delegitimise a country… proponents of the ruling 
order can also reinforce their hegemonic position. By stigmatising alleged rogues as such, 
those in charge… avoid having to address the normative visions and demands which they 
propagate… The inconsistent and arbitrary application of the ‘rogue state’ label thus 
primarily serves the interests of the proponents of the existing order.98 
 
Although axiomatic, this thesis thus reveals ramifications associated with the performativity 
and stickiness of revisionist ascription as “a strategic construction embedded in a system of 
power.”99 In doing so, it has contributed to “research in the social constructions of deviance 
(that) represents an inherently critical inquiry, in that it questions the “natural” existence of 
seemingly taken-for-granted institutions and reveals associated power relations as well as 
the potential for change.”100 
 
96 Bially Mattern, Zarakol, “Hierarchies,” 629-33. Similarly: Puchala, Hopkins, “Regimes,” 66. 
97 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 15. 
98 Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 89. Also: 81, Rogue, 3-4,64-7,272, Homolar, “Rebels,” 707. 
99 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 12. 
100 Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 301-2. Similarly: Engelkamp, Glaab, “Norms,” 211-2. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
CONCLUSION 
 
A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of 
pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, 
unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest… Criticism is a matter of 
flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident 
as one believed, to see what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. 





This thesis has responded in not one but two ways to ‘the duty of critique’: “to 
‘denaturalise the taken-for-granted’ social constructs that were built on and further 
entrench unequal power relations.”2 First, it challenged assumptions in mainstream norm 
literature that international norms will be rejected by a purported revisionist state, 
alternative revolutionary norms may be proffered in response, or revisionists will be 
socialised into norm internalisation and thereby no longer revisionist. Instead, this thesis 
reveals that purported revisionist states may appropriate and endorse international norms 
in attempts to constrain the hegemon credited with maintaining the very normative 
structure within which such norms flourish. Rather than boycotting the league, Cuba sought 
to harness the rules of the game to challenge the prevailing champion. International norm 
endorsement became a form of empowerment of resistance against the hegemon. Second, 
this study revealed the smoke and mirrors of prevailing ascriptions of revisionism. By 
foregrounding the perspective of the purported revisionist it exposed taken-for-granted 
constructions of revisionism as not only subjective but performative ascriptions, designed to 
reinforce the supremacy of the supreme. Successful revisionist ascriptions therefore 
represent both products and producers of the stratified power relations underlying IR. This 
concluding chapter briefly summarises these key findings and contributions and outlines 
avenues for further research. 
 
 
1 In Campbell, Security, 191. 
2 Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 3. 
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8.1 KEY FINDINGS 
 
By analysing the respective influence of fifteen international norm diffusion attributes in 
the case of purported revisionist state norm endorsement, this research offers six key 
findings. First, results demonstrate the presence of equifinality in revisionist norm 
endorsement with multiple causal pathways and divergent attribute influence contributing 
across the three studies. Second, results reveal the import of a synthesis of attributes across 
systemic, state and norm-levels: top-down, bottom-up or norm-focused explanations alone 
prove insufficient. Third, cross-case comparisons highlight the particular significance of six 
of the fifteen attributes frequently credited for norm diffusion, however they did not always 
operate as expected. While norm-related attributes of norm substance and international 
concurrence proved crucial in each case as anticipated in the analytical framework, national 
identity and salience proved likewise at state-level, although in unexpected ways. It was 
high rather than low salience, and both self-perceived and ascribed revisionist national 
identity that led to norm endorsement in each case. National identity, in a twist 
unanticipated in associated scholarship, held impact given conceptions of revisionism. It was 
precisely Cuba’s identity as a purported revisionist state that drove norm endorsement. 
Similarly, IO and state suasion at the systemic-level proved influential but highly complex, 
multilinear and plural. Whilst IOs were critical for norm development and endorsement, 
they also had symbiotic relationships with the norms, provided platforms for dissident 
objectives and, on one occasion, actually facilitated postponement of endorsement via 
indirect adverse effect. Meanwhile, state suasion was found to be not only singular but 
collective, and not only positive but negative, resulting in new notions of ‘reverse state 
suasion’ and ‘indirect inverse state suasion’. Ultimately, these results led to reconsideration 
of the overarching analytical framework to highlight and prioritise these six key attributes, 
while recognising the alternative effects of those remaining. 
 
This led to two key conclusions pertaining to socialisation and revisionist norm 
endorsement, which reflect the fourth and fifth overall findings. With the frequently 
negligible or detrimental impacts of key drivers of socialisation including international norm 
entrepreneur (in conjunction with domestic norm entrepreneur), regional, IO and state 
suasion, alongside stalwart maintenance of Cuba’s revolutionary identity and the remaining 
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state and norm-level attributes operating as neither socialisation filters or enablers, 
socialisation was neither the explanation for, nor outcome of, revisionist norm 
endorsement. Cuba endorsed the norms under analysis in the absence of socialisation. The 
fifth key conclusion finds instead that norm endorsement in fact represented an attempt by 
the purported revisionist to constrain the prevailing hegemon. Cuba played by the rules in 
an attempt to beat the champion at its own game. International norm endorsement in these 
cases thus became a tool of resistance, and type of ‘weapon of the weak’, for attempted 
hegemonic entrapment. Sixth, and finally, in unveiling Cuban attempts to harness 
international norms against perceived hegemonic recalcitrance, questions were raised 
regarding the very meaning of revisionism in IR. Cuba and the US launched allegations of 
revisionism against each other in each case, yet US rather than Cuban ascriptions primarily 
stuck. The final finding of this thesis thus reveals revisionism as a subjective construct, 
reliant upon underlying power relations for its success and reinforcing those very power 
relations as a result, in a mutually propagating process. It was not international norms that 
socialised revisionist states, thereby reinforcing the hegemonic status quo. Conceptions of 




These findings hold important ramifications for both scholarly and policy circles. By 
foregrounding the perspective of a peripheral, post-colonial, socialist, purportedly 
revisionist ‘Other,’ this thesis placed the subaltern standpoint at the forefront of 
international norm research and proffered a crucial contribution to the theory and practice 
of global governance from an oft-neglected perspective. It aimed to overcome the “implicit 
or explicit normative predisposition vis-a-vis dissenters”3 and “the ‘abnomal’”4 in associated 
scholarship, and directly addressed the ‘infantilisation of the socialisee,’ or otherwise 
 
3 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 12. Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” Wunderlich, Rogue, 67,276, Engelkamp, Glaab, 
“Norms,” 211-2, Smetana, Deviance, 70,217-8 foreground revisionists however focus on stigma management, 
revolutionary entrepreneurship and contestation rather than norm endorsement. 
4 Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 302. Similarly: Zarakol, “World,” 328: “the peculiar experiences of the 'outsiders' of 
the international system get completely overlooked in these accounts.” 
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complete occlusion of the revisionist ‘Other’.5 As Epstein has demonstrated, socialisation “in 
the conventional constructivist scholarship has yielded an epistemological apparatus that 
effectively silences those whom one might call reluctant socialisees,” in effect “reproducing 
the very structures it purports merely to be studying.”6 This echoes Guha’s concern that, 
“this, too, amounts to an act of appropriation which excludes the rebel as the conscious 
subject of his own history and incorporates the latter as only a contingent element in 
another history with another subject.”7 Instead, analysing such “situated perspectives offers 
different starting points for theory-building, ones that seek not to deny the partiality of 
perspective, but instead use it to deliberately delimit the claims to be able to generalise 
about the social world.”8 Although it cannot “fully grasp a past consciousness and 
reconstitute it,”9 by resurrecting the critical perspective of a purportedly revisionist 
outsider, placing it at the forefront of consideration, and determining why such an actor 
endorsed international norms against expectations, this thesis offers a unique perspective 
and important contribution to both academic and policy circles.10  
 
In terms of academic contribution, the results call for refinement of international norm 
diffusion theories. A vast range of IR and IL scholarship has attributed credit for 
international norm diffusion to a confluence of attributes, yet rarely have they been 
consolidated and assessed holistically. IR studies frequently focus either solely on systemic, 
state or norm-related attributes, or on more comprehensive, yet singular, norm or state 
case studies. Meanwhile, IL research is primarily directed towards explaining 
non/compliance and post-adherence non/implementation rather than endorsement, and 
rarely incorporates in-depth qualitative analysis of particular cases to support larger N 
studies. Finally, few tested results in specific relation to revisionist cases. This thesis rectified 
this. By identifying the respective influence of international norm diffusion attributes in a 
 
5 Epstein, “Infantilisation,” 75-6,79-83, “Postcolonial,” 13, Chua, “Against,” 101, Falk, et al, “Introduction,” 4, 
Anghie, “IL,” 37, Phillips, “Violence,” 151. Reflecting Edward Said, Orientalism (London, Penguin Books, 2003), 
109: “The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor.” 
6 Epstein, “Infantilisation,” 74,77,79-80: “these epistemological limits carry over into the policy arena where, 
effaced theoretically, the socialisee’s perspective becomes even harder to bring to bear upon the 
negotiations.” Also: Phillips, “Violence,” 151. 
7 Ranajit Guha, “Prose of Counter-Insurgency” in Guha, Spivak, Subaltern, 77. 
8 Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 10-11. 
9 Guha, “Prose,” 77. 
10 Akin to Ranajit Guha, “Preface” in Guha, Spivak, Subaltern, 35. 
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combined and systematic manner across three separate norm observations, this research 
built upon and refined existing norm diffusion and treaty endorsement theories. Certain 
causal pathway conjunctions were identified and others dismissed, resulting in revision of 
the overarching analytical framework with particular regard to revisionist states. This is 
useful, according to George and Bennett, given “middle-range typological theories, which 
identify recurring conjunctions of mechanisms and provide hypotheses on the pathways 
through which they produce results, provide more contingent and specific generalisations 
for policymakers and allow researchers to contribute to more nuanced theories.”11 Further 
research is required to determine the precise universalisability - and placement upon 
Sartori’s ladder of abstraction12 - of these results, both within the revisionist state 
population and beyond. Yet these conclusions nonetheless fill an important gap and provide 
the requisite stepping-stone for this work. 
 
From a policy perspective, these conclusions assist international and national civil 
servants, policy-makers and norm entrepreneurs in practice. This research has stripped back 
the layers of a frequently misunderstood process to expose who is successfully promoting 
what, why, where and how in international norm diffusion and multilateral treaty 
endorsement in a least likely scenario. Findings assist policy-makers to formulate and 
promote multilateral rule-based action at the international level, with particular reference 
to, involvement of and engagement with perceived revisionist states. Understanding and 
harnessing the power through which ideas prompt global change is empowering in and of 
itself, let alone in respect of how it may be employed in relation to ostensibly recalcitrant 
subjects, whether considered rogues or hegemons. Policymakers may also be interested in 
the potential consequences of perceived hegemonic exceptionalism, if not hypocrisy, which 
may justify and propel revisionist norm endorsement as hegemonic resistance. Finally, the 
subjective and performative construction of revisionism as an “expression of power” and 
“discursive weapon,”13 which underlies so much policy and discourse in international 
politics, remains crucial to understand; for considerations of international norms,14 
 
11 George, Bennett, Case, 8,129. 
12 Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” Political Science Review (64:4, 1970), 1040-6. 
13 Wunderlich, Rogue, 66,272, quoting Jacobi, et al. 
14 Gallagher, “World,” 335: “intrusive and controlling definitions of ‘them’ in relation to ‘us’ saturate the 
language of norms and socialization, and continually overlook and seek to overturn political and social 
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interrogation of interrelationships between deviance and hegemony,15 and understandings 
of global governance and world order. 
 
8.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
8.3.a: International Norm Diffusion and Socialisation 
 
This thesis revises the analytical framework for international norm diffusion in relation to 
a single paradigmatic deviant state case. Given it represents norm endorsement in the least 
likely scenario, these results may well extrapolate broadly, both to the general population of 
‘revisionist’ states and population at large. As Wunderlich notes: “That the transferability of 
the concept could be proven by applying it to an extreme case suggests that it can also be 
applied to other unorthodox and previously unconsidered types of actors. Yet this 
assumption remains to be confirmed in future studies.”16 Further work is thus required to 
determine precisely how these conclusions might apply more broadly, and to solidify 
generalisations regarding norm diffusion. Analysis of negative case studies, and the 
respective impact of the norm diffusion attributes in counter cases - where purported 
revisionist states did not endorse international norms - will likely prove useful. Further 
research is also required to establish under which conditions international norms may not 
only be endorsed but in fact employed by purported revisionist states as a form of 
hegemonic resistance, when these efforts may or may not prove successful, and why.17 Such 
work will entail obvious implications for the socialisation agenda, and likely advance fourth 
wave and more critical constructivist norm and socialisation research. Overall, this will 
contribute to broader understandings regarding how ideas may be harnessed to impact 
decisions, actions, actors, behaviour and governance at the global level, with important 
ramifications for international relations policy and scholarship. 
 
relationships and meanings that do not conform.” Also: Epstein, “Infantilisation,” 74: a “larger critique levelled 
at conventional constructivism for its neglect of the dynamics of power in the international system.” 
15 Chan, “States’,” 15-6, Evers, “Transgression,” 789, Foot, Walter, “Global,” 344, Simpson, Powers, xiv,52, Fey, 
et al, “Established,” 196, Müller, “Agency,” 356,360, Rajagopal, “Counter-hegemonic,” 71, Smetana, Deviance, 
34: “deviance-making is also closely connected with the diffusion of power, social stratification, and the issue 
of hierarchical relationships.” 
16 Wunderlich, Rogue, 275. 
17 Busby, Greenhill, “Shame,” 108-13. 
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8.3.b: Revisionism in International Relations 
 
Noting the prevalence of constructions of revisionism spatially and temporally, and the 
likelihood it is an inherent element of the very constitution of society,18 future research 
should also target questions regarding what leads to or comprises revisionist constructions 
in world politics, examining “the process of deviance (re)construction rather than an 
explanation of deviant behavior.”19 In one sense this entails reversing Campbell’s question 
regarding “What functions have difference, danger, and otherness played in constituting the 
identity of the United States as a major actor in international politics?”, but it 
unquestionably involves interrogating his further question regarding “the strategies and 
tactics by which (states) are calculated as dangers, and the means by which they come to be 
other.”20 Wunderlich has argued that “it seems apt to entirely abandon the “rogue state” 
concept. It neither has analytical benefits, nor has it generated the desired political effects… 
‘roguishness’ is inherent in every actor.”21 However, so long as it remains a dominant and 
impactful construction of world politics, it merits active interrogation.22 
 
Clues pertaining to what generates revisionist construction already appear in this 
research. A consistent theme across the case studies, for example, was deflection - 
employment of revisionist allegations to divert attention from one’s own behaviour. This is 
akin to Blaney and Inayatullah’s ‘projected deflection’, where there is “an attempt to 
distance oneself from the bad by displacing it onto another, who becomes the object of 
one’s rescue or reform through socialization.”23 As explained by Smith in relation to the 
anti-racist norm, “forms of denial require other reference groups or individuals as exemplars 
 
18 Goffman, Stigma, 164-5, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 145,147-52,170-1, Towns, Rumelili, “Pressure,” 768, 
Smetana, Deviance, 33, Gallagher, “World,” 345-6, Adler-Nissen, Tsinovoi, “Misrecognition,” 6, Adler-Nissen, 
“Self,” 33, Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, “Recognition,” 26. 
19 Smetana, Deviance, 33: five interrelated dimensions of stigma nexus, imposition, management, reversal, 
power. Also: Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 463,466-8: four rationales, O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” 299-300: Herrmann 
and Fischerkeller’s ‘strategy scripts’, Hoyt, “Rogue,” 306-7: three judgements of other- threat, relative 
capability, relative culture, Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 146-7: Link and Phelan’s four steps of stigma imposition. 
20 Campbell, Security, 8,191,196. 
21 Wunderlich, Rogue, 273. 
22 O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” 296,305. 
23 Inayatullah, Blaney, “Dark Heart,” 174. Also: Gallagher, “World,” 335,346. 
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of racism in order to show that the speaker or speaker’s group is not racist… Deflecting 
racism to another society, however, requires specific discursive constructions of entire other 
cultures… as opposed to one’s own society.”24 This was reflected in both US and Cuban 
rhetoric in each case study. As noted by Geis and Wunderlich, the “long history of the use of 
demonizing concepts has shown: The temptation to suppress or externalize all the troubling 
features of one’s own identity and to shift responsibility onto others seems too great to 
resist… The self bears no responsibility for abhorrent deeds; it is always the ‘other’ on whom 
all evil in the world can be blamed.”25 Further work is required to understand the 
international dimension of such ‘diversionary theory’, and how norms may be employed to 
deflect and denote the deviant ‘other’ in global discourse.26  
 
Deflection may in part explain why or when revisionism is deployed, but not against 
whom. Conceptions of stigmatisation may help in this regard.27 Perhaps states that do not 
mirror the behaviour of the dominant group - an absence of mimicry - suffer 
stigmatisation,28 rendering them ripe for targeting as revisionist when deflection is required. 
As Campbell demonstrates, the “mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the 
presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalises 
the claim of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the 
understanding of a threat.”29 Stigmatisation - or lack of deferential mirroring - in 
conjunction with deflection may therefore lead to revisionist ascription. And when such 
ascriptions are repeatedly tendered by a dominant party, they may resonate until taken-for-
granted and presumed as fact.  
 
 
24 David Smith, “On the therapeutic uses of racism in other countries” in Epstein, Against IR, 125. Similarly: 
Geis, Hobson, “Existence,” 420, Inayatullah, Blaney, “Constructivism,” 34-5. 
25 Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 458-70. Also: Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 18, Sheikh, “Evil,” 500. 
26 Smith, “Therapeutic,” 125-9, Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 17: “The strategy of pointing the finger at an 
enemy as a way of safeguarding one’s own power is well-known and much discussed - under the rubric of 
‘diversionary theory’ - as a domestic-level explanation of international conflict.”  
27 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 89, Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 18, Smetana, 
Deviance, Zarakol, “World,” 313. 
28 Epstein, “Postcolonial,” 14, Jabri, “Colonial,” 49, Chowdhury, “Norms,” 119, An-Naim, “Cross-Cultural,” 24 
blames ethnocentricity, Zarakol, “World,” 314, Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, “Recognition,” 18, Mgbeoji, “Civilised,” 
153: “To be regarded as ‘civilised’, the ‘savage’ is required to imbibe and reproduce Eurocentric norms.” Adler-
Nissen, Gad, “Post-colonial,” 175-81,187: document an absence of stigmatisation, possibly due to mimicry. 
29 Campbell, Security, 3,30-1,89. 
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Recent research also suggests answers to the ’stickiness’ or success of revisionist 
ascription,30 although often only implicitly given “explicit theorising on the performativity of 
evil is absent despite the presence of all the necessary stepping stones.”31 Work on 
hierarchies, including social and organised hierarchies associated with norm diffusion and 
inter-communal non/mis/recognition state hierarchies, will likely provide important insights 
on conceptions of revisionism, given recognition that “the stratification of international 
systems is an important variable in the whole setting of blame tolerance and blaming 
effects.”32 Much as “social ranking is a requisite component built into the logic of all 
norms”33 it is also both the driver and outcome of successful revisionist ascription. While 
some scholars focus on conditions attached to the ascriber34 - such as Franklin,35 or 
Gertheiss and Herr who consider actor legitimacy or ‘moral authority’36 - others focus on 
ascribee responses– such as Busby and Greenhill who consider target reactions “to public 
exposure of hypocrisy”37 and Adler-Nissen and Zarakol who document varying responses to 
stigmatisation.38 A great deal of scope is available to elucidate and build upon this research 
with specific regard to revisionist construction. 
 
The varying consequences of revisionist ascription also require further understanding, 
building upon recent research into “the damaging and dangerous consequences that arise 
from using ‘evil’ rhetorically.”39 This thesis at least demonstrates that socialisation may not 
in fact result, with allegations of Cuban revisionism appearing misplaced in relation to the 
CWC, where Cuba endorsed the norm due to fears it was the victim and not protagonist of 
roguery, serving to defer Cuban CAT endorsement, and actually promoting Cuba’s 
 
30 Smetana, Deviance, Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” Sheikh, “Evil,” 503. 
31 Sheikh, “Evil,” 493-7,503. Also: Müller, “Evilization,” 482,485-8, Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 458-74. 
32 Hveem in Towns, Rumelili, “Pressure,” 761. Also: Ayse Zarakol (ed), Hierarchies in World Politics (New York: 
CUP, 2017), Mattern, Zarakol, “Hierarchies,” Towns, Women, “Norms,” 179-209, Smetana, Deviance, 50-4, 
Simpson, Powers, 20-1,88, Adler-Nissen, Zarakol, “Recognition,” Adler-Nissen, Tsinovoi, “Misrecognition,” 6, 
Carsten-Andreas Schulz, “Hierarchy Salience and Social Action,” International Relations (33:1, 2019), 88-108. 
33 Towns, “Norms,” 203. 
34 Müller, “Evilization,” 483-5, Goffman, Stigma, 152: “it is not to the different that one should look for 
understanding our differentess, but to the ordinary.” 
35 Franklin, “HR,” 53-5: military, economic, diplomatic, geographic might. Also: Friman, “Conclusion,” 211. 
36 Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 21. Further: Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” 171, Wunderlich, “Delegitimisation,” 95. 
37 Busby, Greenhill, “Shame,” 105. See also: Friman, “Conclusion,” 211, O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” Hoyt, “Rogue.” 
38 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma,” Zarakol, “World.” Similarly: Smetana, Deviance, 42. 
39 Geis, Hobson, “Existence,” 420. Also: Geis, Wunderlich, “Good,” 464, Müller, “Evilization,” 476-9, Sheikh, 
“Evil,” 493,495-7, Gertheiss, Herr, “Dissidence,” 16,18, Smetana, Deviance, 32-3, Zarakol, “World,” 326, Hoyt, 
“Rogue,” 309, O’Reilly, “Perceiving,” 297,300,308-12. 
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unexpected role as CBD vanguard. Thus, Friman’s observation proves pertinent: “the 
prominence of these efforts and their uneven track records of success underscore the need 
to look more closely at what naming and shaming entails and the conditions that shape its 
effectiveness.”40 Following Adler-Nissen, further research should explore the conditions 
under which such ascriptions are accepted, acted upon, countered or rejected,41 and how, 
in relation to both dominant ascriptions against the weak and vice versa. Analysis of 
consequences for the ascriber may also prove worthwhile. As Gallagher notes, “such 
avoidance of ‘psychic discomfort’ dooms them to continually misunderstand and 
misrepresent the world.” This leads to examination of potentially broader consequences in 
which such ascriptions may represent an “inherent ambivalence at the heart of liberalism 
itself… an idealized representation of a universal pure project, to paper over the internal 
confusion and a hidden terror of the colonial project.”42  
 
These conclusions are written in a world under lockdown due to the global Covid-19 
pandemic. In this ‘post-truth’ world accusations and allegations of revisionism, deflection, 
stigmatisation and hypocrisy prevail from a multitude of directions. Understanding the 
constitution, causes and consequences of the constructions behind such discourse remains 
all the more important. Campbell’s contention maintains prescience: we must continue to 
interrogate “claims of ‘fact’ made by the policy discourses to support their articulation of 
danger,” given “what counts as ‘normal’ and what is thus ‘pathological’ would have been 
reconfigured.”43 Comprehending the nuances behind global constructions of revisionism - 
its causes, manifestations, performance, misconceptions and consequences - and analysing 
the impact of deflection, stigmatisation, hypocrisy, legitimacy and rhetoric, will contribute a 
great deal to contemporary understandings and management of global governance. 
 
 
40 Friman, “Introduction,” 2,22-3. Similarly: Smith, “Therapeutic,” 124, Schulz, “Caught,” 34-7. 
41 Adler-Nissen, “Stigma.” 
42 Gallagher, “World,” 346-7. Also: Smith, “Therapuetic,” 125: “liberal states affirm their anti-racist identities 
by condemning norm violators… blinding them and their citizens to their own realities of racial inequality.” 
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